Tajikistan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Regional Integration

Opinion: Central Asia Is Consolidating Its Role as a Full-Fledged Actor in Global Processes

The seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Tashkent, was far more than a routine regional gathering. It marked a pivotal moment with the potential to shape the political and economic architecture of the region for the next decade or two. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s keynote address stood out for articulating a forward-looking and comprehensive strategic vision. Notably, he proposed redefining the format itself from a loose “consultative mechanism” into a more cohesive and institutionalized “Central Asian Community.” At the summit, leaders endorsed several landmark documents: the Concept for Regional Security and Stability in Central Asia, the Catalogue of Threats to Central Asia’s Security and measures for their prevention for 2026-2028 and its implementation plan, a joint appeal supporting the Kyrgyz Republic’s candidacy for the UN Security Council, and the decision to admit Azerbaijan as a full-fledged participant. Taken together, these steps signal that Central Asia increasingly sees itself not as a passive bystander amid global geopolitical turbulence, but as an emerging regional actor capable of shaping its own trajectory. Two broader trends deserve special emphasis. First, the region is moving beyond reactive engagement with external initiatives and power blocs. Rather than relying solely on structures created by outside actors, Central Asia is beginning to develop its own institutions. This shift mirrors a global pattern: as the international order becomes more fragmented and unpredictable, regional communities are strengthening their internal mechanisms as a means of resilience. Second, the format envisioned in Tashkent diverges from “Brussels-style integration.” It does not require the transfer or dilution of sovereignty. Instead, it relies on soft integration, consultation, consensus-building, and phased convergence. As President Mirziyoyev noted, having a shared and realistic sense of “what we want our region to look like in 10-20 years” is essential. Without such a vision, Central Asia risks remaining the object of great-power competition rather than an autonomous participant in it. One of the summit’s most consequential developments was the decision to welcome Azerbaijan as a full-fledged member of the format. The emerging political and economic bridge between Central Asia and the South Caucasus is quickly becoming not only a transit nexus but also a cornerstone of a broader geopolitical space. The strengthening of Trans-Caspian corridors, the advancement of the “China – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan” railway, the Trans-Afghan corridor, and the alignment of Caspian Sea transport routes will significantly expand the region’s strategic and economic potential. A further nuance is worth highlighting: Azerbaijan’s long-standing ties with the Western political and security architecture, through NATO partnership mechanisms and energy corridors, as well as its membership in the Organization of Turkic States, introduce new layers of connectivity. Its inclusion repositions the “Central Asian Community” from a post-Soviet platform into a wider geopolitical constellation spanning Eurasia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East. For Central Asian states, this new configuration opens additional room for multi-vector diplomacy and reduces the risks of unilateral dependence. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not...

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

Opinion: A Trump Visit to Central Asia Would Deliver Results and Anchor a Corridor Strategy

On November 6, Washington will host the C5+1 leaders’ summit, marking the format’s 10th anniversary and signaling a rare alignment of political attention and regional appetite for concrete outcomes. The date is confirmed by regional and U.S.-focused reporting, with Kazakhstan’s presidency and multiple outlets noting heads-of-state attendance in the U.S. capital. This timing is decisive. Russia’s bandwidth is constrained by the war in Ukraine, China’s trade weight in Central Asia has grown, and European demand for secure inputs and routes has intensified. All these developments together create a window where a visible United States presence can meaningfully alter the deal flow. A visit sequenced off the November C5+1 will attach U.S. political attention to minerals, corridors, and standards that regional governments already prioritize, confirming the conversion of the summit's symbolism into leverage. Washington already has the instruments but has lacked a synchronized presence. Development finance, export credit, and C5+1 working groups exist, yet announcements have too often outpaced commissioning. A targeted tour could unveil named offtakes, corridor slot guarantees, and training compacts. This would move from the dialogue to bankable packages if paired with financing envelopes, posted schedules, and third-party verification. Deals, dates, and delivery would make operational signals clear to partners and competitors alike. Strategic Rationale and Operating Concept The United States has three clear goals. These are to diversify critical minerals away from single-point dependency on China, de-risk trans-Eurasian routes that connect Asian manufacturing to European demand, and reinforce the sovereignty of the states in the region without pressuring them to choose sides in great-power competition over other issues. These imperatives already guide the national-security strategies of Central Asian governments, which implement them according to multi-vector doctrines. A presidential visit that treats minerals, corridors, and standards as a single package would show that Washington is prepared to move forward on the same problem set that the region has defined for itself. The ways to do that are through finance-first diplomacy and an end-to-end corridor approach, including the Caspian crossing. Finance-first diplomacy pairs every political announcement with insurance, offtake letters, and term sheets (short non-binding summaries of key commercial and legal terms for a proposed deal). These signal the intention to convert declarations into commissioning. An end-to-end corridor approach accepts the physical reality that Central Asian outputs move west through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and across the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan functioning as the hinge that makes Europe reachable at scale. Each element of the “minerals–corridors–standards” triad reinforces the others when the whole is pursued as a single program. Reliable customs and traceability raise corridor credibility, which raises project bankability, which in turn attracts the private capital required for mineral processing. The instrumentalities for this already exist. The C5+1 framework can be tasked to track deliverables; the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can cover risk and long-term debt; aid and technical programs of the Department of State and Commerce can align standards, procurement integrity, and traceable supply chains; U.S. universities and labs can...

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Contact Group on Afghanistan – Central Asia Formulates a Regional Position

On August 26, special representatives on Afghanistan from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met for the first time in Tashkent. The meeting resulted in the creation of a permanent regional platform: the Contact Group on Afghanistan. This gathering was not only a continuation of commitments outlined in the joint statement from the most recent Consultative Summit of Central Asian heads of state, but also a step toward preparing for the next high-level format, scheduled for November in Tashkent. Formally, Turkmenistan was absent. Available information suggests the reasons were purely technical. Ashgabat was ready to join and expressed support for the results through its foreign ministry channels. The key outcome is that Central Asian states have, for the first time, shown their readiness to speak with one voice on an issue long shaped by competing external interests. This is not the start of forming a common position; that had already developed de facto in recent years. All Central Asian countries have supported trade and transit with Afghanistan, continued supplying electricity and food, and maintained working contacts with the Taliban, while avoiding extremes. The Tashkent meeting institutionalized this approach: parallel tracks have now shifted, cautiously, toward coordination. Informal unity has been formalized into a tool. Unlike external players, who often cloak interests in grand rhetoric, Central Asia acts openly and pragmatically. The logic is simple: whatever is done for Afghanistan is, in fact, done for oneself. That is the distinctive feature of the regional approach - no ideological cover, no attempts to reshape Afghanistan. Examples are straightforward. Electricity continues to flow even when payments are delayed - not as charity, but as an investment in security. A blackout in Afghanistan could trigger refugee flows and threats heading north. Exports of flour and fuel sustain Afghan markets but also expand outlets for Central Asian producers. Participation in trans-Afghan corridors is not a gift to Kabul but an opportunity for Central Asia to anchor itself in southern logistics routes. Ultimately, every step “for Afghanistan” is primarily for the region itself. If Kabul ignores basic rules, cooperation will simply stop. In politics, there are no eternal friends, only eternal interests. The new format does not yet imply collective pressure on the Taliban. Rather, it creates conditions for each country to conduct more substantive bilateral dialogue, but grounded in a shared position. Until now, Central Asia has mainly spoken to the Taliban about trade, transit, and infrastructure. The Contact Group now makes it possible to add another dimension: clarifying boundaries of what is acceptable on issues like extremism, border escalation, or water pressure. For now, “red lines” are unlikely, since the Taliban have not crossed them. The situation remains manageable, leaving room for constructive dialogue. Equally important, the Contact Group is not a threat or ultimatum. Coordination is meant to expand opportunities for dialogue, not limit them. In the long run, this could evolve into a sustainable C5+A format. Afghanistan would then be integrated into regional frameworks not as a problem to be managed, but as...

SCO Summit

Opinion: China’s Diplomatic Power Play Unfolds in Tianjin

On August 31, the next SCO Plus summit will begin in the Chinese city of Tianjin and run through to September 1. Judging by the list of participants, China, under Chairman Xi Jinping, is positioning itself to challenge the United States for influence over the global geopolitical agenda. As part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, Xi will host a formal banquet for the attending heads of state, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Xi is also scheduled to chair the 25th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State and lead the expanded SCO Plus session - the largest since the establishment of the organization - where he will deliver a keynote address. Clues to the themes of Xi’s speech can be found in the diverse array of leaders expected to attend. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Bin confirmed at a Beijing press conference that among the SCO member states, participants will include Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Several leaders from non-member states will also join, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh; Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev; Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto; and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, whose participation suggests Ashgabat’s cautious but growing interest in regional dialogue. Also in attendance will be the prime ministers of Armenia (Nikol Pashinyan), Cambodia (Hun Manet), Nepal (Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli), Egypt (Mostafa Madbouly), Malaysia (Anwar Ibrahim), and Vietnam (Pham Minh Chinh). The summit will also host key international institutional leaders, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres; SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev; CIS Secretary-General Sergey Lebedev; ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn; CSTO Secretary-General Imangali Tasmagambetov; EAEU Chairman Bakytzhan Sagintayev; and AIIB President Zhou Ji. Kazakhstan will be prominently represented. In addition to President Tokayev, three high-profile Kazakhs mentioned above - Yermekbayev, Tasmagambetov, and Sagintayev - will attend in their capacities as heads of international organizations. Their presence signals Astana’s growing diplomatic weight and reflects the strategic outreach led by Tokayev, himself a former UN Deputy Secretary-General. This background likely contributes to the rapport between Kazakhstan and Guterres. The summit will also inevitably draw attention due to the presence of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, figures central to the ongoing realignment in the South Caucasus. Both Baku and Yerevan have increasingly distanced themselves from Moscow, favoring closer ties with Turkey and the United States. The recent peace agreement between Aliyev and Pashinyan, signed in the presence of President Trump, underscored the growing American role in the region and the diminishing influence of Russia. While Moscow appears willing to tolerate this shift, Tehran views it with deep concern, especially after its recent 12-day conflict with Israel. Russia, for its part, seems to be signaling disengagement from the region. Its silence in response to Baku and Yerevan’s Western overtures suggests strategic apathy, if not withdrawal. Beijing, of course, is...

Opinion

The Rise of Regionalism in Central Asia: From Divisions to Dialogue

In recent years, Central Asia has undergone a remarkable transformation — from a region historically marked by political divisions and competing national interests, to one increasingly characterised by cooperation and dialogue. Today, Central Asian countries are exploring the idea of strategic autonomy and greater regional solidarity, not as an abstract ambition, but as a practical response to the shared challenges and opportunities they have. A key institutional vehicle for this evolving cooperation is the Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders. Unlike formal international summits, this forum allows for open and informal dialogue between heads of state. It is valued precisely because it enables leaders to discuss sensitive regional matters candidly, without the constraints of protocol. The momentum for regional cooperation is clearly growing, and this forum has become a symbol of Central Asia’s desire to take its future into its own hands. Beyond this, the countries of Central Asia cooperate through platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Organisation of Turkic States, both of which offer multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security, economic integration, and cultural exchange. Importantly, what was once a region of competing national agendas is now evolving into a space of shared strategic vision, including coordinated positions in international forums such as the United Nations. Additionally, in recent years, the foreign policies of Central Asian countries have demonstrated more and more coordination and regional alignment, especially in their engagement with external partners. This shift is reflected in the emergence of multilateral dialogue formats between Central Asia and key global actors. Notably, the European Union–Central Asia Summit, most recently held in Samarkand in 2025, underlined a shared commitment to regional connectivity, sustainable development, and mutual security. Similar formats have been institutionalised with other global players, such as the C5+1 format with the United States, focusing on green transition, economic reforms, and regional security. Germany has also advanced a Central Asia–Germany high-level dialogue, including the “Berlin Initiative,” aimed at promoting green energy, vocational training, and the rule of law. Meanwhile, Italy has launched its Central Asia + Italy format as part of its strategy to diversify partnerships in Eurasia and promote economic diplomacy. These platforms reflect a common approach, where Central Asian countries are increasingly choosing to engage as a bloc, rather than solely through bilateral channels. This enhances their negotiating capacity, visibility, and strategic coherence on the global stage. While each country maintains its sovereignty and specific foreign policy priorities, there is a growing recognition that regional solidarity amplifies voices and leverage in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. This shift aligns with the broader regional identity-building efforts under the Consultative Meetings of Central Asian Leaders, and reflects a pragmatic understanding that shared challenges — such as water management, climate adaptation, and migration — are better addressed collectively and in concert with international partners. Common regional challenges also drive this growing convergence. Climate change, water scarcity, and labor migration are issues that transcend borders. One of the most pressing concerns is the region’s vulnerability due to...

Central Asia-China Summit

Opinion: From Xi’an to Astana – Elevating China–Central Asia Cooperation to a New Height

As summer awakens the vibrant landscapes of Kazakhstan, with lilac blossoms aglow and the Ishim River meandering through the capital, Astana is once again at the center of regional diplomacy. From June 16 to 18, Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Kazakhstan to attend the Second China–Central Asia Summit — an event of both symbolic weight and strategic substance. This year’s summit marks more than a diplomatic gathering — it signifies the maturing of a young but increasingly impactful multilateral framework born from centuries-old ties. From the ancient Silk Road to today’s modern infrastructure corridors, the five Central Asian nations and China are deepening a relationship rooted in trust, driven by mutual benefit, and destined to shape the region’s collective future. Ancient Friendship, Strategic Renewal More than 2,100 years ago, Chinese envoy Zhang Qian opened the first pathway to Central Asia, laying the groundwork for millennia of exchange. In 2013, standing in Kazakhstan, President Xi unveiled the Silk Road Economic Belt, the founding vision of what would become the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reviving the spirit of the ancient Silk Road for a new era. Since then, cooperation between China and Central Asia has grown from historical affinity into a full-spectrum partnership. Over the past decade, this partnership has reached “three completions”: the full establishment of comprehensive strategic partnerships between China and all five Central Asian countries, full coverage of BRI cooperation documents, and full alignment with the concept of a shared future for humanity. These milestones demonstrate not just diplomatic intent but a shared strategic outlook that has withstood global uncertainties. As Xi noted, the decision to deepen China–Central Asia cooperation is not a product of convenience, but a generational choice made by leaders with long-term vision, responding to the will of their peoples and the imperatives of regional stability. Tangible Results: A Shared Path to Modernization Since the launch of the China–Central Asia mechanism in 2020, progress has accelerated. The elevation of this platform to the leaders’ level in 2023 during the Xi’an Summit underscored its growing relevance. From the Xi’an Declaration to the establishment of a permanent secretariat, institutional foundations are now firmly in place. More importantly, the mechanism is delivering real results. Trade between China and the five Central Asian states reached a record $94.8 billion in 2024, a $5.4 billion increase from the previous year. New cooperation structures in transport, agriculture, customs, and emergency management are enabling efficient multilateral coordination. A flagship example is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, now under active construction, marking a milestone in physical connectivity. This long-anticipated project, personally championed by the three heads of state, will reshape regional logistics and unlock new trade routes across Eurasia. Beyond rail, a web of cooperation is forming: the high-functioning Khorgos Gateway and the newly launched Kazakhstan Xi’an Terminal, increased Caspian Sea corridor traffic, and regularized freight trains between China and Central Asia. These are not mere infrastructure projects — they are lifelines of mutual development. Kazakhstan, in particular, is actively reinforcing its role as...