• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10698 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10698 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10698 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10698 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10698 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10698 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10698 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10698 0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

UNEP Interview: From Space, Central Asia’s Methane Challenge Comes Into Focus

Satellites are changing the way the world sees methane. What was once an invisible leak from a well, flare, pipeline, landfill, or coal mine can now be detected from space, traced to a specific site, and sent to governments and companies for action.

A new analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme’s International Methane Emissions Observatory puts that system to the test. Its Methane Alert and Response System, known as MARS, uses 35 satellite instruments to identify major human-caused methane “super-emitters” and notify those responsible. UNEP says the system has already enabled 41 mitigation cases in 11 countries, covering sources estimated to have released 1.2 million tonnes of methane.

For Central Asia, the findings are especially relevant. UNEP’s new data includes a rolling list of the world’s 50 largest satellite-detected methane sources, covering oil and gas, coal, and waste, and shows where rapid action may be possible. Several of those sources are linked to Turkmenistan’s oil and gas sector, placing the region firmly inside a global debate over methane transparency, climate responsibility, and whether satellite alerts can lead to action on the ground.

Of the 50 sources featured in the latest UNEP/IMEO snapshot, China has the largest number, while Turkmenistan stands out sharply for Central Asia, with the second-largest individual source and four of the top ten.

Methane is shorter-lived than carbon dioxide, but far more powerful in the near term. That makes cutting large leaks one of the fastest ways to slow global warming. The harder question, as UNEP’s latest data makes clear, is no longer only where the leaks are, but who responds when they are found.

On April 30, UNEP/IMEO presented the new MARS findings, highlighting the growing role of satellite-based monitoring in identifying major methane sources and pressing governments and companies to act. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Meghan Demeter, MARS Programme Manager, International Methane Emissions Observatory, UNEP.

TCA: What does the new MARS data reveal about Central Asia specifically that may surprise readers?

Demeter: The latest MARS data products depict the region as one with growing engagement and significant mitigation potential. Responses to MARS notifications are increasing, supported in particular by designated national focal points who play a key role in coordinating follow-up with operators. Based on the published 2025 data alone, the response rate across Central Asia currently stands at 22%.

Managing a high volume of alerts requires more effort to achieve very high response rates compared to countries that receive only a handful of notifications. Encouragingly, the region has already recorded nearly 20 mitigation cases, underscoring the strong potential for emissions reductions when large methane sources are identified and addressed.

TCA: Why does Central Asia matter in the global methane debate, even if it is not the world’s largest methane-emitting region?

Demeter: Across Central Asia, looking at the 2025 data alone, UNEP’s International Methane Emissions Observatory, through the Methane Alert and Response System (MARS), detected and notified 298 emission sources from the oil and gas sector. While satellites detect only a fraction of global methane emissions, satellites are highly effective at identifying so-called “super-emitters,” methane emission events so large they can be detected from space. These represent opportunities where action can deliver the greatest and fastest climate wins, while also catalyzing broader change.

Regarding the “top 50” list of emission events, 11 of these sources are located in Central Asia, all from the oil and gas sector—the sector that also has the most potential for rapid, low-cost mitigation. This means that the region has high mitigation potential.

It is important to note that this is dynamic. We expect the “top 50” list to evolve over the coming months, as satellite detection capabilities vary with observation conditions, including seasonal weather patterns such as cloud cover.

Satellite detection is only one part of the solution. To address the broader methane challenge, we have to work system-wide. That means improving measurement and reporting to tackle smaller, more diffuse emissions in the oil and gas sector, which is what UNEP’s Oil and Gas Methane Partnership 2.0 (OGMP 2.0) is designed to do.

TCA: Beyond the broad oil and gas picture, what types of sites are most visible in the satellite data?

Demeter: In terms of sectors, oil and gas sector sources dominate in most countries, but we also see significant emissions from waste, for example, at a landfill near Tashkent in Uzbekistan, which is most visible during the summer months.

In terms of emission sources within the oil and gas sector, most emissions come from malfunctioning flares, gas disposal facilities, and, frequently, significant emissions from midstream facilities (pipelines), all with very high mitigation potential. Although aging infrastructure in the region remains a significant challenge, with some methane leaks requiring major infrastructure fixes or replacements, documented cases already signal tremendous potential for quick, high-impact action in this region.

TCA: Can you give a simple example of how a satellite detection becomes a confirmed mitigation case?

Demeter: MARS is designed to turn satellite observations into real-world action.

First, IMEO analyses satellite data to detect large methane plumes and attribute them to specific facilities and operators. Once attributed, UNEP notifies the relevant government authorities and, where applicable, the operating company. (We directly notify companies that are members of OGMP 2.0.)

Along with the notification, we ask stakeholders to provide feedback about the detected emission event, including the emission source, an explanation for the cause of emissions, and any mitigation actions taken or status updates on the emissions. That information requires operators to investigate the emissions on the ground.

Finally, IMEO continuously monitors the site to track progress and confirm when emissions are no longer observable by satellites.

recent case in Kazakhstan illustrates how this works in practice. After a satellite detection, the operator located a methane leak using simple Audio‑Visual‑Olfactory (AVO) checks and soap‑foam testing. The team quickly identified a faulty valve, replaced it, and fully stopped the emissions. This case shows that, while some methane reductions require complex, long‑term solutions, others can be achieved rapidly with basic techniques and straightforward repairs, delivering immediate climate benefits.

TCA: What would measurable progress in Central Asia look like over the next year or two: fewer large plumes, faster responses, stronger reporting, or something else?

Demeter: Measurable progress would be reflected across several dimensions.

First, we would hope to see an increase in MARS response rates across all countries, which would signal stronger engagement and more effective follow-through. Responding to a MARS alert requires governments and operators to acknowledge alerts, investigate the source of emissions, and provide timely, substantive feedback on root causes and mitigation actions.

As countries increasingly investigate major emission sources and take action to address them, we would expect to detect fewer large methane plumes over time, reflecting effective mitigation of the biggest sources.

Lastly, but equally important, is progress on improved measurement and reporting to tackle smaller, more diffuse emissions in the oil and gas sector, which is what UNEP’s OGMP 2.0 is designed to do. That means seeing current Central Asian OGMP 2.0 members advance through OGMP 2.0’s reporting framework, as well as OGMP 2.0 membership growing in the region.

Opinion: The Regional Ecological Summit and the Making of a Central Asian Voice

On 22–24 April, Astana hosted the Regional Ecological Summit—a gathering of governments, international organizations, financial institutions, and civil society that marked a new level of ambition in Central Asia’s environmental diplomacy. Fifty-eight sessions were held across three days at a moment when Central Asia’s ecological agenda is becoming inseparable from its political and economic future.

The opening ceremony was attended by the presidents of all five Central Asian states. The summit adopted the Astana Declaration on Ecological Solidarity in Central Asia and brought renewed attention to the need to reform the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Taken together, these developments signal more than procedural diplomacy. They point to growing political momentum.

The region has never lacked shared history or channels of communication. Russian remains a practical language of intergovernmental exchange, and borders, economies, rivers, energy systems, and labor markets have tied these countries together long before contemporary climate diplomacy gave this interdependence a new vocabulary.

For decades, much external analysis of Central Asia expected this interdependence to produce confrontation, particularly around water and energy. Those risks remain real. Yet the Astana summit showed a more complex trajectory. Climate change, biodiversity loss, water insecurity, land degradation, and food security are not separate national problems neatly contained within borders. Addressing them is becoming one of the fields through which regional coherence is being built.

The significance of the Summit lies less in ceremonial language than in the consolidation of multiple ecological agendas into a visible diplomatic architecture. Through its panels and high-level discussions, the Summit placed Central Asia’s natural heritage not at the margins of development but at its center. Ecosystems, rivers, glaciers, mountains, and landscapes are not only environmental assets. They are conditions for prosperity, stability, and resilience.

Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of IFAS reopened the question of whether the Fund, long criticized for its limitations, can be reworked rather than left as a symbol of failed regional environmental governance. Kazakhstan’s proposal for an International Water Organization should be read in the same frame: it is not merely a technical proposal about water governance but an attempt to move a Central Asian concern into the language of global institutional reform.

Kyrgyzstan’s mountain agenda and Tajikistan’s glacier diplomacy also belong to this broader pattern. They are not just isolated national branding exercises. Together with Uzbekistan’s increasingly active regional posture, they form a wider mosaic: each country brings a distinct ecological priority, but these priorities are becoming legible as parts of one regional perspective, and its voice carries more weight when presented as such.

This is particularly important in the current geopolitical moment. As larger powers turn inward, compete over corridors, or speak about Central Asia through the old grammar of influence, the region is attempting to define itself not as terrain for another “Great Game” but as a pole of its own. This does not mean distance from external partners. On the contrary, the United Nations was a strategic partner of the Summit, and many formats involved major international organizations, European partners, development institutions, and civil society. The difference is in the direction of agency: external engagement is increasingly being organized around regional priorities, not merely around external agendas.

The limitations, however, are equally clear. The summit exposed the financial asymmetry at the heart of climate politics. Central Asia contributes only a small share of global greenhouse gas emissions, yet it is disproportionately affected by its impacts, warming around twice as fast as the global average. Shrinking glaciers, droughts, floods, and deteriorating water systems are already visible across the region.

Without more accessible and better-targeted climate finance, regional declarations will struggle to translate from diplomatic coherence into concrete implementation.

This is where a common regional voice becomes more than symbolism. Individually, Central Asian states can present national adaptation needs. Collectively, they can argue that the region’s climate vulnerability is systemic, transboundary, and underfinanced. That argument is more difficult to ignore.

Astana did not resolve the contradictions of Central Asian ecological politics. It could not. IFAS reform remains difficult. Climate finance remains insufficient. Water management is politically sensitive. But the Summit made visible something that has been developing for some time: Central Asia is no longer only reacting to ecological risks.

In a fragmented international environment, Central Asia is trying to convert risk into a basis for regional diplomatic weight, and this may become one of the region’s most important political resources.

 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

Michael Daniel Appointed Head of Kazakhstan’s Aviation Administration

Kazakhstan has appointed U.S. aviation veteran Michael Daniel as chief executive officer of the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan, a step that officials say is linked to plans for direct flights to the United States.

Daniel took up the post on May 4. He has more than 40 years of experience in civil aviation and holds a degree in aeronautics from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.

He began his career at the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), where he served as a flight operations inspector, aircraft certification specialist, and head of flight safety. He later worked on international programs and policy and held posts in Frankfurt, New York, and Washington.

From 2006 to 2009, Daniel led the FAA’s international office in Singapore and Beijing, overseeing foreign repair stations and international safety assessments.

During his career, he also took part in international initiatives, including work within Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and cooperated with the International Civil Aviation Organization on safety oversight and evaluation.

Kazakhstan’s Civil Aviation Committee said one of Daniel’s main priorities will be the launch of direct flights to the U.S. Aviation expert Abul Kekilbayev said the appointment appeared to be tied to that objective.

“The aircraft have already been bought, you need to pass an audit for compliance,” he said.

Before direct flights can begin, airlines from Kazakhstan will need to complete several stages of approval with U.S. regulators. Those steps include obtaining authorization from the U.S. Department of Transportation and then applying to the FAA, which will assess whether Kazakhstan meets international aviation safety standards.

Austria to Use Uzbekistan as Transit Route for Afghan Deportations Under New Agreement

Austria’s Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger and Interior Minister Gerhard Karner are expected to visit Uzbekistan on May 7 to sign a mobility agreement aimed at strengthening cooperation on migration, according to Die Presse.

The agreement is intended to improve coordination between the two countries, particularly on deportations and the return of migrants. Austrian officials say it will create a more structured framework for handling individuals required to leave the country.

A key provision involves the use of Uzbekistan as a transit route for deportations to Afghanistan. Afghan nationals facing removal from Austria could be escorted through Uzbekistan to Kabul. Until now, deportations to Afghanistan have largely taken place via Istanbul, meaning the new arrangement would open what officials describe as a “second route.”

Karner said the deal would establish “the conditions for the consistent implementation of deportations as part of a firm and fair asylum policy.” The agreement also covers the readmission of nationals, third-country citizens, and stateless individuals who entered the European Union through Uzbekistan.

In return, the document includes provisions to support legal migration from Uzbekistan to Austria.

Despite its growing economy, Uzbekistan is heavily reliant on remittances from abroad, with Uzbek migrants sending home $4.8 billion in Q2 of 2025. Over the past few years, Tashkent has been seeking out alternative destinations than traditional routes dominated by Russia.

To that effect, both Uzbekistan and Austria have committed to promoting “safe, orderly, and regular mobility of qualified workers” in line with national legislation. Austrian authorities note that Uzbek professionals already have multiple pathways to access the country’s labor market.

The agreement does not provide for the establishment of return centers for rejected asylum seekers, an idea Austria has been pursuing with several EU partners, including Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

The visit to Uzbekistan is part of a broader regional trip that will also include Kazakhstan, which Austrian officials consider an important partner, particularly in the energy sector.

The planned agreement comes amid continued migration pressures linked to Afghanistan’s humanitarian situation. According to the United Nations Development Programme, in 2024 around 85% of Afghanistan’s population was living on less than $1 a day. In June 2025, the World Food Programme reported that approximately 15 million people in the country were facing severe hunger.

At the same time, large-scale deportations from neighboring countries have added to the strain. In July last year, Tajikistan launched a campaign to detain and deport Afghan refugees, giving them 15 days to leave the country.

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region.

This week, the team will be tracking the culmination of Bishkek’s power struggle as charges are formally brought against Tashiyev, alongside a fresh wave of EU sanctions that look designed to make an example of one Central Asian state. We’ll also break down the shutdown of a key Kazakh pipeline carrying oil to Europe, Russia’s increasingly blunt statements on foreign military deployments across the region, Ashgabat’s crackdown on Starlink connections in Turkmenistan, and the EU’s push to turn Central Asia into a transit point for Afghans being deported back to Afghanistan. We’ll also cover the spread of a new strain of foot-and-mouth disease tearing through the region. And for our main story, we turn to the mounting ecological crisis in the Caspian Sea, where falling water levels and worsening environmental pressures are becoming impossible for the region to ignore.

On the show this week: Vadim Ni, co-founder of the Save the Caspian Sea movement.

Czech Prime Minister Says Foreign Ministry Urged Pressure on Kazakhstan Over Russia Ties

On May 2, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has claimed that officials at the country’s Foreign Ministry advised him to push Kazakhstan to scale back its ties with Russia and China. Speaking to Czech broadcaster TV Nova, Babiš criticized the recommendation, warning it could harm the Czech Republic’s economic interests.

Babiš, a billionaire businessman and populist politician, returned to power in December 2025 after his ANO movement won 35% of the vote in the October 2025 parliamentary election and formed a governing coalition.

The prime minister said he received a briefing note prepared by the diplomatic service. “They handed me a memo saying I should call on Kazakhstan to limit its relations with Russia and China,” he said.

Babiš was vague about the provenance of the memo, describing it as having been drafted by “some officials,” but he suggested that former Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský, a figure associated with the previous pro-Western coalition government (2021–2025), may have been involved in its preparation.

Babiš criticized the foreign policy of the previous administration, arguing that it had damaged the Czech Republic’s economic interests. Relations with several major countries, including China, had deteriorated, negatively affecting business activity, he said.

The remarks followed Babiš’s visit to Kazakhstan on April 28-29, during which the two sides discussed expanding economic cooperation, including supplies of Kazakh oil and uranium. The Czech Republic views Kazakhstan as an important strategic partner, he added.

According to the Kazakh government, bilateral trade between the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan reached approximately $705 million in 2025, a 13% increase on the previous year.