• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10899 -0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
08 December 2025

Uzbekistan Gains ASEAN Approval to Join Cooperation Treaty

Uzbekistan’s efforts to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asia advanced significantly this week after all member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) approved Tashkent’s application to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The decision was made during a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers chaired by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, according to the Dunyo news agency.

Signed in Bali in 1976, the TAC outlines core principles for regional cooperation, including peaceful dispute resolution, non-interference, renunciation of force, and respect for sovereignty.

ASEAN now comprises 11 countries with a combined population nearing 700 million, forming one of the world’s most dynamic economic regions. Uzbekistan’s accession to the TAC is expected to enhance its political and economic presence in Southeast Asia, facilitate state-to-state cooperation, boost trade and investment, and increase confidence among international companies operating in or considering expansion into Central Asia.

Political analyst Jahongir Akramov described the approval as a significant diplomatic achievement for Uzbekistan. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, he said the move aligns closely with Uzbekistan’s foreign policy principles: “Uzbekistan’s joining this treaty can be seen as a very significant diplomatic success. One of the key reasons is that the core principles of the TAC fully match the principles set out in Article 17 of Uzbekistan’s Constitution, non-use of force, resolving conflicts peacefully, negotiating disputes, and respecting the sovereignty of states.”

Akramov noted that since 2016, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has evolved along three strategic vectors, all of which are reinforced by the TAC: “First, Uzbekistan adopted a multi-vector foreign policy. Second, the country has taken major steps to develop economic diplomacy. Third, we have been deepening regional integration. All three of these trends are fully consistent with joining the TAC.”

He emphasized that the timing is especially relevant amid growing geopolitical strains: “Geopolitical tensions have intensified, particularly among the United States, China, and Russia. In this situation, participating in platforms such as ASEAN can help reduce pressure and maintain diplomatic balance.”

Akramov also positioned Uzbekistan’s move as part of a broader Global South cooperation trend. “Central Asian and ASEAN countries are both part of the Global South. Building closer relations ensures our interests are better represented in shaping new international norms.”

Economically, Akramov pointed to ASEAN’s size and diversity as highly advantageous. “ASEAN includes Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, Singapore, a global innovation hub, Malaysia, an advanced and diversified economy, and Thailand, a leading tourism destination. Closer ties with these states could expand tourism, improve Uzbekistan’s international image, and boost the competitiveness of Uzbek products.”

He added that ASEAN’s extensive experience with regional integration offers a model for Central Asia. “As one of the first Central Asian countries to join the TAC, Uzbekistan could take a leading role in fostering ASEAN-Central Asia cooperation. A regional office or cooperation structure based in Tashkent or Samarkand would be a major diplomatic achievement.”

However, Akramov cautioned that the partnership would require careful navigation. “Southeast Asia has its own geopolitical tensions, such as the South China Sea disputes involving the Philippines and China. Uzbekistan must remain neutral and avoid diplomatic entanglements.”

He also cited internal ASEAN challenges. “The crisis in Myanmar, including issues related to the Rohingya population, remains unresolved. Taking a strong stance on sensitive issues could backfire. Diplomacy will need to be measured.”

On the economic front, Akramov warned of increased competition. “Indonesia and Vietnam are highly competitive in textiles. Thailand dominates tourism. Singapore leads in innovation. Uzbekistan must prepare to compete in a tougher environment, requiring adaptation across our diplomatic, economic, and educational institutions.”

When asked about priority sectors, Akramov identified textiles, food production, tourism, and collaboration with innovative IT parks in Singapore and Malaysia as key areas of opportunity. “These sectors can generate jobs and expand expertise. Education and cultural exchange programs will also see gains.”

Uzbekistan is now expected to complete the final steps toward full accession to the TAC. Originally a regional agreement, the treaty has expanded into a global platform. Since the late 1990s, China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union have all joined, bringing the number of signatories to nearly 50.

For Tashkent, joining the TAC reflects a deeper integration with one of the world’s most strategically important regions, cementing its place in a rapidly evolving global order.

Over 62% of All Microloans in Kyrgyzstan Are for Consumer Purposes

Between January and September 2025, microcredit organizations in Kyrgyzstan issued loans totaling approximately $720 million to nearly 797,000 recipients, according to the National Statistics Committee. These figures highlight the growing role of microfinance in a country with a population of just over 7 million.

While the number of borrowers declined by 13.2% compared to the same period in 2024, the total volume of microloans increased by 33.6%, suggesting a trend toward larger individual loan sizes.

Bishkek, the capital, accounted for the largest share of microloan recipients, with nearly 259,000 people, 32.5% of the nationwide total, taking out loans during the nine-month period.

Consumer lending dominated the sector, making up more than 62% of all microloans issued. Loans for agricultural development comprised just over 15%, while those for trade and the catering sector represented 9.5%.

Compared to the same period last year, the share of consumer loans rose by 9.7%, while the share of agricultural loans declined by 4.6%, reflecting a shift in borrowing priorities.

Kyrgyzstan currently has 21 commercial banks and 515 non-bank financial institutions, including microcredit organizations. The financial sector’s client base grew by 40% in the first nine months of 2025, largely due to increased adoption of mobile banking and the rise of online lending through microfinance platforms.

In response to growing concerns about digital financial fraud, Kyrgyzstan introduced a self-restriction mechanism on November 1. The system allows individuals to voluntarily block new loans or credit being issued in their name, an effort to protect consumers from unauthorized lending using forged or stolen identification documents.

Under the new regulation, banks and microfinance institutions are legally required to verify whether a client has enacted a self-restriction before issuing a loan.

Kazakhstan Trades Electricity for Water in Bid to Mitigate Summer Drought Risks

Central Asia is entering a new phase in the management of its water-energy nexus, moving from declarations to practical coordination. A trilateral protocol signed in Almaty by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan marked a significant step toward stabilizing the region’s water regime amid escalating climate risks.

Brokered under Kazakhstan’s chairmanship, the agreement aims to balance the load on the Toktogul Reservoir, the main regulating structure of the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan typically increases winter water discharges to generate electricity, which reduces irrigation water availability downstream during summer. Under the new deal, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will supply Kyrgyzstan with electricity during winter, in return for Kyrgyzstan’s commitment to store water and ensure its release during the 2026 growing season.

The Almaty Protocol complements the existing plan for filling the Shardara Reservoir, which aims to accumulate 11 cubic kilometers of water by April 1, 2026. Achieving this target hinges on Toktogul’s operations. Without external support, Kyrgyzstan’s energy infrastructure would struggle to meet the requirement. Supplemental electricity from Astana and Tashkent thus forms the economic backbone of this arrangement.

Longstanding disparities in regional water and energy needs remain a source of instability. Kyrgyzstan requires water in winter for hydropower, while Kazakhstan, especially its Turkestan and Kyzylorda regions, relies on it in summer for irrigation. Recent water shortages have pushed the countries toward more pragmatic coordination. Uzbekistan has committed to managing the technical conditions for transit and balancing inter-system flows. Despite facing its own energy shortfall and aging infrastructure, Kazakhstan is participating in regional stabilization to avert socio-economic risks in its southern provinces.

External factors are adding urgency to regional cooperation. Afghanistan’s construction of the Qosh-Tepa Canal is expected to reduce the Amu Darya’s water balance by 20-25%. Although Uzbekistan is most directly affected, the resulting pressure on water systems could also impact the Syr Darya, on which southern Kazakhstan heavily depends.

Internally, Kazakhstan faces persistent challenges. Water loss during transport reaches up to 40-50% due to outdated canal infrastructure. Rice cultivation continues in the water-intensive Kyzylorda region, while water-saving technologies are used on only about 30% of irrigated land.

These new agreements suggest that Central Asian countries can rapidly implement collective mechanisms in response to shared threats. In effect, elements of a regional Water and Energy Consortium are already operating in a de facto, ad hoc manner. Water, energy, and food security are increasingly seen as interconnected resources requiring coordinated governance.

For Kazakhstan, the priority now is to institutionalize these provisional agreements. If the “electricity-for-water” model can be formalized into a durable framework, it could stand as one of the most significant accomplishments of the country’s regional diplomacy.

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Electoral Reforms – Why Officials and Experts Are Reconsidering Local Democracy

The metaphor that history moves in a spiral has resurfaced in Kazakhstan, where ongoing debates over electoral reform and information policy are testing the boundaries of the country’s democratic trajectory. Recent official messaging points toward a more managed model of political participation, framed as a necessary response to emerging challenges.

This trajectory was articulated by State Councilor Erlan Karin in his article, “The Politics of Common Sense,” published in the state-run Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. In the piece, Karin reflects on the formation of public values in Kazakhstan, portraying it as an evolutionary process. Simultaneously, Karin references government-led social programs, such as “Law and Order,” “Clean Kazakhstan,” and “Adal Azamat” – a program focused on building character, promoting civic responsibility, and fostering national unity – as instruments of state-directed civic education.

Karin reiterates his previously stated position on the existence of “red lines” in public discourse, sensitive subjects such as interethnic relations, religion, language, and foreign policy. While insisting that these topics should not be off-limits, he calls for “common sense” in how they are discussed.

“When it comes to public stability, the state will not compromise,” he asserts, adding that the government will lawfully oppose any attempts at “destructive information influence and incitement to hatred.”

Karin also highlights what he describes as a new category of problematic actors:

“This spring, I drew attention to a phenomenon known as ‘inforeket,’ in which certain bloggers and activists engage in outright extortion. This practice stems from past policies of appeasement toward disruptive elements, which encouraged the rise of pseudo-public figures, bloggers, and ‘tame oppositionists.’ Now abandoned by their once-powerful patrons and wealthy clients, they continue to seek income using outdated methods.”

In the same article, Karin names a group of experts, deputies, and public figures who contributed input to the new internal policy principles. Several of these individuals are currently advancing proposals to revise aspects of Kazakhstan’s electoral system—particularly the mechanisms for selecting district akims.

Among them is Berik Abdygaliuly, political scientist, historian, and director of the National Museum of Kazakhstan. In a recent podcast, Abdygaliuly argued for reconsidering the model of electing district akims. He noted that while more than 3,000 rural akims and maslikhat deputies have been elected in recent years, the outcomes have been mixed. Voter fatigue is mounting, he said, and the financial costs of repeated campaigns – amounting to hundreds of millions of tenge – have not corresponded with visible improvements in local governance.

His proposal is that district akims should be chosen not by direct popular vote but by maslikhats, the local representative bodies empowered to demand reports, assess performance, express no confidence, and initiate dismissals.

This idea quickly gained support from other commentators participating in public discussions of governance reform. Political analyst Marat Shibutov wrote on his Telegram channel that the electorate is “simply getting tired of elections” after several consecutive voting cycles since 2021. Shibutov supported the idea of “revising or freezing” the election mechanism for district akims as “rational.”

Meanwhile, political scientist Andrey Chebotarev highlighted a recent speech by Deputy Minister of National Economy Bauyrzhan Omarbekov at a Public Chamber session of the Mazhilis, focused on improving local government legislation. Omarbekov reportedly emphasized the mismatch between candidates’ campaign promises and pre-approved district development plans, the lack of accountability mechanisms, and the limited involvement of maslikhats.

Chebotarev, while a proponent of elected local self-government in rural and urban areas, argues that districts, being integral to regional administrations, might be better suited to appointments under the state administration framework. He calls for a clear delineation between state governance and local self-governance, suggesting that electing district akims is not a critical issue. Still, given the growing powers of maslikhats, transferring the authority to elect akims to them is “worthy of official consideration.”

Taken together, these developments suggest the emergence of an increasingly aligned expert discourse – featuring political scientists, sociologists, and economists – aimed at shaping public understanding of governance reforms and lending intellectual support to the state’s evolving policy priorities. Unlike earlier periods, when political conformity was often maintained through direct coercion or patronage, today’s adjustments appear to be advancing through institutional argumentation, procedural refinement, and carefully managed public messaging.

In an era marked by global hybrid conflicts and intensifying disinformation pressures—and with Kazakhstan’s digital public sphere increasingly exposed to external narratives—the government is positioning these reforms as necessary safeguards. The result is a systemic reshaping of political discourse and electoral practice that, to some observers, recalls earlier patterns of managed participation, albeit presented through the language of expertise, stability, and civic rationality.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

Moldova To End Visa-Free Travel for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Moldova has formally withdrawn from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) visa-free travel agreement, a move that will introduce visa requirements for citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Moldovan parliament approved the government’s proposal to terminate the 1992 Bishkek Agreement, according to inbusiness.kz.

The CIS, which originally included 11 post-Soviet states upon its creation in 1991, now counts only seven full members. Although Moldova ended its membership in the CIS earlier, it had continued to uphold visa-free travel arrangements with several former Soviet republics, including countries in Central Asia.

The new legislation does not affect Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. Moldovan officials told local media that Chişinău intends to preserve visa-free travel with these two countries through separate bilateral agreements. “For citizens of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the procedure for travel remains unchanged,” Azattyq.org reported, citing Moldovan government sources. In 2024, Moldova also announced plans to open its first embassy in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana.

The new visa requirements apply solely to citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who will now need to obtain visas for work, study, or personal travel to Moldova. Authorities in Chişinău explained that the decision is part of Moldova’s broader effort to align its legal framework with European Union standards. EU regulations require visas for all CIS nationals, and Moldova is gradually adjusting its migration and visa policies in preparation for EU accession.

The move comes in the wake of Moldova’s October 2024 referendum, in which voters supported the country’s path toward EU membership. Since then, the government has withdrawn from numerous CIS treaties, exited the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, ceased payments to the Mir television network, and closed its local bureau.

Relations between Moldova and Kyrgyzstan have been further strained by unresolved issues, including Kyrgyzstan’s calls for the repayment of a Soviet-era debt and Moldova’s ban on Kyrgyz airlines due to their inclusion on the EU’s aviation safety blacklist. Kyrgyz civil activist Almaz Tazhybay told Vesti.kg that Kyrgyz carriers will only regain access to Moldovan airspace after meeting EU safety requirements.

Moldovan authorities have emphasized that the policy is not targeted at any specific country. Officials in Chişinău describe the changes as part of a broader legal realignment as Moldova pursues its goal of joining the European Union by 2030.

Kazakhstan Faces Deepening Medical Personnel Shortage Amid Rising Emigration

Kazakhstan continues to grapple with a severe shortage of medical personnel, a crisis intensified by the steady emigration of specialists. According to First Deputy Minister of Health Timur Sultangaziev, there are currently around 9,000 unfilled positions across the country, approximately 4,000 for doctors and over 5,000 for mid-level healthcare workers.

Speaking during a session of the Mazhilis, Kazakhstan’s lower house of parliament, Sultangaziev reported that roughly 2,500 medical professionals have left the country over the past five years. “There is an outflow of medical personnel from the healthcare system to foreign countries,” he said.

Sultangaziev cited inadequate compensation as the primary factor driving this exodus. In response, the government has allocated an additional $9.6 million this year to raise salaries for public emergency medical service employees. The Health Ministry is currently evaluating a further salary increase estimated at $19.2 million, though a final decision has yet to be made.

The parliamentary session also focused on proposed legislation to increase penalties for violence against medical workers. MP Askhat Aimagambetov noted that 280 such incidents have been officially recorded in the past five years, but suggested the real number is much higher. Many medical professionals reportedly choose not to report assaults, fearing retaliation or loss of work hours.

The draft bill includes a new article in the Criminal Code, introducing special legal status for “medical workers” and “ambulance drivers”, and stipulating harsher penalties for violent offenses. Aimagambetov compared the proposed sanctions to those for attacks on gamekeepers, which carry a maximum sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment.

“If a hooligan breaks the finger of an ordinary citizen, it’s moderate harm. If he breaks a surgeon’s finger, it’s a disaster. Thousands of operations may be cancelled because of one broken finger,” Aimagambetov said, emphasizing the vulnerability of ambulance staff, who must respond to emergency calls without regard to risk.

The final version of the bill outlines penalties including fines, correctional or community service, or up to three years’ restriction or deprivation of liberty for non-life-threatening violence. In cases involving aggravating circumstances, the punishment increases to 3-7 years. Life-threatening or severe injuries could result in 5-10 years’ imprisonment, or 7-12 years under aggravating conditions.

As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan has already begun implementing additional protective measures for medical personnel. In the summer, authorities announced plans to equip ambulance staff with body cameras in response to the rising number of assaults on healthcare workers.