The Samarkand Summit, taking place on April 3–4, 2025, represents a defining moment in Central Asia-European Union (CA-EU) relations. Hosted in the historic city of Samarkand, a crossroads of civilizations and trade for millennia, this inaugural summit marks a geopolitical realignment as the European Union seeks to expand its engagement in a region historically dominated by Russia and China. Against the backdrop of Uzbekistan’s proactive foreign policy reforms under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the summit signifies a recalibrated vision for connectivity, sustainability, and economic diversification in Eurasia.
The symbolism of Samarkand as the summit’s venue is profound. Once a flourishing center of Silk Road commerce and Timurid cultural grandeur, the city embodies the historical role of Central Asia as a bridge between East and West. Over the centuries, shifting empires and economic transitions relegated the region to a peripheral status in global affairs, particularly after the collapse of the Silk Road, its incorporation into the Russian Empire, and the subsequent Soviet era. However, post-Soviet transformations and recent geopolitical shifts — accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — have reinvigorated global interest in Central Asia. As the EU strives to reduce dependence on Russian energy and counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Samarkand Summit emerges as an urgent diplomatic effort to establish stronger economic and political ties with the region.
At the heart of the summit’s agenda is the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), a modern-day Silk Road initiative designed to enhance trade connectivity between Europe and Central Asia via the Caucasus, bypassing Russian territory. By offering an alternative route for energy exports and critical minerals, the corridor could significantly reduce transit times by 15–20%, facilitating the EU’s quest for strategic autonomy in global supply chains. For Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the project presents an opportunity to diversify trade partners and lessen their economic dependence on Moscow and Beijing. However, the corridor’s implementation faces substantial geopolitical and financial hurdles. Russia and China may perceive it as a challenge to their regional influence, potentially leading to diplomatic friction or economic countermeasures. Moreover, the corridor’s development requires an estimated $20–30 billion in infrastructure investments, a daunting figure for cash-strapped Central Asian economies.
Parallel to trade discussions, the summit will spotlight climate action and green energy investments. The EU’s €1.5 billion Central Asia Water and Energy Program aims to modernize irrigation systems, promote renewable energy, and reduce fossil fuel dependency. This aligns with Brussels’ broader Green Deal ambitions, positioning the EU as a global leader in sustainable development while offering Central Asian states financial and technical support to address water scarcity and environmental degradation. However, challenges persist — bureaucratic inefficiencies, regulatory gaps, and regional water disputes complicate large-scale green energy implementation. Moreover, while hydropower is a viable alternative to fossil fuels, its intensive water usage could exacerbate tensions between upstream and downstream nations such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
The summit will also emphasize digital connectivity and modernization, with the Connecting Central Asia (C4CA) Initiative promoting e-governance, high-speed internet expansion, and digital trade facilitation. This digital push is strategically positioned as a counterweight to China’s authoritarian tech model and Russia’s disinformation networks. However, Central Asian states remain cautious about European data protection regulations, fearing potential restrictions on state-controlled digital infrastructure. The digital divide between urban and rural areas further complicates the region’s technological transformation, raising concerns about equitable access and long-term sustainability.
Beyond economic and technological collaboration, the CA-EU partnership offers a critical opportunity for geopolitical diversification. The EU, with its multilateral trade frameworks and WTO accession support for countries like Uzbekistan, provides an attractive alternative to Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China’s SCO-led economic integration. However, the European model comes with conditions on governance and human rights, a point of contention for authoritarian-leaning regimes in the region. The EU’s push for democratic reforms and rule-of-law measures may be met with resistance, limiting the depth of institutional engagement.
The summit’s vision draws historical parallels to the “Great Game” of the 19th century, when Britain and Russia vied for influence over Central Asia. While the EU’s rhetoric frames its involvement as cooperative rather than competitive, concerns about neo-imperial economic extraction persist. Central Asia’s rich reserves of lithium, copper, and uranium have attracted European investment, raising questions about whether the region will truly benefit from resource partnerships or simply serve as a supplier for Europe’s critical mineral needs.
In this context, literary reflections provide insightful perspectives. Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (1901) dramatized the Great Game’s strategic maneuvering, echoing themes of power and survival in contested spaces. More contemporary Central Asian literature, such as Hamid Ismailov’s The Railway (2006), explores the region’s struggle between modern aspirations and traditional identity — a theme that resonates in the EU’s push for high-tech infrastructure in historically agrarian societies. Similarly, President Mirziyoyev’s Development Strategy 2022–2026 articulates Uzbekistan’s vision for sovereignty in an increasingly interconnected world, reflecting the broader regional balancing act between economic pragmatism and geopolitical caution.
As the Samarkand Summit unfolds, its ultimate success will depend on the balance between ambition and pragmatism. While the EU seeks to expand its Eurasian footprint, Central Asian states must ensure that new partnerships do not replicate historical patterns of dependency or exploitation. Brussels must recognize that its aspirational policy goals must be matched with flexibility in addressing the region’s unique governance models and economic constraints. Likewise, Central Asian governments should leverage this engagement to strengthen institutional resilience and negotiate equitable terms for cooperation.
With Samarkand’s Silk Road legacy as a backdrop, the summit represents a transformative opportunity — but one that must be approached with strategic foresight and mutual respect. As 14th-century Persian poet Hafez aptly stated, “The world is a bridge — pass over it, but build no house upon it.” The CA-EU partnership must navigate this bridge wisely, ensuring that its ambitions foster genuine collaboration rather than another fleeting geopolitical experiment.
