As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, located just outside of Anchorage, Alaska, hopes and anxieties are reverberating across Central Asia. Trump has signaled that securing a ceasefire in Ukraine is his top priority, warning of “very severe consequences” for Moscow if Putin refuses to halt the war.

For the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia, these peace talks carry high stakes. Any truce or breakdown could ripple into their economies and strategic calculus. The war has already fundamentally changed Central Asia’s strategic positioning, accelerating diversification away from Russian dependence. With Trump and Putin poised to negotiate, Central Asian leaders are mindful that all possible outcomes – a ceasefire, a prolonged conflict, or a major power realignment – could each reshape the region’s economic fortunes and foreign policy choices.

Central Asian Stances on the Ukraine War

All five Central Asian governments have officially maintained neutrality on the Ukraine conflict. On the first UN General Assembly resolution of March 2, 2022, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan abstained, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan did not vote. On subsequent resolutions, Uzbekistan abstained alongside Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; Turkmenistan continued not to vote. None has recognized Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory.

Seated beside Putin at a plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2022, referring to them as “quasi-state territories,” President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan refused to recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. “Modern international law is the United Nations Charter,” Tokayev stated. Despite maintaining ties with Russia, Kazakhstan has boosted its engagement with China, Turkey, and Europe during the conflict.

Whilst publicly affirming that it will comply with Western sanctions on Russia, Kazakhstan has stated that it will continue to prioritize its economic interests, vowing not to “blindly follow” such measures when they harm its domestic industries. “Kazakhstan will continue to comply with the sanctions but will pursue a balanced policy to minimize the impact on its own economy,” Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin said in August 2024.

Uzbekistan has adopted a similar “balanced and neutral” approach to the war in Ukraine. In March 2022, then-Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated that Uzbekistan “recognizes the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and does not recognize the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics.” Despite Kamilov leaving his position shortly after making this statement, the nation’s position appears largely unchanged.

Calling for an immediate end to “hostilities and violence,” Tashkent has expanded links with Turkey, China, and the EU. According to a U.S. State Department report from 2024, “Uzbekistan formally committed to adhering to U.S. and EU sanctions and trade restrictions on Russia.”

Kyrgyzstan has continued to maintain a close economic relationship with Moscow while abstaining from all key United Nations resolutions concerning the Ukraine war. President Sadyr Japarov has said the country “adheres to a neutral position” and that exports to Russia are civilian in nature.

In January 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s Keremet Bank was designated by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for facilitating sanctions evasion, effectively freezing its U.S. assets and prohibiting U.S. persons from transacting with it. U.S. officials alleged that since the summer of 2024, Keremet Bank had been facilitating cross-border transactions for Russian financial institutions, including Promsvyazbank – a player in Russia’s defense sector – which has been under U.S. sanctions since early 2022. Following the U.S. Treasury’s designation of Keremet Bank, several major Kyrgyz banks, including Bakai Bank, Demir Bank, Optima Bank, and Keremet itself, curtailed or suspended transactions with Russian institutions.

Tajikistan has remained largely silent on the Ukraine conflict, offering only broad appeals for peace and “efforts to find political and diplomatic ways to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.”

On February 11, 2025, Chairman of the State Committee on Investment and State Property Management Sulton Rakhimzoda confirmed the receipt of an official U.S. letter urging the enforcement of sanctions targeting several Russian companies operating in Tajikistan, specifically naming Gazpromneft‑Tajikistan, a major fuel supplier in the country. A subsidiary of Russia’s Gazprom Neft, Gazpromneft Tajikistan is the country’s dominant energy supplier, operating gas stations and controlling a large share of its fuel distribution network. Legal analysts warn that companies or banks cooperating with this entity could face secondary sanctions, although Tajikistan itself is not at risk of sovereign sanctions. Tajik officials have stated that the issue is under review, while insisting that any restrictions will not disrupt domestic fuel supplies.

Turkmenistan has consistently upheld its constitutionally mandated policy of “permanent neutrality,” a status endorsed by the UN in 1995. According to a U.S. Congressional report from 2023, this “translates in practice to foreign policy isolationism.”

While avoiding involvement in international conflicts – including the Ukraine war – Turkmenistan has sought to secure stable energy export routes, such as the February 2025 deal to begin shipping natural gas to Turkey through Iran, underlining its economic emphasis on stable markets. There are fears in Turkmenistan, however, that its gas swap deals could become collateral damage following the Israeli-Iran conflict.

Economic Fallout: Oil, Inflation, and Trade Winds

The war in Ukraine has triggered soaring energy and food prices. By late 2022, median inflation across emerging Europe and Central Asia had surged to 15.9%, marking its highest level in 20 years, driven by spikes in fuel and grocery costs. A peace agreement has the potential to ease these pressures by helping to stabilize global markets.

Oil and gas prices play a significant role in shaping Central Asia’s economic balance. Producers like Kazakhstan benefit from elevated prices, while importers such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan face higher costs. In March 2025, oil prices fell sharply, with Brent crude dropping by about $7 per barrel to around $70/bbl, as investor sentiment weakened over global economic prospects and reports that OPEC+ might ease production cuts despite geopolitical tensions. In August 2025, prices fluctuated again, with analysts projecting that they may “head toward the low $60s per barrel by the end of this year.” Lower energy prices would relieve inflationary pressure on consumers in importing countries but reduce export earnings for top producers such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

Remittances remain another critical economic link. Millions of Central Asians work in Russia, and their remittances are vital to domestic consumption. Despite the conflict, remittance inflows have stayed strong: Kyrgyzstan alone recorded $1.367 billion during the first five months of 2025 – a 16% increase over the same period in 2024 – reflecting resilience in migrant incomes despite ongoing geopolitical uncertainty. However, a September 10 deadline is looming for the potential mass expulsion of migrants from Russia.

Sanctions, Trade Corridors, and Tariffs

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, a growing share of Eurasian trade has been rerouted via Central Asia. Incidents of backdoor trade, the re-exporting of dual-use goods such as electronics and machinery through Central Asian intermediaries to Russia have emerged, resulting in the sanctioning of entities involved and warnings being issued to regional governments. Russian imports from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have surged since 2022, as shown through think-tank analysis documenting large re-export spikes: Kyrgyzstan’s exports to Russia increased in volume by 250% in 2022, Kazakhstan’s by 39%, and Uzbekistan’s by 77% between 2021 and 2023 –  much of it re-exports of goods not produced locally.

Meanwhile, the war has accelerated the rise of the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, an alternative route bypassing Russia. Freight volumes jumped from around 600,000 tons in 2021 to 1.5 million in 2022, and then soared to over 4.1 million tons in the first 11 months of 2024 – a 63% year-on-year increase. Central Asian governments have indicated that they intend to maintain and expand these diversified transport links even if peace returns, viewing them as a permanent strategic gain.

Currently, U.S. tariffs on Central Asia include a baseline 10% duty on exports from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, while Kazakhstan has faced a 25% customs duty since August 1. Because most of Kazakhstan’s U.S.-bound commodities – such as oil, uranium, and silver – are exempt, however, the headline rate has hit a relatively small slice of shipments. Nevertheless, it has raised compliance costs for non-resource exporters and prompted the Kazakh government to lobby the U.S. to soften the impact. Region-wide, tariffs are unlikely to upend total trade volumes but could redirect supply chains and financing, especially if the U.S. pursues threatened 100% “secondary” tariffs tied to Russia.

Scenarios: Ceasefire, Prolonged War, or Realignment

A ceasefire or peace deal would likely stabilize energy and food prices, reduce the risks posed by secondary sanctions, and affirm Central Asia’s policy of neutrality, while also empowering the region to strengthen its role as a trade and mediation hub by leveraging newly developed transport corridors and drawing fresh investment interest. However, while the Middle Corridor should persist as a politically backed, upgraded alternative thanks to ongoing Kazakh–Turkish investment, should peace normalize trade, many shippers are expected to shift part of their volumes back to the cheaper, higher-capacity northern route via Russia.

In contrast, a prolonged conflict would keep markets volatile and sanctions pressure high – forcing harder policy choices about re-exports – yet it could simultaneously diminish Moscow’s capacity to exert any coercive influence, providing Central Asia more space to pursue independent alignments and expand ties with countries like China and Turkey.

Finally, a major power realignment – for instance, an outcome to the summit that heavily favors Ukrainian – could accelerate the region’s movement away from Russia, enhancing cooperation with Western powers, Turkey, and China. Conversely, a perceived Russian victory might prompt renewed pressure on Central Asia, though even then, China is poised to reinforce its influence through investment and infrastructure leadership.

Looking Ahead

Whatever the Alaska summit brings, Central Asia will adapt, using its geography and multi-vector diplomacy to protect sovereignty and extract benefits. From new Silk Roads to recalibrated tariffs, the ripple effects of any Trump–Putin handshake will be felt from the Caspian to the Pamirs for years to come.