Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia
In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments.
When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable.
The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention.
Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed.
Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability.
However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game.
History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained.
There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you.
This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly.
This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia.
First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection.
Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central Asian languages. ISKP propaganda frequently highlights and promotes the idea of Central Asian militants and targets Uzbek- and Tajik-speaking audiences. This suggests that its intended audience extends far beyond the territory of a single state. Extremist networks actively engage with the cultural and linguistic space of the region.
The proximity of Afghanistan amplifies these factors. Even without direct infiltration across borders, the risks of ideological influence and localized radicalization remain.
As the region becomes more open and integrated, the need for coordinated security cooperation increases. The key conclusion is clear: no country in Central Asia can afford to view itself as an outside observer.
In the context of networked threats, isolation is not an option. A threat may not be visible today. It may appear distant. Yet in the digital age, security is increasingly interdependent.
This does not mean that Central Asia is on the verge of destabilization. On the contrary, in recent years, the region has demonstrated an ability to coordinate policies and pursue pragmatic approaches. However, the evolving nature of security threats requires constant adaptation, particularly as networked extremist structures move beyond traditional security models.
Relying solely on force is no longer sufficient. A comprehensive strategy is required, including information sharing, monitoring financial flows, countering online propaganda, and addressing the social drivers of radicalization.
In a broader sense, it is important to remember that attempts to treat extremist networks as potential proxy forces almost always produce unintended consequences. Over time, such structures begin operating according to their own logic and spiral beyond control. This pattern is universal and not confined to any specific region or political context.
For Central Asia today, the challenge is not only responding to threats but also assessing their true nature. In some cases, the greatest danger lies not in the threat itself, but in the belief that it can be controlled.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.
