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17 Oct 2025

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Moody’s Assigns Kyrgyzstan First-Ever Positive Outlook

October 17, 2025
By Anton Chipegin

For the first time, international credit rating agency Moody’s has assigned Kyrgyzstan a positive outlook, while reaffirming the country’s sovereign credit rating at B3. According to the Ministry of Finance, the shift reflects Kyrgyzstan’s stable economic growth.

Finance Minister Almaz Baketaev met with Moody’s Managing Director David Aldrich on the eve of the announcement. Discussions covered areas of future cooperation, Kyrgyzstan’s investment profile, strategies for attracting external financing, and the country’s credit trajectory.

“Moody’s has revised its outlook on the Kyrgyz Republic’s sovereign credit rating from stable to positive, confirming the long-term rating at B3. The economy is demonstrating steady growth: real GDP for January to July 2025 rose by 11.5%,” the Ministry of Finance stated. “In May 2025, Kyrgyzstan successfully issued its first Eurobonds, raising $700 million. Investor demand exceeded supply threefold, with a five-year maturity and a 7.75% coupon rate.”

The ministry noted that all proceeds from the Eurobond issuance have been placed in a dedicated account to manage public debt responsibly.

Kyrgyzstan’s B3 rating has remained unchanged in recent years. While Moody’s upgraded the country’s outlook from negative to stable in 2024, this year marks the first time the outlook has been revised to positive.

The Ministry of Economy described the revised outlook as recognition of the government’s efforts to stabilize and grow the economy.

“The updated forecast reflects improvements in Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomic and fiscal indicators, as well as stronger long-term development potential,” the ministry noted. “These results stem from key reforms, economic diversification, and sustained infrastructure investment.”

According to official figures, all sectors of the economy posted growth in the first half of 2025. Construction recorded the highest increase at 45% since the start of the year, while agriculture saw the most modest growth at 3.8%. Total GDP for the first six months of the year amounted to 711 billion soms.

17 Oct 2025

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Kazakhstan’s Cement Exports to Uzbekistan Plunge Amid Customs Dispute

October 17, 2025
By Sadokat Jalolova

Cement exports from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan have fallen sharply in recent months, with industry officials blaming a sudden change in Uzbek customs policy. According to Yerbol Akimbayev, head of the Cement and Concrete Producers Association of Kazakhstan (QazCem), new customs rules imposed by Tashkent are significantly disrupting cross-border trade.

Speaking to Forbes Kazakhstan, Akimbayev said Uzbek authorities now require Kazakh cement imports to be declared at $300 per ton, ten times the actual sale price of roughly $30 per ton. “Taxes should reflect the real import price. Setting the customs declaration at $300 has made exports economically unfeasible,” he stated.

The new pricing rule comes at a difficult time for Kazakhstan’s cement industry, which is already grappling with overcapacity and shrinking export opportunities. The country currently operates 16 cement plants with a combined annual capacity of 18 million tons, while domestic demand has stagnated between 11.5 and 12 million tons over the past five years. Even with demand growing by 15-20% this year, roughly 2 million tons, production still far exceeds consumption.

“Operating plants can already produce 17 million tons, and our technical capacity is around 18.5 million tons,” Akimbayev explained. “With new facilities under construction, we could soon reach 22 million tons. That leaves us with about 6 million tons in excess capacity, exports are essential for industry viability.”

While Russia remains Kazakhstan’s top cement supplier, followed by Iran, Uzbekistan has become an increasingly important export market in recent years. However, Akimbayev argues that the recent policy shift undermines fair competition and could destabilize the regional cement market.

“This isn’t about competition, it’s about clear and objective rules,” he said. “Our producers meet strict quality and safety standards. It’s only fair that importers face similar conditions. When we addressed this imbalance in 2019, the number of import certificates issued dropped by 95%, exposing the scale of shadow trade.”

The impact is already being felt across Kazakhstan’s cement sector. A plant in the Kostanay region declared bankruptcy earlier this year, and another in the Akmola region is facing financial strain. At the same time, three new factories are under construction, adding further pressure to an oversupplied market.

“Foreign investment is welcome, but it should target sectors that align with the country’s actual needs, like data centers or airports, not industries already in crisis,” Akimbayev warned.

Industry leaders in Kazakhstan are urging both governments to resolve the dispute and reestablish stable trade conditions for cement exports.

17 Oct 2025

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Kazakhstan Urges Regional Cooperation to Save the Aral Sea

October 17, 2025
By Aliya Haidar

Kazakhstan has intensified its efforts to restore its portion of the former Aral Sea, calling on neighboring Central Asian states to increase their participation in regional environmental cooperation. Once the world’s fourth-largest lake, the Aral Sea has become a symbol of ecological catastrophe. Experts warn that international efforts remain inadequate.

How the Sea Died

Straddling the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the Aral Sea began to shrink in the 1960s when large-scale irrigation projects diverted water from its two main tributaries, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, to support cotton production and agriculture. A growing regional population added further strain.

By 1989, the sea had split into the Northern (Small) and Southern (Large) Aral Seas. In 2014, the eastern basin of the Southern Aral Sea dried up completely. Today, the Aralkum Desert occupies much of what was once open water. Kazakhstan has since focused on restoring the Northern Aral Sea.

A ship stranded in the desert, Moynaq, Uzbekistan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland

The restoration of the Northern Aral Sea has already yielded visible environmental and social benefits. Rising water levels have lowered salinity, allowing several native fish species to return. Local fisheries, once thought lost, are now active again in communities such as Aralsk. According to the Ministry of Ecology, the annual fish catch in the North Aral has risen more than tenfold since the early 2000s, reviving local employment and boosting food security. Experts note that even small ecological gains have had a profound psychological impact on residents who once witnessed the sea’s disappearance.

Call for Renewed Efforts

On October 15, Kazakhstan called for expanded international cooperation to protect both the Aral and Caspian Seas. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yerzhan Ashikbayev, speaking at the International Astana Think Tank Forum-2025, emphasized Kazakhstan’s contribution to the global climate agenda. He noted that a regional climate summit, set to be held in Astana in 2026, would provide a platform for coordinated strategies and joint decision-making among Central Asian nations.

“Astana also calls for increased international participation in solving environmental problems and preserving the water resources of the Aral and Caspian Seas,” Ashikbayev said.

Earlier, on October 10, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov met with senior officials from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan during the second meeting of the Board of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), chaired by Kazakhstan. The event highlighted the need for a united regional approach, noting that restoration of the Aral Sea can be achieved through collective action.

Bektenov acknowledged the challenges of the recent growing season, but said regional cooperation had helped maintain a stable water regime in the basin.

“Each country has its own national interests, and we are obliged to defend them and will always do so. But I am convinced that our common strategic, long-term priority is good neighborly relations. In solving everyday short-term tasks, we must not undermine long-term priorities. I think that we will take joint measures to ensure that issues are always resolved on a mutually acceptable and mutually beneficial basis,” he said.

The International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), created in 1993 by the five Central Asian states, is the main framework for joint management of transboundary water resources. Although the fund has facilitated dialogue, it has struggled to overcome divergent national interests. Upstream, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan focus on hydropower, while downstream states rely on irrigation. Under Kazakhstan’s current chairmanship, IFAS is aiming to modernize its work through digital data-sharing and basin-wide monitoring systems designed to improve transparency and trust.

Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of IFAS has prioritized digital transformation and the use of artificial intelligence in water management. Bektenov said these tools will enhance transparency, reduce losses, and improve efficiency. A unified automated system for monitoring and distributing water across the Aral Sea basin is under development.

Expert Opinion: “Only Kazakhstan Is Saving the Aral Sea”

According to the political analyst, Marat Shibutov, Kazakhstan is largely acting alone in efforts to revive the Aral Sea. Writing on social media, he pointed to what he described as a “subtle hint to Kyrgyzstan” in Bektenov’s remarks about giving precedence to long-term goals.

“Right now, Kazakhstan is saving the Aral Sea on its own, both the Small Aral and the Syr Darya delta. We took out a World Bank loan for this, and are paying it back,” Shibutov wrote.

Shibutov warned that downstream efforts are futile without cooperation from upstream countries. “If they don’t release water from the upper reaches, nothing will work. Hence, the appeal to stop hoarding water in reservoirs or discharging it into Arnasai, where capacity is limited. Kazakhstan needs help,” he emphasized.

Climate change further complicates water management in the Aral basin. Rising temperatures and shifting precipitation patterns threaten to reduce the flow of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, increasing pressure on already scarce water resources. Frequent droughts and heatwaves worsen evaporation losses, while dust storms from the dried seabed carry salt and pollutants across the region. Kazakhstan frames its Aral Sea initiatives within a broader climate agenda, emphasizing that local restoration supports global adaptation and resilience goals.

A dust storm over the Aral Sea; image: ISS/NASA

Kazakhstan’s Restoration Efforts

Kazakhstan has made the Northern Aral Sea a centerpiece of its environmental revival strategy. The Northern Aral Sea now covers 3,065 square kilometers, an increase of 111 square kilometers since early 2022, according to the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation. Key projects include the preservation of the Kokaral Dam and the restoration of the Syr Darya River delta.

Recent infrastructure work includes the reconstruction of dams between Lake Karashalan and the Syr Darya, the construction of the Tauir protective dam, and the rehabilitation of the Karashalan-1 canal. The Kokaral Dam, which separates the Northern and Southern Aral Seas, is also nearing full restoration. These initiatives aim to preserve the Northern Aral Sea and reduce salinity.

The Kokaral Dam; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland

Kazakhstan is also focused on reforestation of the former seabed to improve the regional climate. From 2021 to 2024, afforestation was carried out on 475,000 hectares, with another 428,000 hectares scheduled for 2025.

Across the border, Uzbekistan has pursued more limited measures in the Southern Aral basin. The government has promoted the “Aral Sea Region” as a zone of environmental innovation under UN auspices, focusing on green energy, sustainable agriculture, and afforestation of the dry seabed. However, these projects mainly address socio-economic development rather than hydrological restoration, as the southern basin remains largely beyond recovery under current water conditions.

In the Kazakh port town of Aralsk, the effects of restoration are tangible. Residents once left stranded by the retreating shoreline now see water returning within sight of the town. Small fishing boats have reappeared, and families who had migrated in search of work are beginning to return. “We lost the sea once, but now we have hope again,” said one local fisherman in a recent television interview. Still, locals know that the revival remains fragile, dependent on continued cooperation and careful management across borders.

17 Oct 2025

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Uzbekistan Begins Construction of New International Airport Near Tashkent

October 17, 2025
By Vagit Ismailov

Uzbekistan has launched one of its largest infrastructure initiatives to date, the construction of a new international airport in the Tashkent region. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev inaugurated the project, which is being implemented by an international consortium of investors.

A National-Scale Project

The new airport is intended to strengthen Uzbekistan’s aviation sector and establish the country as a key transit hub between East and West.

“Ultimately, our goal is to turn Uzbekistan into a major aviation hub connecting East and West, North and South,” Mirziyoyev stated. He underscored that developing transport infrastructure and modernizing air traffic management remain strategic priorities.

The project is being led by a consortium comprising Vision Invest (Saudi Arabia, 45%), Sojitz (Japan, 30%), Incheon International Airport Corporation (South Korea, 15%), and Uzbekistan Airports (10%).

Construction will unfold in four phases. The first stage, with an estimated cost of $2.5 billion, includes building the terminal complex and airfield. Once completed, the airport will have the capacity to handle up to 20 million passengers annually, process 129,000 tons of cargo, and support up to 30 take-offs and landings per hour. It will feature 14 telescopic ramps and parking for 62 aircraft across a 1,300-hectare site in the Urtachirchik and Kuyichirchik districts of the Tashkent region.

Technology, Sustainability, and Connectivity

Designed to fully comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards, the airport will incorporate state-of-the-art air navigation and meteorological systems to ensure operational reliability in all weather conditions.

Environmental sustainability is a key focus. It will be the first airport in Central Asia constructed in line with “green” building principles. The passenger terminal will house a 46,000 square meter duty-free zone.

The facility will serve as part of a broader multimodal transport hub. It will connect directly to major regional highways, Tashkent-Samarkand, Tashkent-Andijan, and Tashkent-Bostanlyk and will feature a dedicated high-speed rail station and a shuttle service linking Tashkent and the planned city of New Tashkent.

Officials project that the new airport could generate more than $27 billion in revenue and create thousands of jobs across sectors including construction, tourism, and logistics.

Strengthening Uzbekistan’s Regional Aviation Role

Passenger traffic in Tashkent has tripled over the past eight years, reaching 9 million annually. By 2040, it is expected to rise to 24 million. The current airport, limited to 11 million passengers and constrained by its urban location, cannot be expanded, prompting the decision to pursue the new megaproject.

Nationwide, Uzbekistan is upgrading seven international airports and has built new terminals in Muynak, Kokand, Zaamin, Shakhrisabz, Saryasyk, and Sohe.

The aviation sector has also seen increased competition: the number of airlines has grown to 15, and the aircraft fleet has expanded from 26 to 105 units. Within five years, officials aim to boost the fleet to 180 aircraft, expand routes to 230 destinations, and increase annual flights to 200,000.

17 Oct 2025

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Kazakhstan Leads Regional Efforts to Save the Caspian Sea

October 17, 2025
By Times of Central Asia

Today, Central Asia and the Caspian littoral states face growing challenges that extend well beyond national borders. Climate change, water scarcity, land degradation, and the shrinking of the Caspian Sea are no longer only environmental concerns but matters of regional security and sustainable development.

The Caspian Sea, the world’s largest inland body of water, has become a symbol of crisis. Its rapid decline threatens ecosystems, navigation, fisheries, and food security from the Caucasus to Central Asia.

Dushanbe: ecology as a new agenda for regional security

A week ago, Dushanbe hosted two major international events: the “Central Asia–Russia” Summit and the meeting of the CIS Heads of State Council. At both forums, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for moving from declarations to concrete action, proposing to

Establish a Council of Ministers for Ecology among the Central Asian countries and Russia
Develop an Interstate Program for the preservation of the Caspian Sea’s water resources
Expand the use of space technologies to monitor transboundary water bodies

These initiatives are part of a broader effort to build a new environmental framework for Eurasia, positioning Central Asia as a laboratory for sustainable solutions rather than a zone of ecological risk.

The environmental disaster of the Caspian Sea

The Caspian Sea is shrinking rapidly. According to data from Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Ecology, since 2006 its surface area has decreased by more than 31,000 square kilometers, and water levels have fallen by about 1.5 to 2 meters. Projections indicate severe consequences for spawning grounds, the Caspian seal population, port infrastructure, and the regional economy.

The crisis mirrors the Aral Sea disaster, where environmental degradation caused widespread illness and social disruption. Experts warn that toxic dust from the exposed seabed could lead to respiratory diseases among millions of people. According to estimates by Save the Caspian Sea, the shoreline could retreat by as much as 89 kilometers, pushing fishing communities to the edge of survival.

Falling sea levels already threaten unique wildlife, navigation, water supply, and agriculture, creating risks of migration and conflict. Because the Caspian is landlocked and not connected to the world’s oceans, its water losses cannot be naturally replenished. A coordinated response is needed, including sustainable water management, pollution control, and climate adaptation.

The Caspian Sea as a crossroads of interests and contradictions

The Caspian region today is more than an ecosystem; it is a geopolitical nexus where the interests of coastal states and global powers converge. Key transport routes such as the North–South Corridor and the Middle Corridor meet here, linking the economic, energy, and political interests of Russia, Iran, Turkey, China, and the European Union.

The United States has also shown growing interest, particularly through its support for infrastructure projects in the South Caucasus and initiatives related to the Zangezur Corridor. Yet logistics, energy, and trade risk losing their purpose if the region’s natural foundation disappears.

An ecological collapse could undermine multibillion-dollar investments, threaten food security, and turn the Caspian from a zone of cooperation into a battleground over resources. That is why saving the sea has become a test of Eurasia’s capacity to act through cooperation rather than competition for survival.

Common interests of coastal countries

About 80% of the Caspian’s inflow comes from the Volga River. Experts note that recurring droughts and heavy water withdrawals over recent years have accelerated the sea’s decline across both sides of the basin. In this context, Astana has proposed that Moscow help establish a mechanism to coordinate water management as part of a joint Caspian program. At the same time, the looming ecological crisis should not be handled by just two countries; it requires regional and international coordination.

For Russia, protecting its southern agricultural zones in the Volga Delta and its fishing industry from ecological consequences is critical. Dust storms from the drying seabed and resulting soil erosion threaten fertile lands in Russia’s Volgograd, Astrakhan, and Saratov regions, and could eventually affect Krasnodar, Stavropol, Rostov, Voronezh, and Dagestan. Maintaining navigation through the ports of Astrakhan and Makhachkala and preserving the integrity of the North-South corridor is also vital.

Iran is focusing on preventing soil salinization in its northern provinces, ensuring the sustainability of Bandar-e Anzali port, and protecting Caspian energy logistics. For Azerbaijan, safeguarding the sea’s unique ecosystem is a priority, especially preserving fish stocks (including sturgeon species), the habitat of the Caspian seal, and limiting economic losses from shoreline retreat. The Baku–Alat port corridor is also strategically important.

What exactly is Kazakhstan proposing?

In his remarks at the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in New York in September, President Tokayev raised the Caspian issue on the global stage, noting that “the Caspian Sea is rapidly shrinking.” He called for urgent steps to preserve the sea’s water resources in cooperation with regional partners and the wider international community.

Astana has proposed three practical steps to serve as pillars of the Caspian initiative:

establish an international coordination mechanism for Caspian restoration. Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan could form a permanent framework for joint action, engaging the UN, World Bank, and regional bodies to carry out hydrological, infrastructure, and scientific projects.
use space and digital technologies to monitor the sea’s level and condition. Kazakhstan proposes integrating satellite systems into a unified information network, analyzing data at a supercomputing center in Astana, and using the UN Regional Centre for Sustainable Development in Almaty as a hub for data exchange and public reporting.
develop an interstate program for sustainable water management across the Caspian basin. The program should coordinate river regulation, shared monitoring systems, infrastructure projects, efficient water use, and climate adaptation efforts.

Additionally, Kazakhstan suggests creating an International Fund for Caspian Environmental Programs, with participation from the UN, the Green Climate Fund, and other partners. Its goals include restoring biodiversity by reviving endangered sturgeon species and supporting the Caspian seal population, strengthening cooperation to curb pollution and poaching, creating new protected areas, and regulating resource use.

Conclusion

Kazakhstan knows the cost of environmental disasters. The Aral Sea tragedy and the Semipalatinsk nuclear tests left lasting scars and made environmental protection a national duty. That experience now drives the country’s global initiatives.

The fate of the Caspian is more than an ecological issue; it is a test of Eurasia’s ability to balance development with survival. The choices made today will decide whether the Caspian remains a living sea or becomes another lost opportunity.

17 Oct 2025

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Russia Announces ‘Deportation Regime’ for Migrant Laborers

October 28, 2025
By Bruce Pannier

It has been more than a month since the deadline for migrant laborers working in Russia to complete their registration documents or face expulsion. The anticipated mass deportations have not happened, but Russian State Duma Chairman, Vyacheslav Volodin, indicated on October 13 that could change soon.

Volodin warned, “A new migration regime is now in effect… the deportation regime.”

The Final Bell

Several months ago, Russian officials announced the September 10 deadline for all migrant laborers to legalize their status to work and live in Russia.

Russia’s Federal Migration Service created a list in the summer of 2024 of “controlled persons,” those who still did not have all the required documentation to remain in Russia. The list was posted on the service’s website in February 2025.

Volodin said those on the list lacked one or more of the following: “documents or certificates required for obtaining migration status or citizenship, registration of a place of stay or residence.” Volodin said the list also included those who failed to complete mandatory procedures such as “annual medical examinations for [their] presence… as well as fingerprinting and photographing” or have failed to show that their “patent, work permits, or employment contract” was renewed.

The Duma Chairman said some 35,000 “foreign citizens” had already been expelled between January and August of this year.

September 10 arrived, and in the days that followed, there were no reports of Russian law enforcement rounding up migrants and sending them back to their homelands. However, it was clear the Russian government was not bluffing.

In his remarks to the Duma, Volodin explained that as of September 1, there were still some 770,000 migrants on the register of controlled persons, and that one-third of them were women and children.

If these people have not taken care of their requirements, Volodin said, “They need to leave our country, informing [us] of the date, place, and route of their departure.”

The Dwindling Number of Central Asian Migrant Laborers in Russia

There are several million foreign workers in Russia, and the largest group is those from Central Asia, though fewer of them work there than was previously the case.

The terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March 2024 that left more than 140 people dead was blamed on citizens of Tajikistan. It sparked a wave of xenophobia in Russia aimed at Central Asians, and prompted a raft of new laws and regulations for migrant laborers.

Uzbekistan’s citizens have long been the largest group of Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia, numbering between 4 to 6 million, depending on the season, during 2016. Figures vary for how many Uzbek citizens are working in Russia now, but Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency said at the start of October that it was about 1.3 million, noting the figure fluctuates depending on the time of the year, and that during the warmer months of 2025, it was closer to 2 million.

During his recent visit to Tajikistan for a CIS summit and a separate meeting with all the Central Asian presidents, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed there are currently more than 1 million citizens of Tajikistan living and working in Russia. That figure is down from 1.7 million in 2024.

In January 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said there were some 350,000 Kyrgyz citizens working in Russia, down from 650,000 in 2023.

Women and Children First

Volodin’s mention that one-third of the people now targeted for violating the terms of staying in Russia are women and children was telling.

In early September 2024, former Russian President and current Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitri Medvedev, said there should be a ban on foreign workers bringing their families with them to Russia. Medvedev said migrant laborers’ children were attending Russian schools, and in some of those schools, “three-fourths” of the students could not speak Russian. In comments clearly aimed at Central Asian migrant laborers, Medvedev said, “By all means come, but leave behind your nine kids and several wives.”

A new regulation was introduced that required children of migrant laborers to pass a Russian language test before being admitted to school. More than 87% of the children of foreign citizens failed to pass the test for the 2025-2026 school year. These children will likely be among the first to be deported from Russia along with their mothers if the latter are unemployed and only in Russia because their husbands are working there.

Coming Home

It is difficult to say how many Central Asian migrant laborers might be among those facing what Volodin called the “deportation regime.”

In late July 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s General Consul in Russia, Bakyt Asanaliyev, said there were some 103,000 Kyrgyz citizens on Russia’s list of controlled persons, but indicated the number was dropping week by week. On September 10, Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs spokeswoman Irina Volk said that more than 14,600 of those Kyrgyz citizens have legalized their presence in Russia.

The authorities in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been quiet about how many of their citizens were on Russia’s list, and how many fulfilled all the obligations to stay and work in Russia. Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which grants citizens of member states special privileges, including for migrant laborers. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are not EAEU members.

If tens of thousands of Kyrgyz citizens face deportation from Russia, the figure must be higher for migrant laborers from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The return home of tens of thousands of Central Asian migrant laborers will put a strain on the labor markets in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, not to mention the loss of millions of dollars in remittances these laborers were sending home.

Volodin said those targeted for deportation would have to pay a fine and would be banned from re-entering Russia for five years. However, Russia is short of workers, especially for the sort of menial labor (construction workers, street sweepers, delivery people) often performed by foreign workers.

The delay in implementing the “expulsion regime” could be a sign that Russian officials are trying to find ways to keep as many of the migrant laborers as possible.