Kyrgyzstan and China to Launch Direct Flight Between Osh and Kashgar
A new air route connecting Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest city, with Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is expected to launch in April, according to a statement from Airports of Kyrgyzstan JSC. The announcement follows a meeting held on January 30 with the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). The new flight is intended to enhance transport connectivity between the two neighboring countries, deepen bilateral trade and economic ties, and promote tourism and cultural exchange. The route is expected to be operated by Chengdu Airlines, a COMAC-affiliated carrier, using COMAC’s C919 aircraft, China’s first domestically developed short-to-medium-range turbofan jet, which can accommodate up to 97 passengers. Osh already has an existing air link to Xinjiang. In November 2025, China Southern Airlines resumed flights between Osh and Urumqi, the region's capital. Xinjiang serves as a strategic gateway to China for Kyrgyzstan, and Kashgar is the departure point for the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, an ambitious regional infrastructure project aimed at connecting China with Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The 523-kilometer railway will run from Kashgar to Andijan, Uzbekistan, passing through Kyrgyzstan via Torugart, Makmal, and Jalal-Abad. Construction on the CKU railway officially began on December 27, 2024, in Kyrgyzstan’s Jalal-Abad region. New transport links by air and rail are expected to further boost trade between Kyrgyzstan and China. According to Chinese Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Liu Jiangping, bilateral trade reached a record $27.2 billion in 2025, up 20% from the previous year.
Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Available Now with Eduards Stiprais, EU Special Representative for Central Asia
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is joined by the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Eduards Stiprais, to discuss connectivity, critical minerals, and what's unique about the EU's engagement with Central Asia.
Analysis: Three Decades of Parliamentary Reform in Central Asia — and What Changed
Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced his reform plans on January 20, including structural changes to the government. Arguably, one of the least consequential of those changes is replacing the current bicameral parliament with a unicameral parliament. Across Central Asia, over the last 35 years, parliaments have repeatedly switched from unicameral to bicameral parliaments, or vice versa, the number of deputies has increased and decreased, and in some cases, parallel bodies have come into existence and later disappeared. Kazakhstan When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, each of the former republics, including the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, had a unicameral, republican Supreme Soviet elected in 1990. These Supreme Soviets continued functioning after independence until 1994, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, until 1995. In Kazakhstan, in December 1993, the majority of the 360 deputies in the Supreme Soviet voted to dissolve the body. In March 1994, there were elections to the new parliament (Supreme Kenges) that had 177 seats. During the tumultuous year of 1995, the parliament was dissolved by then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ruled by decree until snap parliamentary elections in December of that year. However, on August 29, 1995, voters approved a new constitution in a national referendum. That constitution created a bicameral parliament with 67 deputies in the Mazhilis, the lower house, and 50 deputies in the Senate, 10 of them directly appointed by the president. Deputies to the Mazhilis were chosen in popular elections. Senators were chosen in indirect elections involving deputies from local, provincial, and municipal councils of large cities. In the snap parliamentary elections of October 1999, 10 seats were added and chosen by party lists, while the original 67 continued to be contested in single-mandate districts. That structure lasted until 2007. Constitutional amendments adopted in late May that year increased the number of seats in the Mazhilis to 107, of which 98 were to be chosen by party lists. Nazarbayev’s Nur-Otan party won all 98 of the party list seats in the August elections. The remaining nine representatives came from the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, a group representing the various ethnic groups in Kazakhstan that Nazarbayev created in 1995. Eight additional members of the Assembly were given seats in the Senate. The Assembly held its own elections to fill those seats. Kazakhstan conducted a constitutional referendum in June 2022, in part aimed at mollifying discontent that lingered from the mass unrest in early January that year, which left 238 people dead. Some amendments stripped away powers in the executive branch that had accumulated during the 28 years Nazarbayev was president, and more power was given to parliament. Another amendment removed the nine Mazhilis seats reserved for members of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan. One amendment reduced the number of Senate members appointed by the president back to 10, after it had been raised to 15 under a 2007 amendment. Kyrgyzstan A referendum in Kyrgyzstan on constitutional amendments in October 1994 created a bicameral parliament with 70 seats in the Legislative Assembly, the lower house, and 35 in the Assembly of People's Representatives, the upper house. Kyrgyzstan’s first parliamentary elections were held in February 1995. When the 2000 parliamentary elections came around, the number of seats was slightly altered: 60 in the Legislative Assembly, and 45 in the Assembly of People’s Representatives. The referendum of 2003 changed the structure again, creating a unicameral parliament with 75 seats for the 2005 elections. In October 2007, another constitutional referendum enlarged parliament to 90 seats and stipulated that they all would be filled in elections by party lists. In June 2010, less than three months after Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted as Kyrgyzstan’s president, a referendum was conducted that changed Kyrgyzstan’s form of government from presidential to parliamentary and increased the number of deputies to 120. Kyrgyzstan’s 2020 parliamentary elections were rife with accusations of vote-buying, gerrymandering, and the use of administrative resources to fill parliament with presidential loyalists. The results announced in October supported these suspicions. That sparked unrest in the capital, Bishkek. Sooronbai Jeenbekov was ousted as Kyrgyzstan’s president in October 2020 and quickly replaced by Sadyr Japarov, Kyrgyzstan’s current president. A referendum in April 2021 approved turning Kyrgyzstan back to a presidential form of government, with Japarov arguably enjoying greater powers than any previous Kyrgyz president. The referendum also reduced the number of seats in parliament back to 90. Another amendment in that referendum raised the status of Kyrgyzstan’s People’s Kurultai to a “public representative assembly… a deliberative, supervisory assembly, making recommendations on areas of social development.” A Kurultai is an ancient Turkic and Mongol tradition of assembling communities, or representatives of communities, to discuss important matters, including the selection of new leaders. In Kyrgyzstan, national Kurultais have been called previously, usually during times of great social tension or by Kyrgyz presidents seeking support from a group that is supposed to represent traditional Kyrgyz values. The status of Kyrgyzstan’s People’s Kuriltai under the current constitution is not clearly defined, but some see it as potentially a parallel structure to parliament. Parliamentary elections in November 2021 were decided under a split-system of 54 seats contested by party lists and 36 in single-mandate districts. In the November 2025 elections, single-mandate districts filled all 90 seats. Tajikistan Less than a year after it became independent, there was a civil war in Tajikistan that lasted until June 1997. The Supreme Soviet remained until 1995, and after the post of president was removed in November 1992, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, at that time Emomali Rahmon (Rahmonov), was made the head of state. A referendum in November 1994 approved a new constitution that created a 181-seat unicameral parliament, and elections for that parliament were held in February 1995. The Tajik Peace Accord was signed on June 27, 1997, ending the civil war. In 1999, a new constitution established a bicameral parliament with 63 seats in the Majlisi Namoyandagon, the lower house of parliament, elected by party lists, and 33 seats in the Majlisi Milli, the upper house, elected by representatives of city, regional, and district administrations. That arrangement has endured to this day. Turkmenistan The constitution that Turkmenistan adopted in May 1992 created a parliament with 50 seats, and that number remained until the 2008 parliamentary elections. However, after a November 2002 attack on President Saparmurat Niyazov’s motorcade, state investigators said the organizers of the attack planned to kill Niyazov, then convene parliament to approve new leadership. In August 2003, Niyazov increased the powers of a consultative body called the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) that had previously met once a year to rubber-stamp presidential policies, including making Niyazov “president for life” at a session in 1999. The Halk Maslahaty was comprised of a variety of people: all the parliamentary deputies, local officials, businessmen, religious figures, and others from around the country. More than 2,500 in all. It was therefore impossible to gather them all quickly, and Niyazov subordinated parliament to the Halk Maslahaty. Niyazov died in December 2006, and his successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, introduced amendments to the constitution in September 2008 that abolished the Halk Maslahaty and increased the number of seats in parliament to 125. The parliamentary elections later in 2008 were also notable for being the first time the ruling Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (formerly the Communist Party of the Turkmen SSR) faced competition. The government created two new parties to give the appearance of conducting competitive elections. The number of parliamentary seats remained 125, but in 2017, Berdimuhamedov told a meeting of the Council of Elders that he was reforming the group into a new Halk Maslahaty that includes citizens of different ages. Changes adopted to Turkmenistan’s constitution in late 2020 led to the creation of a bicameral parliament in early 2021, with parliament becoming the lower house and the Halk Maslahaty the upper house. Berdimuhamedov stepped down as president in early 2022 after having spent several years preparing his son Serdar to take the post. The elder Berdimuhamedov then took the post of Halk Maslahaty chairman. In January 2023, parliament amended the constitution. The Halk Maslahaty was made the supreme body in the country, with parliament reverting to its unicameral form, and the Halk Maslahaty’s chairman becoming the country’s most powerful politician, more powerful than the president. Uzbekistan Voters in Uzbekistan elected 250 deputies to the unicameral parliament in the elections of 1994 and 1999. The January 2002 referendum approved the creation of a bicameral parliament with 120 seats in the Oliy Majilis, the lower house, and 100 seats in the Senate, the upper house. Voters only cast ballots for deputies in the Oily Majlis. In the Senate, 84 members were elected by provincial, district, and city councils, and 16 were selected by the president. They took office after the 2004 elections. Before the 2009 parliamentary elections, an additional 30 seats were added to the Oliy Majlis. However, 15 of these places were reserved for members of the Ecological Movement. The Uzbek authorities were pressuring Tajikistan not to go ahead with plans to build a massive hydropower plant (HPP), Rogun, upstream. Uzbekistan’s Ecological Movement was spearheading the criticisms against Tajikistan even before its inclusion in parliament. Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, died in the summer of 2016. His successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, reversed Uzbekistan’s position on the Rogun HPP and declared that Uzbekistan would work with Tajikistan to build it. The first parliamentary elections held after Mirziyoyev came to power were in 2019. Before those elections, the Ecological Movement became the Ecological Party and had to compete for seats in the Oliy Majlis, like the other parties. Constitutional amendments in 2023 reduced the size of the Senate to 65 members, four from each of Uzbekistan’s 12 provinces, the Karakalpakstan Republic, and Tashkent city, with the president appointing the remaining nine members. Round in Circles Kazakhstan’s new unicameral parliament will be called the Kurultai. It will have 145 deputies elected on the basis of party lists. It appears the rule will stand that only candidates from officially registered parties will be able to participate in elections. That is also true in all the other Central Asian states except Kyrgyzstan, the only country that still allows independent candidates to run. All the Central Asian states have seen their parliaments transformed, expanded, and contracted. Every time, there were reasons given why these changes represented political and social progress. Yet after 35 years, the decisions in each country are still made by one man, the president (or in Turkmenistan’s case, the Halk Maslahaty chairman), and a small inner circle. The changes coming to Kazakhstan could herald a new era of politics in that country, but in the past, such changes have usually been window-dressing, not substantive political change.
Switzerland Backs Winter Tourism Development in Kyrgyzstan
Switzerland is providing practical support to Kyrgyzstan in developing its winter tourism sector, with a strong focus on training professional staff. A program for ski instructor training is currently underway in the city of Karakol, Issyk-Kul region, with Swiss backing.
Switzerland's ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Sirocco Meserli, recently visited a cross-country skiing training session, a sport that has seen systematic development in Kyrgyzstan since 2022.
According to Swiss diplomats, specialists from Switzerland have arrived to train Kyrgyz instructors and sports school coaches in modern international methods tailored for children, adults, and tourists.
The initiative is part of the Sustainable Winter Tourism project, funded by the Swiss government. The final stage of this year’s training sessions with Swiss experts is currently taking place.
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Meserli stated that the program covers skiing techniques, instructional methods, tourist engagement, and safety protocols.
“Infrastructure development is important, but qualified personnel who can provide a high level of service and a positive tourist experience play a decisive role,” he said.
The project introduces international training standards for instructors at the Admission, Aspirant, and Instructor levels, commonly used in alpine skiing and snowboarding training globally.
The Swiss side has emphasized the project’s long-term goals: not only to train instructors but also to lay the foundation for winter sports as a sustainable economic sector, fostering growth in tourist traffic, job creation, and service offerings during the winter season.
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Kyrgyz experts see high potential in this area. Approximately 94% of Kyrgyzstan’s territory is mountainous, and new ski resorts are actively being developed across the country.
“Skiing is becoming popular. Young people are eager to learn. All instructors speak Kyrgyz, Russian, and English, and demand for training has grown significantly,” ski instructor Daniyar Toichbek told The Times of Central Asia.
Karakol remains Kyrgyzstan’s primary ski destination. During the winter season, numerous rental shops operate in the city, where a full set of ski equipment can be rented for about $35, making winter recreation accessible to both locals and international visitors.
Central Asia Launches Regional Electricity Market with World Bank Support
On January 22, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved the 10-year Regional Electricity Market Interconnectivity and Trade (REMIT) Program, an ambitious initiative to establish Central Asia’s first regional electricity market. The program aims to boost cross-border electricity trade, expand transmission capacity, and lay the foundation for large-scale renewable energy integration across the region. Electricity demand in Central Asia is projected to triple by 2050 under a business-as-usual scenario. Yet electricity trade in the region currently accounts for only 3% of total demand. The REMIT Program seeks to harness Central Asia’s diverse and complementary energy resources: hydropower in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, thermal power from coal and natural gas in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the region’s rapidly expanding solar and wind potential. Over the next decade, REMIT aims to:
- Increase regional electricity trade to at least 15,000 GWh annually, enough to supply millions of consumers
- Triple regional transmission capacity to 16 GW
- Enable up to 9 GW of clean energy integration
Finland’s President Stubb Warns Russia’s Imperial Thinking Poses Risks for Central Asia
Russia’s imperial worldview may pose a greater long-term risk to Central Asia and the South Caucasus than to NATO member states, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said in an interview with The Washington Post, highlighting concerns that continue to resonate across the post-Soviet space. Speaking with columnist David Ignatius, Stubb referenced Finland’s long and complex history with its eastern neighbor, noting that expansionist thinking remains deeply rooted in Russian political culture. “I think the DNA of Russia is still expansion and imperialism,” he said, arguing that President Vladimir Putin views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a historical injustice. While much of the Western debate centers on potential threats to NATO countries such as the Baltic states, Finland, or Poland, Stubb suggested that more vulnerable regions lie elsewhere. “I think the more worrying aspect for others is the Central Asian countries, the Southern Caucasus and others,” he said, pointing to what he described as a top-down political system driven by the ideology of Russkiy mir, or the “Russian world.” Stubb also spoke about his personal interactions with Russian officials, including Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, stressing that meaningful political dialogue remains unlikely while the war in Ukraine continues. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Russian television host Vladimir Solovyov sparked backlash after suggesting that Moscow could conduct “special military operations” in Central Asia and Armenia. The remarks were widely condemned by Uzbek scholars, journalists, and analysts as destabilizing and provocative. More recently, Russian ultranationalist Alexander Dugin, often described as an ideologue of the “Russian world”, publicly questioned the sovereignty of several former Soviet republics, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. A video of his comments circulated widely online, drawing sharp criticism across the region. Russia’s Foreign Ministry later sought to distance the Kremlin from such statements. Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Solovyov’s remarks did not reflect official policy and reaffirmed that Moscow’s relationships with Central Asian countries are based on partnership and respect for sovereignty.
Disability Inclusion Is Emerging as Central Asia’s Next Social Frontier
More than 1.3 billion people worldwide live with some form of disability, yet disability remains one of the least visible dimensions of social and economic life. In Central Asia, that invisibility is especially pronounced. As governments focus on infrastructure, growth, and modernization, far less attention is paid to whether people with disabilities are becoming more present in schools, workplaces, and public life, or whether they remain largely confined to families and institutions beyond the reach of public discussion. Across the region, cities are expanding, labor mobility is increasing, and younger generations are more connected to global ideas through study and migration. These shifts are often treated as shorthand for progress. At the same time, people with disabilities consistently face lower educational attainment and weaker labor market outcomes, making inclusion a practical test of whether development reaches beyond headline indicators into everyday life. Disability policy across much of Central Asia has long centered on legal classification, benefit eligibility, and institutional care. Long-term institutionalization is associated with reduced autonomy and poorer social outcomes, yet institutions remain a common default, reinforcing the idea that disability is primarily an administrative or medical issue rather than a social one shaped by access and expectations. In practice, families remain the primary providers of care throughout the region. In Kyrgyzstan, around 200,000 people are officially registered as living with disabilities, and outside major cities, most daily support is provided by family members due to limited community-based services. In Turkmenistan, public disability data remain sparse, and undercounting is widely acknowledged, leaving extended families as the central source of long-term care. In Tajikistan, official estimates place the number of people living with disabilities between 150,000 and 200,000, with caregiving overwhelmingly home-based due to constrained public resources. Family-based care provides continuity and belonging, but it also carries an economic cost. Caregivers are more likely to reduce paid employment and experience long-term income loss, a burden that falls disproportionately on women and shapes household economic outcomes. This reliance on family support is often contrasted unfavorably with wealthier countries, but the comparison is more complicated. In the United States, more than one in four adults lives with a disability, and people with disabilities report significantly higher rates of loneliness and depression despite extensive legal protections and formal services. By contrast, strong family networks are associated with lower levels of severe social isolation, even in settings with fewer public resources. In recent years, small but notable shifts have begun to appear. Local organizations across the region are experimenting with community-based rehabilitation, inclusive education, and supported employment models that move beyond institutional care. These efforts remain fragmented and under-resourced, but they reflect a growing recognition that disability policy is about protection and participation. As Central Asian governments seek to retain talent, expand their labor force, and project social modernization, inclusion is increasingly intersecting with economic and demographic realities rather than remaining a niche social issue. Institutional care remains common across Central Asia, yet community-based rehabilitation is consistently linked to better social participation and quality of life. Families are increasingly questioning whether institutions should be the default response when local support could preserve relationships and autonomy. Disability inclusion will not define Central Asia’s future on its own. It does, however, offer a clear measure of whether modernization is reflected not only in infrastructure and growth, but in who is visible, connected, and able to participate in everyday life.
Kyrgyzstan to Continue Electricity Imports in 2026 to Cover Power Deficit
Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet of Ministers has confirmed that the country will continue importing electricity in 2026 to compensate for a persistent shortfall in domestic power generation, Deputy Energy Minister Altynbek Rysbekov said during a meeting of a parliamentary committee. According to Rysbekov, Kyrgyzstan currently produces around 14.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity per year, while overall demand exceeds domestic supply by approximately 4.5 billion kilowatt-hours. To bridge the gap, the country imported about 4.3 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity in 2025, and officials expect similar volumes will be required next year. Rysbekov said electricity imports remain necessary to meet consumption needs, particularly during periods of peak demand. Electricity is sold to households at a socially regulated tariff that does not fully reflect production and import costs, with the difference absorbed by the national power company, NENK, placing a continued strain on the utility’s finances. The deputy minister acknowledged that reliance on imported electricity reflects deeper structural challenges in Kyrgyzstan’s energy sector. The country remains heavily dependent on hydropower, with the Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Station alone supplying about 40% of the country’s electricity, leaving generation vulnerable to fluctuating water levels at major reservoirs. Reduced inflows and steadily rising domestic consumption have contributed to recurring electricity shortages in recent years. Officials said the government’s medium- and long-term strategy is aimed at reducing dependence on electricity imports by expanding domestic generation capacity and diversifying energy sources. Rysbekov noted that efforts are underway to attract investment into renewable energy projects, including wind and solar power, alongside upgrades to existing infrastructure. The Energy Ministry has previously said that increasing non-hydropower generation is essential to improving energy security and reducing seasonal risks, particularly during dry years. However, officials have cautioned that new capacity will take time to come online, making electricity imports unavoidable in the near term. Kyrgyzstan has relied on electricity imports from neighboring countries during periods of deficit for much of the past decade, a pattern authorities say will continue until long-standing imbalances between supply and demand in the energy sector are addressed.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
