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Risk and Reward: Why Savvy Investors Should Dive into Central Asia-Caspian Region

Central Asia-Caspian basin has long been a geopolitical chessboard — fragmented by conflict but dependent on cooperation. In an era of shifting alliances, political instability, and economic uncertainty, multinational corporations (MNCs) must reassess their strategies. While the region's challenges remain considerable, it also presents unique investment opportunities that should not be overlooked. Since the 1990s, operating in post-Soviet Eurasia has been synonymous with political risks. The Central Asian states have sought foreign direct investment (FDI) but face significant obstacles, including weak rule-of-law, inconsistent regulatory frameworks, and entrenched corruption. Yet despite these barriers, the region continues to attract international capital, signaling its long-term potential. Traditionally reliant on oil and gas exports, these countries are now pivoting toward diversification. Nations like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are strengthening ties with the European Union (EU) to balance their historical reliance on Russia’s energy network. This shift is opening new frontiers for investment, particularly in green energy, infrastructure, and technology. However, geopolitical instability remains a critical risk. The war in Ukraine has intensified uncertainties, with Russia, China, the EU, and the U.S. vying for influence. Energy security, once an afterthought, has become a central issue. The closure of the Novorossiysk terminal in early 2023, halting Kazakh oil exports, underscored how quickly geopolitical disruptions can affect supply chains, prompting companies like ExxonMobil to reassess their regional strategies. Yet this volatility also creates opportunities. The region’s economic shift away from resource dependence toward a knowledge-based economy offers fertile ground for businesses willing to invest in infrastructure, technology, and renewable energy. The Caspian basin’s strategic location, as a transit hub for energy to Europe, only heightens its importance in the EU’s efforts to reduce dependency on Russian supplies. For international businesses, this means new markets, sectors, and investment channels are emerging. The post-Covid landscape adds complexity, with digital transformation accelerating across industries. Countries in the Central Asia-Caspian basin are under pressure to adopt these technologies, which could drive long-term economic growth. Yet the gap between ambitious reform plans and their implementation remains wide. Regulatory inefficiencies and bureaucratic hurdles continue to hamper progress, presenting a challenge for foreign investors looking for stability. For multinational corporations, the region presents both risks and significant upsides. On one hand, border disputes, political unpredictability, and regulatory uncertainty create barriers. On the other, the region’s growing role as an energy transit hub and its emerging sectors, from green energy to infrastructure, offer promising avenues for investment. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in particular, have been proactive in bolstering energy exports to Europe, positioning themselves as critical players in the global energy transition. If the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate, the region’s geopolitical risks will undoubtedly increase. However, external actors — particularly the U.S., the EU, and China — are also likely to deepen their involvement, further reshaping the region’s economic and political landscape. The rise of Sino-American tensions only adds another layer of complexity to an already volatile environment. Yet, for companies that can navigate these complexities, the rewards are significant. Central Asia-Caspian basin remains...

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The Ferghana Valley: Navigating Complex Challenges in Central Asia’s Most Volatile Region

The Ferghana Valley is one of Central Asia’s most fertile and densely populated areas, but it is also among the most volatile. Spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, this landlocked region has long been a hotbed of ethnic tension, water disputes, and political instability. These challenges are deeply rooted in the geography, history, and sociopolitical landscape, making the valley a key focal point for understanding broader regional dynamics in Central Asia. Geographical Importance and Ethnic Diversity Nestled between the towering Tien Shan and Pamir Mountain ranges, the Ferghana Valley covers over 22,000 square kilometers. It is fertile land nourished by the Syr Darya River, making it a critical area for cultivating cotton, fruits, and vegetables. These natural resources have historically drawn diverse populations, creating a vibrant ethnic mosaic. The valley is home to Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, as well as smaller ethnic groups. While ethnic Uzbeks form the majority, significant Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities inhabit border regions. The ethnic diversity of the Ferghana Valley is both a strength and a source of tension. Soviet-era border policies exacerbated these divisions by creating artificial boundaries that crisscrossed the valley, leaving behind ethnic enclaves — pockets of one nationality surrounded by the territory of another. These enclaves have complicated governance and territorial integrity, making border management a persistent challenge. The Soviet Legacy and Border Disputes During Soviet rule, the Central Asian republics were organized under Stalin’s divide-and-rule strategy, which deliberately created complex borders to weaken local identities and prevent regional unity. The Ferghana Valley, divided among three Soviet republics, is a prime example of this approach. After the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, the administrative boundaries became international borders overnight between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The lack of clearly defined borders has sparked numerous conflicts over territory, water, and land. A notable clash between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2021 resulted in over 40 deaths and the destruction of homes and infrastructure. Many disputes revolve around access to scarce resources like water and arable land. These issues have escalated into violent confrontations, leading to casualties and the displacement of local populations. Water: A Scarce and Contested Resource Water is the lifeblood of the Ferghana Valley, but disputes over its allocation are a major source of tension. The valley depends heavily on irrigation for its agricultural productivity, and the Syr Darya River, along with its tributaries, plays a crucial role in supplying water to the region. However, the division of the valley among the three countries complicates water management. Uzbekistan, the most populous of the three, relies on the valley’s water resources for its cotton industry, a cornerstone of its economy. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the headwaters of the Syr Darya, often use their upstream position to leverage water access. This dynamic has led to frequent disagreements over water usage. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has at times threatened to withhold water unless it receives compensation, either through payments or electricity. Ethnic Tensions and Political Instability Ethnic tensions further complicate the Ferghana Valley’s already volatile...

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Why Does Energy-Rich Kazakhstan Want Tajikistan’s Uranium?

Despite having significant uranium resources, Tajikistan does not plan to build a nuclear plant anytime soon, if it all. Quite aware of that, Kazakhstan – Dushanbe’s ally in the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – is reportedly eyeing Tajikistan’s uranium. But why? "I would rather earn a profit from the resources of others than my own," John D. Rockefeller, a prominent industrialist, is often paraphrased as saying. Policymakers in Astana could soon begin implementing such a strategy in regard to uranium. Kazakhstan is the largest producer of natural uranium worldwide. In 2022, the energy-rich nation produced the largest share of uranium from mines (43% of world supply), followed by Canada (15%) and Namibia (11%) (ref). In spite of that, Astana could eventually start purchasing the radioactive element from Tajikistan. On August 22, following Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Dushanbe, the Tajik Rare-Earth Metals Company, TajRedMet, and Kazakhstan’s national atomic company, Kazatomprom, signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation in the extraction and processing of uranium and rare-earth metals. Signing such a protocol aligns with Astana’s ambitions to build a nuclear power plant in the country. In that context, Kazatomprom – the world's largest uranium producer – is likely seeking to play an active role in producing uranium fuel for the proposed nuclear plant. Given the global resurgence of nuclear energy and the ensuing “race for uranium,” Kazatomprom is keen to assess the current status of Tajikistan's uranium reserves, and, if feasible, expand its resource base. Uranium is considered one of the main natural resources of Tajikistan. It is believed that the first atomic bomb developed by the Soviet Union contained raw materials from Tajikistan. But after the collapse of the USSR, uranium mining was curtailed in the mountainous country. According to various estimates, 14% of the world's reserves of uranium are located on the territory of the landlocked country of around 10 million people. But compared to other nations, Tajikistan does not have significant uranium mining operations, meaning its uranium deposits remain underdeveloped. However, the fact that Russian companies are interested in exploration and mining of uranium in the Tajikistan suggests that Kazatomprom might have serious competition. It is entirely possible that other foreign corporations will also eventually join the “race for uranium” in Tajikistan. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan will almost certainly be inclined to consolidate its own uranium market. In terms of uranium production in the largest Central Asian state, the Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation Rosatom is the leader due to its shares in five enterprises operating in Kazakhstan. Since Astana aims to develop closer ties with the West, it is no surprise that France is looking to strengthen its position in the energy-rich country, particularly in its nuclear and uranium sectors. Russia and China are unlikely to give up easily on their ambitions to preserve their influence in the Central Asian nation, however. In 2022, Kazakhstan exported around half of its uranium to China. From January to October 2023, Astana shipped uranium worth $922.7 million to the...

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Central Asians Beaten and Deported from Russia

The punishment for many Central Asians in Russia whose work or residency documents are not in order is pain and humiliation, and then possibly deportation. Xenophobia targeting Central Asians in Russia has been on the rise since the March 22 terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall that left more than 140 people dead. Russian authorities apprehended a group of ethnic Tajiks who allegedly carried out the attack and after that the level of prejudice against Central Asians in Russia, which has always existed, dramatically worsened. The treatment of Central Asians at the Sakharovo migration center on the outskirts of Moscow is an example. Moscow courts are likely to send Central Asians caught with document problems to the Sakharovo center. Radio Free Europe’s Kyrgyz Service interviewed several people who passed through the Sakharovo center. Their descriptions shed light on the conditions inside. One man who spent 18 days in the center said, “The day we entered there, they intimidated us, forced us to walk in single file, run fast… then they examined us and beat us with a stun gun.” That jibes with another man’s description. “They call your last name, then you go out into the corridor and run. There they hit you on the back of the head and tell you to ‘run.’” Then, the man continued, “They made me face the wall, forced me to raise my arms up, spread my legs, and started hitting me with a stun gun.” There is an anti-Islamic element to the treatment of detainees at Sakharovo. A different person remembered this about his detention. “They fed us food with pork. Since we were hungry, we removed the meat and ate what was left.” He said there were some people who recited their daily prayers in their rooms. “When one guy was saying namaz, the guards entered. Then one of them (the guards) hit him in the face twice.” When the person continued saying his prayers, the guards said, “Let him go to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and read his prayer there.” Some of the detainees with beards were forcibly shaved. Batygul Moldobayeva is from Kyrgyzstan. She was detained in Moscow this summer with an expired work permit and sent to Sakharovo. Moldobayeva said the guards yelled at women detainees and were rude to them. She added that sometimes the guards “asked them to be their ‘temporary wives.’” Moldobayeva said there were pregnant women in the center, some as far along as six months, and the guards did not pay any attention to their condition. According to Moldobayeva, there were some Kyrgyz citizens at Sakharovo who had been there for three or four months. Askar Uskenbayev is another Kyrgyz citizen who was detained in Moscow in mid-June and sent to Sakharovo. He said he met fellow Kyrgyz citizens who had been there six months. After being deported back to Kyrgyzstan, Moldobayeva posted about her experience on social media and warned Kyrgyz citizens to be sure all their documents were in order if they...

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SCO and Afghanistan on the Cusp of a New Relationship

The hype surrounding the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State in Astana has died down, and the expert community has offered differing takeaways, with some experts optimistic and others cautious. Few, however, have considered what new this summit delivered on Afghanistan. In general, what is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in resolving the political issues around long-suffering Afghanistan and rebuilding its economy? Despite the SCO’s previous hands-off approach to Afghan affairs, the issue of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was raised for the first time at the highest level of the SCO in Astana, which gives hope that the organization will expand its role. In their remarks, almost every SCO head of state touched on Afghanistan in essentially the same vein, stating the need for peace, stability and security, while underlining the fact that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia. Indeed, Afghanistan was mentioned in the final declaration of the Astana summit, with Member States “reaffirming their commitment to asserting Afghanistan as an independent, neutral and peaceful state free from terrorism, war, and narcotic drugs [and voicing] their readiness to support the international community’s efforts to facilitate peace and development in that country.” At the same time, there was a clear message to the Taliban that “the establishment of an inclusive government involving multiple representatives of all ethnic and political groups of Afghan society is the only way toward attaining lasting peace and stability in that country.” These statements represent a rather big step, considering that previously the SCO failed to find a consensus on Afghanistan and develop its own mechanisms to interact with Kabul. The creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group back in 2005 was rather a spontaneous reaction to the US-led coalition's Operation Enduring Freedom in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The SCO itself says the contact group was created because of the "concerns of the SCO countries about the negative development of the situation in Afghanistan and the intention of the SCO to establish a specific consultative dialogue with Kabul." While the contact group included the members’ permanent representatives to the SCO, only a few events were ever held. Indeed, interest in the contact group was only really apparent from the Afghan side, which was looking for SCO assistance in rebuilding the Afghan economy and SCO participation in implementing various energy and transport infrastructure projects and creating favorable conditions for Afghan goods to access the markets of SCO countries. However, none of this was realized. The SCO states preferred, as they still do, to conduct relations with Afghanistan bilaterally, and did not support the efforts of the SCO Secretariat to intensify the work of the contact group. In 2010, Uzbekistan directly indicated its interest in building relations with Afghanistan exclusively on a bilateral basis and stated that it would no longer take part in the contact group. In June 2012, Afghanistan’s application for SCO observer status was granted. Yet this step was more symbolic and failed to...

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Saudi Islamic Development Bank Increasing Its Presence in Central Asia

The Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has been particularly active in Central Asia so far in 2024. The growing IDB role is part of Central Asian region’s foreign policy shift toward the Arab world as financial backers to replace Russia, which is devoting huge attention and resources to its war in Ukraine, and China, which is increasingly reluctant to spend large sums of money in Central Asia after pouring in tens of billions of dollars there during the last 25 years. Some of the Central Asian governments owe China substantial amounts of money that they are unlikely to be able to pay for possibly decades. The Central Asian states have been members of the IDB for many years. Kyrgyzstan was first, joining in 1993, followed by Turkmenistan in 1994, Kazakhstan in 1995, Tajikistan in 1996, and Uzbekistan in 2003. One of the IDB’s three regional offices is in Almaty, Kazakhstan (the other two are in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Rabat, Morocco). The IDB has been dealing individually with the five Central Asian countries on a wide range of projects and programs in recent months. Energy Resources In February, Tajik Minister of Economic Development and Trade Zavqi Zavqizoda announced a deal was reached for the IDB to provide $250 million to Tajikistan. Zavqizoda said $150 million of that would go toward construction of the Rogun hydropower plant (HPP). The Rogun HPP was a Soviet-era project. Construction started in 1976 but was discontinued shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed. Tajikistan restarted work on the HPP in 2008. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has repeatedly said that building the HPP with a planned 3600 MW capacity will make the country energy independent and even allow Tajikistan to bring in extra revenue exporting electricity to neighboring countries. In its 28 years as an IDB member, Tajikistan had received some $620 million from the IDB, so the $250 million announced in February 2024 represents a significant jump in IDB financial help. Not surprisingly, when IDB President Muhammad Al-Jasser visited Kyrgyzstan in June, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov sought IDB investment in the Kambar-Ata-1 HPP, another decades-old project with a multi-billion-dollar price tag that has barely made any progress in being realized during the 33 years Kyrgyzstan has been independent. Al-Jasser did not commit to IDB financing for the Kyrgyz HPP. However, less than a week after Al-Jasser was in Kyrgyzstan, the IDB was one of several international financial organizations that signed on at a conference in Vienna to be a members of a coordination donors’ committee for the Kambar-Ata-1 projects. At a meeting in Istanbul in February, the IDB reaffirmed its support for the Central Asia-South Asia-1000 (CASA-1000) project that aims to export electricity from HPPs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kyrgyz Energy Minister Taalaybek Ibrayev met with Al-Jasser in June during the latter’s visit to Kyrgyzstan to discuss funding for Kyrgyzstan’s section of CASA-1000. Not Only Energy In June, the IDB pledged up to $2 billion in funding for improvements to water management...