Recently, there has been a significant increase in tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with both sides regularly exchanging accusations. In addition to this, border conflicts have become more frequent, with border crossings periodically closed. According to Modern Diplomacy, both countries are in a state of quite severe political conflict, and distrust and hostility from the Afghan population towards Pakistan is growing even though the “victory of the Taliban and the reincarnation of the Islamic Emirate… should have been a victory for Pakistan and strengthened its position in the region.”

The confrontation between the two neighbors in South Asia is a source of concern for other countries in the region, especially for the Central Asian republics, which are increasingly acquiring the status of independent players in their dealings with Afghanistan. Due to their proximity, these republics to varying degrees link their development with a stable Afghanistan designed to become a bridge to South Asia.

Negative dynamics in Afghan-Pakistani relations are a cause of much wringing of hands. Pakistan was among the first states to recognize the independence of the former Soviet Central Asian republics and has dynamic ties with them. Pakistan’s trade turnover with the region is roughly $500 million annually, most of which comes from imports to Pakistan. The nations are linked by the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA), the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project, the CASA-1000 energy project, and the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway Project. The majority of these projects use Afghanistan as a bridge between Central Asia and Pakistan.

In this regard, the countries of Central Asia are interested in a political situation which excludes confrontational approaches; none of them are interested in further destabilization in Afghanistan.

In the Central Asian republics, there is a well-established understanding of Pakistan’s exceptional and particularly important role in Afghanistan’s stability. Pakistan has a defining influence on security in Afghanistan and has historically been the most integrated in Afghan issues at the level of political and multi-ethnic conflicts. Pakistan is linked to its neighbor by historical and socio-cultural ties. In reality, however, a different story is emerging.

At both a global and regional level, active measures out of Islamabad set to discredit the de facto Taliban-led government of Afghanistan have been observed. Islamabad has undertaken a robust information campaign, which has put forward an entrenched narrative about Afghanistan being one of the world’s major sources of terrorism.

In this information war, Islamabad, being a fully-fledged member of the international community, has clear advantages and has used all available tools, including access to global platforms. Islamabad also has access to specialized committees and departments of the UN, which regularly prepare reports on the situation in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, it has used these to include ideas favorable its’ position on the world stage.

Acting as a source of information, Islamabad has presented its point of view, which the international community has largely accepted as objective information. However, it does not provide specific data, such as the size of terrorist groups or the location of their training camps. In shaping the new narrative, Islamabad does not mention its involvement in the formation, establishment, and development of the Taliban movement.

“The Taliban became the latest incarnation of Pakistan’s desire to support Islamist rather than nationalist rule in neighboring Afghanistan,” American author Michael Rubin once wrote in characterizing Islamabad’s policy at the time in an Op-Ed for The Washington Institute for Near East Policy titled “Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?” Rubin quoted Robert Kaplan, a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, who stated that Bhutto and Babar saw the Taliban “as a solution to Pakistan’s problems,” and Ahmed Rashid, who wrote that the “Taliban was not beholden to any one Pakistani lobby, such as the ISI. In contrast, the Taliban had access to more influential lobbies and groups in Pakistan than most Pakistanis.”

Objectively, the narratives in Pakistan’s foreign policy are somewhat of a forced defense. Pakistan’s politics reflect its own domestic issues, including ethnic and religious conflicts, radicalization, and counter-terrorism efforts. Afghan-Pakistani relations have been strained since the formation of the state of Pakistan; Afghanistan was the only country to vote against its new neighbor joining the UN, but later changed its stance.

The main catalyst was and remains the so-called Durand Line, which mechanically divided Pashtuns into Afghans and Pakistanis. This line was established in 1893 as the border between Afghanistan and British India (the British Raj), and was inherited by Pakistan in 1947. Based on the principle of uti possidetis juris, Islamabad considers it a state boundary, which is not entirely agreed upon within Afghanistan.

However, Pakistan is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country, and Pashtuns make up about 20% of the population. In this regard, the idea of national identity is very important to the authorities in Pakistan. This pursuit of national identity and unity affects relations with neighboring countries, especially since the issue of “Pashtunistan” has failed to go anywhere. As Barnett Rubin commented in his 1992 study, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: “The resentments and fears that the Pashtunistan issue aroused in the predominantly Punjabi rulers of Pakistan, especially the military, continue to affect Pakistani perceptions of interests in Afghanistan.“

Kabul, meanwhile, believes that the Pakistani military and intelligence services are conducting a disinformation campaign in order to portray Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorist groups – an initiative that seems to be aimed at undermining Afghanistan’s relations with neighboring countries, particularly India and Iran. Yet the implications of this propaganda go beyond mere rhetoric, posing real risks to diplomatic relations and regional stability.

The Sunday Guardian in India reported that the spread of fake news and propaganda is part of a broader strategy to discredit the Taliban. Such targeted campaigns carry real dangers, as they can escalate conflict and create favorable conditions for radical groups. There is no doubt that such content will continue to affect perceptions of Afghanistan in international circles, especially if think tanks and media outlets contribute to its dissemination. At a time when stability in South Asia and Central Asia is key to international peace, such campaigns not only undermine trust between countries, but also lead to increased hostilities and tensions.

In retaliation, the Taliban has been disseminating confessions made by detained ISIL fighters in which they speak of receiving training inside Pakistan. For example, according to an Al-Mursad publication, three ISIS-Khorasan members confessed to receiving training in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. In this regard, one could argue that this calls into question Pakistan’s claims from the UN podium that it is Afghanistan that is the training center for ISIS-Khorasan and al-Qaeda.

Such allegations also contribute to the strengthening of anti-Pakistan rhetoric in the Afghan public and the radicalization of sentiments. For example, the theses postulated by the Afghan political analyst and religious figure Mufti Mohammad Ajmal Salar have resonated widely, especially in the context of Pakistan’s current relations with its neighbors. Salar has openly questioned Pakistan’s sovereignty and independence, calling it a project to serve foreign interests. In his view, Pakistan lacks the competence and sustainability to fulfill its commitments to Afghanistan or to establish long-term relations with it. In this context, Salar urged the Afghan leadership not to engage with the current authorities in Pakistan, but with the “principal authorities,” alluding to external powers which can be seen to control Islamabad’s strategic decisions.

These competing narratives create a dilemma for the international community as it seeks a more balanced approach to analyzing regional security. Rather than placing the blame entirely on Afghanistan, it is worth considering that in the complex dynamics of terrorism in South Asia, different actors may use the territories of neighboring countries for their operations.

According to experts, Pakistan’s statements may have overtly political overtones aimed at diverting attention away from its internal issues with extremism. Despite the presence of terrorist groups, Afghanistan is not the sole culprit behind regional instability, and the international community must take such factors into account to avoid distorting the real picture on the ground.

When Pakistan uses the UN podium to shape foreign policy narratives and accuse Afghanistan of supporting terrorism, this is primarily done to protect its geopolitical interests and divert attention from its problems. This strategy allows Pakistan to reinforce its status as a ‘victim of international terrorism’; attract sympathy and support from the international community, including financial and military assistance to fight terrorism; and build relations with key world powers such as the U.S. and China by dangling the idea of stability in the region.

The old adage, “Trust but verify,” once a catchphrase of President Reagan, springs to mind in these times of geopolitical crisis. In addition, the Taliban needs to act in a more transparent, unambiguous, and, most importantly, relatable way for its neighbors and the international community.

Whether Islamabad and Kabul can find an understanding affects not only the future of the above-mentioned large-scale projects involving the countries of Central Asia, but stability in general, which is a primary condition for economic development. If Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot agree and find common ground, they could turn to a third party for reconciliation efforts. Countries within Central Asia would undoubtedly be willing to act as facilitators, given their interest in finding a mutually acceptable solution for all sides and maintaining further cooperation between all parties.