Uzbekistan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Opinion – The Great Convergence: Central Asia and the EU in a New Geopolitical Landscape

The Samarkand Summit, taking place on April 3–4, 2025, represents a defining moment in Central Asia-European Union (CA-EU) relations. Hosted in the historic city of Samarkand, a crossroads of civilizations and trade for millennia, this inaugural summit marks a geopolitical realignment as the European Union seeks to expand its engagement in a region historically dominated by Russia and China. Against the backdrop of Uzbekistan’s proactive foreign policy reforms under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the summit signifies a recalibrated vision for connectivity, sustainability, and economic diversification in Eurasia. The symbolism of Samarkand as the summit’s venue is profound. Once a flourishing center of Silk Road commerce and Timurid cultural grandeur, the city embodies the historical role of Central Asia as a bridge between East and West. Over the centuries, shifting empires and economic transitions relegated the region to a peripheral status in global affairs, particularly after the collapse of the Silk Road, its incorporation into the Russian Empire, and the subsequent Soviet era. However, post-Soviet transformations and recent geopolitical shifts — accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — have reinvigorated global interest in Central Asia. As the EU strives to reduce dependence on Russian energy and counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Samarkand Summit emerges as an urgent diplomatic effort to establish stronger economic and political ties with the region. At the heart of the summit’s agenda is the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), a modern-day Silk Road initiative designed to enhance trade connectivity between Europe and Central Asia via the Caucasus, bypassing Russian territory. By offering an alternative route for energy exports and critical minerals, the corridor could significantly reduce transit times by 15–20%, facilitating the EU’s quest for strategic autonomy in global supply chains. For Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the project presents an opportunity to diversify trade partners and lessen their economic dependence on Moscow and Beijing. However, the corridor’s implementation faces substantial geopolitical and financial hurdles. Russia and China may perceive it as a challenge to their regional influence, potentially leading to diplomatic friction or economic countermeasures. Moreover, the corridor’s development requires an estimated $20–30 billion in infrastructure investments, a daunting figure for cash-strapped Central Asian economies. Parallel to trade discussions, the summit will spotlight climate action and green energy investments. The EU’s €1.5 billion Central Asia Water and Energy Program aims to modernize irrigation systems, promote renewable energy, and reduce fossil fuel dependency. This aligns with Brussels’ broader Green Deal ambitions, positioning the EU as a global leader in sustainable development while offering Central Asian states financial and technical support to address water scarcity and environmental degradation. However, challenges persist — bureaucratic inefficiencies, regulatory gaps, and regional water disputes complicate large-scale green energy implementation. Moreover, while hydropower is a viable alternative to fossil fuels, its intensive water usage could exacerbate tensions between upstream and downstream nations such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The summit will also emphasize digital connectivity and modernization, with the Connecting Central Asia (C4CA) Initiative promoting e-governance, high-speed internet expansion,...

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Opinion – Not Ready for Democracy? Come See Our Street

In March 2025, the first round results of Uzbekistan’s Open Budget vote were announced. Among the thousands of approved projects, one quietly transformed the life of my neighborhood: our village street was getting asphalt. To many, that might not sound like much. But for us, it was everything. After decades of walking through dust and mud, we were finally getting a paved road. When the results came in, something incredible happened: people began to celebrate. Not in the restrained, bureaucratic sense that tends to accompany official programs, but with real joy: music playing, neighbors cheering, children dancing in the same dirt that was finally going to be covered. It felt like a wedding. [video width="720" height="1280" mp4="https://timesca.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/video_2025-03-26_12-50-00.mp4"][/video] It was the result of effort. Weeks earlier, our local mahalla council had met and chosen this road as our community’s proposal. Then came the work. They assigned residents to campaign: not in any formal political sense, but with sincerity and purpose. People went door to door, house by house, explaining what Open Budget was and why this project mattered. Elders were helped to vote online. Younger neighbors posted in group chats. No one was forced; people just believed that for once, something depended on them. And it did. The Open Budget initiative, launched in 2019, allows Uzbek citizens to propose local development projects, new roads, repaired schools, better lighting, and vote for which ones deserve funding. The process is digital, accessible, and remarkably straightforward. But the impact is deeper than infrastructure. It gives people something they rarely get in official life: the feeling that their voice matters. We often hear, especially from outside observers, that Central Asians are not “ready” for democracy. That our cultures don’t value participation, or that our political habits are too rooted in hierarchy and obedience. But the truth is simpler and less convenient: people participate when they believe their participation means something. Open Budget, though limited in scope, creates a rare and meaningful space where that belief can grow. People vote not for politicians or platforms, but for real things - things they can touch, walk on, benefit from. And because of that, they care. They organize. They show up. Of course, it’s not a perfect system. There have been reports about votes being bought, people being pressured, and outcomes being nudged. But even with those imperfections, the initiative continues to expand, and millions of people continue to engage. That’s not because they’ve been told to. It’s because they’ve seen results. There’s a kind of quiet dignity that emerges when people take collective action for the first time, and it actually works. In our case, that dignity took the form of asphalt. It may seem simple, but it was hard-won, and it matters. What’s most telling is how people talked about the process afterward. Not with skepticism, not with detachment, but with a sense of ownership. People said, “We voted for this road.” And that’s no small thing. Because in much of our recent history, things have...

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Opinion: In Central Asia, the EU Defies Its “Geopolitical Dwarf” Label

As the United States and Russia reportedly aim to create a new global security architecture, other major actors in the international arena are working to improve their positions in the redefined world order. Often underestimated in terms of its geopolitical influence, the European Union has actively focused its attention on the post-Soviet space, particularly the strategically important Central Asian region. The EU, despite Russia’s and the United States' attempts to undermine its role in the settlement of the Ukraine War and to portray it as a “geopolitical dwarf”, is seeking to increase its presence in global affairs. In Central Asia, the 27-nation bloc is often viewed as a key actor that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can rely on to balance China’s growing dominance, as well as their security and dependence on Moscow. The EU's desire to strengthen cooperation with Central Asia can be seen as Brussels’ attempt to reduce Russia's influence in the region. Indeed, bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow is slowly but surely being pushed out of Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been within the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit. As a result, China has managed to significantly increase its economic presence in all five Central Asian nations. The EU is now attempting to do the same. The recent visit of the European Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela to Central Asia, as well as the upcoming EU-Central Asia summit scheduled for April 3-4, 2025 in Samarkand, clearly indicates the intensifying geopolitical competition between the EU and China over the region. One of Síkela’s major goals was to expand the scope of the EU's investment strategy, Global Gateway, in Central Asia. The project, launched in 2021, is often viewed as the EU’s version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As part of its strategy to increase its economic presence in Central Asia, the European Union seems to have four priorities: the development of transport infrastructure (particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor), cooperation in raw materials, digital connectivity, and the development of the water resources, energy, and climate sectors. The problem for Brussels is that China, due to its proximity to Central Asia and the lack of bureaucratic procedures, is ahead of the EU in most, if not all of these areas. Beijing has had 12 years to strengthen economic ties with the region through the BRI. As a result, in 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8 billion, nearly double the EU's trade volume with the region in 2022, which stood at $47 billion. Last year, the world’s second-largest economy replaced Russia as Kazakhstan's biggest trade partner. In neighboring Uzbekistan, it remains the top trading partner, while in Tajikistan, over the past 18 years, China has become the major investor in the landlocked nation’s economy. The same applies to Tajikistan and China’s neighbor Kyrgyzstan. The European Union, however, is now intensifying its efforts to position itself as a major foreign power operating in Central Asia. According to...

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Power Shifts in Central Asia: The Unpredictable Path of Leadership

European Union Commissioner for International Partnerships Josef Sikela has concluded his tour of Central Asia, a visit conducted against the backdrop of global geopolitical turbulence. Unlike previous engagements, where European officials often criticized the region’s leadership for a lack of democratic progress, Sikela refrained from making demands on local governments. Historically, Europe has accused Central Asian states of authoritarianism and the entrenchment of long-serving leaders. However, the idea that power is uniquely permanent in the region is increasingly questioned. Critics point to Western examples, such as Angela Merkel’s 16-year tenure as Germany’s chancellor, and alleged electoral manipulation within the EU, such as in Romania, where elections were annulled after an undesired candidate’s victory. Meanwhile, in Central Asia, even presidents once considered “eternal” have eventually left office, sometimes peacefully, sometimes under turbulent conditions. Kyrgyzstan: The Unpredictable Outlier Kyrgyzstan is often described as a "democratic exception" within Central Asia, yet its history is marked by political instability and frequent leadership changes, arguably more so than in many of the world’s most conflict-prone regions. The country’s first president, Askar Akayev, held power from 1990 to 2005. Though re-elected three times, his rule ended in March 2005 when protests erupted over parliamentary election results that heavily favored pro-government candidates. Demonstrators stormed the Government House in Bishkek, prompting Akayev to flee. Reports, though unverified, claimed he was smuggled out wrapped in a carpet. Following Akayev’s ouster, Kurmanbek Bakiyev took power, but his rule ended in 2010 after violent unrest. His downfall was allegedly facilitated by Kazakhstan’s intelligence services, and he later found political asylum in Belarus under President Alexander Lukashenko. Since Bakiyev’s departure, Kyrgyzstan has continued to experience political turbulence. Presidents Almazbek Atambayev (2010-2017) and Sooronbai Jeenbekov (2017-2020) both left office under pressure. Atambayev’s tenure saw a diplomatic fallout with Kazakhstan, while Jeenbekov resigned in 2020 amid protests over parliamentary elections. His successor, Sadyr Japarov, remains in office, but whether he will complete his term is an open question. Uzbekistan: Reform Within Limits Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan’s first post-Soviet leader, ruled for over 26 years before his death in 2016. While he maintained a strictly centralized government, his tenure was also marked by violent crackdowns, most notably the Andijan uprising in 2005, which resulted in a Western diplomatic fallout. His successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has introduced some reforms, loosening restrictions on civil liberties and the economy. However, the fundamental structure of state control remains intact, with opposition movements still tightly monitored. Kazakhstan: From Nazarbayev to Tokayev Kazakhstan’s transition from Nursultan Nazarbayev to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is often described as managed succession rather than a genuine power shift. Nazarbayev, who led Kazakhstan for nearly three decades, officially stepped down in 2019, yet retained significant influence until the January 2022 unrest, which forced him to relinquish much of his remaining power. These protests, initially sparked by fuel price hikes, rapidly escalated into anti-government riots. While official accounts describe the unrest as an attempted coup orchestrated by figures within Nazarbayev’s inner circle, critics suggest Tokayev used the crisis to consolidate power....

Opinion: What the Loss of RFE/RL Would Mean for Central Asia

The decision to terminate the federal grant agreement funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a crushing blow for hundreds of millions of people. These people know their governments are not telling them the full truth about what is happening in their countries or in the world outside. The objective information provided by RFE/RL has been important to people such as these. Perhaps as important, since the end of the Cold War, was the platform RFE/RL provides, whenever possible, for people in these countries to explain their views to the outside world. I know, because I worked at RFE/RL for 25 years covering Central Asia. RFE/RL was founded in 1950, and I didn’t show up there until 1997. I can only speak about what I saw and heard when I was an RFE/RL employee. My understanding of my tasks as an RFE/RL employee was that we were supposed to keep close track of what was happening in Central Asia, cover as many of the important topics of the region as possible, and make objective and accurate information on these topics available to the people in Central Asia. During Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, for example, RFE/RL’s Tajik service, Radio Ozodi, was the most trusted source of information for the people of Tajikistan. During the Coronavirus pandemic, the Turkmen government would not even allow the word COVID to be spoken and denied there were any cases of the virus in the country, leaving RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, Azatlyk, as one of the only sources of information for Turkmenistan’s people about the illness. I lived in Central Asia before joining RFE/RL, so I had some idea of what was important to people there. Calling for respect for fundamental rights is a big part of RFE/RL’s work. Read the constitutions of any Central Asian country and you will see enshrined there the right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to freely receive or disseminate information, and much more. In practice, these rights are not always observed in Central Asia. In such a situations RFE/RL’s Central Asian services are a voice for those who, with good reason, are afraid to speak out publicly, or more importantly, for those who did speak out and are punished for that. At RFE/RL we looked for “impact stories,” testimony from people of the region about unfulfilled government promises, abuses, or state mismanagement that were hurting communities and individuals. Central Asian government officials are among the most faithful RFE/RL listeners, and often RFE/RL reports that raised social issues led officials to rectify the situation. Ramshackle buildings or schools were suddenly repaired, electricity or running water became accessible to city districts and rural areas, sufficient food became available to communities. The pleas of average citizens too often fell on deaf ears in government halls, but the criticism of an international organization such as RFE/RL, which was broadcasting to the entire country and Central Asian region, was too embarrassing for officials to ignore. This made RFE/RL unpopular with Central...

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Opinion: How Central Asia Has Strengthened Ties with the West Since 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the relationship between Russia and Central Asia. Russia’s decision to invade a neighboring country, and the devastation and destruction that followed, has forced Central Asia to reconsider its relationship with the Russian Federation. Russia is no longer seen as an “invincible superpower,” meaning it cannot be relied on to protect other members of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). In addition, the U.S. and European countries have levied heavy sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Russia has attempted to evade these sanctions by conducting business with third parties, but the international community has warned several organizations and countries not to partake in these relations. Otherwise, should these businesses and countries opt to help Russia, then the international community has said that it will impose stiff penalties on these Russian intermediaries as well. Given these events, the Central Asian states have now been actively pursuing new relationships beyond Russia to bolster national, economic, and energy security within the region. During this process, China has attempted to assert itself as Central Asia’s new ally. Like Russia, China already has a significant trade relationship with Central Asia. In addition, China is Central Asia’s largest gas consumer, meaning the Chinese have attempted to force Central Asia into an economic and energy partnership. Despite this relationship, the countries of Central Asia have opted not to increase their reliance on China. Instead, recent developments have led them to improve their relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. But how has the West strengthened its relationship with Central Asia since 2022? Take, for example, the United States. When Russia’s invasion began in February 2022, the then U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to discuss the war. During their meeting, Secretary Blinken stated that the United States supports Central Asia’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.” He also said that the United States will continue to strengthen its relationship with the region. Since this meeting, Blinken has met with foreign ministers from Central Asia on several occasions in 2023 and 2024, where they further discussed how Central Asia can “develop the strongest possible capacities for their own security, their growing economic prosperity, and the strength and resilience of their societies.” Furthermore, U.S. President Joe Biden met with senior officials from Central Asia. During his meeting with his Central Asian counterparts in September 2023, Biden said that the United States would help “invest in and develop Central Asia’s energy infrastructure.” The United States also established a new business initiative with Central Asia, where the United States has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to the region. Then, during the United States-Central Asia Trade Investment Framework Council in June 2024, the United States and the Central Asian states discussed new investment opportunities and how they could diversify trade. These discussions were well received, and the United States called for future engagements between it and Central...