• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00192 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09224 0.55%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 -0.14%
22 January 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 13

Opinion: What Will a New Trump Presidency Mean for Central Asia?

During his presidency, Donald Trump introduced a foreign policy approach that recalibrated U.S. engagement with Central Asia, a region strategically critical yet overshadowed by the influence of China and Russia. Trump’s policies, targeting the collective challenge of CRINK (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea), aimed to foster regional autonomy and counter external dependency. This policy shift, aimed at countering the global influence of CRINK has extended to the vital region of Central Asia. Further, it is geographically wedged between Russia and China and serves as a critical bridge for U.S. interests. The CRINK nations, in their regional strategies, have made substantial inroads in Central Asia. Additionally, each nation is pursuing influence through economic, political, or military avenues. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, for instance, have been noted as major forces reshaping Central Asian economies as well as infrastructure. In 2013, the BRI of China was launched, which has channeled billions into roads, railways, and other infrastructure projects in Central Asia, seeking to create new trade routes connecting Asia to Europe. On the other side, Russia has promoted its Eurasian Economic Union as a trading bloc that has aimed at fostering economic integration among Central Asia and neighboring countries. These initiatives have provided economic incentives for Central Asia but also intensified its reliance on external powers, particularly China and Russia​. During his presidency, Trump emphasized a CRINK-focused strategy, which prioritized Central Asia's sovereignty and reduced dependency on China and Russia. This strategy laid the groundwork for U.S. engagement in the region, influencing current policy directions. In 2020, Trump’s administration unveiled a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia, marking the first such effort in over two decades. The policy emphasized U.S. support for border security and defense collaboration, including financial aid to Tajikistan and military training for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These measures, though initiated under Trump, continue to shape current U.S. approaches to combating terrorism and fostering regional stability. For example, the U.S. has established the C5+1 initiative as a dialogue platform between the United States and the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan). It was developed further to promote mutual goals in regional security, economic development, and environmental resilience​. Security cooperation is a vital aspect of this U.S. strategy which has given the threats of terrorism and also potential instability at CRINK’s peripheries (Sciutto, 2024). In particular, Afghanistan’s proximity to Central Asia poses both risks as well as opportunities for these nations. The U.S. has provided financial support to Tajikistan to strengthen border security and counter drug trafficking. Furthermore, while also assisting Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with training and equipment to improve their defense capabilities the US has financially supported the nation. This military cooperation has aimed to prevent the encroachment of extremist groups like ISIS, which could exploit regional instability and threaten U.S. interests​. Trump’s presidency emphasized private sector investments as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Although modest compared to China’s commitments, these investments reflected an effort to position...

Turkmenistan’s Geopolitical Shift Toward the West

Turkmenistan, whose foreign policy since 1995 has been based on the principle of permanent neutrality, is reportedly seeking to establish closer ties with the West, primarily with the United States. The energy-rich nation has long expressed an intention to export natural gas to Europe, but its leadership’s recent moves suggest that Ashgabat might also aim to develop closer political and economic relations with Western countries. Over the past few months, Turkmen and American officials have held several very important meetings. Most recently, on November 25, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov hosted Steve Daines, U.S. Senator from Montana and member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The fact that the Turkmen leader told the American politician that Ashgabat is “implementing a strategy for diversifying energy export routes” clearly shows that Turkmenistan’s ambition to begin exporting natural gas to Europe was on the agenda. But energy was unlikely the only reason why Daines came to Ashgabat. He also met with the Turkmen Minister of Foreign Affairs Rashid Meredov, with whom he discussed “key aspects of partnership cooperation in political and diplomatic, trade and economic, cultural, humanitarian and other spheres.” According to reports, “the active dynamics of development of political ties at the highest state level was emphasized,” indicating that Turkmenistan has begun implementing its 2023 plan to strengthen ties with the United States.  Moreover, as a result of the U.S. Senator’s visit to Ashgabat, a meeting of the Turkmenistan-US Business Council is scheduled to take place later this month. One of the reasons why the Turkmen authorities seek deeper economic ties with Washington is because they hope that such an approach can help their country join the World Trade Organization (WTO).  On November 20-22, just days before Daines’ visit to Turkmenistan, the Ministry of Finance and Economy organized a training seminar as part of the country's preparation for joining the WTO.  Interestingly enough, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) “made a significant contribution to the event's preparation”, while the U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan Elizabeth Rood attended the seminar.  The United States undoubtedly sees Turkmenistan as an important regional actor. In February, American companies including John Deere, Boeing, Exxon Mobil, and General Electric met with the Turkmen business delegation in Washington, discussing various forms of cooperation. Nine months later, on November 6, Rahimberdi Dzhepbarov, Chairman of the Board of the State Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of Turkmenistan, was on a working visit to Washington to discuss “issues of further strengthening economic and environmental cooperation with the United States.” The following day, according to the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. “highly praised Turkmenistan's achievements in fulfilling its international commitments on climate change.” But Washington did not always have such a positive view on Turkmenistan. In 2018, in an annual State Department report, Ashgabat was criticized for "alleged torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, involuntary confinement, imprisonment of political prisoners, severe corruption, lack of free and fair elections, and restrictions on freedom of religion, assembly, and movement.” Also, in...

The Geopolitical Battle for Control Over Transportation Routes in Central Asia

Russia and Kazakhstan may be nominal allies, but their geoeconomic interests are not always aligned. As Astana seeks to develop the Middle Corridor – a transportation link connecting China and Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, bypassing Russia – Moscow reportedly aims to build a trade and logistics route that would connect Russia and Kyrgyzstan, thereby circumventing Kazakhstan.  While various regional actors and international institutions actively invest in the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Route (TITR), a potential route linking Russia and Kyrgyzstan, through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, remains merely an idea. From the geopolitical perspective, the TITR is seen as an alternative to reach European and international markets and bypass Russia. But what is the primary goal of the Russia-Kyrgyzstan route? Although both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are members of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, queues of trucks at the Kyrgyz-Kazakh state border seem to have become a norm. Bishkek accuses Kazakhstan of “artificially creating obstacles at the border to weaken competition from Kyrgyzstan”, while the Kazakh authorities claim that Kyrgyz truckers are “unwilling to comply with Astana’s requirements and submit fraudulent documents for cargo.” Since Kyrgyzstan’s main connection with Russia – the major market for its agricultural products – goes through Kazakhstan, it is Astana that has the upper hand over Bishkek. From a purely economic perspective, a new route, including sea transport across the Caspian Sea, would enable faster delivery of vegetables, fruits, as well as other goods from Kyrgyzstan to Russia. However, it remains highly uncertain if Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as transit countries, are genuinely interested in this project. “Both nations are far more interested in East-West trade, actual supply chain relocations into the region, and new gas contracts with the West,” Samuel Doveri Vesterbye, Managing Director of the European Neighborhood Council, told The Times of Central Asia. In his view, a Kyrgyzstan-Russia corridor would offer a limited amount of trade, due to the sanctions the West imposed on Moscow over its actions in Ukraine. But in spite of that, Kyrgyzstan, like all countries, tries to be part of any connectivity corridor. “There is a lot of ‘corridor competition’ at the moment. Most of it is bluff. It is important to look at which projects are being built and how much investments is going into them. The Russia-Kyrgyzstan corridor, at present, is more hot air than reality. There is no funding from the United States, the European Union, China or Turkey. Also, major players like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) do not seem interested in funding the construction of this route. Therefore, its lifespan and potential look rather limited,” Vesterbye stressed. European institutions seem interested in further development of the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Route. From the European Union’s perspective, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased the need to find alternative, reliable, safe and efficient trade routes between Europe and Asia. That is why Brussels is reportedly willing to invest €10 billion ($10.5...

Risk and Reward: Why Savvy Investors Should Dive into Central Asia-Caspian Region

Central Asia-Caspian basin has long been a geopolitical chessboard — fragmented by conflict but dependent on cooperation. In an era of shifting alliances, political instability, and economic uncertainty, multinational corporations (MNCs) must reassess their strategies. While the region's challenges remain considerable, it also presents unique investment opportunities that should not be overlooked. Since the 1990s, operating in post-Soviet Eurasia has been synonymous with political risks. The Central Asian states have sought foreign direct investment (FDI) but face significant obstacles, including weak rule-of-law, inconsistent regulatory frameworks, and entrenched corruption. Yet despite these barriers, the region continues to attract international capital, signaling its long-term potential. Traditionally reliant on oil and gas exports, these countries are now pivoting toward diversification. Nations like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are strengthening ties with the European Union (EU) to balance their historical reliance on Russia’s energy network. This shift is opening new frontiers for investment, particularly in green energy, infrastructure, and technology. However, geopolitical instability remains a critical risk. The war in Ukraine has intensified uncertainties, with Russia, China, the EU, and the U.S. vying for influence. Energy security, once an afterthought, has become a central issue. The closure of the Novorossiysk terminal in early 2023, halting Kazakh oil exports, underscored how quickly geopolitical disruptions can affect supply chains, prompting companies like ExxonMobil to reassess their regional strategies. Yet this volatility also creates opportunities. The region’s economic shift away from resource dependence toward a knowledge-based economy offers fertile ground for businesses willing to invest in infrastructure, technology, and renewable energy. The Caspian basin’s strategic location, as a transit hub for energy to Europe, only heightens its importance in the EU’s efforts to reduce dependency on Russian supplies. For international businesses, this means new markets, sectors, and investment channels are emerging. The post-Covid landscape adds complexity, with digital transformation accelerating across industries. Countries in the Central Asia-Caspian basin are under pressure to adopt these technologies, which could drive long-term economic growth. Yet the gap between ambitious reform plans and their implementation remains wide. Regulatory inefficiencies and bureaucratic hurdles continue to hamper progress, presenting a challenge for foreign investors looking for stability. For multinational corporations, the region presents both risks and significant upsides. On one hand, border disputes, political unpredictability, and regulatory uncertainty create barriers. On the other, the region’s growing role as an energy transit hub and its emerging sectors, from green energy to infrastructure, offer promising avenues for investment. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in particular, have been proactive in bolstering energy exports to Europe, positioning themselves as critical players in the global energy transition. If the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate, the region’s geopolitical risks will undoubtedly increase. However, external actors — particularly the U.S., the EU, and China — are also likely to deepen their involvement, further reshaping the region’s economic and political landscape. The rise of Sino-American tensions only adds another layer of complexity to an already volatile environment. Yet, for companies that can navigate these complexities, the rewards are significant. Central Asia-Caspian basin remains...

How Central Asia Is Shifting From Russia Towards Turkey

For Turkey, a NATO member and EU hopeful, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an instrument that helps Ankara increase its presence in the strategically important region of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the Turkish-dominated group seems to be a tool that allows them to achieve their economic goals, while also continuing to distance themselves from Russia. Although Moscow still has a relatively strong foothold in Central Asia, it does not seem able to prevent the growing role of the Organization of Turkic States in the post-Soviet space. This entity – whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hold observer status – has the potential to eventually serve as a counterbalance not only to Russian, but also Chinese influence in the region. Since its foundation in 2009, the OTS has held ten summits of its leaders. Over this period, the intergovernmental organization’s working bodies have also convened dozens of times. On November 5-6 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, the OTS heads of states will meet for the eleventh time to discuss the future of the Turkic world. Although the agenda has yet to be announced, it is believed that the OTS leaders will seek to strengthen economic cooperation between its members. Currently, their major trade partners are nations outside the bloc. For instance, Turkey’s largest trading partner is Germany, Azerbaijan’s is Italy, while China has recently become Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner with bilateral trade hitting $31.5 billion. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, China and Russia remain the most important economic partners. One of the group’s major problems is the fact that its members, excluding Turkey, are landlocked countries heavily-dependent on Russia and China geographically. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as major energy exporters, rely on oil and gas pipelines traversing Russian territory to reach their customers in Europe. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Organization of Turkic States governments’ agreed in September to create a simplified customs corridor, aiming at reducing the number of documents required for customs operations and customs procedures between OTS member states. In other words, they plan to increase trade among themselves. According to Omer Kocaman, OTS Deputy Secretary-General, the Turkic nations are also looking to “continue cooperation to stimulate positive changes in their financial systems.” That is why the organization has recently launched the Turkic Investment Fund – the first joint financial institution for economic integration of the Turkic countries, with an initial capital of $500 million. Kyrgyzstan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced on October 17 that, starting in January 2025, the Turkic Investment Fund will begin financing major joint projects in OTS nations. However, in July, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the current structure of the Organization of Turkic States does not meet its established goals, and that its budget is insufficient for their implementation. In order to change that, on October 19, ministers of economy and trade of the OTS nations met in Bishkek to...

Saudi Islamic Development Bank Increasing Its Presence in Central Asia

The Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has been particularly active in Central Asia so far in 2024. The growing IDB role is part of Central Asian region’s foreign policy shift toward the Arab world as financial backers to replace Russia, which is devoting huge attention and resources to its war in Ukraine, and China, which is increasingly reluctant to spend large sums of money in Central Asia after pouring in tens of billions of dollars there during the last 25 years. Some of the Central Asian governments owe China substantial amounts of money that they are unlikely to be able to pay for possibly decades. The Central Asian states have been members of the IDB for many years. Kyrgyzstan was first, joining in 1993, followed by Turkmenistan in 1994, Kazakhstan in 1995, Tajikistan in 1996, and Uzbekistan in 2003. One of the IDB’s three regional offices is in Almaty, Kazakhstan (the other two are in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Rabat, Morocco).  The IDB has been dealing individually with the five Central Asian countries on a wide range of projects and programs in recent months. Energy Resources In February, Tajik Minister of Economic Development and Trade Zavqi Zavqizoda announced a deal was reached for the IDB to provide $250 million to Tajikistan. Zavqizoda said $150 million of that would go toward construction of the Rogun hydropower plant (HPP).  The Rogun HPP was a Soviet-era project. Construction started in 1976 but was discontinued shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed. Tajikistan restarted work on the HPP in 2008. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has repeatedly said that building the HPP with a planned 3600 MW capacity will make the country energy independent and even allow Tajikistan to bring in extra revenue exporting electricity to neighboring countries.  In its 28 years as an IDB member, Tajikistan had received some $620 million from the IDB, so the $250 million announced in February 2024 represents a significant jump in IDB financial help. Not surprisingly, when IDB President Muhammad Al-Jasser visited Kyrgyzstan in June, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov sought IDB investment in the Kambar-Ata-1 HPP, another decades-old project with a multi-billion-dollar price tag that has barely made any progress in being realized during the 33 years Kyrgyzstan has been independent. Al-Jasser did not commit to IDB financing for the Kyrgyz HPP. However, less than a week after Al-Jasser was in Kyrgyzstan, the IDB was one of several international financial organizations that signed on at a conference in Vienna to be a members of a coordination donors’ committee for the Kambar-Ata-1 projects. At a meeting in Istanbul in February, the IDB reaffirmed its support for the Central Asia-South Asia-1000 (CASA-1000) project that aims to export electricity from HPPs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kyrgyz Energy Minister Taalaybek Ibrayev met with Al-Jasser in June during the latter’s visit to Kyrgyzstan to discuss funding for Kyrgyzstan’s section of CASA-1000. Not Only Energy In June, the IDB pledged up to $2 billion in funding for improvements to water management...