Uzbekistan Prepares for the Polls: Embracing a New Electoral System
On October 27, citizens of Uzbekistan will cast their ballots under a new mixed electoral system for the 150-member Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis (Lower House of Parliament) in elections billed as “My choice is my prospering Motherland.” Half of the candidates will be elected from single-member districts using a first-past-the-post system, whilst the other half will come from nationwide proportional representation which requires parties to surpass a 7% electoral threshold. If fewer than one-third of eligible voters participate, the election will be deemed invalid, and should no party meet the threshold for proportional seats, those elections will be considered void. By mandate, at least 40% of the candidates must be women, up from 30% in the elections held in 2019. Additionally, 56 members of the upper chamber, 65 deputies of the Jokargy Kenes of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, 12 regional and 208 district and city council seats are also being contested by approximately 30,000 candidates. At the invitation of the authorities in Uzbekistan, at the end of September, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) dispatched a team of long-term observers. On October 5, Uzbekistan held a groundbreaking pre-election TV debate for party leaders which was broadcast live on multiple TV channels and social media platforms in Uzbek, Russian, English, and Karakalpak. Reportedly modeled on the BBC’s Question Time, the debate’s audience featured voices from the nation's youth, women, and ethnic minorities as part of a drive to engage with voters described by organizers as “innovate, creative [and] interactive. Five parties - the Liberal-Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, Milli Tiklanish (National Revival) Democratic Party, the Ecological Party of Uzbekistan, the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), and the Adolat (Justice) Social-Democratic Party – have been registered for the upcoming elections. However, others have faced a backlash for attempting to register. According to The Diplomat, all of the entities running “have always been perceived as mere extensions of the state.” Since the death of long-term despot, Islam Karimov, however, Uzbekistan’s “state apparatus [have] become more open,” as noted by an election observer in 2019, whilst the platforms of figures such as Alisher Qodirov have increasingly chimed with the public. Amidst reforms aimed at tackling endemic corruption, in recent years Uzbekistan has gained ground on Transparency International’s global corruption perception index, and recently partnered with the World Bank on “training, projects, and research to combat corruption.”
Kyrgyz Economy Is on the Rise
Government statistics and independent analysts note growth in almost all sectors of the Kyrgyz economy The most significant increase is recorded in the construction sector, which in turn, has positively impacted other sectors, such as industrial production, agriculture, and foreign trade. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, macroeconomics expert Nasirdin Shamshiev remarked: “This year, due to favorable weather, twice as many beets, and one and a half times more barley and wheat were harvested. Due to the high rate of construction of small hydropower plants, the energy sector is also showing good growth. In addition, the production of construction materials has increased, and textile production is growing. Exports for the first eight months of 2024 increased by 13.5%, and imports by 8.1%." According to Shamshiev, the good economic dynamics were influenced by several factors: the strengthening of fiscal rules, fighting corruption and illegal financial flows, and a balanced monetary policy. Earlier, Kyrgyzstan' president Akylbek Japarov, held a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, during which the socio-economic development results for the first nine months of 2024 were summarized. According to Japarov, Kyrgyzstan's GDP grew by 8.4%. However, gold exports, traditionally the economy's leading revenue-generating sector, have declined this year; a situation previously reported by The Times of Central Asia with reference to a decline in production at Kumtor, the country's largest gold mine. According to the Prime Minister's information, 37% of the growth in the construction sector provides an increase in industrial production in Kyrgyzstan. Data also shows that over the past year, following the launch of the Chinese oil refinery Junda near Bishkek, the production of refined petroleum products almost doubled. Hailing the success of recent ventures, Japarov stated: “The growth rate of our economy is nothing short of encouraging. We are now implementing the Leap of the Leopard program and approaching our set ambitious goals and objectives."
Central Asia: Working Together on Border Landscapes
Talk of closer cooperation among Central Asian countries has ebbed and flowed as far back as the period after independence from Soviet rule in the early 1990s. The goal of a more unified region is a work in progress, though one promising area of collaboration is a plan to restore and protect damaged ecosystems in border regions. The first regional meeting on the topic, held this month in Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s capital, brought together government officials from the host nation as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The portfolios of the delegates were nature preservation, protected areas, emergencies, agriculture, and forestry. They talked about coordinating on wildfire alert systems in cross-border areas, erosion control, tree-planting and nature-oriented tourism in protected areas and other sites shared by Central Asia countries, according to the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, a non-profit group based in Almaty, Kazakhstan that promotes regional dialogue on the environment. The group, which organized the Tashkent meeting, was created in 2001 by the five Central Asian states as well as the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme. The initiative is supported by a $256 million World Bank program to restore degraded landscapes in the region. The World Bank has noted big progress toward poverty alleviation and economic growth by Central Asian countries in the last decades. However, it has cautioned that oil and gas extraction in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have taken a heavy environmental toll, while soil erosion and water scarcity have accompanied land development in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Arid conditions exacerbated by climate change and inefficient management threaten transboundary water resources, a problem that is becoming increasingly severe. “A key example of tragic impacts on livelihoods and health of communities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and across the region are massive sand and salt storms originating from the land areas once covered by the Aral Sea,” the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia said. It cited an international disaster database as saying more than 10 million people in Central Asia have “suffered from land degradation-related disasters” since 1990, inflicting damages estimated at around $2.5 billion. Central Asian countries also seek to collaborate on early warning systems and other emergency precautions as they face a variety of natural hazards, including floods, landslides and droughts. Supported by United Nations agencies, the heads of the national emergency departments of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan convened in August at a lakeside resort town in northern Kyrgyzstan. There, they shared information and experiences.
Navigating Afghan-Pakistani Conflict: Central Asia’s Mediating Role in Regional Stability
Recently, there has been a significant increase in tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with both sides regularly exchanging accusations. In addition to this, border conflicts have become more frequent, with border crossings periodically closed. According to Modern Diplomacy, both countries are in a state of quite severe political conflict, and distrust and hostility from the Afghan population towards Pakistan is growing even though the "victory of the Taliban and the reincarnation of the Islamic Emirate... should have been a victory for Pakistan and strengthened its position in the region.” The confrontation between the two neighbors in South Asia is a source of concern for other countries in the region, especially for the Central Asian republics, which are increasingly acquiring the status of independent players in their dealings with Afghanistan. Due to their proximity, these republics to varying degrees link their development with a stable Afghanistan designed to become a bridge to South Asia. Negative dynamics in Afghan-Pakistani relations are a cause of much wringing of hands. Pakistan was among the first states to recognize the independence of the former Soviet Central Asian republics and has dynamic ties with them. Pakistan's trade turnover with the region is roughly $500 million annually, most of which comes from imports to Pakistan. The nations are linked by the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA), the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project, the CASA-1000 energy project, and the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway Project. The majority of these projects use Afghanistan as a bridge between Central Asia and Pakistan. In this regard, the countries of Central Asia are interested in a political situation which excludes confrontational approaches; none of them are interested in further destabilization in Afghanistan. In the Central Asian republics, there is a well-established understanding of Pakistan's exceptional and particularly important role in Afghanistan’s stability. Pakistan has a defining influence on security in Afghanistan and has historically been the most integrated in Afghan issues at the level of political and multi-ethnic conflicts. Pakistan is linked to its neighbor by historical and socio-cultural ties. In reality, however, a different story is emerging. At both a global and regional level, active measures out of Islamabad set to discredit the de facto Taliban-led government of Afghanistan have been observed. Islamabad has undertaken a robust information campaign, which has put forward an entrenched narrative about Afghanistan being one of the world’s major sources of terrorism. In this information war, Islamabad, being a fully-fledged member of the international community, has clear advantages and has used all available tools, including access to global platforms. Islamabad also has access to specialized committees and departments of the UN, which regularly prepare reports on the situation in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, it has used these to include ideas favorable its' position on the world stage. Acting as a source of information, Islamabad has presented its point of view, which the international community has largely accepted as objective information. However, it does not provide specific data, such as the size of terrorist groups or the location of their training camps. In shaping the new narrative, Islamabad does not mention its involvement in the formation, establishment, and development of the Taliban movement. “The Taliban became the latest incarnation of Pakistan's desire to support Islamist rather than nationalist rule in neighboring Afghanistan,” American author Michael Rubin once wrote in characterizing Islamabad's policy at the time in an Op-Ed for The Washington Institute for Near East Policy titled “Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?” Rubin quoted Robert Kaplan, a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, who stated that Bhutto and Babar saw the Taliban "as a solution to Pakistan's problems," and Ahmed Rashid, who wrote that the “Taliban was not beholden to any one Pakistani lobby, such as the ISI. In contrast, the Taliban had access to more influential lobbies and groups in Pakistan than most Pakistanis.” Objectively, the narratives in Pakistan's foreign policy are somewhat of a forced defense. Pakistan’s politics reflect its own domestic issues, including ethnic and religious conflicts, radicalization, and counter-terrorism efforts. Afghan-Pakistani relations have been strained since the formation of the state of Pakistan; Afghanistan was the only country to vote against its new neighbor joining the UN, but later changed its stance. The main catalyst was and remains the so-called Durand Line, which mechanically divided Pashtuns into Afghans and Pakistanis. This line was established in 1893 as the border between Afghanistan and British India (the British Raj), and was inherited by Pakistan in 1947. Based on the principle of uti possidetis juris, Islamabad considers it a state boundary, which is not entirely agreed upon within Afghanistan. However, Pakistan is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country, and Pashtuns make up about 20% of the population. In this regard, the idea of national identity is very important to the authorities in Pakistan. This pursuit of national identity and unity affects relations with neighboring countries, especially since the issue of "Pashtunistan" has failed to go anywhere. As Barnett Rubin commented in his 1992 study, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: “The resentments and fears that the Pashtunistan issue aroused in the predominantly Punjabi rulers of Pakistan, especially the military, continue to affect Pakistani perceptions of interests in Afghanistan.“ Kabul, meanwhile, believes that the Pakistani military and intelligence services are conducting a disinformation campaign in order to portray Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorist groups - an initiative that seems to be aimed at undermining Afghanistan's relations with neighboring countries, particularly India and Iran. Yet the implications of this propaganda go beyond mere rhetoric, posing real risks to diplomatic relations and regional stability. The Sunday Guardian in India reported that the spread of fake news and propaganda is part of a broader strategy to discredit the Taliban. Such targeted campaigns carry real dangers, as they can escalate conflict and create favorable conditions for radical groups. There is no doubt that such content will continue to affect perceptions of Afghanistan in international circles, especially if think tanks and media outlets contribute to its dissemination. At a time when stability in South Asia and Central Asia is key to international peace, such campaigns not only undermine trust between countries, but also lead to increased hostilities and tensions. In retaliation, the Taliban has been disseminating confessions made by detained ISIL fighters in which they speak of receiving training inside Pakistan. For example, according to an Al-Mursad publication, three ISIS-Khorasan members confessed to receiving training in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. In this regard, one could argue that this calls into question Pakistan's claims from the UN podium that it is Afghanistan that is the training center for ISIS-Khorasan and al-Qaeda. Such allegations also contribute to the strengthening of anti-Pakistan rhetoric in the Afghan public and the radicalization of sentiments. For example, the theses postulated by the Afghan political analyst and religious figure Mufti Mohammad Ajmal Salar have resonated widely, especially in the context of Pakistan's current relations with its neighbors. Salar has openly questioned Pakistan's sovereignty and independence, calling it a project to serve foreign interests. In his view, Pakistan lacks the competence and sustainability to fulfill its commitments to Afghanistan or to establish long-term relations with it. In this context, Salar urged the Afghan leadership not to engage with the current authorities in Pakistan, but with the “principal authorities,” alluding to external powers which can be seen to control Islamabad's strategic decisions. These competing narratives create a dilemma for the international community as it seeks a more balanced approach to analyzing regional security. Rather than placing the blame entirely on Afghanistan, it is worth considering that in the complex dynamics of terrorism in South Asia, different actors may use the territories of neighboring countries for their operations. According to experts, Pakistan's statements may have overtly political overtones aimed at diverting attention away from its internal issues with extremism. Despite the presence of terrorist groups, Afghanistan is not the sole culprit behind regional instability, and the international community must take such factors into account to avoid distorting the real picture on the ground. When Pakistan uses the UN podium to shape foreign policy narratives and accuse Afghanistan of supporting terrorism, this is primarily done to protect its geopolitical interests and divert attention from its problems. This strategy allows Pakistan to reinforce its status as a 'victim of international terrorism'; attract sympathy and support from the international community, including financial and military assistance to fight terrorism; and build relations with key world powers such as the U.S. and China by dangling the idea of stability in the region. The old adage, “Trust but verify,” once a catchphrase of President Reagan, springs to mind in these times of geopolitical crisis. In addition, the Taliban needs to act in a more transparent, unambiguous, and, most importantly, relatable way for its neighbors and the international community. Whether Islamabad and Kabul can find an understanding affects not only the future of the above-mentioned large-scale projects involving the countries of Central Asia, but stability in general, which is a primary condition for economic development. If Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot agree and find common ground, they could turn to a third party for reconciliation efforts. Countries within Central Asia would undoubtedly be willing to act as facilitators, given their interest in finding a mutually acceptable solution for all sides and maintaining further cooperation between all parties.
Secret Spots Favored by Tashkent’s City Dwellers
Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, has a wealth of unique attractions, each with its own history and atmosphere. Residents, from students to entrepreneurs, have their favorite corners where they return again and again. Here some of a few recommended by locals to TCA.
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photo: uzbekistan.travel Eco Park[/caption]
Eco Park
Located in the city center, the Eco Park is especially popular amongst students seeking somewhere to relax, take a break from their studies and immerse themselves in nature.
“Here you can not only walk around, but also learn and be inspired by new ideas.”
Saeed, 19, Programming student
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photo: www.tripadvisor -Seoul National Park[/caption]
Seoul National Park
Easily accessible by bus from the city center, Seoul National Park offers a taste of Korea in its landscaping and various pavilions. Passionate about Korean culture, Samira often visits the park to relax and socialise with friends.
“This place has become my little world where I can enjoy nature and feel part of Korean culture.”
Samira, 17, High school student
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photo: www.afisha -Patriki Coffee Shop[/caption]
Patriki Coffee Shop
For Dilshot, aside from its excellent coffee, the cozy atmosphere of Patriki is a perfect and inspirational spot in which to complete tasks on his computer.
“There is always cool music here, and I can focus on my projects without being distracted by noise.”
Dilshot, 22, Programmer
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photo: www.tripadvisor - Café 1991[/caption]
Café 1991
Nasiba, prefers to chill in Cafe 1991; a venue renowned for its excellent menu and which she favors for its elegant and stylish atmosphere.
“It is my place of rest. I like to relax here after work, enjoy delicious food and socialize with friends.”
Nasiba, 30, Cafe Administrator
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photo: www.gazeta.uz - Chinorkent[/caption]
Chinorkent Mountain Resort
Lured by the great outdoors, Gafur likes to escape his daily routine and the hustle and bustle of the city by heading for the picturesque mountain resort of Chinorkent. Located in Tashkent's Bostanlyk district, 65 kilometers from the center, the resort has a cable car to transport visitors within ten minutes to an observation deck offering panoramic views.
“The tranquil atmosphere makes it a perfect place to relax.”
Gafur, 22, Entrepreneur
Tajikistan Court Issues Harsh Sentences to Opposition Group 24 Leader and Associate
A Dushanbe court has handed down sentences to two opposition activists: Sukhrob Zafar, leader of the banned Group 24 (G24), and his associate Nasimjon Sharifov. Zafar was sentenced to 30 years and Sharifov to 20 years in prison. The verdict was announced on October 10 behind closed doors in the Dushanbe pre-trial detention center, and according to Radio Ozodi sources, it fully complies with the state prosecution's request. Official structures still need to confirm this information. Representatives of G24 say the sentences relate to the charges of “calls for violent change of the constitutional order” spread through the Internet. They consider these accusations unfounded and call the case politically motivated. In their opinion, the trial was conducted under pressure from the authorities and was a manifestation of Emomali Rahmon's government's repressive policy. Both activists previously lived in Turkey, where they were hiding from the Tajik authorities. Suhrob Zafar had been there since 2014 and had received repeated threats. He was detained several times at Tajikistan's request but was soon released. Sharifov had also been living in Turkey since 2015 and was detained three times but released each time. In March 2024, they mysteriously disappeared, and only in August it became known that they were taken to Dushanbe, where an investigation against them began. The trial, according to G24 representatives, was yet another example of human rights violations and political repression. The organization claims that the trial was held under tremendous pressure and calls the authorities' actions an act of suppression of dissent. Supporters believe that the repression of activists continues as part of the anti-opposition policy that the Tajik authorities have been pursuing for years. G24 is an opposition organization founded in 2012 by businessman Umarali Kuwwatov, who left Tajikistan after conflicts with the authorities. The movement opposes President Emomali Rahmon's policies, accusing him of corruption and authoritarianism. In 2014, Tajikistan's Supreme Court declared the organization extremist after calls for protests and banned its activities, including websites and publications. The group's founder was killed in 2015 in Turkey, raising suspicions of involvement by Tajik authorities.
Russia Floats Idea of Help from Kazakh Airlines
Russia is talking to Kazakhstan and other “friendly countries” about the possibility of foreign airlines flying domestic routes inside Russia, according to Russian state news agency Tass. The report comes as Russia’s civil aviation industry struggles under the impact of Western sanctions that were implemented after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Russian Transport Minister Roman Starovoit did not mention the sanctions in comments that were reported by Tass this week, but he referred generally to a global shortage of aircraft. "We are negotiating with friendly countries,” Starovoit said to journalists at a forum in Yekaterinburg, Russia. “For example, we are negotiating with Kazakhstan.” The minister, who took office this year, said Kazakhstan had experienced a 35% increase in “aviation mobility” this year. “The fact is that there is currently a shortage of aircraft all over the world,” Sarovoit said, according to Tass. “And we see that against the backdrop of growth in transportation in foreign countries, the shortage of aircraft leads to a deficit of them, and it is difficult for other countries to solve these problems." He was referring to a process called cabotage, under which an aircraft registered in one country is used for transportation from one point to another within another country. It is unusual in the case of commercial aircraft because countries want to boost their domestic airlines and markets, though the rules can be more relaxed for some private or business aircraft. Russian airlines have traditionally relied on Western aircraft and were vulnerable to sanctions aimed at depriving them of spare parts and supplies. Western companies had demanded that Russia return hundreds of leased aircraft because of the war, but Russia refused. The industry is heavily reliant on state support to keep it going. “Russian aviation, disconnected from suppliers and from experience and knowledge transfer networks, will likely survive, but increasingly as a stand-alone operation,” Anastasia Dagaeva wrote in a March blog post for the Kennan Institute, a research center on Eurasia affiliated with the Washington-based Wilson Center. In contrast, civil aviation in Kazakhstan has been experiencing considerable growth and the Central Asian country is a more popular destination for transit flights because of restrictions affecting Russian airspace. Though the Kazakh industry faces its own challenges, including a shortage of staff.
Karakalpak Activists Facing Charges in Uzbekistan, Granted Asylum in the United States
The waiting, worrying, and wondering are finally over for four Karakalpak activists who were detained in Kazakhstan some two years ago, and faced possible extradition back to Uzbekistan. Zhangeldi Zhaksimbetov, Tleubike Yuldasheva, Raisa Khudaybergenova, and Ziuar Mirmanbetova received word on October 15 that they had been granted asylum in the United States. It ended more than two years of uncertainty that started with the unrest in Karakalpakstan on July 1, 2022. Karakalpakstan is part of Uzbekistan, but has a special status as a sovereign republic with its own parliament and constitution that allows the region to hold a referendum on seceding from Uzbekistan. Those unique privileges are also enshrined in Uzbekistan’s constitution, but in spring 2022 parliament proposed making amendments to the constitution. The main reason for the amendments was to change the presidential term from five to seven years so that incumbent President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who was serving his second and constitutionally last term at the time, could extend his stay in power. However, the commission drafting the constitutional changes also dropped the articles referring to Karakalpakstan’s sovereign status and right to secede. Those rights were nominal as there was no chance Uzbek authorities would allow Karakalpakstan to fully govern itself or secede. Karakalpakstan accounts for some 37% of Uzbekistan’s territory, and also has large oil and natural gas reserves that have just started being developed in the past ten years. The special rights Karakalpakstan had might have been nominal, particularly since ethnic Karakalpaks make up only about one-third of Karakalpakstan’s two million inhabitants. But these distinctions, albeit it only on paper, were important to the Karakalpaks, and when the proposed amendments were published at the end of June 2022, tensions started rising immediately in Karakalpakstan. On July 1, Karakalpak community leaders went to apply for permission to hold a public meeting against the planned changes affecting Karakalpakstan. The group’s leader, activist and lawyer Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, was detained. Word spread and a large group numbering at least several thousand gathered, protesting peacefully outside the administration building in the Karakalpakstan capital, Nukus. When police and security forces attempted to disperse the crowd, violence broke out, and when it was over and order finally restored, at least 21 people were dead and 243 injured. Nearly all the casualties were Karakalpaks, and police and security forces were accused of using unnecessary and indiscriminate force against the protesters. News of the proposed amendments, and the ensuing violence spread to the Karakalpak communities in other countries, notably to neighboring Kazakhstan, where, according to various estimates, anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000 Karakalpaks live. Most have Kazakh citizenship, but some simply work in Kazakhstan and remain citizens of Uzbekistan. Karakalpak activists in Kazakhstan followed events in Karakalpakstan in late June and early July 2022 and posted about it on social networks, sometimes with words of support for the protesters. After Uzbek authorities had restored order in Kazakhstan and arrested more than 500 people, Uzbek officials requested the Kazakh government detain Karakalpaks in Kazakhstan who had been posting statements and information on social networks before, during, and after the violence. Based on a warrant from Uzbekistan, Zhaksimbetov and Koshkarbai Toremuratov were detained in Almaty on September 13, 2022. Uzbek law enforcement accused them of encroaching on the constitutional order of Uzbekistan and disseminating material that threatened public safety and order in Uzbekistan. On September 16, Karakalpak activist Khudaybergenova was detained in an Almaty suburb on the same charges from Uzbekistan, and at the start of October, Almaty police detained Mirmanbetova. On October 14, 2022, Human Rights Watch released a statement calling on the Kazakh authorities not to extradite the Karakalpak activists to Uzbekistan, but Kazakhstan’s then-Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi said his country’s position was that the four were citizens of Uzbekistan. On November 13, Kazakh border guards apprehended Yuldasheva as she was trying to cross the border into Russia. In all five cases, the Kazakh authorities initially ordered the Karakalpaks be held for 40 days, then extended their terms of detention to approximately one year. All were released after that time, but they remained in legal limbo, trying to find political asylum in a third country while always fearing they could be detained again in Kazakhstan at any moment and sent back to Uzbekistan, where they would almost surely be imprisoned. Toremuratov left for Poland, where his request for asylum is still under review. Zhaksimbetov, Yuldasheva, and Khudaybergenova and her family left for the United States on October 15. Mirmanbetova is reportedly waiting for paperwork for a member of her family to be cleared, then they will both also depart for the United States. Several Karakalpak activists are still being held in Karakalpakstan, notably Aqylbek Muratbai, who became the Karakalpaks’ main spokesman on what has been happening in Karakalpakstan since the July 2022 unrest. For these Karakalpak activists remaining in custody in Kazakhstan, the fortuitous turn of events for Zhaksimbetov, Yuldasheva, Khudaybergenova, and Mirmanbetova is a good sign they too might be released from detention and find asylum in the United States.
Sunkar Podcast
Kazakhstan’s Return to Nuclear Power
