• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10849 0.37%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
11 December 2025

Kazakhstan Prepares for the Second Phase of North Aral Sea Restoration

On August 1, Kazakhstan’s minister for water resources and irrigation, Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, chaired a meeting on preparations for the second phase of the North Aral Sea restoration project.

The North Aral Sea is the portion of the former Aral Sea fed by the Syr Darya River. It split from the South Aral Sea in 1987–1988, when water levels dropped due to water diversion for agricultural use.

The meeting reviewed the preparation of a feasibility study for the project.

The project consists of three components. The first component improves conditions for fisheries and the aquatic environment in and near the sea, and stabilizes wetlands in the Syr Darya River delta.

The second component supports sustainable economic, social, and environmental activities in Kazakhstan’s Kyzylorda region by developing fisheries, livestock farming, tourism, and forest planting.

The third component plans to improve water management systems in the Aral-Syr Darya basin.

Nurzhigitov commented: “The project being prepared is a continuation of a large-scale project to regulate the Syr Darya River bed and preserve the North Aral Sea, which was implemented between 2002 and 2010 and positively affected the entire Aral Sea region. The second phase covers many different areas — from the stable provision of the North Aral Sea with water to developing economic and social projects.”

High Water in Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Reservoir Forecast to Boost Electricity Generation

On August 2, the volume of water in the reservoir of Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul hydroelectric power plant reached 11.922 billion cubic meters, which according to the plant’s operator Electric Stations OJSC, is almost one billion cubic meters more than that recorded on August 1, 2023.

Located on the Naryn River, which feeds the Syr Darya River that flows to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Toktogul HPP is the largest power plant in Kyrgyzstan and generates some 40% of the country’s electricity.

The Toktogul reservoir currently receives 840 cubic meters of water per second and releases 475 cubic meters per second. The released water is used to generate electricity and then flows to downstream countries where it is used for irrigation.

The reservoir has a maximum capacity of 19.5 billion cubic meters, with an average volume is 17.3 billion cubic meters, and the “dead” level at which the power plant would stop operating is 5.5 billion cubic meters.

As reported by 24.kg news agency, Electric Stations OJSC expects  the volume of water in the Toktogul reservoir to reach 12.5 billion cubic meters at the beginning of the next heating season (October 1, 2024) and at the end of  2024/25 season, fall to around  7.9 billion cubic meters.

Toktogul HPP comprises four hydroelectric units with a total generating capacity of 1320 MW and on completion of the modernization of hydroelectric unit #1, later this year, the capacity will increase by 60 MW and reach 1380 MW.

In recent years, because Kyrgyzstan has been unable to produce enough electricity to meet the country’s growing demand, electricity has been imported from neighbouring states.

 

EU’s Borrell Reaffirms European Commitment to Cooperation with Kazakhstan

On August 1, the high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy, Josep Borrell, visited Astana and met with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu.

Explaining the purpose of the visit, Borell said “as my mandate as a representative of the European Union ends in three months, it was very important for me to come here to Astana to reaffirm the strong interest and commitment of the European Union to strengthen cooperation with Central Asia in general and with Kazakhstan in particular as the strongest country in the region.”

“I used to say that four years ago, when I came to Brussels, Central Asia was a little bit in the middle of nowhere – and now, you are in the middle of everything…Everything that matters between Europe and Asia goes through you”, he added.

The EU High Representative also said, “Under the leadership of President Tokayev, Kazakhstan has embarked on the path of the wide range of political and economic reforms that we support”. Stressing Kazakhstan’s strategic geographical position as a bridge between Europe and Asia, Borrell noted that the EU is Kazakhstan’s number one trade partner, representing more than one-third of all Kazakh exports, and the biggest investor in the country.

Borrell’s meeting with President Tokayev covered progress of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Kazakhstan and the EU, a comprehensive accord aimed at enhancing political, economic, and social collaboration between the EU and Kazakhstan.

Tokayev commended the high-level dialogue between Kazakhstan and the EU, notably the productive visit of European Council President, Charles Michel, and talks with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. “I think we reached many common views as far as our cooperation is concerned,” Tokayev said. He also lauded a memorandum signed by the Government of Kazakhstan and Ursula von der Leyen on the development of green hydrogen on November 7, 2022, during the COP27 climate conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, calling it “a very concrete step forward in terms of mutual cooperation”.

Borrell commented that they had “discussed key political and economic reforms in Kazakhstan and topics of mutual interest in the challenging geopolitical context. We appreciate Kazakhstan’s principled support to the UN Charter and commitment to international law.”

Borrell also met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Murat Nurtleu. Speaking about the Ukraine war, Borrel stated: “We encourage you to take further steps in order to make this war reach an end, and to use your influence for that.” Also on the agenda were cooperation in transport and logistics, digitalization, civil aviation, agriculture, use of critical raw materials, and energy.

According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, the European Union is Kazakhstan’s leading trading and investment partner, accounting for more than 30% of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade and investments. In 2023, trade between Kazakhstan and the EU amounted to $41.4 billion. In January-May 2024, bilateral trade reached $20.2 billion, showing a 14.1% increase compared to the same period last year ($17.7 billion). The volume of European investments in Kazakhstan’s economy since 2005 has amounted to $180 billion.

Kazakhstan was the first country in Central Asia to sign a memorandum of understanding with the EU on critical raw materials in 2022.

China Expands Footprint in Central Asia

In July, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, architect of the Belt and Road economic initiative, traveled to Kazakhstan for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security group whose founding members include several Central Asian countries. There, Xi warned against the threat of “external interference” and celebrated Chinese collaboration with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, the region’s other traditional power. Then he visited Tajikistan, a security partner that borders China and Afghanistan.

Europe and the United States, which want to counterbalance Chinese and Russian sway in Central Asia, were watching.

Last week, several analysts affiliated with Western institutions held a Zoom discussion titled “The China-Central Asia Crossroads.” It was hosted by the Center for the National Interest, a non-profit group based in Washington – a few blocks from the White House. Here are excerpts from the analysis:

 

Balancing China and Russia:

Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center:

There is a misconception that “China is somehow replacing Russia” as the main partner in Central Asia because of unease over Russia´s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

“The reality is much more nuanced and detailed,” Umarov said. Since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, he said, Central Asian countries have always looked for “diversified ties with the world” and “Central Asia wants to have China’s presence be enlarged into other spheres and to have a counterbalance in the face of Russia.”

 

Elizabeth Wishnick, an expert on Sino-Russian relations at the Center for Naval Analyses and the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University:

“Central Asians wanted to diversify away from Russia to have more choice. China is not necessarily the only partner they want. And they they’ve been trying, especially recently, to engage with European countries, with India, with Iran, with Turkey, with a broader range of countries.”

Wishnick, who traveled recently to Central Asia, said some people described Russia as “toxic” in private conversations. She also said: “You see a lot of caution about the relationship with China in terms of the lack of transparency of some of the projects that China is investing in, the potential environmental consequence of some of these projects.

 

Brian Carlson,  a research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College:

There is “a little bit of slippage of Russian influence in the region,” although Putin has worked to maintain it with frequent meetings with Central Asian leaders, Carlson said. He noted that, after Putin visited China in May, he called the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to update them on the trip. Even so, China’s influence is increasing.

“And so, this does pose challenges for the Central Asian countries. In the past, they’ve kind of tried to play Russia and China off against each other. To some extent, that will be more difficult given that China and Russia have a very close partnership. So, it will be difficult for Central Asian countries to navigate great power relations in the coming years. It’s true that they can look beyond just Russia and China to other partners.”

 

Xi’s Visit to Tajikistan:

Umarov:

President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan is “getting closer and closer” to transferring power to his son, and so, since Xi doesn’t visit Tajikistan often, this might be the Chinese leader’s last trip there before the political transition.

There are two Chinese armed police bases on the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, according to Umarov, and “this is a unique case, not only for Central Asia, but also for the world.”

 

Wishnick:

“For China, there’s a lot of concern about Afghanistan and its future. And Tajikistan is seen as integral to that question.”

“They probably see Tajikistan as a kind of weak link on China’s border, and they’re trying to invest as much as possible to bolster Tajikistan. Although I would say that sometimes it doesn’t have the desirable conclusions, like the investment in a gold mine there has led to some dissatisfaction on environmental grounds as well.”

 

Carlson:

For years, people have talked about a “sort of informal agreement on a division of labor in which China promotes economic development, whereas Russia has the main security role” in Central Asia.

“Starting several years ago, China did begin to engage with the countries along its western border – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan – in a format that did not include Russia. And the discussions were mainly about security along China’s western border and making sure that instability didn’t spill over, especially from Afghanistan, across the border into China.”

 

U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan:

Carlson:

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 potentially opened opportunities there for China, which along with Russia has engaged in outreach to the Taliban.

A Taliban representative made a statement of “support for China’s policies in Xinjiang, or at least, a pledge not to do anything that would aggravate the situation.”

(China has imposed an assimilation program in its western region of Xinjiang, which borders Kazakhstan. Rights groups accuse China of widespread abuses, including mass detentions, against Uyghurs and other Muslims).

 

China and Russia – Getting Along in Central Asia:

Umarov:

“In my view, we tend to underestimate the level of cooperation that exists between Moscow and Beijing on Central Asia.”

“I think it will be a hybrid future – there will exist some sort of competition between these two countries, but also a lot of cooperation… Cooperation is also something that Central Asian countries want to see.”

Even Russia and the United States, which have big problems in their bilateral relationship, coexist in a place like Kazakhstan, according to Umarov.

 

Wishnick:

“Central Asia is one of the routes that Chinese entities use to send their dual use items to Russia for use in Ukraine. And of course, there’s a lot of different sentiment on the war in Central Asian countries and large swathes of public opinion opposed to the war. But there are certain business entities and elites that are collaborating in this trade.”

China surpasses Russia in terms of trade in Central Asia, but Russia still has “levers of influence,” for example in the way it impacts Kazakhstan’s westward export of energy through pipelines that pass through Russian territory.

 

The U.S. Role:

Umarov:

Central Asian countries thought the Trump administration’s efforts to get them to cooperate less with China were “unrealistic.”

But the Biden administration “got rid of this approach and started to not even mention so much China, Russia or anything outside of Central Asia when it comes to building relationships with the region, but rather highlighting the strategic importance of the region as it is.”

 

Carlson:

“I think that the United States also has an interest in encouraging the Central Asian countries to work more closely [with] each other to strengthen intraregional collaboration, and that should strengthen the Central Asian countries´ hand in dealing with China; and possibly the United States also has an interest in other countries exerting some influence in the region, including Turkey, as a way to get the Central Asian countries some other options.”

A possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan would put Central Asia in a difficult position because “the United States would be interested in getting the Central Asian countries to provide some kind of support for the U.S. effort, but it would be very difficult for them to stand up to China by joining sanctions or cutting off energy supplies or anything like that. So, the Central Asian countries in that case would just have to try as hard as possible to maintain neutrality and stay out of it.”

 

Wishnick:

Lately, the United States “has focused more on functional areas of cooperation rather than grand strategies, looking at strategic minerals, customs clearance, green energy, things like that, where the U.S. can play a useful role. I think another area that would be very promising and helpful would be education.”

“To get Central Asia out of both the Russian and Chinese information space, they need to have access to other information spaces.”

SCO and Afghanistan on the Cusp of a New Relationship

The hype surrounding the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State in Astana has died down, and the expert community has offered differing takeaways, with some experts optimistic and others cautious. Few, however, have considered what new this summit delivered on Afghanistan. In general, what is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in resolving the political issues around long-suffering Afghanistan and rebuilding its economy?

Despite the SCO’s previous hands-off approach to Afghan affairs, the issue of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was raised for the first time at the highest level of the SCO in Astana, which gives hope that the organization will expand its role. In their remarks, almost every SCO head of state touched on Afghanistan in essentially the same vein, stating the need for peace, stability and security, while underlining the fact that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia.

Indeed, Afghanistan was mentioned in the final declaration of the Astana summit, with Member States “reaffirming their commitment to asserting Afghanistan as an independent, neutral and peaceful state free from terrorism, war, and narcotic drugs [and voicing] their readiness to support the international community’s efforts to facilitate peace and development in that country.” At the same time, there was a clear message to the Taliban that “the establishment of an inclusive government involving multiple representatives of all ethnic and political groups of Afghan society is the only way toward attaining lasting peace and stability in that country.”

These statements represent a rather big step, considering that previously the SCO failed to find a consensus on Afghanistan and develop its own mechanisms to interact with Kabul. The creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group back in 2005 was rather a spontaneous reaction to the US-led coalition’s Operation Enduring Freedom in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The SCO itself says the contact group was created because of the “concerns of the SCO countries about the negative development of the situation in Afghanistan and the intention of the SCO to establish a specific consultative dialogue with Kabul.” While the contact group included the members’ permanent representatives to the SCO, only a few events were ever held.

Indeed, interest in the contact group was only really apparent from the Afghan side, which was looking for SCO assistance in rebuilding the Afghan economy and SCO participation in implementing various energy and transport infrastructure projects and creating favorable conditions for Afghan goods to access the markets of SCO countries. However, none of this was realized. The SCO states preferred, as they still do, to conduct relations with Afghanistan bilaterally, and did not support the efforts of the SCO Secretariat to intensify the work of the contact group. In 2010, Uzbekistan directly indicated its interest in building relations with Afghanistan exclusively on a bilateral basis and stated that it would no longer take part in the contact group.

In June 2012, Afghanistan’s application for SCO observer status was granted. Yet this step was more symbolic and failed to jump-start the development of SCO-Afghanistan relations. In July 2021, a month before the fall of the republican regime in Kabul, a contact group meeting took place in Dushanbe between the foreign ministers of the SCO states and their Afghan counterparts, with a joint statement being adopted.
The contact group continues to exist on paper, but uncertainty about its status prevails, as demonstrated at the Astana summit: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev pointed to the need to restart the contact group, while the Tajik leader Emomali Rahmon stated that there is no legal basis for the contact group and proposed launching an extensive expert discussion of Afghan issues in the format of the SCO member states.

Against a backdrop of stalling UN initiatives on Afghanistan and the growing influence of the SCO in world affairs, the organization could take a firmer stance in the international discourse on Afghanistan. SCO countries cover more than 35 million km², 65% of the territory of Eurasia, and have a combined population of approximately 3.5 billion people, almost half of the planet, accounting for about a quarter of world GDP, and more than 15% of international trade.

In this respect, a potential transformation of the SCO is hoped for, as voiced by Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the Astana summit: “In the context of rapid global changes, we face the urgent task of further improving the SCO’s activity. The ongoing process of expanding the organization opens new opportunities and gives impetus to its development,” he stated. Indeed, Kazakhstan, which currently chairs the organization, has put forward “balanced proposals for transforming the organization into an even more effective multilateral cooperation mechanism” in particular strengthening the SCO Secretariat and the secretary-general.

Objectively, in the current era of turbulence, change and upheaval, when a global crisis of confidence is driving geopolitical conflicts and confrontations, the SCO should cultivate a new regional reality that excludes bloc and confrontational approaches to resolving international problems, which directly affects the entire system of continental and global security. None of the SCO member states are interested in another destabilization of Afghanistan. The mission of the country, historically a geopolitical buffer and a site for proxy wars, should be rethought, and Afghanistan should serve as a link in the SCO space between Central Asia and South Asia, as well as between the north and south of Eurasia.

At the same time, the national interests of all SCO member states are closely linked with the situation in Afghanistan, which should make this a key issue on the organization’s agenda. All the countries interested in future large-scale economic projects in Afghanistan are members of the SCO. These projects include the trans-Afghan railways, the North-South Transport Corridor, and the Central Asian branches of the New Silk Road – which are part of the Partnership Network concept of strategic ports and logistics centers that are being developed within the SCO. In addition, the SCO countries have direct economic interests in other projects, like the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline, the Central Asia–South Asia (CASA-1000) power project, and mining in Afghanistan.

Today’s Afghanistan, following the withdrawal of Western coalition troops, offers the SCO more opportunities to promote the interests of its members in the country. But what is preventing the SCO from taking a firmer stance on Afghanistan? One obvious factor is the need to transform the organization itself, as voiced by the Kazakhstani president.

The new goal of the SCO in Afghanistan could be combining and coordinating the efforts of its member states on trade, and economic as well as political issues. The SCO could act as an agent of the political process on Afghanistan as part of a broader mission to take on some of the most challenging issues of international relations, with the rights and responsibilities of the SCO as an international organization expanded. This is exactly what Astana has in mind.

Japan to Offer Aid to Central Asia

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is set to announce an economic aid package for Central Asia.

According to The Japan Times, details will be revealed during the Japanese prime minister’s meeting with heads of  the five Central Asian states during his visit to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia from August 9 to 12.

Tokyo is seeking to strengthen ties with the region by helping to create a trade route across the Caspian Sea that would link Central Asia and Europe, bypassing Russia. According to the Japanese government, the initiative will reduce the heavy influence of both Russia and China on the region and afford Central Asia economic independence.

Kishida is expected to announce the economic support package in a joint statement following the six-party summit in Kazakhstan on  implementing a new trade route, helping to decarbonize the economy, and promoting people-to-people exchanges.

Japanese companies will also help Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries reduce their dependence on coal by providing technology and loans to develop natural gas production and processing. In exchange, the Central Asian states will send skilled labor to Japan.