• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
10 December 2025

Petropavl – A City of Two Tales

No one seems to like the name Petropavl.

The city, situated in northern Kazakhstan in a peninsula of territory that juts into Russian Siberia, has long lived between two worlds. From monuments to manhole covers, there have long been conflicting stories about who belongs here.

In the Russian telling, the city was founded as a fortress on “empty steppe” in 1752 by Tsarist troops, named for Saints Peter and Paul – in Russian, Petropavlovsk. For over a century, it remained a frontier post that guarded the empire’s edge before the push into Central Asia in the mid-nineteenth century. Yet for Kazakhs, this place was never empty: long before the Cossacks came, nomadic Kazakhs from the Middle Zhuz grazed their herds here along the Ishim River, calling the place Qyzyljar – “the red ridge”.

Manhole covers imprinted with Qyzyljar; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes

Since independence, Kazakhstan has restored the names of thousands of cities, towns, and villages across the country in order to give the land a more Kazakh stamp. But Qyzyljar has not returned. Instead, the authorities’ immediate solution has been to Kazakh-ify the Russian name, leaving us with Petropavl.

It’s a fudge that satisfies no one, and the official name is rarely heard on the city streets. In this overwhelmingly Russian-speaking city, most continue to call it “Petropavlovsk,” or even “Piter,” echoing Saint Petersburg’s nickname.

Ethnic Russians

Ethnic Russians now make up just under half the population of the North Kazakhstan region. In individual cities such as Petropavl, the proportion is far higher, although official information is hard to come by. The boundaries of Kazakhstan’s provinces, or oblasts, were gerrymandered in 1997 to soften perceptions of Russian dominance, but a mere walk around the city makes it clear that about two-thirds of the population is not Kazakh.

These numbers and the region’s proximity to Russia have long made it a focus of uneasy attention. When Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014, President Vladimir Putin remarked that Kazakhstan had “never had statehood” before Nursultan Nazarbayev, and Dmitri Medvedev called it an “artificial state” in 2022 (although he subsequently claimed to have been hacked).

Other Russian lawmakers have called northern Kazakhstan “a gift from Russia,” while nationalist commentators as far back as Solzhenitsyn have called for Northern Kazakhstan to be “reunited” with Russia.

Dr. Petr Oskolkov, affiliated researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, was part of a team that undertook research on the ethnic Russian population in Kazakhstan in 2020-21, and believes that these fears are overblown.

“Initially, there was a lack of public trust in the prospects of Kazakhstani statehood, especially among Russian-speakers. Nowadays, these doubts are absent,” he told The Times of Central Asia. “Moreover, the overall level of the identification with Kazakhstan, and the quality of life, have both grown significantly since the 1990s, so the idea [of separatism] has lost its main appeal.”

Soviet mosaic; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes

Nevertheless, doom-mongers in Astana worry that Petropavlovsk and other cities with large Russian populations could still become a font of potential instability, a kind of Kazakh Donbas. Indeed, in the wake of the Crimea annexation, Kazakh lawmakers expanded the definition of separatism in an attempt to head off such threats before they gained any momentum. Article 170 of Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code, which used to punish violent threats to Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity, has, for the past decade, criminalized peaceful calls to join Russia, including videos made online.

This law was most notably employed in March 2023, when several dozen people calling themselves the “People’s Council of the Workers of Petropavlovsk” declared independence, claiming they “did not recognize the collapse of the USSR” and considered Kazakhstan an “oligarchic corporation” rather than a state. Three leaders of the group were sentenced to between 7-9 years in prison.

The Kazakh Perspective

That is not to say there are no Kazakhs in the city.

Overlooking the Ishim River stands the Ablai Khan Museum, a reconstruction of the eighteenth-century residence of the last Kazakh ruler to unite the country’s three zhuz.

Aigul, a student guide, moves through rooms lined with embroidered carpets and painted maps. “We are very proud of Ablai Khan,” she told The Times of Central Asia. “He was a Batyr (warrior), but also a poet.”

From a loudspeaker overheard comes soft folk music, Elim Ai (Our Country), lamenting the defeats of the Kazakhs at the hands of the Dzungars in the 1700s. “Every Kazakh knows this,” said Aigul. “It reminds us that we survived.”

The museum’s existence is a pointed reminder that Kazakhs have been here long before the Peter and Paul Fortress was built.

The Piter & Paul restaurant gives a nod to the city’s heritage; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes

The Russian Perspective

For some Kazakh nationalists, a long-term psychological goal has been to “restore” the city’s Kazakh name, Qyzyljar. It received the most momentum in 2010, when a member of Kazakhstan’s parliament, Zharasbay Suleimenov, made an official request to the Prime Minister to rename the city.

The news caused the usually apathetic locals to rapidly organize against the idea. The symbol of their protest was a yellow ribbon; these appeared on fences and lampposts, coats and bags – a spontaneous protest against what many saw as erasure. The campaign succeeded, and Petropavl has remained – for now.

But the name Qyzyljar has been kept alive by other means. It became the name of the football team in 2009, and has also been bestowed on the city’s most prominent hotel, the public water company, and one of Kazakhstan’s most popular vodka brands.

The Qyzylijar Hotel; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes

An editor at the city’s flagship newspaper, Petropavlovsk News, told The Times of Central Asia that articles surrounding the city’s name are always bound to generate the greatest number of hits. She points to a recent story where new manhole covers emerged on the city’s newly restored Constitution Street bearing both the names Qyzyljar and Petropavl.

Comments on the video give an idea of the depth of feeling on the issue:

“This is how it starts!” said one user.

“There is nothing in my memory apart from Petropavlovsk, and my memory is good!” said another.

A third put it more provocatively: “Qyzyljar – where’s that?”

Autumn on Constitution Street; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes

Exodus

But while each of these cases receives column inches, a far bigger concern is the number of people leaving the region.

“There are so few opportunities here,” Kamila, a master’s student at the University of Toronto, who has returned to visit her family, told TCA. Kamila is ethnically Kazakh, but believes people are leaving the city regardless of ethnicity. “Almost all my classmates have moved, most to Astana or Omsk, but also to Almaty, or abroad. Whether you’re Russian or Kazakh doesn’t really matter. Most of us just want a future.”

Omsk, in particular, just three hours’ drive away, is a draw for both students and workers. This has only increased since the onset of war in Ukraine. With many young Russians mobilized to the front and a simultaneous crackdown on migrant laborers, ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan have found themselves in high demand.

Kazakhstan’s government has long recognized the issue and launched various resettlement programs, giving financial incentives to people from south Kazakhstan to move north. But progress is slow. Many southerners balk at the harsh winters and lack of opportunities in the country’s north. Indeed, last year, one politician called the whole scheme a failure. Northern Kazakhstan’s population is expected to fall by 600,000 by 2050.

Soviet mosaic; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes

A Success Story

Nevertheless, some people have stayed.

Dmitriy Lapitsky is the founder of one of the city’s most renowned success stories: Lapitsky Bakehouse. Like many born and raised here, he moved to Omsk for his education but then decided to return to Petropavl to try his luck in business.

“We already had a bakery,” he told The Times of Central Asia. “But then we decided to collaborate with a local coffee shop, and the chain grew from there.”

Lapitsky now has six establishments across the city, and plans to open a café in Astana.

He feels that Petropavl’s geography has “no effect whatsoever” on the business, although he too admits that staffing can often be an issue.

“This is one of the main problems at the moment, not only in our industry but in others as well. Despite high salaries that can even compete with those in Astana, young people are trying to find their place in big cities like Astana and Almaty, or they leave for Russia,” he said.

But Lapitsky is positive about Petropavl’s future.

“Over the past two years, we’ve seen the city begin to transform; many businessmen have begun to improve their businesses and renovate old buildings. We have a cozy little city; we love it and believe in its prosperity,” he said.

“Our city isn’t about hustle and bustle, it’s about life,” said Lapitsky fondly. “We’re in no rush. Our natural surroundings give us the chance to explore lakes, forests, and more with loved ones, rather than just sit within four walls.”

Indeed, the city is remarkably walkable: the Park of the First President is one of the prettiest in the country, particularly in autumn. Meanwhile, Constitution Street, the pedestrianized central avenue, stretches over a mile through the city center, with low, red-brick houses dotted along its sides.

Standing along this road, opposite the Hotel Qyzyljar, is the Pushkin–Abai monument, where the two poets, one Russian, one Kazakh, stand shoulder to shoulder in bronze.

A symbol of a city that has learned that compromise isn’t always a bad thing.

C5+1 at 10: Washington Seeks Concrete Outcomes With Central Asia

A leaders’ summit between Central Asia and the United States is scheduled for 6 November in Washington, D.C. Kazakhstan’s presidency has said the meeting will take place on that date, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has confirmed his attendance. Others have confirmed as well. The meeting would bring the heads of state of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Washington for only the second leaders’ level C5+1 meeting, after the first took place on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2023. The timing is notable as 2025 marks the C5+1’s tenth year.

Since 2015, the C5+1 format, linking the five Central Asian states with the United States, has steadily become Washington’s primary channel for strategic diplomacy in the region. With Russia constrained by the war in Ukraine and China expanding Belt and Road finance and logistics, the U.S. is building a durable presence through programmatic work, published procedures, and predictable commitments.

Public calls in the United States to mark the tenth year with a Washington meeting have focused on concrete results. Stakeholders such as U.S. and Central Asian ministries, regulators, banks, carriers, and investors now expect clear schedules for practical work on corridor performance, compliance guidance under evolving sanctions, critical minerals cooperation, grid reliability, aviation access, and investment risk-sharing. The success of the summit depends on more than words that have characterized prior summits. One metric of success could be the consummation of a final joint communiqué including 90-day and 180-day check-backs with a designated lead and co-lead for each item – identified by name, title, and agency – and a requirement to publish brief progress notes.

The summit was preceded by a visit of U.S. officials to the region: on October 25, U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau arrived in Tashkent, met senior officials and U.S. companies, continued to Samarkand, and then to Almaty. The trip was not publicly scheduled; initial confirmation came via embassy Telegram posts. Discussions reportedly covered rare-earth processing and other sensitive cooperation areas, signaling agenda-setting ahead of November 6.

How Washington Can Regularize Intensified C5+1 Coordination

This meeting would normalize leaders’ level C5+1 engagement after the first such gathering in September 2023. That shift matters. Since 2015, the format has moved from occasional ministerials to a steadier dialogue built around defined themes, even when leaders have met on the sidelines of larger events. With Washington now hosting, observers will compare outcomes to the 2023 joint-statement themes – security, economic resilience, sustainable development, climate, and sovereignty – and to readouts that set a precedent for presidential-level participation. In this sense, the Washington summit represents not only a procedural step but a test of whether the United States can institutionalize its Eurasia policy with a more proactive diplomacy. An annual leaders’ cycle, spring ministerials, and quarterly sherpa meetings pre-scheduled through Q4 2026 would signal a commitment to deepen the process.

In Washington, there is bipartisan pressure to show continuity and delivery in this anniversary year. The executive branch needs to translate prior promises into named tasks with fixed dates. Tools exist via the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) for risk-sharing, technical assistance, and joint guidance on export controls and financial-crime compliance; however, these will matter only if agencies name co-chairs, locations, and calendars, and then meet them.

Central Asia Seeks Practical Results

Regional priorities are practical: trade, finance, and security. Governments are seeking to widen their options while avoiding new dependencies and addressing immediate needs. These needs include Middle Corridor customs harmonization and digital documentation, new civil-aviation routes to add capacity, grid reliability to support industry and exports, banking channels that manage sanctions exposure without over-correction, and clear coordination on border management and Afghanistan-adjacent risks. These priorities reflect a broader trend across the region since 2022: a turn toward pragmatic economic sovereignty and diversified partnerships, as Central Asian states hedge between Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, and Washington. Leaders will be judged by whether they instruct technical bodies to deliver time-bound outputs that reduce friction for firms and financiers. Benchmarking corridor procedures against recent diagnostic work underscores why process reforms, not just hard infrastructure, determine throughput.

The likely pillars of the agenda are connectivity and trade corridors, energy and critical minerals, and sanctions compliance and security. Capacity matters for connectivity and trade corridors, but results are often decided by the procedures used. Pilot projects could be launched at named crossings – for example, Ak-Jol/Korday (Kyrgyzstan–Kazakhstan), Zhibek Zholy–G‘ishtkuprik (Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan), and Panjakent–Jartepa (Tajikistan–Uzbekistan) – with responsible agencies named and a schedule for public reporting. Such specificity would distinguish the C5+1 from the region’s more declaratory forums, such as the SCO or CSTO, which often produce communiqués without measurable follow-up.

In aviation, a plan for route development could pair regulators and carriers around specific feasibility studies, such as Almaty–Frankfurt for freighter uplift, and Tashkent–New York for long-haul passenger service. Dates and projects will impress more than general expressions of support. On energy and critical minerals, U.S. support can help where DFC and export-credit tools share midstream and processing risk, where grid-efficiency projects cut technical losses in measured steps, and where uranium and other inputs move under transparent, long-dated contracts. That approach would position Washington as a facilitator of private-sector investment rather than a counterweight to Chinese or Russian state capital, an important distinction in the region’s eyes.

From Sequencing Work to Measurable Outcomes

Leaders can set direction, but ministries must then sequence the work: pre-feasibility and permitting, then finance, then construction. The results of the C5+1 leaders’ summit in 2023 provide a policy base for proceeding in this manner, but they did not pre-commit to numbers. A minerals working group that publishes by the end of Q1 2026 a shortlist of three processing projects with estimated capex ranges and indicative purchase commitments would be a material step. Such visible benchmarks would reassure both investors and skeptical regional publics that the C5+1 is not merely another talking shop.

On sanctions compliance, trade continues to be shaped by secondary-sanctions exposure, export-control observance, and risks assumed by correspondent banks. A useful outcome of the summit would be a standing technical forum co-chaired by U.S. and C5 authorities that shares guidance notes and anonymized cases with banks and exporters. On security, emphasis will likely remain on border management, counter-terrorism cooperation, and information exchange. Any communiqué would do well to schedule a first compliance-forum meeting within 60 days, with a commitment to a quarterly digest of guidance and case studies thereafter. This would help local banks and traders navigate Western compliance regimes without freezing legitimate commerce, a key regional grievance since 2022.

Outcomes from the summit that would matter include: corridor targets or customs-harmonization pilot projects with dates and named border points; a minerals-supply-chain working group with designated U.S. and C5 co-chairs and a first meeting on the calendar; a sanctions-compliance forum that commits to publish guidance and case digests; and an aviation track that pairs regulators with carriers for route-development facilitation. Over-programming beyond interagency capacity must be avoided, but credibility will rest on milestones, clear instruments, and prompt ministerial follow-through. This balance between ambition and deliverability will determine whether Washington’s renewed attention translates into durable influence.

Measurable Progress

Chinese finance in Central Asia moves quickly and at scale; Russian links persist through energy, logistics, and labor migration. The United States adds value where it lowers transaction costs: customs and data interoperability at border crossings, bankable structures for minerals and grid projects, and route development linking Central Asian airports to global hubs.

Progress on corridor governance, minerals chains, and aviation markets over the next 12–24 months will indicate whether this summit strengthens regional agency. A practical indicator is a 10–20% reduction in average clearance times at the named border crossings, and the publication of at least one long-haul aviation feasibility study by mid-2026.

The broader takeaway for Central Asia is incremental but real. A durable leaders’ track that produces verifiable, time-bound outputs would shift standards and procedures toward predictability across trade, energy, finance, and aviation. Such an approach would support cooperation under competitive geoeconomic conditions and increase the region’s ability to turn multi-vector intent into operational autonomy. If Washington follows through, the C5+1 could evolve from a symbolic dialogue into a practical architecture for regional resilience, something neither Moscow nor Beijing currently offers.

If by a year from now two pilot border crossings have institutionalized new procedures and one minerals-processing project has agreed on a term sheet (a non-binding summary of the key commercial and legal terms the parties use to draft final binding contracts), the region will have taken a measurable step toward autonomous operating capacity. For both Washington and Central Asia, that would mark not only policy progress but the emergence of a new standard for results-based regional diplomacy.

Cyprus as a Mirror of Turkish Geopolitics: How Ankara Uses Northern Cyprus to Project Influence in Central Asia

Northern Cyprus has become a microcosm of Turkish foreign policy, a space where Ankara combines military presence, the ideology of “Turkic brotherhood,” and economic leverage. For Turkey, this territory is not merely a long-standing geopolitical dispute but a laboratory for a new diplomatic model centered on the vision of a “great Turkic world.”

As noted by Stratfor, despite the decisive victory of Republican Turkish Party leader Tufan Erhürman in the October 19, 2025, presidential elections in the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a candidate who supports renewed negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus and advocates for a federal model, Ankara has shown no intention of revising its entrenched two-state doctrine. Analysts suggest Turkey may apply economic pressure and diplomatic isolation, including suspension of subsidies and credit lines, should Erhürman attempt to implement a federal solution.

Concurrently, Turkey is lobbying for the TRNC’s recognition within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), aiming to set a symbolic precedent: if Turkic-speaking nations will not support each other, who will? For Central Asia, this initiative reflects Ankara’s commitment to unifying the Turkic world under its political leadership, extending far beyond cultural solidarity.

Political Implications for Central Asia

Turkey’s push to incorporate the TRNC into the OTS shifts the organization from a cultural bloc to a geopolitical instrument. Should Northern Cyprus gain observer status, Ankara will likely expect symbolic support from its Turkic partners.

This poses a significant dilemma for Central Asian states. Aligning with Turkey could be perceived by Western actors as a breach of international law, while maintaining neutrality might be viewed as a rejection of Turkic unity. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have so far emphasized adherence to international law and sovereignty. At the April 2025 EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, these states jointly reaffirmed UN Security Council resolutions from the early 1980s, which declared the TRNC’s independence and all related separatist actions legally invalid.

Kyrgyzstan may face a more delicate challenge due to its deep humanitarian and educational ties with Turkey.

Northern Cyprus thus serves as a litmus test for Turkic integration: how closely can nations align without compromising their political autonomy?

Economic and Energy Dimensions

Cyprus plays a strategic role in Turkey’s energy policy, linking the Caspian region, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish control over Northern Cyprus bolsters its influence over maritime logistics, offshore gas development, and export corridors.

This holds direct relevance for Central Asia. A stronger Turkish position in the Mediterranean enhances its leverage over energy transit routes from the Caspian to Europe, particularly in relation to the Trans-Caspian pipeline and the Middle Corridor.

Over time, Ankara is expected to use energy infrastructure as a tool for political engagement, promoting an “economy of Turkic solidarity”, offering mutual benefits, but often tied to strategic conditions.

Security and Military Presence

The TRNC functions as a prototype for Turkey’s military protectorate model, a way to retain control while presenting itself as a guarantor of stability. This model is echoed across the Turkic region through Turkey’s expanding military partnerships with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Northern Cyprus operates as a “security showroom,” illustrating the perceived benefits of alliance with Turkey. Yet deeper military ties with Ankara may provoke unease in Moscow and Beijing, which view a consolidated Turkic defense bloc as a threat to their regional interests. As such, Turkey is emerging not just as a partner, but as an assertive strategic actor vying for regional leadership.

Ideological and Symbolic Dimensions: The “Turkic Nation”

In Turkish political discourse, Cyprus is framed not simply as a territory, but as a symbol. The refrain “Türkiye never left its friends” encapsulates Ankara’s ideological expansion, casting solidarity as a willingness to support even unrecognized entities.

In Central Asia, this message is conveyed subtly, through cultural programs, religious initiatives, and media outreach. If TRNC recognition within the OTS becomes a reality, it could set a precedent for prioritizing ethnic unity over international norms. This would be particularly problematic for Kazakhstan and other multiethnic societies, potentially undermining foundational principles of their foreign policy. In such a shift, Turkey would position itself less as an economic ally and more as an ideological coordinator.

Forecast: Navigating Between Solidarity and Sovereignty

In the medium term, Turkey is expected to continue advocating for the TRNC’s inclusion in the OTS, using both economic incentives and diplomatic persuasion. Kazakhstan will likely uphold its stance as a mediator and proponent of international law, while Ankara intensifies its influence through humanitarian and cultural engagement across the region.

Should tensions between Turkey and the EU or the US escalate, Central Asia could serve as a strategic rear base for Ankara, further enhancing Turkey’s interest in the region. However, overly assertive pressure from Turkey risks pushing some states closer to China or Russia as counterweights. Turkey will thus need to balance economic and symbolic tools with diplomatic finesse.

Final Assessment

For Ankara, Northern Cyprus represents more than a geopolitical dispute; it is a test case for constructing a new political order based on identity rather than legality. If Turkey succeeds in legitimizing the TRNC within the OTS, it will redefine Turkic integration as a geopolitical enterprise rather than a cultural one.

For Central Asia, this marks a critical juncture. The region must remain engaged in Turkic cooperation without becoming subsumed into a Turkish-led geopolitical project. Kazakhstan, in particular, bears responsibility as a stabilizing force, asserting that genuine unity can only be achieved through mutual respect for sovereignty and adherence to international norms.

Northern Cyprus is not merely a territory, it is a symbol of how far Turkey is prepared to go to assert leadership, and of how resolutely the Turkic nations will defend their own space for independent decision-making.

Tokayev Meets with U.S. Envoys Ahead of C5+1 Summit

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met in Astana with Sergio Gor, U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia, and Christopher Landau, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, to discuss the future of the Kazakh-American expanded strategic partnership and preparations for the upcoming C5+1 summit in Washington.

Tokayev expressed confidence that the summit, scheduled for November 6, would be productive in setting priorities for long-term cooperation. He emphasized Kazakhstan’s commitment to strengthening trade, economic, and investment ties with the United States.

Tokayev also conveyed his appreciation to U.S. President Donald Trump for the invitation to the summit. He voiced Kazakhstan’s support for the domestic and foreign policies pursued by the Trump administration and praised its role in promoting global peace and security.

Sergio Gor delivered Trump’s greetings and reaffirmed the strategic importance of Central Asia in U.S. foreign policy. He noted that the upcoming summit is expected to elevate bilateral cooperation to a new level.

The leaders discussed opportunities for deepening cooperation in energy, critical minerals, digitalization, and the development of transport and logistics infrastructure.

Earlier in their visit, the U.S. delegation traveled to Almaty, where Gor and Landau met with local business leaders and executives from American companies operating in Kazakhstan.

They also toured the Museum of Modern Art, the Shymbulak ski resort, and the Medeu high-altitude ice rink.

“Almaty is Kazakhstan’s largest city and financial capital, located at the foot of the Zailiyskiy Alatau mountains. Just half an hour’s drive from the city is the world-famous Shymbulak ski resort, where we enjoyed warm Kazakh hospitality. I’m starting to feel at home here, surrounded by golden eagles and my new Kazakh friends!” Landau wrote on social media.

The date of the C5+1 summit was first reported in media outlets before being confirmed through official correspondence between Tokayev and Trump. Uzbek media later corroborated the event, citing sources close to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s administration, followed by confirmation from Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov.

The Artistic Brilliance of Central Asia Takes Center Stage at Sotheby’s

On October 29, Sotheby’s will host its Arts of the Islamic World and India sale, featuring a dazzling selection of manuscripts, ceramics, metalwork, and jewelry that together trace the creative reach of Central Asia across six centuries. The auction highlights how the region’s artists shaped Islamic visual culture from the early medieval period to the Timurid age.

Among the most important works is a rare page from the monumental Baysunghur Qur’an, produced around 1400 in Herat or Samarkand. Another piece connects to the earlier Samanid Dynasty, whose rule from Bukhara and Tashkent fostered a flourishing of calligraphic pottery in the ninth and tenth centuries. The Arab geographer al-Maqdisi once praised the “large bowls from Shash,” an early name for Tashkent, noting their reputation throughout the Islamic world.

A line from the ‘Baysunghur Qur’an’, attributed to ‘Umar al-Aqta, Herat or Samarkand, circa 1400; image: Sotheby’s

Two colorful Timurid mosaic tiles from the fourteenth or fifteenth century illustrate the architectural splendor of Samarkand and Herat. Their glazed patterns in cobalt, turquoise, and white once formed part of vast decorative panels in mosques and mausoleums. The geometric interlace and stylized foliage that define them became a visual signature of Timurid architecture, a style that spread from Central Asia to Persia and India.

A Golden Horde turquoise and pearl-set gold belt or necklace, Pontic-Caspian Steppe, 14th century; image: Sotheby’s

The Times of Central Asia spoke with Frankie Keyworth, a specialist in Islamic and Indian Art at Sotheby’s, for a closer look.

TCA: How did manuscripts like the Baysunghur Qur’an serve as symbols of power and faith in the Timurid court, and what does its immense scale – a Qur’an so vast it took two people to turn a page – reveal about the empire’s ambition, artistry, and self-image?

Keyworth: The manuscript was a hugely ambitious and challenging project, even just by the tools it would take to create, with monumental sheets of paper measuring 177 by 101cm., and a large pen whose nib would have to measure over 1cm. Displayed on a magnificent marble stand, the manuscript would be a staggering visual representation of the patron’s wealth and piety. Their subsequent use during public recitation reinforced the elite’s religious aspirations. The fact that this manuscript is unsurpassed by any other medieval Qur’an and remains so valued centuries after it was produced at the turn of the 15th century reveals the key role manuscripts played in the establishment of the Timurid dynastic image.

A Timurid brass jug (mashrabe), Herat, Afghanistan, 15th-early 16th century; image: Sotheby’s

TCA: A brass jug from Herat shaped like a Chinese vase, a ceramic bowl from Tashkent inscribed in Arabic script – these objects tell of traders, scholars, and artists linking worlds from Samarkand to Beijing long before globalization had a name. What can you tell us about how this trade transpired, and are there similarities to modern transport corridors?

Keyworth: Trade via the so-called Silk Road endured for centuries, and its role in the movement of works and the sharing of ideas has been well-documented. Diplomacy, patronage, and the movement and dispersal of artists as empires were created and fell, also resulting in artistic influence and exchange. Innovations in material and techniques allowed different centers to develop and apply their own stamp to forms derived from other regions. The Timurid jug, for example, displays a form associated with Ming pottery, but here it is transformed into a metalwork and adorned with the intricate floral ornament and calligraphy of the Timurid repertoire. It can also be related to examples in other media, such as the remarkable jade jug of Ulugh Beg, and, later, in Ottoman silverwork of the 16th century.

A parcel-gilt silver cup, Pontic-Caspian Steppe, Central Asia or Persia, 13th-14th century; image: Sotheby’s

TCA: On many items in the collection, the written word becomes the art itself. Curving naskh letters bless a silver cup, while bold Kufic script circles a Samanid bowl. Each inscription transforms an everyday object into something sacred. What messages of joy, faith, or poetry were meant to be read or simply admired centuries ago?

Keyworth: The inscriptions on such wares reveal the repertoire of aphorisms and poetry that would have been widely used and familiar to users at the time, such as a quatrain signaling the virtues of generosity by Ibn Mubarak on the Samanid bowl. The inscriptions here relate to the use of the bowl, displaying a message of literary refinement and generosity fitting of a generous host who would own such a luxurious article of tableware.

The inscriptions also reveal the relationships between different craftsmen, and scholars have compared the foliate stems and calligraphic cartouches on Timurid jugs such as ours with manuscript illumination, suggesting a dialogue between the metalworkers and Kitab-khaneh. The accomplished Kufic script around the Samanid bowl also shows an artist highly skilled in calligraphy.

Each work offered at Sotheby’s reflects a meeting ground of ideas and artistry. A picture is created of Central Asia and its cities, especially Samarkand and Herat, which became centers of invention connecting the Islamic world with China, India, and Byzantium. There, poets, scholars, and craftsmen turned geometry into art and faith into design, creating works that gave ideas visible shape and devotion lasting substance.

For historians, the significance of these objects lies in what they reveal about movement. Ideas, materials, and craftsmen travelled along trade routes that carried silk, gold, and paper; the same roads that brought goods from Xi’an to Constantinople also spread architectural forms, calligraphic styles, and decorative motifs.

The sale also reflects a broader shift in how museums and collectors view Central Asian art. Once treated as peripheral to Islamic culture, the region is now recognized as a driving force in its evolution. The restoration of monuments in Samarkand and Bukhara and new research into Timurid manuscripts have deepened understanding of how Central Asia influenced later Persian and Mughal art. Institutions such as the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha and the Louvre in Paris have expanded their collections of Central Asian material, underscoring its importance in the global story of Islamic civilization.

Two Timurid cut-mosaic tiles, Central Asia or Persia, 14th-15th century; image: Sotheby’s

The auction begins at Sotheby’s New Bond Street gallery in London at 10:30GMT on October 29, with bidding available online and in person. The full catalogue and sale details are available on the Sotheby’s website.

Kazakhstan’s Strong Bond Sale Anchors Regional Capital Markets

The Republic of Kazakhstan once again captured global investor attention with its highly successful sovereign bond issuance in October 2025, underscoring its status as Central Asia’s benchmark borrower. The Ministry of Finance sold a $1.5 billion five-year Eurobond at a record-low 4.412% yield, about 85 basis points above U.S. Treasuries, after attracting nearly $4.4 billion in orders from a geographically diverse investor base spanning Europe, the U.S., and Asia – almost three times oversubscribed.

Strong Market Reception and Competitive Pricing

This five-year issue achieved the lowest yield in Kazakhstan’s independent history and was one of the tightest-priced five-year sovereign bonds among investment-grade peers, pricing inside higher-rated Poland, and modestly above Qatar’s comparable five-year yield. The Finance Ministry credited the result to investors’ confidence in Kazakhstan’s macroeconomic management and fiscal credibility, strengthened by the country’s ongoing budget and tax reforms enacted in 2025. These measures have reinforced perceptions of policy discipline and institutional reliability, enabling Kazakhstan to secure funding at exceptionally low costs.

June 2025: Dual-Tranche Success

In June 2025, Kazakhstan executed a $2.5 billion dual-tranche Eurobond comprising a 7-year $1.35 billion note at 5.0% and a 12-year $1.15 billion note at 5.5%. Investor demand was exceptional, with orders roughly twice the issue size from global funds across Europe, the U.S., and Asia. The transaction priced tightly against comparable BBB sovereigns, reflecting market confidence in Kazakhstan’s low debt levels, ample reserves, and consistent reform momentum.

Together, the June and October offerings have demonstrated Kazakhstan’s ability to tap international markets repeatedly in 2025 on favorable terms, even amid global volatility.

Fiscal Strength and Ratings Support

Kazakhstan’s strong market performance rests on a robust fiscal foundation and solid credit ratings. Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kazakhstan’s long-term foreign-currency issuer default rating at ‘BBB’ with a Stable Outlook, noting the country’s low government debt – around 25% of GDP – and substantial sovereign net foreign assets supported by the National Fund and foreign-exchange reserves. Combined reserves and National Fund assets total roughly $93 billion, equal to about 31% of GDP.

S&P Global Ratings, which upgraded Kazakhstan’s outlook to Positive in August 2025, forecasts 5.5–5.6% GDP growth and has commended progress in deficit reduction and institutional reform. The agency noted that Kazakhstan’s new Budget and Tax Codes, along with tighter fiscal rules and improved oversight of quasi-fiscal activities, are expected to strengthen fiscal consolidation and institutional transparency.

These reforms, together with the country’s moderate debt burden and substantial sovereign assets, have helped sustain investor confidence. Kazakhstan’s ability to issue Eurobonds at yields tighter than some A-rated peers demonstrates that credibility in practice, and market participants now view the country as the regional benchmark sovereign in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan: Reform Progress, Higher Yields

In February 2025, Uzbekistan raised roughly $1.5 billion equivalent through a multi-currency sovereign issue — a $500 million 7-year U.S. dollar tranche at 6.95%, a €500 million 4-year euro tranche at 5.1%, and a UZS 6 trillion 3-year local-currency note at 15.5%. Total demand reached about $4.2 billion, nearly 2.8 times oversubscribed, underscoring strong interest despite global rate volatility.

Fitch upgraded Uzbekistan to ‘BB’ (Stable) in June 2025, citing accelerated structural reforms and resilient growth. International reserves exceeded $50 billion as of September 2025, buoyed by rising gold prices. While GDP growth continues at around six percent, the yields achieved by Uzbekistan remain materially wider than those of more mature issuers, reflecting its shorter track record in global capital markets.

Kyrgyzstan: A Debut Success with Frontier-Market Pricing

In May 2025, Kyrgyzstan entered the international markets with a $700 million, five-year Eurobond priced at 7.75%, marking its first sovereign issue. Demand topped $2.1 billion – about three times oversubscribed – with participation from more than 100 investors across the U.S., Europe, and Asia.

The yield reflected Kyrgyzstan’s higher-risk, frontier-market profile. Fitch rated the country ‘B’ (Stable), and Moody’s kept it at ‘B3’, raising the outlook to Positive after GDP grew 11.5% year-on-year in early 2025. Proceeds are being channeled into infrastructure and debt-management projects, a prudent strategy for a debut sovereign issuer. The Times of Central Asia previously described the debut as a “landmark Eurobond launch” on the London Stock Exchange, noting proceeds were directed to infrastructure and debt management.

Global Perspective

Kazakhstan remains Central Asia’s most established sovereign issuer, combining investment-grade strength, fiscal prudence, and steady market access at tight spreads. Its 2025 performance reaffirmed that stability and aligned it more closely with mature emerging-market peers in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, while still considered frontier markets, are advancing along a constructive path toward deeper participation in global capital markets. Uzbekistan’s reform-driven issuance and Kyrgyzstan’s well-received debut both highlight rising investor confidence and the region’s expanding market footprint.

Together, these developments point to a more diversified and resilient sovereign landscape in Central Asia, reflecting steady progress in policy credibility and access to international investors.