Page 41 – The Times Of Central Asia

04 Mar 2026

Central Asia, Home, Business & Economy, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Business & Economy, Features, Kazakhstan Featurees, Kazakhstan Home

Navigation Seals in the EAEU: Digital Modernization or a New Barrier for Kazakhstani Businesses?

March 4, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

Since February 2026, the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Russia, have begun the phased introduction of a navigation seal system to track cargo shipments. The mechanism is designed to increase transit transparency, strengthen control over the movement of goods, and speed up logistics operations.

However, business representatives warn that the new system could lead to higher logistics costs and create additional administrative barriers for carriers. Against the backdrop of the launch of the project’s first phase in Kazakhstan, debate is growing over whether digitalization will deliver the expected benefits, or become another source of pressure on the market.

New Transport Control System

The agreement on the use of navigation seals in the EAEU was signed by the heads of state on April 19, 2021, and ratified by Kazakhstan in 2023. The document provides for the tracking of goods transported through the territories of two or more member states of the union.

In Kazakhstan, amendments were introduced to national legislation to implement the agreement, the information systems of controlling authorities were modernized, and pilot projects were conducted in both road and rail transport.

Under a resolution of the Government of Kazakhstan dated September 10, 2024, the national operator of the transport tracking system is the Institute of Space Technology and Technologies LLP, which operates under the Aerospace Committee of the Ministry of Digital Development.

By decision of the Eurasian Economic Commission’s Collegium dated September 23, 2025, phased transport tracking using navigation seals began on February 11, 2026, for goods transported between EAEU countries.

In 2025, the national operator, together with the State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan, conducted a pilot project on the use of navigation seals in transit transportation.

Testing took place at road border crossings and along railway routes. The main objective was to test procedures for installing and removing seals, as well as to verify the interaction between government information systems and the Transit platform.

As a result of the pilot project, more than 890 shipments involving 1,757 vehicles were tracked, and a total of 1,637 navigation seals were installed.

The devices were used at key road checkpoints and along the railway route between Altynkol and Saryagash stations. Based on the results, authorities concluded that the system was technically and organizationally ready for large-scale implementation.

How “Digital Seals” Work

According to Osken Toishibekov, director of the Institute of Space Technology and Technologies, the system is based on the Transit information platform, which connects carriers, operators, and government agencies.

He explained to The Times of Central Asia that a navigation seal is a device equipped with an electronic module and a sealing element with satellite navigation capabilities. It enables the location of a vehicle to be tracked via GPS, with data transmitted to the system through mobile networks.

The device records attempts to open or damage the seal, break the sealing cable, interfere with the equipment, or trigger other abnormal events. All information is automatically transmitted to the monitoring system.

To manage the process, a mobile app called Transit has been developed. It allows users to activate and deactivate seals, scan QR codes, and record the installation of the device with photographs.

Transportation will be monitored by a 24-hour dispatch center that tracks vehicle movements, analyzes incoming data, and communicates with drivers in the event of abnormal situations.

Communication Problems and Technical Risks

One potential challenge remains unstable mobile coverage along certain sections of transport routes.

According to Toishibekov, the system allows for offline operation in such cases. When connectivity is unavailable, operations with the seal can be performed via Bluetooth, with the data transmitted to the system once the connection is restored.

In addition, satellite internet and other technical solutions are planned for use at certain checkpoints to improve system stability.

The cost of using navigation seals varies depending on the country and the mode of transport.

According to current estimates, the cost of services in Kazakhstan is approximately:

about $83 for the start of transportation and tracking by road;
about $140 for the start of transportation and tracking by rail;
about $57 for transit through the country;
about $76 for the completion of transportation tracking.

The national operator says that the cost of sealing represents only a relatively small share of overall transportation expenses.

Business representatives, however, take a different view.

According to Timur Zharkinov, deputy chairman of the board of the Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, calculations by businesses suggest that the system’s introduction could significantly increase logistics costs.

In some cases, the cost of rail transport could rise by tens of percent, particularly when transporting small consignments of goods.

Entrepreneurs argue that mandatory sealing could become an additional administrative burden, especially for small and medium-sized businesses.

Which Goods Will Be Subject to Control

The system will be implemented in stages. In the first phase, tracking will apply to:

alcoholic beverages;
tobacco and tobacco products;
goods subject to special economic measures;
certain categories of consumer goods transported by road.

In the future, the list may expand to include additional cargo categories and rail shipments.

The business community has proposed maintaining exemptions from mandatory sealing for several categories, including humanitarian aid, the transport of animals, hatching eggs, and international postal items.

Digitalization of Logistics or New Barriers?

By the end of 2026, Kazakh authorities plan to expand the use of navigation seals and increase the infrastructure operated by the national system provider. Plans also include further development of the information system and improvements to regulations governing the interaction among transport participants.

Authorities argue that the system will improve transit transparency, reduce cases of false transit declarations, and increase budget revenues.

Businesses, however, are calling for a careful assessment of the economic consequences of the technology’s introduction and, if necessary, a revision of tariffs.

Whether the project ultimately becomes a tool for modernizing logistics or a new barrier to trade will likely become clear in the first years of its implementation.

04 Mar 2026

Central Asia, Home, Business & Economy, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Business & Economy, Kazakhstan Featurees, Kazakhstan Home

Public-Private Partnership Makes Strides in Kazakhstan

March 4, 2026
By Sergey Kwan

In Kazakhstan, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a mechanism for implementing infrastructure projects using limited government financial resources. At a briefing on February 25, Aslan Kaligazin, Chairman of the Management Board of the Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Center, spoke about public-private partnership development in 2025 and outlined priorities for the future.

According to Kaligazin, Kazakhstan has so far concluded 1,257 PPPs and concession agreements totaling KZT 3.6 trillion (€7.19bn). Of these, 697 projects are currently being implemented. Only 17 these projects are implemented at the national level, while accounting for more than half (KZT 1.8 trillion, $3.6bn) of the total projects’ value.

The absolute majority of the PPPs – 1,240 projects – are being implemented at the local level.

The projects mainly concentrate in the social sector, healthcare, education, energy, and housing and utilities, together accounting for over 88% of all contracts.

Transport and infrastructure represent a significant share in value terms: around 27% of the total portfolio.

Kaligazin noted that PPP in Kazakhstan has been undergoing a transformation in recent years: while the number of contracts is declining, the average project size is increasing. Prior to 2022, the average project cost stood at approximately KZT 6 billion ($11.99 million, but increased to KZT 18 billion ($25.97 million) in 2022–2025. The portfolio is increasingly shaped not by small social facilities, but by large-scale and technologically sophisticated infrastructure projects.

Among the most capital-intensive projects of 2025 were the construction of Industrial Park No. 2 in the Astana Technopolis Special Economic Zone, and a project to introduce AI-based solutions into Astana’s security and urban infrastructure management system.

The Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Center’s future plans include identifying priority infrastructure and sectoral segments where PPPs should become the primary project delivery mechanism. A list of areas will be formed in which PPP projects will gradually replace projects financed exclusively from the state budget.

“Our task is not to formally expand the PPP portfolio, but to develop sustainable, well-structured projects that deliver long-term economic impact and tangible benefits for citizens,” Kaligazin concluded.

In recent years, Kazakhstan has adopted legislative amendments increasing the efficiency and transparency of PPP project planning. PPP contracts are now concluded solely on a competitive basis, and the planning and competitive selection procedures have been digitalized, according to the Ministry of National Economy.

To engage private business in the creation of social infrastructure, a Comprehensive PPP Development Plan for 2024–2028 was adopted, providing for the implementation of 43 projects in the areas of education, healthcare, sports, and social protection.

04 Mar 2026

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

March 4, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments.

When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable.

The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed.

Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability.

However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game.

History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained.

There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you.

This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly.

This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia.

First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection.

Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central Asian languages. ISKP propaganda frequently highlights and promotes the idea of Central Asian militants and targets Uzbek- and Tajik-speaking audiences. This suggests that its intended audience extends far beyond the territory of a single state. Extremist networks actively engage with the cultural and linguistic space of the region.

The proximity of Afghanistan amplifies these factors. Even without direct infiltration across borders, the risks of ideological influence and localized radicalization remain.

As the region becomes more open and integrated, the need for coordinated security cooperation increases. The key conclusion is clear: no country in Central Asia can afford to view itself as an outside observer.

In the context of networked threats, isolation is not an option. A threat may not be visible today. It may appear distant. Yet in the digital age, security is increasingly interdependent.

This does not mean that Central Asia is on the verge of destabilization. On the contrary, in recent years, the region has demonstrated an ability to coordinate policies and pursue pragmatic approaches. However, the evolving nature of security threats requires constant adaptation, particularly as networked extremist structures move beyond traditional security models.

Relying solely on force is no longer sufficient. A comprehensive strategy is required, including information sharing, monitoring financial flows, countering online propaganda, and addressing the social drivers of radicalization.

In a broader sense, it is important to remember that attempts to treat extremist networks as potential proxy forces almost always produce unintended consequences. Over time, such structures begin operating according to their own logic and spiral beyond control. This pattern is universal and not confined to any specific region or political context.

For Central Asia today, the challenge is not only responding to threats but also assessing their true nature. In some cases, the greatest danger lies not in the threat itself, but in the belief that it can be controlled.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

03 Mar 2026

Central Asia, Home, Life & Culture, Kazakhstan Life & Culture, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Home

Death Toll in Cafe Gas Explosion in Kazakhstan Rises to Nine

March 4, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

A cafe owner in northern Kazakhstan is under arrest for alleged negligence after a gas explosion and fire that killed nine people.

The explosion occurred at the Plov Center cafe in the town of Shchuchinsk in Akmola region, outside the capital Astana, early on February 27, killing seven people, including six cafe workers and the 16-year-old daughter of one of the employees, city officials said. Two injured people later died, according to the city. It attributed the death toll to the regional health department.

More than two dozen people were injured, and about half of them were hospitalized, according to the Ministry of Emergency Situations.

The café is attached to a five-story residential building. The owner was arrested on Monday for suspected violation of fire safety regulations.

After the disaster, workers from the emergency situations ministry conducted fire safety checks at cafes, restaurants and dormitories in northern Kazakhstan. They checked that gas cylinders were correctly positioned, fire extinguishers were on hand and evacuation routes were accessible.

The ministry is leading a high-level investigation of the causes and circumstances of the gas explosion.

03 Mar 2026

Central Asia, Uzbekistan Environment, Environment, Home, Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan Home

Uzbekistan Introduces Incentives for Major Industrial Polluters to Reduce Environmental Impact

March 3, 2026
By Sadokat Jalolova

Uzbekistan’s government has approved new measures aimed at encouraging large industrial enterprises to reduce their environmental footprint.

Resolution No. 85 establishes regulations to incentivize environmental impact reduction efforts by industrial enterprises classified as Category I and Category II facilities based on their level of environmental impact. These categories include enterprises considered to have significant or moderate effects on the natural environment.

Under the new framework, incentives will be introduced in two stages.

At the first stage, an enterprise that installs a background air pollution monitoring station will be eligible for relief from previously assessed outstanding compensation payments for environmental damage. In addition, 50% of compensation payments allocated to the state budget for environmental harm will be refunded over a two-year period.

At the second stage, if the enterprise installs dust and gas cleaning equipment as well as local wastewater treatment facilities within one year after commissioning the monitoring station, 70% of the compensation payments directed to the state budget will be refunded over two years.

Enterprises seeking to benefit from these incentives must notify the Ecology Committee through Public Service Centers or via the government’s online portal. The committee will review submitted documentation within 15 working days and issue a formal conclusion on whether the enterprise qualifies for state support.

The Times of Central Asia previously reported, that more than a dozen valuable trees were cut down at the construction site of the Ritz-Carlton Tashkent project in central Tashkent. Environmental damage in that case was officially assessed at 351,230,000 Uzbek sum (approximately $29,000), according to documentation cited by officials.

03 Mar 2026

Central Asia, Education, Home, Justice, Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan Home, Uzbekistan Justice

Uzbek FLEX Finalist Returns Home After Alleged Harassment by Host Father in Indiana

March 3, 2026
By Sadokat Jalolova

An Uzbek high school student selected for the prestigious FLEX exchange program has returned home after her family alleged she was subjected to sexual harassment by her host father in the United States. The claims were made public by her father, Dr. Aziz Boltayev, in a detailed Facebook post. Uzbek officials have confirmed that they requested explanations from program representatives, while the U.S. side has not issued a public statement.

Dr. Boltayev’s daughter was one of nearly 60 finalists from Uzbekistan selected in 2025 for the Future Leaders Exchange Program (FLEX), had traveled to the United States to complete her final year of high school. The fully funded initiative, supported by the U.S. Department of State, enables students from participating countries to study at American high schools and live with volunteer host families for one academic year.

According to Boltayev’s account, his daughter was placed in a small town in Indiana with a childless couple, both music teachers, who had previously hosted exchange students. Initial video calls reportedly reassured the family prior to her departure.

“After graduating from medical school, I received a U.S. Department of State grant and spent time in the United States for professional development,” Boltayev wrote. “I returned to Uzbekistan with a deep sense of gratitude and a positive impression of American values. Naturally, when my eldest daughter won the FLEX grant in 2025, I was proud and supportive.”

He said the situation changed approximately a month after her arrival. According to his post, the host father allegedly began making inappropriate remarks and advances when his wife was not present.

“He told my daughter that it was ‘necessary to gain sexual experience’ before marriage,” Boltayev wrote. “To her credit, [his daughter] firmly resisted and immediately informed her assigned FLEX coordinator.”

According to Boltayev, the local coordinator relocated his daughter shortly after the complaint was filed. However, he criticized the way communication with the family in Uzbekistan was handled.

“The coordinator moved [his daughter] out of the house immediately, but in doing so, they completely bypassed us, her parents,” he wrote. Due to the time difference, he said he was informed the following day by the FLEX office in Tashkent.

Boltayev further alleged that during this period his daughter’s phone was switched off and her parents’ messages went unanswered. He claimed that the coordinator had instructed her to turn off her phone for “security reasons,” which he described as isolating a minor from her parents.

He also asserted that neither the temporary host family nor U.S.-based program representatives agreed to speak directly with him. According to Boltayev, his daughter was told that program officials were not obligated to provide information to her parents.

Seeking reassurance, Boltayev contacted a friend, a faculty member at the University of Michigan, who lives several hours from his daughter’s location, and asked him to check on her in person.

“Even then, FLEX representatives tried to block him, telling my daughter: ‘He needs our permission to see you, and for now, permission is denied,’” Boltayev wrote. “Only after my firm insistence did they meet.” His friend later confirmed that his daughter was physically safe but emotionally distressed.

Boltayev said he subsequently sent a formal letter to FLEX administrators in Washington, asking how his daughter had been placed with a host parent he characterized as predatory, and what measures would be taken. He described the response as formal and unsatisfactory, stating that officials expressed regret but maintained that program procedures had been followed.

Dissatisfied with the outcome, Boltayev requested his daughter’s immediate return to Uzbekistan. She returned after approximately six weeks in the United States. Despite not completing the academic year, she was reportedly granted alumni status.

“She arrived home safe but psychologically traumatized,” he wrote. “Despite completing only 1.5 months of a 10-month program, she would be granted ‘Alumni’ status.”

The case has attracted attention from Uzbek authorities. Boltayev stated that he filed complaints with the Children’s Ombudsman and the Ministry of Preschool and School Education. According to him, the Ombudsman’s office indicated that the matter had been forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He added that the Ministry of Preschool and School Education, together with representatives of the Ministry of Justice, summoned the director of the FLEX office in Tashkent for explanations.

Boltayev alleged that during the meeting, the American representative declined to answer questions verbally and requested that inquiries be submitted in writing. He wrote that more than two months have passed since formal requests were sent by the ministries without a response.

FLEX has operated in Uzbekistan for many years and is widely regarded as one of the most competitive secondary school exchange programs. Each year, finalists are selected through a multi-stage process that includes English-language testing, essays, and interviews.

As of publication, neither the U.S. Department of State nor FLEX program officials have issued a public statement addressing Boltayev’s allegations. The Uzbek ministries involved have not disclosed details of their correspondence.

In his Facebook post, Boltayev said he chose to speak publicly to alert other families.

“If a crisis occurs, you and your child may find yourselves alone against a system that prioritizes its own image over your child’s well-being,” he wrote.