Page 6 – The Times Of Central Asia

09 Apr 2026

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Kazakhstan Gains Weight in China’s Energy System

April 10, 2026
By Dr. Robert M. Cutler

The newly extended U.S. waiver for Russian oil transit through Kazakhstan and the reported giant onshore hydrocarbon discovery in western Kazakhstan point in different directions, yet they belong in the same analytical frame. One concerns an existing flow that already reaches China through working infrastructure, while the other concerns a possible future source that has not yet reached the stage of commercially proven reserves. Together, they mark a change in Kazakhstan’s position. The country is increasingly important to China both as a corridor and as a possible larger upstream partner.

The U.S. waiver now runs until March 19, 2027. Kazakhstan is not a giant direct oil supplier to China in the way that Russia or Saudi Arabia is; China’s import structure is broader. But Kazakh-origin oil shipments, Russian transit oil, and adjacent energy links now constitute a single, more complex relationship. According to official Chinese sources, oil imported from Kazakhstan enters mainly through the China-Kazakhstan crude pipeline.

More Than Kazakhstan’s Own Barrels

Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP reported that in 2024, the Atasu-Alashankou route carried 1.2 million tons of oil and 9.989 million tons of transit oil, against a design capacity of 20 million tons a year. Official Chinese figures sharpen the point. By the end of 2024, total cumulative throughput on the pipeline had reached 280 million tons, including 19.139 million tons in 2024, while cumulative crude imported from Kazakhstan was lower. Kazakhstan’s significance to China is therefore larger than Kazakhstan’s own volumes would suggest, because the route carries more than Kazakhstan’s own oil.

A glance at Europe keeps that proportion straight. Eurostat reports that Kazakhstan supplied 12.7% of the European Union’s petroleum oil imports in 2025. The European External Action Service said that Kazakhstan accounted for 10.9% of EU oil imports in the first quarter of 2024. This made it the bloc’s third-largest supplier in that period, and a more important direct oil supplier to Europe than to China.

The significance of Kazakhstan’s geographic proximity to China becomes clearer when one looks beyond crude oil. Kazakhstan is not only a direct oil supplier, but also a transit corridor for multiple China-bound energy flows. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline is one of China’s major import routes. At the same time, while Kazakhstan’s own gas exports to China remain limited due to rising domestic demand, gas from Turkmenistan and Russia both pass through its territory. Oil and gas do not form a single operational system, but together they show that China’s energy connection with Kazakhstan extends beyond one commodity and beyond Kazakhstan’s own barrels.

The Source Side May Be Growing

In this context, the reported discovery on the Zhylyoi carbonate platform makes a difference because it widens the source side of the relationship without changing present flows. According to public statements by KazMunayGas officials, the Karaton, Kazhygali, and Zhylyoi formation has resource potential of 4.7 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons, and the broader Zhylyoi carbonate reservoir may hold as much as 20 billion metric tons of oil equivalent. The field is onshore in the Atyrau Region near the Caspian coast. A well at Karaton has already been drilled to 5,750 meters. The formation is being compared with Kashagan not only because of the headline scale, but also because it is a very large structure in one of Kazakhstan’s core producing regions.

Caution nevertheless remains essential, as these are geological-potential figures rather than proven recoverable reserves. Hydrogen sulfide has already been encountered, and deposits may extend much deeper, perhaps to nine kilometers. Negotiations over subsoil-use contracts are underway, and exploration is expected to expand to the Kazhygali block. This is what is drawing attention from Chinese and other energy observers, although any Chinese participation remains far from decided.

The bilateral energy relationship does not stop at oil and transit. Kazakhstan produced about 25,839 metric tons of uranium in 2025, about 40% of world output, and has been the world’s leading uranium producer since 2009. More importantly, the Ulba-FA fuel-assembly plant in Oskemen reached its design capacity in 2024 at 200 tons of low-enriched uranium in fuel assemblies per year, and the company says all fuel assemblies produced there are supplied to nuclear power plants in China. Kazakhstan’s value-added nuclear-fuel link to the Chinese market is therefore significant.

Taken together, these lines do not make Kazakhstan into China’s overwhelming energy supplier, but they show that China needs Kazakhstan in several specific ways. First, it is a corridor for Russian oil as well as a direct supplier of some crude and other energy-related products. Second, it is a major uranium producer with a China-linked fuel-assembly operation. And third, it is also a country where a large onshore oil prospect may increase future upstream significance if the geology proves commercially sound.

The Regional Energy Network

That broader pattern returns the discussion to the argument about Berdimuhamedov’s recent Beijing visit and the reshaping of Central Asia’s gas system. The larger point is that the region’s energy relations are becoming more cross-linked through infrastructure, transport routes, and related forms of cooperation. In the recent Turkmen case, gas provided the clearest example, as China’s westward energy connection increasingly depends not on a single bilateral exchange but on a chain of producing states, transit territories, and linked projects. Oil transit through Kazakhstan and the new onshore discovery suggest that the same tendency is becoming visible in another energy sector as well, even if in looser form.

Kazakhstan alone does not fill a dominant share of Chinese oil demand, but China needs Kazakhstan because Kazakhstan occupies a growing place in a more networked Central Asian energy space. That place appears modest when measured against China’s biggest crude suppliers, but it becomes much more significant when bilateral corridor utility, regional geographic position, and multi-sector energy context are taken into account. The U.S. waiver extension confirms Kazakhstan’s present value in the network, and the Zhylyoi discovery increases its possible future weight.

08 Apr 2026

Life & Culture, Home, Kazakhstan Life & Culture, Kazakhstan

How Kazakhstan’s Animation Industry: An Interview with an ARA Studios Co-Founder

April 8, 2026
By Tamila Olzhbaekova

Kazakhstan’s animation industry is gradually developing despite a number of persistent challenges. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Bakytzhan Shabdukarimov, co-founder of ARA Studios, about how the team was formed, the difficulties animators face today, and how he views the future of the industry.

TCA: How did the idea to create ARA Studios come about?

Bakytzhan: The studio has two co-founders: Bakytzhan Shabdukarimov, that’s me, and Meirzhan Sandybay. The idea first emerged in 2017, and the studio was officially established in 2018. Before that, we worked on the project Shyraq. Last year, we had to disband most of our team after joining the animated series Säbi for the Balapan TV channel. That’s when we began transitioning to 3D projects. Originally, the studio focused more on 2D, while I personally worked in 3D. Over time, we fully shifted toward 3D production.

TCA: Who is behind the studio and how many people are on the team?

Bakytzhan: Right now, the core team is essentially just the two of us. But last year, we had more than 20 people. Unfortunately, projects and orders suddenly stopped, and it became difficult to maintain a large staff. So we switched to a new format, an online studio. We used to rent an office and maintain a large in-house team, but that has recently become too challenging. Now our team works remotely, and we come together when we take on larger projects.

TCA: Which projects do you consider the most important?

Bakytzhan: Of all our projects, Maqta Qyz remains the most important because it’s our flagship and we continue to develop it. But in reality, all our projects matter to us; each one has contributed to our growth and given us valuable experience. Our YouTube channel is active, and we’ve gained around 7,000 subscribers organically, without advertising or targeting. We plan to keep releasing new episodes and possibly expand into merchandise in the future.

TCA: How is the animation industry developing in Kazakhstan today?

Bakytzhan: Honestly, I haven’t been closely following all industry developments lately, but from what I can see, progress is slow. The industry remains relatively small; there is hardly a fully developed market. Most studios either work on government commissions from the Ministry of Culture or collaborate with “Qazaq Animation,” which allocates funding annually for short films, with the aim of developing them into larger projects. Other studios, including independent teams, focus on commercial work, advertising both domestically and internationally, as well as short films. At the same time, we do have strong 2D and 3D specialists and talented teams.

TCA: Is there any support for animation studios?

Bakytzhan: Yes, there is some support. As I mentioned, part of it comes through “Qazaq Animation.” There is also a new creative fund being launched that will support not only animation but the broader creative industries, film, music, and dance. Private funds are also emerging. For example, there are initiatives involving private investors and financial institutions. However, they mostly invest in feature live-action films. I’ve heard less about investment in animation. Still, interest in experimental projects and animation is gradually growing.

TCA: What are the main challenges animators face in the country?

Bakytzhan: Recently, I’ve often seen posts on Instagram, where animators, artists, and 2D and 3D specialists say there is no work. Perhaps opportunities exist, but they are very difficult to find. It feels like major global changes are underway due to AI. Studios are closing and the market is shifting. I think AI plays a significant role, as these changes affect not only creative professions but also other digital fields, including documentary production, legal services, and finance. It is especially difficult for junior specialists to find work right now. Those at a mid-level have more opportunities, but juniors need to significantly improve their skills to compete.

TCA: Where do your project ideas come from?

Bakytzhan: Ideas come from different people within the team. When we worked together in a physical studio, we constantly pitched ideas to each other. It didn’t have to come from management; we considered all kinds of proposals. If someone brings an idea and develops it properly, with sketches, a script, and a synopsis, then why not pursue it? The key is that it aligns with the studio’s values. We create family-oriented content that we believe has a positive impact on young people, children, and even adults.

TCA: Do you use elements of Kazakhstani culture or folklore in your animation?

Bakytzhan: Not fully yet. We’ve made attempts, but creating such stories properly is quite difficult.

TCA: What makes Kazakhstani animation interesting for an international audience?

Bakytzhan: This is very important because it defines our identity, what makes us recognizable. We can incorporate the Kazakh language, musical instruments, clothing, and cultural elements. But the most important thing is storytelling. It’s not enough to create something simply about Kazakh traditions, the story must be engaging and accessible to a broad audience. We need to show our way of life, not only traditional, but also modern: how we live, the challenges we face, and how we address them. It’s important to present this authentically, without inventing something artificial, and instead work with what genuinely exists.

TCA: How do you see the future of animation in Kazakhstan?

Bakytzhan: That’s a difficult question because the future is hard to predict. But we have access to the internet, and we speak different languages and so does the younger generation. That’s crucial. We can create international projects, collaborate, adapt to new realities, and improve management practices. This is an area where we are still lacking. In Kazakhstan, the animation sector remains underdeveloped in terms of industry organization, and that needs to improve.

TCA: Are there any projects you are currently working on?

Bakytzhan: Yes, Maqta Qyz. At the same time, we are trying to develop a feature-length project, but our main focus right now is Maqta Qyz.

TCA: What would you like to change in the industry?

Bakytzhan: Not much depends on a single person. The main way to influence the industry is through your own work and projects, that’s how change happens. We’re simply trying to do our job well.

08 Apr 2026

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Central Asia Welcomes Ceasefire, Urges Talks as Energy Risks Persist

April 9, 2026
By Stephen M. Bland

Central Asian governments have cautiously welcomed the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, describing it as a necessary pause in a conflict that has already begun to affect regional stability, trade, and energy flows.

Across the region, official statements struck a consistent balance: support for the truce, alongside calls to translate it quickly into negotiations rather than allow it to become a temporary pause in hostilities.

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the agreement as a “ceasefire and truce” reached through international mediation, including efforts involving Pakistan’s leadership. According to the presidential press service, Tokayev said that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” Tokayev went on to express his hope that the agreement would prove sustainable and contribute to global trade and economic stability.

Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry described the ceasefire as an “important step toward de-escalating tensions” and stressed that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tashkent called for “all parties to exercise restraint, [and] refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation, warning that further escalation risks widening the conflict and undermining regional stability. The statement reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s “unwavering position on the need to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”

Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that the ceasefire would open the way to a comprehensive and long-term peace. Dushanbe emphasized that the conflict has “no military solution and its continuation will only worsen the already difficult situation in the Middle East and cause colossal damage to all countries in the region.” The statement urged all parties to “abandon the use of force” and use political and diplomatic mechanisms in accordance with international law and the UN Charter.

Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said it “welcomes the achievement of a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East,” highlighting the role of Pakistan’s mediation efforts in reducing tensions. Bishkek reaffirmed that disputes must be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, and expressed its “hope for achieving sustainable and long-term peace in the region.”

Turkmenistan had not issued an official public statement on the ceasefire at the time of publication, in line with its longstanding policy of neutrality and cautious approach to external conflicts.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the “announced ceasefire” and praised the efforts of mediators who helped broker the agreement. Baku called on all parties to “engage in productive dialogue aimed at resolving existing problems and strengthening mutual trust” and signaled its readiness to “support initiatives aimed at strengthening lasting peace, security, and cooperation in the region.”

The convergence in tone reflects more than diplomatic routine. The conflict has already spilled into Central Asia’s political and humanitarian agenda, prompting coordination on evacuations, aid deliveries, and contingency planning. It has also exposed the region’s vulnerability to disruption along key energy and transport corridors, raising the cost of renewed escalation if the ceasefire fails.

That vulnerability is already visible in global energy markets. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz — a critical artery for global oil shipments — has prompted major Asian importers to seek alternative supply routes, with Central Asia increasingly entering the conversation as a potential, if partial, substitute.

Countries such as South Korea and Japan, both heavily dependent on Middle Eastern crude, are exploring ways to diversify supply, including increased engagement with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. For these buyers, the appeal of Caspian crude lies not only in its availability but in its compatibility with existing refinery systems.

Yet geography imposes clear constraints. Unlike Gulf producers, Central Asian exporters rely on longer, more complex routes, including transit across the Caspian Sea and onward through the South Caucasus or the Black Sea. Much of Kazakhstan’s oil also continues to move through infrastructure linked to Russia, notably via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), adding a further layer of geopolitical risk.

Even so, the current crisis may accelerate longer-term investment in alternative corridors, including the Trans-Caspian route, as governments and energy companies seek to reduce exposure to chokepoints such as Hormuz. What has changed is not just the perception of risk, but the cost of maintaining reliable connectivity.

For Central Asia, the ceasefire offers a reprieve. Whether it holds — and whether it leads to a negotiated settlement — will determine not only the trajectory of the conflict, but the region’s role in an increasingly fragmented global energy and transport system.

08 Apr 2026

Business & Economy, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan Business & Economy, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Business & Economy, Kazakhstan Business & Economy, Kyrgyzstan Business & Economy

Kyrgyzstan Tests Alternative Transport Route to Russia That Bypasses Kazakhstan

April 8, 2026
By Sergey Kwan

Kyrgyzstan and Russia are advancing plans for an alternative transport route that would bypass Kazakhstan. The proposed Southern Transport Corridor would connect the Russian port of Astrakhan across the Caspian Sea to the Turkmenbashi port in Turkmenistan and then continue overland through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan.

The first test cargo shipments along this corridor have already been completed, according to Russian media reports citing Kyrgyzstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiyev.

Amangeldiyev said Kyrgyzstan views the development of this southern route via the Caspian Sea as a promising alternative for trade between the two countries.

“We’re working in this direction. We have a strategic partnership in this area and a shared vision. We are currently in negotiations,” he told Russia’s TASS news agency on April 3 on the sidelines of the CIS International Economic Forum in Moscow.

Discussions on establishing the new transport corridor date back to October 2024, during the visit of then–prime minister of Kyrgyzstan Akylbek Japarov to Moscow.

For Kyrgyzstan, the Southern Transport Corridor offers a way to reduce dependence on transit through Kazakhstan. At present, most cargo traffic between Russia and Kyrgyzstan passes through the territory of Kazakhstan. Trucks from Kyrgyzstan often face delays of several days at the border, creating significant obstacles for cargo transport, particularly for perishable agricultural goods.

The new corridor is expected to help alleviate these bottlenecks and provide an alternative route linking Kyrgyzstan with the European part of Russia. Kazakhstan would continue to serve as the primary transit route for trade with Russia’s Siberian, Ural, and Far Eastern regions.

08 Apr 2026

Business & Economy, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Business & Economy

Six New Oil Fields Added to Kazakhstan’s Reserves

April 8, 2026
By Dmitry Pokidaev

Six new oil fields in western Kazakhstan, with combined reserves exceeding 127 million tons, were added to the country’s national reserves in 2025, Vice Energy Minister Yerlan Akbarov has announced.

“Production will be carried out primarily by local, small companies that discovered these fields,” Akbarov said in response to journalists’ questions. He added that Kazakhstan has 15 sedimentary basins with potential hydrocarbon resources; five are currently under development, while geological exploration is ongoing in the others.

Earlier, at the Geoscience & Exploration Central Asia forum, Minister of Industry and Construction Yersayin Nagaspayev said that exploration aimed at discovering new oil and gas reserves is planned in the west, as well as in the southeast and north of the country. “Seismic exploration work is planned in the Shu-Sarysu and North Torgay sedimentary basins, which remain underexplored. The results are expected to provide a basis for more detailed prospecting and exploration,” Nagaspayev said.

According to the minister, approximately 10,000 deposits are currently recorded in Kazakhstan, of which only 359 are hydrocarbon deposits. In addition, more than 1,000 solid mineral deposits, over 3,700 sites of common minerals, and around 4,900 groundwater sources have been added to the national balance sheet.

At the same forum, Askhat Khasenov, Chairman of the Management Board of JSC National Company KazMunayGas (KMG), said the company’s remaining recoverable oil reserves amount to about 445 million tons, with more than 50% classified as hard to recover.

He noted that KMG is implementing innovative technologies to bring these reserves into production. As part of this effort, the company has adopted a Technological Challenges Program focused on deploying advanced solutions.

Under this program, an additional 434,000 tons of oil were produced in 2025. By 2040, the initiative is expected to generate a further 54 million tons of output, helping to sustain production and preserve jobs at mature fields around which local communities have developed over many years.

As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan is launching its most ambitious geological exploration program in the past 15 years. Over the next three years, the government plans to invest more than $470 million in the study of mineral resources. A major hydrocarbon field has already been discovered in the Atyrau region, with reserves potentially comparable to those of Kashagan, the country’s largest oil field.

08 Apr 2026

Justice, Tajikistan Justice, Home, Tajikistan

Second Attack in Moscow Was Planned Alongside Crocus City Hall Assault

April 8, 2026
By Sadokat Jalolova

Organizers of the deadly attack at the Crocus City Hall concert venue near Moscow had initially planned a second, simultaneous attack in the Russian capital but later abandoned the idea, according to materials from the ongoing investigation cited by TASS.

A participant in the court proceedings told the agency that investigators had identified a coordinator operating from abroad, known by the alias Saifullo, who had prepared a group of recruited and trained attackers for two separate operations in Moscow. The second attack was intended to take place at the same time as the assault on Crocus City Hall, with two individuals assigned to carry it out and three others designated for the concert venue.

However, shortly before the attack, the plan was revised. Instead of dividing their forces, the organizers decided to concentrate on a single target, reinforcing the group assigned to Crocus City Hall. The exact location and method of the planned second attack were not disclosed in the case materials, although investigators noted it was also intended to result in mass casualties.

According to TASS, one week before the attack the coordinator informed the perpetrators that an additional individual, previously assigned to the second operation, would join the group targeting Crocus City Hall. Several suspects linked to the case have been placed on Russia’s list of designated terrorists, while the alleged coordinator remains at large abroad.

As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, a man sentenced to life imprisonment in connection with the attack died in pretrial detention, in what Russian authorities described as suicide.

Investigations into the organization and execution of the Crocus City Hall attack are ongoing.