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28 Apr 2026

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Crackdown on Private Taxis Complicates Life for Residents of Ashgabat’s Outskirts

April 28, 2026
By Vagit Ismailov

In Turkmenistan’s capital, Ashgabat, traffic police have intensified inspections of private taxi drivers in outlying districts such as Choganly, Garadamak, and Shor. While the measures are formally aimed at curbing informal transport services, they have had significant consequences for local residents.

Public transport technically operates in these areas, but routes largely run along main roads. Those living farther away often have to walk several kilometers to reach their homes. According to residents, private drivers previously helped bridge this gap by offering rides from bus stops. That option has now largely disappeared.

Drivers are being stopped, fined, or, according to eyewitness accounts, asked to pay bribes. As a result, not only the drivers, many of whom rely on informal taxi services as one of the few sources of income amid unemployment, are affected, but also passengers. People with children or heavy bags are increasingly forced to walk.

The situation is further aggravated by earlier restrictions. Around two years ago, at the request of city authorities, small shops were closed across the capital, including in these districts. As a result, residents must now travel to supermarkets or markets to buy groceries. This has led many to purchase goods in bulk, making the journey home even more difficult.

Conditions are particularly challenging on more remote streets. For example, Ashgabat Street deep within Choganly is poorly developed, lacking sidewalks and turning into muddy streams during rainy weather. Residents say that walking in such conditions is difficult and nearly impossible with strollers or heavy bags. The street branches into smaller roads, many of which are unpaved. As a result, even routine trips outside the home can become a serious challenge.

More broadly, residents note that restrictions are being introduced faster than basic infrastructure problems are being addressed. In such conditions, any tightening of regulations has an immediate and tangible impact on daily life.

28 Apr 2026

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A View from Afghanistan: Silk Seven Plus a New Framework for Regional Integration

April 28, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

In recent years, regional integration has increasingly become a key instrument in countries’ economic and foreign policy strategies. This is particularly relevant for Central Asia, a landlocked region facing structural constraints in accessing global markets.

In this context, the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative, recently introduced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, has drawn attention. The concept is currently being promoted in Washington. According to its authors, the initiative has received “overwhelming bipartisan support from leading members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.”

S7+ is positioned as a multi-stage framework for regional coordination centered on the countries of Central Asia, with plans for gradual expansion, first to Afghanistan and Azerbaijan, and potentially later to Pakistan.

The initiative appears to propose a new model of cooperation focused on developing transport connectivity, facilitating trade, and coordinating economic policy among countries in Central and South Asia, as well as neighboring regions.

Unlike traditional integration formats, S7+ is designed as a flexible, network-based framework rather than a rigid institutional structure. It functions more as a platform for practical cooperation, including the development of transit routes, the digitization of customs procedures, the reduction of logistics costs, and the expansion of trade and investment flows. This approach allows countries to participate voluntarily and at varying levels of engagement.

Within this model, Central Asia is viewed as a key region for the formation of new economic linkages. Strengthening transport connectivity, diversifying trade routes, and reducing dependence on a limited number of corridors could enhance the resilience of regional economies and support deeper integration into global supply chains.

Afghanistan holds particular significance within the S7+ framework. Geographically, it lies at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, positioning it as a potential transit bridge. The development of routes through Afghanistan could shorten transport distances and improve regional logistics efficiency.

In practice, however, this potential faces significant constraints. Key challenges include underdeveloped infrastructure, institutional limitations, and a lack of international recognition. These factors restrict Afghanistan’s ability to fully participate in multilateral initiatives and limit its access to investment and financial resources.

At the same time, the flexibility of the S7+ format may create opportunities for Afghanistan’s gradual involvement. Unlike formal organizations, the initiative allows participation on a project-by-project basis without requiring full institutional integration. This aligns with the country’s current model of external engagement, where practical cooperation continues despite the absence of formal recognition.

A comparison between S7+ and traditional regional formats highlights key differences. Existing frameworks, such as regional cooperation programs, typically rely on formal agreements and institutional mechanisms. In contrast, S7+ emphasizes flexibility, pragmatism, and the implementation of specific projects, potentially reducing political sensitivities and prioritizing economic interests.

In a broader geopolitical context, interpretations of the initiative vary. For some external actors, it may signal the emergence of alternative transport routes and reduced dependence on established corridors. For others, it represents a complementary element within existing economic strategies. In any case, S7+ reflects intensifying competition over the development of Eurasia’s transport and logistics architecture.

For Central Asian countries, such initiatives offer additional opportunities, not only to expand trade ties but also to pursue more flexible and diversified foreign economic policies.

Overall, Silk Seven Plus remains largely conceptual. Nevertheless, its emergence reflects a broader trend: a shift from rigid models of cooperation toward more flexible, network-based, and project-oriented approaches to regional integration.

The future of the initiative will depend on participating countries’ ability to translate it into practice, as well as on the broader political and economic environment in the region.

Adapted translation Open World Policy Lab, Astana

28 Apr 2026

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Bishkek Warns of Risks to Ties Over EU Sanctions Decision

April 28, 2026
By Vagit Ismailov

Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed concern over the inclusion of Kyrgyz legal entities in the European Union’s 20th sanctions package against Russia, including the application of the so-called anti-circumvention mechanism.

In a statement, the ministry said Bishkek adheres to an “open, responsible, and constructive approach” in its dialogue with the European Union on mitigating sanctions-related risks and advocates for mutual consideration of interests, as well as transparency and trust.

The Foreign Ministry noted that despite ongoing negotiations, regular contacts with European partners, and the provision of requested information, including details of measures taken by state authorities, the Kyrgyz position, in its view, “is not being taken into account.”

“It is a matter of concern that the position of the Kyrgyz side is effectively being ignored,” the statement said.

The ministry also emphasized that such decisions could undermine trust in bilateral relations and contradict the EU’s stated intention to develop cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries.

Bishkek further expressed concern over the use of unilateral restrictive measures affecting third countries.

The Foreign Ministry called on the EU to engage in a “transparent, professional, and depoliticized dialogue,” as well as to adopt a more consistent and balanced approach that takes into account Kyrgyzstan’s position and previously reached agreements.

The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the EU had stepped up sanctions pressure on Kyrgyzstan by restricting supplies of sensitive technologies and imposing measures on the country’s financial institutions. Brussels is concerned that the Central Asian republic may be used as a transit hub to circumvent sanctions.

According to European Commission data, imports of sensitive goods from the EU to Kyrgyzstan surged by nearly 800% in 2025 compared to pre-war levels, while exports of similar goods from Kyrgyzstan to Russia increased by approximately 1,200%.

28 Apr 2026

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Iran Proposes Defense Cooperation to SCO Partners at Bishkek Meeting

April 30, 2026
By Stephen M. Bland

Iran used a Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense meeting in Bishkek to signal that it is ready to share military experience and defense capabilities with other SCO members, giving a sharper geopolitical edge to the gathering hosted by Kyrgyzstan under its current chairmanship of the bloc.

The meeting of SCO defense ministers opened on April 28 at the Ala-Archa state residence in Bishkek. Defense officials from the organization’s member states attended, along with SCO Secretary General Nurlan Yermekbayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Ruslan Mukambetov chaired the session.

Iran was represented by Deputy Defense Minister Reza Talaei-Nik. In a statement carried by Mehr News Agency, Talaei-Nik said Iran was ready to share its defense weapons capabilities and experience with “independent countries,” especially SCO member states. He also described the SCO as part of a wider shift away from what Tehran called a “unipolar” international order.

The remarks came after weeks of fighting between Iran, the United States, and Israel, including Iranian drone and missile strikes on U.S. bases in the region and Israeli sites. A ceasefire announced earlier this month reduced hostilities, but efforts to reach a wider settlement have stalled.

Talaei-Nik also used the meeting to frame the recent conflict as a lesson for other states, declaring, “We are ready to share our experiences in defeating America with other members of the organization.”

The SCO meeting gave Tehran a platform inside a bloc that now includes China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran became a full member in 2023. The SCO also has a wider circle of observer states and dialogue partners, including 15 dialogue partners listed by the organization’s secretariat.

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov received the SCO defense delegations before the ministerial session. He said Kyrgyzstan, as the SCO chair, attaches special importance to practical defense cooperation, including joint exercises, experience-sharing, and stronger coordination. He said agreements reached in Bishkek should strengthen defense cooperation and security across the SCO region.

Kyrgyzstan’s SCO chairmanship is being held under the slogan “25 Years of the SCO: Together Towards Sustainable Peace, Development, and Prosperity.” Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Mukambetov said the organization needed solidarity, mutual trust, and collective responsibility to respond to current security challenges. Kyrgyz state agency Kabar said the participants discussed military cooperation, regional security, and joint responses to current threats.

The SCO began as a border-security framework. Its roots go back to agreements signed in 1996 and 1997 by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan on military trust and troop reductions along border areas. Uzbekistan later joined, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formally founded in 2001. Since then, the bloc has grown into a wider Eurasian platform covering security, defense contacts, counterterrorism, transport, energy, and economic cooperation.

Talaei-Nik also held talks with Russian and Belarusian defense officials on the fringes of the Bishkek meeting, with both sides discussing continued cooperation with Tehran.

For Central Asian governments, including non-SCO member Turkmenistan, the Bishkek meeting highlighted the pressures facing multi-vector diplomacy. All five have spent years balancing security ties with Russia, deepening economic ties with China, engagement with the United States and Europe, and links to the wider Islamic world. That approach gives them room to maneuver, but it also means that conflicts involving Iran, Russia, China, or the West can quickly enter regional platforms such as the SCO, especially when security cooperation is already on the agenda.

28 Apr 2026

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Opinion: As Water Runs Short, Uzbekistan Faces New Migration Pressure

April 28, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

In the 21^st century, Uzbekistan is no longer just confronting an ecological crisis – it is on the verge of socio-political transformations driven by water. As agricultural lands are being degraded and river flows are decreasing, the country is now facing what experts describe as a “slow-onset disaster”: internal climate migration.

The roots of this crisis go back to the tragedy of the Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth-largest lake, which has shrunk to roughly 10% of its original area since the 1960s largely due to Soviet-era irrigation projects. The human toll has been enormous: not only is agriculture in decline, but the lives of the people living in the Aral Sea region have been profoundly altered. Each year, storms lift an estimated 15 million to 75 million tons of sand, dust, and salt from the dried Aral seabed, spreading it across Uzbekistan and the wider region. Now, another challenge is looming – the water supply. In 2018, 79,942 internally displaced people were reported in Uzbekistan. The dwindling water supply and the threat to agro-ecosystems are creating a new generation of climate migrants. The number of climate-related displacements is expected to reach 200,000 in the coming years.

The Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, Uzbekistan’s hydrological lifelines, are under growing strain from climate change, inefficient irrigation, and transboundary water-distribution pressures. Experts warn that the country’s water deficit could reach 7 billion cubic meters by 2030, and 15 billion cubic meters by 2050. The World Bank predicts that Uzbekistan’s economy could shrink by 10% by 2050 if no meaningful action is taken to adapt to climate change.

Now, another new factor threatens to accelerate this trend. The Taliban government in Afghanistan is building the Qosh Tepa Canal, a 285-kilometer irrigation project that will divert water from the Amu Darya River. According to Rieks Bosch, an international expert on natural resources and economics, the canal will divert 20% of the Amu Darya’s water, which will exacerbate water shortages in some parts of Uzbekistan and negatively affect agriculture. “In any case, Uzbekistan will definitely suffer,” he said. Analyses show that up to 250,000 people could lose their jobs in agriculture as a result of water shortages.

The most vulnerable regions – Bukhara, Khorezm, Karakalpakstan, Surkhandarya, and Kashkadarya – are located mainly in rural areas and depend on agriculture and livestock. With almost half of Uzbekistan’s population living outside urban centers, the loss of agricultural viability is not just an economic problem; it is the disruption of a way of life.

“Water scarcity, air pollution, biodiversity loss, and a sharp decline in agricultural productivity are constantly increasing,” President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said at COP 28, acknowledging that these problems are “reaching their “critical peak.” Yet policy responses are still lagging behind the pace of environmental change.

Uzbekistan’s climate migration problem cannot be solved by managing water resources alone. This requires a new strategic framework – a “Water-Migration-Security” strategy that combines regional cooperation, innovative water-saving technologies in agriculture, and proactive adaptation measures for the communities most at risk. The window for action is narrowing. Today’s farmers are potentially tomorrow’s environmental refugees.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

28 Apr 2026

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Japarov, Tashiyev, and the Kompromat War

April 29, 2026
By Bruce Pannier

Kyrgyzstan has seen three revolutions since 2005. It has been a politically active country since becoming independent in late 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. But since the current President Sadyr Japarov came to power after the 2020 revolution, he and his long-time friend and security chief, Kamchybek Tashiyev, have stifled expressions of public discontent.

For the last five years, Kyrgyzstan’s political scene has been uncharacteristically quiet. But events since Japarov sacked Tashiyev on February 10 have raised speculation that a fierce political battle between the two powerful men now looms ahead for the country.

Japarov has already fired the first shots. Accusations of corruption against Tashiyev and his family have led to arrests. But two can play at that game, and the former security likely has compromising information about Japarov and his family.

“You Can’t Cook Two Sheep’s Heads in One Cauldron”

The February 10 announcement of Tashiyev’s firing was arguably Kyrgyzstan’s biggest political shock since the October 2020 revolution that saw Japarov go from a prison cell to simultaneously occupying the posts of prime minister and president within ten days.

The two had been friends for decades, they started their political careers about the same time, and both quickly rose through the ranks of government during the presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was ousted in the 2010 revolution. The day after he was confirmed as president, Japarov appointed Tashiyev to be head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB).

The day before Tashiyev was sacked, a group of 75 prominent figures, who included former government officials, released an open letter to President Japarov and the speaker of parliament calling for an early presidential election. The group pointed to the discrepancy over whether Japarov was serving the six-year presidential term mandated in the 2010 constitution or the five-year term stipulated in the constitution adopted in April 2021, three months after the snap presidential election that Japarov won.

It quickly became apparent that Tashiyev’s dismissal and the letter were connected. The same day Tashiyev was fired, so were several top GKNB officials, with the sacking of officials said to be close to Tashiyev continuing for days. Japarov’s spokesman said it was necessary to “prevent a split in society.”

However, Japarov has avoided any detailed explanation of the reasons for the many changes and repeatedly described Tashiyev as a friend.

Member of Parliament Elvira Surabaldiyeva, in an April 24 interview with a Kazakh journalist, said Tashiyev was dismissed because he was planning a coup and had been preparing it for a long time. “The president is going through a very difficult time right now, because his longtime friend tried to remove him from office,” Surabaldiyeva said, and added, “There’s a saying: ‘You can’t cook two sheep’s heads in one cauldron.’ This seems to be exactly the case.”

Kompromat

Tashiyev was out of Kyrgyzstan when the news broke that he had been fired. He briefly returned on February 13, leaving again on February 17. He returned on March 19 and the same day went to the Interior Ministry as a “witness” to answer questions about Kyrgyzneftegaz, the state oil company.

Kyrgyzstan’s State Tax Service is investigating corruption allegations at Kyrgyzneftegaz that date back more than four years and involve Tashiyev and members of his family. State Tax Service chief Almambet Shykmamatov said on March 17, “Kyrgyzneftegaz was under the complete control of the GKNB,” and that during the time Tashiyev was GKNB chief, it was impossible to check on the company’s activities.

Tashiyev’s nephew, Baigazy Matisakov, who was the head of the Kyrgyzneftegaz refinery, was detained on March 18. Tashiyev’s son, Tay-Muras, who is connected to the private company, Moko Group, that is accused of buying oil and reselling it to Kyrgyzneftegaz, was questioned by the Interior Ministry in March.

At the start of April, Tashiyev’s brother Shairbek was arrested in connection with the Kyrgyzneftegaz investigation. Shairbek was a parliamentary deputy when his brother was fired. Shairbek at first said he was not concerned with his brother’s dismissal and would remain in parliament. He was questioned at the Interior Ministry on March 13 and handed in a letter resigning from parliament the next day.

After Surabaldiyeva’s interview, Japarov spoke with Kaktus Media, and while not confirming there was evidence of a coup plot, he said any decision about Kamchybek Tashiyev’s role was a matter for investigators and the courts.

It seems the net is tightening around Kamchybek Tashiyev and that it might only be a matter of time before he, too, is detained and facing charges.

Two Can Play at that Game

There could be, and probably are, more allegations of wrongdoing involving Kamchybek Tashiyev, members of his family, or close associates. But the business dealings of Japarov and members of his family might not bear scrutiny either.

In March 2017, Japarov was arrested as he tried to re-enter Kyrgyzstan. He fled the country in late 2013 to avoid facing criminal charges that included making death threats, hostage taking, hooliganism, and use of violence against a government official. He was convicted after returning in 2017, and languished in prison until supporters freed him after the October 2020 revolution.

After Japarov became president, the Supreme Court reviewed and overturned the 2017 verdict against him.

At the time he was detained in 2017, Kyrgyzstan’s independent outlet Kaktus Media recalled that in 2009, under then-President Bakiyev, Japarov was head of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption. “It is unclear how Japarov fought corruption,” Kaktus wrote, noting that “there was so much corruption” that it was impossible to keep track of.

The former owner of Investbank Issyk-Kul, Bolot Baykozhoyev, alleged that Japarov embezzled some $400,000 from the bank in 2004. In 2007, Investbank Issyk-Kul was illegally seized by a group that included Bakiyev’s son Maksim and Japarov’s sister Raykul. Just before she was convicted on money laundering charges in 2014 and sentenced to seven years in prison, Raykul fled Kyrgyzstan. In 2015, she was convicted of illegally taking over Investbank Issyk-Kul and sentenced to an additional ten years in prison.

Days after her brother was elected president, Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court overturned the verdict against Raykul.

Japarov’s nephew, Ulan Japarov, was detained for corruption in July 2023 and eventually placed under house arrest in October 2023 while his investigation was being conducted. President Japarov said at the time that his nephew’s arrest should serve as an example to all his relatives that he would not intervene if they were caught breaking the law.

While still being investigated for corruption, Ulan Japarov was arrested again in July 2024 for embezzlement, but by September 2024, a Bishkek court had ordered him released.

Japarov has five brothers and five sisters, and they have offspring, so the chances that some in the Japarov clan have been using Sadyr’s position as president to further their own careers cannot be ruled out.

The Uzbek Card

One of the most interesting cards Tashiyev might have and could play concerns Uzbekistan.

On the day of the announcement that Tashiyev had been sacked, there were reports that Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Japarov “held a phone call.” The reports are careful not to clarify who called whom. But the information that is provided, that the two presidents discussed joint railway and hydropower projects, seems questionable, given that Kyrgyzstan was facing what parliamentary deputy Surabaldiyeva now describes as a coup attempt.

As GKNB chief, Tashiyev worked to eradicate organized crime. Some of the links of Kyrgyzstan’s organized criminal world extended into Uzbekistan. In August 2024, the GKNB put out a warrant for Uzbek crime boss Salim Abduvaliyev for his ties to Kyrgyz mafia kingpin Kamchy Kolbayev, aka Kolya Kyrgyz, who was killed in a GKNB raid on a Bishkek restaurant in October 2023.

Two members of Kyrgyzstan’s parliament were stripped of their mandates over ties to Abduvaliyev. Tashiyev said in January 2025 that there was a time when Abduvaliyev “completely” controlled organized crime in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Abduvaliyev supported Mirziyoyev to become Uzbekistan’s new president after the country’s first, and until then, only president, Islam Karimov, died in the summer of 2016. Ahead of the December 2016 snap presidential election, Abduvaliyev posted a photo of himself wearing a T-shirt with Mirziyoyev’s photo and the words “My President” written on it.

An Uzbek court sentenced Abduvaliyev to six years in prison in March 2024, after the notorious crime boss was found guilty of illegal firearms, but he was released for health reasons in January 2025.

There is also the case of Habibullah Abdukadyr, a Chinese-born Uyghur businessman who is allegedly tied to organized criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The GKNB’s investigations into organized crime when Tashiyev headed the security service likely uncovered information about the underworld in Uzbekistan and Uzbek officials connected to organized crime. That might explain the February 10 phone call between Mirziyoyev and Tashiyev, and might also explain why Tashiyev still remains free in Kyrgyzstan.

With Kyrgyzstan set to conduct a presidential election in January 2027, it seems the current standoff cannot last for very long, and the big question now is, will Japarov or Tashiyev make the next move?