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28 Apr 2026

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Uzbekistan’s ‘When Apricots Blossom’ Shortlisted for Fuorisalone Award at Milan Design Week

April 28, 2026
By Sadokat Jalolova

Uzbekistan’s first national exhibition at Milan Design Week 2026 has closed with strong international recognition, drawing large crowds and earning praise from critics for its focus on culture, craft, and environmental change.

Titled When Apricots Blossom, the exhibition ran from April 20 to 26 at Palazzo Citterio, welcoming around 25,000 visitors over seven days. Organized by the Uzbekistan Art and Culture Development Foundation (ACDF), the project was commissioned by its chairperson Gayane Umerova and curated by architect Kulapat Yantrasast, founder of WHY Architecture.

The exhibition was shortlisted for the main Fuorisalone Award, which recognizes leading installations among the thousands of events held across Milan during the week. It also received a Special Mention from a panel of media partners and critics. The jury praised the project for creating “a dialogue between the space and the content” and for encouraging deeper engagement with its themes.

Uzbekistan’s debut comes at a time when design is increasingly addressing global challenges, including climate change and sustainability. In this context, When Apricots Blossom stood out for its focus on the Aral Sea region, one of the world’s most widely recognized environmental disasters.

Cooking demonstration led by Bayrangul. Still from the film Where the Water Ends by Manuel Correa and Marina Otero 2026. Courtesy of ACDF

Over the past six decades, the Aral Sea has largely disappeared, reshaping life in Karakalpakstan, an autonomous region in northwestern Uzbekistan. The exhibition explored how communities in the area have adapted to these changes, not only through new solutions but also through long-standing traditions.

Rather than presenting craft as something of the past, the project framed it as a form of living knowledge.

“Our intention was for the Aral Sea to be recognized not only as a site of loss, but as a lens through which design considers broader questions of climate, culture, and responsibility,” Umerova said.

She emphasized that collaboration played a key role in the exhibition. Designers from different countries worked alongside Uzbek and Karakalpak artisans, creating a space for exchange between tradition and contemporary practice.

“The knowledge exchange between our craftspeople and international designers has helped reconnect past, present, and future,” she said.

Inside Palazzo Citterio, visitors moved through installations centered on three fundamental aspects of life: food, shelter, and clothing. These were represented through bread-making, yurt-building, and textile weaving, practices that have helped communities adapt to changing environments.

Twelve designers created new works inspired by these traditions, including bread trays and stamps used in the preparation of non, a staple of Uzbek cuisine. Made from materials such as wood, ceramics, felt, and reeds, the objects reflected both local resources and evolving design approaches.

The exhibition also included artifacts selected by participants of the Aral School, an international educational program focused on the region through design and research. A film, Where the Water Ends, offered visitors a closer look at the lives and landscapes shaped by the disappearance of the sea.

For Yantrasast, the project marks the beginning of a longer process.

“This is not about preserving craft as something from the past,” he said. “It is about understanding where it can go in the future, as something essential, resilient, and alive.”

Artefacts selected by participants of the Aral school – When Apricots Blossom. Courtesy of ACDF.

One of the most discussed elements of the exhibition was the Garden Pavilion, a structure inspired by traditional yurts. Designed by WHY Architecture, the installation reinterpreted portable homes used by nomadic communities, transforming them into a space for discussions, workshops, and reflection.

Yantrasast described the pavilion as both an architectural concept and a symbol.

“It shows how design can hold absence while creating new meaning,” he said, referring to environmental changes in the Aral Sea region.

Following its success in Milan, parts of the exhibition will return to Uzbekistan. The Garden Pavilion, a large textile installation, and the collection of bread-related objects are expected to be displayed again, extending the project beyond the design week.

According to the Uzbekistan Art and Culture Development Foundation, the exhibition is part of a broader effort to support long-term development in the Aral Sea region. This includes cultural, educational, and research initiatives aimed at strengthening local communities and encouraging new ideas.

Upcoming projects linked to this work include Uzbekistan’s national pavilion at the Venice Biennale, the first Tashkent Design Week, and the second Aral Culture Summit, scheduled to take place in Nukus in September.

28 Apr 2026

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A View from Afghanistan: Silk Seven Plus a New Framework for Regional Integration

April 28, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

In recent years, regional integration has increasingly become a key instrument in countries’ economic and foreign policy strategies. This is particularly relevant for Central Asia, a landlocked region facing structural constraints in accessing global markets.

In this context, the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative, recently introduced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, has drawn attention. The concept is currently being promoted in Washington. According to its authors, the initiative has received “overwhelming bipartisan support from leading members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.”

S7+ is positioned as a multi-stage framework for regional coordination centered on the countries of Central Asia, with plans for gradual expansion, first to Afghanistan and Azerbaijan, and potentially later to Pakistan.

The initiative appears to propose a new model of cooperation focused on developing transport connectivity, facilitating trade, and coordinating economic policy among countries in Central and South Asia, as well as neighboring regions.

Unlike traditional integration formats, S7+ is designed as a flexible, network-based framework rather than a rigid institutional structure. It functions more as a platform for practical cooperation, including the development of transit routes, the digitization of customs procedures, the reduction of logistics costs, and the expansion of trade and investment flows. This approach allows countries to participate voluntarily and at varying levels of engagement.

Within this model, Central Asia is viewed as a key region for the formation of new economic linkages. Strengthening transport connectivity, diversifying trade routes, and reducing dependence on a limited number of corridors could enhance the resilience of regional economies and support deeper integration into global supply chains.

Afghanistan holds particular significance within the S7+ framework. Geographically, it lies at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, positioning it as a potential transit bridge. The development of routes through Afghanistan could shorten transport distances and improve regional logistics efficiency.

In practice, however, this potential faces significant constraints. Key challenges include underdeveloped infrastructure, institutional limitations, and a lack of international recognition. These factors restrict Afghanistan’s ability to fully participate in multilateral initiatives and limit its access to investment and financial resources.

At the same time, the flexibility of the S7+ format may create opportunities for Afghanistan’s gradual involvement. Unlike formal organizations, the initiative allows participation on a project-by-project basis without requiring full institutional integration. This aligns with the country’s current model of external engagement, where practical cooperation continues despite the absence of formal recognition.

A comparison between S7+ and traditional regional formats highlights key differences. Existing frameworks, such as regional cooperation programs, typically rely on formal agreements and institutional mechanisms. In contrast, S7+ emphasizes flexibility, pragmatism, and the implementation of specific projects, potentially reducing political sensitivities and prioritizing economic interests.

In a broader geopolitical context, interpretations of the initiative vary. For some external actors, it may signal the emergence of alternative transport routes and reduced dependence on established corridors. For others, it represents a complementary element within existing economic strategies. In any case, S7+ reflects intensifying competition over the development of Eurasia’s transport and logistics architecture.

For Central Asian countries, such initiatives offer additional opportunities, not only to expand trade ties but also to pursue more flexible and diversified foreign economic policies.

Overall, Silk Seven Plus remains largely conceptual. Nevertheless, its emergence reflects a broader trend: a shift from rigid models of cooperation toward more flexible, network-based, and project-oriented approaches to regional integration.

The future of the initiative will depend on participating countries’ ability to translate it into practice, as well as on the broader political and economic environment in the region.

Adapted translation Open World Policy Lab, Astana

28 Apr 2026

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Iran Proposes Defense Cooperation to SCO Partners at Bishkek Meeting

April 28, 2026
By Stephen M. Bland

Iran used a Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense meeting in Bishkek to signal that it is ready to share military experience and defense capabilities with other SCO members, giving a sharper geopolitical edge to the gathering hosted by Kyrgyzstan under its current chairmanship of the bloc.

The meeting of SCO defense ministers opened on April 28 at the Ala-Archa state residence in Bishkek. Defense officials from the organization’s member states attended, along with SCO Secretary General Nurlan Yermekbayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Ruslan Mukambetov chaired the session.

Iran was represented by Deputy Defense Minister Reza Talaei-Nik. In a statement carried by Mehr News Agency, Talaei-Nik said Iran was ready to share its defense weapons capabilities and experience with “independent countries,” especially SCO member states. He also described the SCO as part of a wider shift away from what Tehran called a “unipolar” international order.

The remarks came after weeks of fighting between Iran, the United States, and Israel, including Iranian drone and missile strikes on U.S. bases in the region and Israeli sites. A ceasefire announced earlier this month reduced hostilities, but efforts to reach a wider settlement have stalled.

Talaei-Nik also used the meeting to frame the recent conflict as a lesson for other states, declaring, “We are ready to share our experiences in defeating America with other members of the organization.”

The SCO meeting gave Tehran a platform inside a bloc that now includes China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran became a full member in 2023. The SCO also has a wider circle of observer states and dialogue partners, including 15 dialogue partners listed by the organization’s secretariat.

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov received the SCO defense delegations before the ministerial session. He said Kyrgyzstan, as the SCO chair, attaches special importance to practical defense cooperation, including joint exercises, experience-sharing, and stronger coordination. He said agreements reached in Bishkek should strengthen defense cooperation and security across the SCO region.

Kyrgyzstan’s SCO chairmanship is being held under the slogan “25 Years of the SCO: Together Towards Sustainable Peace, Development, and Prosperity.” Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Mukambetov said the organization needed solidarity, mutual trust, and collective responsibility to respond to current security challenges. Kyrgyz state agency Kabar said the participants discussed military cooperation, regional security, and joint responses to current threats.

The SCO began as a border-security framework. Its roots go back to agreements signed in 1996 and 1997 by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan on military trust and troop reductions along border areas. Uzbekistan later joined, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formally founded in 2001. Since then, the bloc has grown into a wider Eurasian platform covering security, defense contacts, counterterrorism, transport, energy, and economic cooperation.

Talaei-Nik also held talks with Russian and Belarusian defense officials on the fringes of the Bishkek meeting, with both sides discussing continued cooperation with Tehran.

For Central Asian governments, including non-SCO member Turkmenistan, the Bishkek meeting highlighted the pressures facing multi-vector diplomacy. All five have spent years balancing security ties with Russia, deepening economic ties with China, engagement with the United States and Europe, and links to the wider Islamic world. That approach gives them room to maneuver, but it also means that conflicts involving Iran, Russia, China, or the West can quickly enter regional platforms such as the SCO, especially when security cooperation is already on the agenda.

28 Apr 2026

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Opinion: As Water Runs Short, Uzbekistan Faces New Migration Pressure

April 28, 2026
By Times of Central Asia

In the 21^st century, Uzbekistan is no longer just confronting an ecological crisis – it is on the verge of socio-political transformations driven by water. As agricultural lands are being degraded and river flows are decreasing, the country is now facing what experts describe as a “slow-onset disaster”: internal climate migration.

The roots of this crisis go back to the tragedy of the Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth-largest lake, which has shrunk to roughly 10% of its original area since the 1960s largely due to Soviet-era irrigation projects. The human toll has been enormous: not only is agriculture in decline, but the lives of the people living in the Aral Sea region have been profoundly altered. Each year, storms lift an estimated 15 million to 75 million tons of sand, dust, and salt from the dried Aral seabed, spreading it across Uzbekistan and the wider region. Now, another challenge is looming – the water supply. In 2018, 79,942 internally displaced people were reported in Uzbekistan. The dwindling water supply and the threat to agro-ecosystems are creating a new generation of climate migrants. The number of climate-related displacements is expected to reach 200,000 in the coming years.

The Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, Uzbekistan’s hydrological lifelines, are under growing strain from climate change, inefficient irrigation, and transboundary water-distribution pressures. Experts warn that the country’s water deficit could reach 7 billion cubic meters by 2030, and 15 billion cubic meters by 2050. The World Bank predicts that Uzbekistan’s economy could shrink by 10% by 2050 if no meaningful action is taken to adapt to climate change.

Now, another new factor threatens to accelerate this trend. The Taliban government in Afghanistan is building the Qosh Tepa Canal, a 285-kilometer irrigation project that will divert water from the Amu Darya River. According to Rieks Bosch, an international expert on natural resources and economics, the canal will divert 20% of the Amu Darya’s water, which will exacerbate water shortages in some parts of Uzbekistan and negatively affect agriculture. “In any case, Uzbekistan will definitely suffer,” he said. Analyses show that up to 250,000 people could lose their jobs in agriculture as a result of water shortages.

The most vulnerable regions – Bukhara, Khorezm, Karakalpakstan, Surkhandarya, and Kashkadarya – are located mainly in rural areas and depend on agriculture and livestock. With almost half of Uzbekistan’s population living outside urban centers, the loss of agricultural viability is not just an economic problem; it is the disruption of a way of life.

“Water scarcity, air pollution, biodiversity loss, and a sharp decline in agricultural productivity are constantly increasing,” President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said at COP 28, acknowledging that these problems are “reaching their “critical peak.” Yet policy responses are still lagging behind the pace of environmental change.

Uzbekistan’s climate migration problem cannot be solved by managing water resources alone. This requires a new strategic framework – a “Water-Migration-Security” strategy that combines regional cooperation, innovative water-saving technologies in agriculture, and proactive adaptation measures for the communities most at risk. The window for action is narrowing. Today’s farmers are potentially tomorrow’s environmental refugees.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

28 Apr 2026

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Japarov, Tashiyev, and the Kompromat War

April 28, 2026
By Bruce Pannier

Kyrgyzstan has seen three revolutions since 2005. It has been a politically active country since becoming independent in late 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. But since the current President Sadyr Japarov came to power after the 2020 revolution, he and his long-time friend and security chief, Kamchybek Tashiyev, have stifled expressions of public discontent.

For the last five years, Kyrgyzstan’s political scene has been uncharacteristically quiet. But events since Japarov sacked Tashiyev on February 10 have raised speculation that a fierce political battle between the two powerful men now looms ahead for the country.

Japarov has already fired the first shots. Accusations of corruption against Tashiyev and his family have led to arrests. But two can play at that game, and the former security likely has compromising information about Japarov and his family.

“You Can’t Cook Two Sheep’s Heads in One Cauldron”

The February 10 announcement of Tashiyev’s firing was arguably Kyrgyzstan’s biggest political shock since the October 2020 revolution that saw Japarov go from a prison cell to simultaneously occupying the posts of prime minister and president within ten days.

The two had been friends for decades, they started their political careers about the same time, and both quickly rose through the ranks of government during the presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was ousted in the 2010 revolution. The day after he was confirmed as president, Japarov appointed Tashiyev to be head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB).

The day before Tashiyev was sacked, a group of 75 prominent figures, who included former government officials, released an open letter to President Japarov and the speaker of parliament calling for an early presidential election. The group pointed to the discrepancy over whether Japarov was serving the six-year presidential term mandated in the 2010 constitution or the five-year term stipulated in the constitution adopted in April 2021, three months after the snap presidential election that Japarov won.

It quickly became apparent that Tashiyev’s dismissal and the letter were connected. The same day Tashiyev was fired, so were several top GKNB officials, with the sacking of officials said to be close to Tashiyev continuing for days. Japarov’s spokesman said it was necessary to “prevent a split in society.”

However, Japarov has avoided any detailed explanation of the reasons for the many changes and repeatedly described Tashiyev as a friend.

Member of Parliament Elvira Surabaldiyeva, in an April 24 interview with a Kazakh journalist, said Tashiyev was dismissed because he was planning a coup and had been preparing it for a long time. “The president is going through a very difficult time right now, because his longtime friend tried to remove him from office,” Surabaldiyeva said, and added, “There’s a saying: ‘You can’t cook two sheep’s heads in one cauldron.’ This seems to be exactly the case.”

Kompromat

Tashiyev was out of Kyrgyzstan when the news broke that he had been fired. He briefly returned on February 13, leaving again on February 17. He returned on March 19 and the same day went to the Interior Ministry as a “witness” to answer questions about Kyrgyzneftegaz, the state oil company.

Kyrgyzstan’s State Tax Service is investigating corruption allegations at Kyrgyzneftegaz that date back more than four years and involve Tashiyev and members of his family. State Tax Service chief Almambet Shykmamatov said on March 17, “Kyrgyzneftegaz was under the complete control of the GKNB,” and that during the time Tashiyev was GKNB chief, it was impossible to check on the company’s activities.

Tashiyev’s nephew, Baigazy Matisakov, who was the head of the Kyrgyzneftegaz refinery, was detained on March 18. Tashiyev’s son, Tay-Muras, who is connected to the private company, Moko Group, that is accused of buying oil and reselling it to Kyrgyzneftegaz, was questioned by the Interior Ministry in March.

At the start of April, Tashiyev’s brother Shairbek was arrested in connection with the Kyrgyzneftegaz investigation. Shairbek was a parliamentary deputy when his brother was fired. Shairbek at first said he was not concerned with his brother’s dismissal and would remain in parliament. He was questioned at the Interior Ministry on March 13 and handed in a letter resigning from parliament the next day.

After Surabaldiyeva’s interview, Japarov spoke with Kaktus Media, and while not confirming there was evidence of a coup plot, he said any decision about Kamchybek Tashiyev’s role was a matter for investigators and the courts.

It seems the net is tightening around Kamchybek Tashiyev and that it might only be a matter of time before he, too, is detained and facing charges.

Two Can Play at that Game

There could be, and probably are, more allegations of wrongdoing involving Kamchybek Tashiyev, members of his family, or close associates. But the business dealings of Japarov and members of his family might not bear scrutiny either.

In March 2017, Japarov was arrested as he tried to re-enter Kyrgyzstan. He fled the country in late 2013 to avoid facing criminal charges that included making death threats, hostage taking, hooliganism, and use of violence against a government official. He was convicted after returning in 2017, and languished in prison until supporters freed him after the October 2020 revolution.

After Japarov became president, the Supreme Court reviewed and overturned the 2017 verdict against him.

At the time he was detained in 2017, Kyrgyzstan’s independent outlet Kaktus Media recalled that in 2009, under then-President Bakiyev, Japarov was head of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption. “It is unclear how Japarov fought corruption,” Kaktus wrote, noting that “there was so much corruption” that it was impossible to keep track of.

The former owner of Investbank Issyk-Kul, Bolot Baykozhoyev, alleged that Japarov embezzled some $400,000 from the bank in 2004. In 2007, Investbank Issyk-Kul was illegally seized by a group that included Bakiyev’s son Maksim and Japarov’s sister Raykul. Just before she was convicted on money laundering charges in 2014 and sentenced to seven years in prison, Raykul fled Kyrgyzstan. In 2015, she was convicted of illegally taking over Investbank Issyk-Kul and sentenced to an additional ten years in prison.

Days after her brother was elected president, Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court overturned the verdict against Raykul.

Japarov’s nephew, Ulan Japarov, was detained for corruption in July 2023 and eventually placed under house arrest in October 2023 while his investigation was being conducted. President Japarov said at the time that his nephew’s arrest should serve as an example to all his relatives that he would not intervene if they were caught breaking the law.

While still being investigated for corruption, Ulan Japarov was arrested again in July 2024 for embezzlement, but by September 2024, a Bishkek court had ordered him released.

Japarov has five brothers and five sisters, and they have offspring, so the chances that some in the Japarov clan have been using Sadyr’s position as president to further their own careers cannot be ruled out.

The Uzbek Card

One of the most interesting cards Tashiyev might have and could play concerns Uzbekistan.

On the day of the announcement that Tashiyev had been sacked, there were reports that Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Japarov “held a phone call.” The reports are careful not to clarify who called whom. But the information that is provided, that the two presidents discussed joint railway and hydropower projects, seems questionable, given that Kyrgyzstan was facing what parliamentary deputy Surabaldiyeva now describes as a coup attempt.

As GKNB chief, Tashiyev worked to eradicate organized crime. Some of the links of Kyrgyzstan’s organized criminal world extended into Uzbekistan. In August 2024, the GKNB put out a warrant for Uzbek crime boss Salim Abduvaliyev for his ties to Kyrgyz mafia kingpin Kamchy Kolbayev, aka Kolya Kyrgyz, who was killed in a GKNB raid on a Bishkek restaurant in October 2023.

Two members of Kyrgyzstan’s parliament were stripped of their mandates over ties to Abduvaliyev. Tashiyev said in January 2025 that there was a time when Abduvaliyev “completely” controlled organized crime in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Abduvaliyev supported Mirziyoyev to become Uzbekistan’s new president after the country’s first, and until then, only president, Islam Karimov, died in the summer of 2016. Ahead of the December 2016 snap presidential election, Abduvaliyev posted a photo of himself wearing a T-shirt with Mirziyoyev’s photo and the words “My President” written on it.

An Uzbek court sentenced Abduvaliyev to six years in prison in March 2024, after the notorious crime boss was found guilty of illegal firearms, but he was released for health reasons in January 2025.

There is also the case of Habibullah Abdukadyr, a Chinese-born Uyghur businessman who is allegedly tied to organized criminal networks in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The GKNB’s investigations into organized crime when Tashiyev headed the security service likely uncovered information about the underworld in Uzbekistan and Uzbek officials connected to organized crime. That might explain the February 10 phone call between Mirziyoyev and Tashiyev, and might also explain why Tashiyev still remains free in Kyrgyzstan.

With Kyrgyzstan set to conduct a presidential election in January 2027, it seems the current standoff cannot last for very long, and the big question now is, will Japarov or Tashiyev make the next move?

27 Apr 2026

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Singer MEREY on Kazakh-Language Music, Tradition, and a New Sound

April 28, 2026
By Tamila Olzhbaekova

Singer, poet, and lyricist MEREY is among a younger group of artists bringing a different sensibility to music in Kazakhstan. Her work is rooted in Kazakh-language expression, but it also pushes beyond familiar expectations of how a female singer should sound and present herself.

In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, MEREY discusses the influence of poetry on her lyrics, the reaction to experimentation, and what she believes is missing from Kazakhstan’s contemporary music scene.

TCA: Tell us a little about yourself. How did you get into music?

MEREY: I came to music at 17, that’s when I wrote my first song in English. Before that, for as long as I can remember, I had been writing poetry; it was my first form of self-expression.

During my school years, I also studied music more formally. I played in a national orchestra, where I both sang and performed dombra parts. That experience strongly shaped my sense of stage presence and musical language.

Today, I position myself as a poet, singer, and lyricist. For me, text and music are inseparable.

TCA: Who or what influenced your artistic development the most?

MEREY: Since school, I have read the works of Mukaghali Makatayev, a classic of Kazakh poetry known for lyrical verses about love, homeland, and the human experience, and Fariza Ongarsynova, a prominent poet who wrote about emotions, time, and women’s lives. They left a deep mark on me as a poet, and echoes of their style can be found in my lyrics.

As a teenager, I listened to Billie Eilish, Lana Del Rey, and The Neighbourhood. Later, Mitski, Zemfira, Valentin Strykalo, and Børns. Now I feel close to what Chappell Roan and Meg Myers are doing. My taste leans toward alternative music with an emphasis on vocals, lyrics, and guitar riffs, with a slightly detached aesthetic. This directly informs my own music.

TCA: Your music is often described as a blend of traditional elements and modern electronics. How did this sound take shape?

MEREY: I wouldn’t fully agree with the phrasing about electronics, but my sound is in many ways inspired by Darkhan Juzz. He was the first artist from Kazakhstan who truly impressed me with his sound.

I come from a Kazakh-speaking background, so my lyrics tend to be more literary rather than conversational, unlike many artists of the new school. That’s thanks to my parents and my education in a Kazakh-language school.

The modern side comes from my musical tastes, especially the Western scene. My sound combines a Western sensibility with precise, expressive Kazakh language. It’s a mix of Western thinking and Kazakh tradition and that is exactly what resonates with listeners.

TCA: How important is it for you to preserve cultural roots in contemporary music?

MEREY: It is fundamentally important. As I grow older, I become more conscious, and even stricter, about the Kazakh language and tradition. I’m glad that today national elements, ornaments, traditional clothing, interest in Tengriism, and the language itself, are once again becoming part of the cultural conversation among young people.

My goal is to promote proper, expressive Kazakh in music. I consciously use idioms, proverbs, and older speech structures that are gradually disappearing from everyday language. For me, it’s important that the language of my songs remains pure and precise, even if in everyday life I allow myself more freedom.

TCA: Do you feel that music can help reinterpret tradition?

MEREY: Absolutely. Music is a universal language that works on an emotional level, even if the listener does not understand the words.

My music is not strictly traditional, but it is precisely through such hybrid forms that listeners from other countries become interested in our culture. People often write to me asking for translations of my lyrics into English, Turkish, and other languages, they want to understand what I’m singing about.

Tradition is not a fixed concept. It is constantly evolving. It is entirely possible that in 20 years, the music of my generation will also be perceived as part of tradition. It is thanks to new-wave artists, including me, that young people are discovering Kazakh culture in a new context.

TCA: Which traditional Kazakh instruments or musical motifs inspire you the most?

MEREY: I am an improvisational dombra player, and the dombra was my first instrument. My musical ability was noticed at school, after which I studied in an orchestra for gifted children, where we combined vocals and instrumental performance. I still have my first dombra, which is now more than 12 years old. That’s where everything began.

Although I’ve lost some of my former skill, I still regularly listen to küy and terme, they continue to inspire me. I also feel close to instruments such as the zhetygen, shankobyz, and kobyz. Although I don’t play them, I closely follow how they are used in contemporary music. For example, I really connect with how the kobyz is integrated into modern genres whether pop, R&B, or electronic music.

In the future, I want to carefully incorporate traditional instruments into my work. For now, it is technically difficult. There are almost no high-quality plugins for Kazakh instruments in digital production software, so everything has to be recorded live.

For example, in my song Nege Bilmedim? I had planned to use the kobyz to create an anxious atmosphere, but in the end I replaced it with a violin for that reason. I especially liked how the kobyz was integrated into contemporary electronic music in the song Jiber, featured on OYU. This track is performed by my close friend Mira.

I would also mention songs by Yerbolat Qudaibergenov, Lyazzat Alauy and Men Qazaqpyn, where contemporary sound is subtly intertwined with traditional dombra motifs. More recently, there is the track Aitshy, where M’Dee combines kobyz with R&B, creating an interesting and fresh sound.

TCA: Some people are quite sensitive to experiments with traditional music. Have you encountered that kind of reaction from audiences?

MEREY: Yes, quite often. The Kazakh cultural space is generally sensitive to newness and I love experimenting. My song Carpe Diem, where I touch on female sexuality in the Kazakh language, caused a strong reaction. More recently, a live performance of my song Betperde went viral on TikTok, where I experimented with vocal delivery and that triggered a wave of criticism.

People need time to adjust to new things. At the same time, if you look at the Western scene, experimentation with form and presentation is seen as an essential part of artistic expression. For example, Mitski uses the microphone as an expressive, sometimes provocative stage object; Chappell Roan works with visual imagery, including deliberately exaggerated elements; Lana Del Rey turns the stage into a cinematic space; Fergie adds strong physical expressiveness and elements of performance. Western audiences have largely moved beyond expecting “just beautiful singing.” Today, listeners care not only about how an artist sings, but what they communicate through performance, image, and concept.

There is still a fixed idea of what a Kazakh female singer is “supposed” to look like: long hair, restrained style, long dresses, traditional aesthetics. When an artist presents a different visual language, it can create dissonance. I believe the development of a music scene is impossible without experimentation. Artists must stop being afraid, and listeners must learn to accept the new. Kazakhstan’s music scene still has significant room for growth. That growth begins when artists stop fearing experimentation and audiences become more open to innovation.

TCA: How do you assess the development of Kazakhstan’s contemporary music scene?

MEREY: Honestly, as an artist, I often feel disappointed. There is a lack of new names, fresh sound, and bold decisions. Much of it feels repetitive, almost formulaic. At the same time, I recognize that as a listener I might perceive it differently.

TCA: In your view, what can make music from Kazakhstan interesting to a global audience?

MEREY: First of all, language and culture. We have a very rich cultural heritage, and when it is combined with modern genres, it becomes accessible and compelling to the world. When nomadic aesthetics meet contemporary sound, a unique artistic product emerges. That is where our potential for global dialogue lies.

For example, Yenlik, who recently performed on COLORS. By Kazakh standards, she appears quite traditional: long hair, restrained style, Kazakh-language lyrics, and elements of national aesthetics. At the same time, there is a distinctly Western confidence in her delivery, which makes her relatable to international audiences. If she worked exclusively within traditional forms such as throat singing, it would likely remain more local in appeal. But by combining Kazakh elements with rap, she becomes accessible to a broader audience.

TCA: In what direction would you like to develop your sound further?

MEREY: I feel that I’ve outgrown my melancholic indie aesthetic and want to move forward. I’m interested in experimenting with vocals and production, particularly electronic pop, UK drill, techno, and more dance-oriented music. Right now, I’m in a phase of searching for and shaping a new sound.

TCA: What are you working on now, and what can listeners expect soon?

MEREY: I’m preparing for my first tour across Kazakhstan, with concerts in Almaty, Astana, and Shymkent. It will be a large-scale program, almost two and a half hours long, featuring material from my solo album HIGANBANA, as well as guest artists in each city. There will also be merchandise, meet-and-greets, and audience interaction. For me, this is an important and exciting stage.

At the same time, I’m working on my first poetry collection in three languages. Over the years, I’ve accumulated enough material.

TCA: How do you see your art in a few years?

MEREY: For me, creativity is not only music, it also includes poetry, producing, and working with young artists. In the future, I’m also interested in film. More specifically, in three years I see myself as one of Kazakhstan’s leading artists, with a strong audience and the ability to perform on major stages both at home and abroad. It is important for me not only to grow personally, but also to support the next generation of artists. And through all of this, to preserve what matters most: freedom, youth, and a sincere love for what I do.