Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will examine accelerated plans to relocate people from the area around Tajikistan's Rogun hydropower plant, with guests from the Coalition for Human Rights in Development, including Eugene Simonov.

Global Internet Freedom Rankings: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan Far Ahead of Eurasian Neighbors

The 2026 Global Internet Freedom Rankings, published this week by the research agency Cloudwards, have revealed that the five countries of Central Asia have significantly less internet censorship than all of their Eurasian neighbors. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s online environments emerge as particularly encouraging cases. Cloudwards defines internet censorship as the banning or restricting of online content or services, such as social media platforms, VPN apps, and certain political or religious messaging. It also covers the more welcome deletion of harmful content. Censorship can be done by governments, or initiated by a country’s internet service providers and other businesses. The internet freedom rankings do not measure state censorship per se. Cloudwards' research scored 171 countries on a scale of 0-100, rating their overall levels of internet censorship using five key criteria: torrenting availability; adult content accessibility; social media platforms; access to varied political and religious content; and VPN regulations. Eleven nations returned the highest score of 92, including New Zealand, Belgium and Timor Leste. While North Korea scored 0, the next four worst countries for internet censorship – each scoring just 4 – all border Central Asia: China, Pakistan, Iran and Russia. Tajikistan’s score of 56, while only middling in the global context, means that its internet is subject to significantly less interference than almost anywhere in the wider Eurasia region. The Times of Central Asia reported last year that the country has repealed a law that allowed citizens to be prosecuted for ‘liking’ posts on social media that are critical of the government. The only Eurasian country to rival Tajikistan is its northern neighbor Kyrgyzstan, which has the second freest internet in Central Asia, scoring 52 in Cloudwards' ranking. For comparison, 52 is also the overall score given to the United Kingdom and Brazil. Kazakhstan scored 36 – above Singapore and South Korea, which both received a mark of 32. Uzbekistan scored 24. While Turkmenistan’s mark of 16 places it firmly among the world’s worst countries for internet censorship, this is nonetheless higher than countries including India and Turkey (both 12). Turkmen netizens still experience fewer restrictions than internet users in the aforementioned China, Pakistan, Iran and Russia. The authors of the Cloudwards report, British editors Kit Copson and Sandra Pattison, commented: "The reasons behind online censorship range from protecting people targeted by hate speech to quelling political dissent. In especially restrictive locations, censorship and internet monitoring are tools commonly to control narratives." They added: "The consequences for breaching government-imposed censorship laws depend on the country. They could include fines or even arrest or imprisonment for those in highly restrictive locations."

Growing Trade Disputes Test the Eurasian Economic Union

Trade disputes within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are as old as its creation. Restrictions on the import and export of certain goods have long been common practice. However, analysts increasingly warn that tensions have reached a point at which the organization risks losing its core function, ensuring the free movement of goods across borders and maintaining simplified conditions for migrant workers. Mounting Restrictions The EAEU currently comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Economic integration among several post-Soviet states began in 2000 with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2006, but suspended its participation in 2008. The foundation of this organization was the Customs Union agreement, intended to abolish customs duties among member states. The structure of the integration project has since evolved. The EAEU treaty was signed in 2014 and entered into force on January 1, 2015. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not join, while Armenia became a member in 2015. More than two decades after the first integration agreements, however, many of the bloc’s original promises remain only partially fulfilled. Experts have long argued that protectionist measures remain widespread within the bloc and that full freedom of movement for all categories of goods, including strategic products, has not been achieved. They also point to pronounced economic asymmetry: Russia accounts for approximately 85–87% of the union’s combined GDP, whereas Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 9–10%. Russia’s significantly larger population and political influence have further reinforced perceptions of structural imbalance. Moscow is now preparing new regulatory measures affecting its partners. From April 1, 2026, a national system for confirming the arrival of goods will be introduced for road imports from EAEU countries. According to the Russian authorities, shifting key control procedures to the pre-border stage is intended to improve transparency in the administration of indirect taxes. Previously, such checks were conducted after goods entered the country through desk and field audits. At the same time, Russia has intensified selective customs controls on its borders with Kazakhstan and Belarus, officially citing efforts to combat counterfeit goods. Particular scrutiny is being applied to product labelling and accompanying documentation. Controls were tightened last summer, when mobile checkpoints were established along the Kazakh-Russian border, followed by the inspections of vehicles leaving Belarus in the autumn. Full-scale checkpoints are now operating on the Kazakh-Russian border, while a simplified regime linked to the Union State and EAEU agreements continues to apply on the Belarusian-Russian border. Logistics industry representatives report that stricter controls on the Kazakh border have significantly increased transit delivery times. Carriers often face lengthy delays at checkpoints even when their documentation is in order. According to Alexandra Pokumeiko, head of a freight-forwarding department, the changes have created uncertainty in delivery schedules along Belarus-Russia transport corridors and on transit routes through Russia to Kazakhstan. The growing number of administrative restrictions has begun to spill into specific sectors of the economy, triggering retaliatory measures between member states. Escalating Tensions in the Automotive Sector A new dispute has emerged between Kazakhstan and Russia over vehicle recycling fees. On March 10, Kazakhstan announced plans to raise the scrap fee on Russian-made cars, describing the move as a reciprocal response to measures introduced by Moscow. Although the relevant order is yet to be formally signed, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry and Construction, Yersayin Nagaspayev, has stated that the increase would mirror Moscow’s policy. Within Russia, recycling fees on vehicles imported from Kazakhstan have reportedly risen tenfold and are set to increase further under a progressive scale through 2029-2030. Astana argues that the reciprocal step is necessary to support its domestic automotive industry. Nagaspayev emphasised that the value of Russian passenger vehicles accounts for only around 3.7% of Kazakhstan’s car imports, suggesting limited market impact and no expectation of sharp price increases. Meanwhile, Russian media outlets have reported that since spring 2024, more than 30,000 Hyundai, Kia, and Skoda vehicles assembled in Kazakhstan have entered the Russian market within the EAEU framework. Debate Over the Union’s Future The dispute has revived debate in Kazakhstan about the country’s economic gains from EAEU membership and speculation about the bloc’s long-term viability. Olzhas Zhorayev, an expert at the Association for Analysis and Management of Public Policy, argues that the institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Commission complicates the promotion of national interests. According to him, the multinational composition of the bloc's leadership positions sometimes makes dispute resolution difficult and contributes to perceptions that Eurasian integration remains largely declarative. Zhorayev also highlights concerns about the preparedness of some national officials working within integration bodies, suggesting that a limited understanding of economic conditions may reduce the effectiveness of their representation. Economist Arman Beisembayev takes a more critical view, arguing that Kazakhstan derives limited economic benefit from its membership in the union. Beisembayev points to a significant trade imbalance with Russia, noting that Kazakhstan imports substantially more from its northern neighbour than it exports. At the same time, he notes that Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on Russian supplies in sectors such as food and pharmaceuticals. Labour Migration Disputes Russia has also tightened legislation governing labour migration. In January, Kyrgyzstan filed a case with the EAEU Court, arguing that Russia’s refusal to provide compulsory medical insurance to the families of migrant workers violates union agreements guaranteeing access to social protection. In March, however, the court’s Grand Chamber clarified that member states are not required to automatically extend compulsory medical insurance coverage to migrants’ family members. The ruling emphasised the distinction within EAEU agreements between social security provisions and access to medical assistance. Armenia’s Strategic Dilemma Armenia’s shifting foreign policy priorities add another layer of uncertainty to the union’s future. The country’s leadership has repeatedly signalled hesitation between deepening integration with the EAEU amid moves aimed at potentially strengthening ties with the European Union. In the summer of 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan joined an EAEU forum via video link rather than attending in person, prompting speculation in regional media about Yerevan’s commitment to the bloc. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko later suggested that Armenia may have its own reasons for adopting a more critical stance toward the organization. Simultaneous membership in both the EAEU and the European Union is not feasible, meaning Armenia may eventually face a strategic choice. Rising Tensions Ahead of Key Meetings Internal disputes are likely to influence discussions at the upcoming EAEU summit of heads of state in May, as well as during the Russian president’s planned state visit to Kazakhstan, scheduled to coincide with the event. Kazakhstan assumed the rotating chairmanship of the EAEU from January 1, 2026. Recent trade disputes suggest that Astana intends to pursue a more assertive position within the organization rather than simply aligning with Moscow’s policy preferences.

Taken together, these disputes highlight growing contradictions within the EAEU. While the union was designed to remove barriers to trade and labor mobility, member states have increasingly resorted to unilateral restrictions when national economic interests are at stake. The result is a system that formally promotes integration but frequently operates through ad-hoc controls, exemptions, and retaliatory measures.

Whether the EAEU can reconcile these tensions remains uncertain. For countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the union still offers access to a large regional market and simplified migration rules, but recurring trade conflicts and regulatory asymmetries continue to fuel debate about how much members are willing to sacrifice for integration. As the bloc approaches another summit, the question is less about whether disagreements exist and more about how far they can escalate before the mechanisms of the union itself begin to erode.

Munara Abdukakharova: Stories of Art, Identity, and Political Memory from Kyrgyzstan

A yellow hammer-and-sickle symbol is sewn onto black, yellow, blue and red mattresses in Up on Manas, down on Sovetskaya, a powerful artwork by artist Munara Abdukakharova presented last year at Fondazione Elpis in Milan. Inspired by the traditional kurak korpe (the hand-stitched patchwork cushions and mattresses that roll up like futons), the piece reimagines a familiar domestic object as a carrier of collective memory for Central Asian migrants, often the most tangible material link to home. Born in 1990 in Bishkek, just one year before Kyrgyzstan declared independence from the Soviet Union, Abdukakharova belongs to a generation that grew up during a profound political and cultural transition. The lingering Soviet legacy, the rise of nationalism, increasing religious influence, and the pressures of global capitalism all intersect in her work, which frequently draws on textiles, felt, and everyday objects rooted in local culture. “The art I make is mostly narrative, based on my everyday life, and depicts broader social issues in Kyrgyzstan,” says Abdukakharova from her home in Bishkek, from where she realizes most of her work. A finalist of the B. Bubikanova Art Prize, Abdukakharova works across embroidery, printmaking, photography, and installation. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, she reflects on her path from architecture to contemporary art, the political realities shaping life in Bishkek, and the role artists play in questioning the direction of a young nation. TCA: You often describe your artistic practice as emerging from observation and your everyday experience. Did you grow up in a family that was into art? Abdukakharova: Not at all. All the members of my family are pharmacists, and while my parents wanted me to go to medical school, I couldn’t; I’m really scared of blood! (laughs) I went to an architectural school instead. I didn’t draw as a child, but I remember really liking to dismantle objects, whether it was toys or even a chair, furniture, and trying to put it back again… something I still love to do. The passion for drawing came only later on, in high school. TCA: Your decision to study architecture in Bishkek came at a time when many young people in Kyrgyzstan still looked toward Russia for their education. Could you describe the circumstances that led you to that choice and the cultural expectations surrounding it? Abdukakharova: When I finished high school in 2008, studying in Moscow was still seen as the best option. Unlike how it is today, growing up in Bishkek, there was a strong belief that anything coming from the former Soviet Union was inherently good. The teacher who helped me prepare university applications only suggested schools in Moscow or St. Petersburg; other countries were never really discussed, even though I already spoke English quite fluently. Looking back, I realize how dominant that perspective was at the time. I took a gap year, thinking that I could go to an art school later, maybe the Moscow Surikov State Academic Institute of Fine Arts. In the end, my parents didn’t let me pursue that path, and now I think it might have been for the best. If I had gone to study in Moscow, my development as an artist and architect would probably have taken a completely different direction. It would have shaped not only my education, but my perspective on art and the way I see the world today. TCA: How would you describe the experience of studying architecture in Bishkek? Abdukakharova: I studied architecture for six years. The first three were okay, but the last few years were really hard. There was a lot of corruption involved, and some professors were very difficult to work with. At some point, I really thought about quitting, but still, I graduated in 2014. The training was very academic: we studied drawing for four years, painting for two, and sculpture for one, learning classical techniques and a very disciplined way of working. For a long time, I remembered that period as plainly bad. But now that more time has passed, I’ve started thinking that anything, good or bad, leaves some experience in your life. Even today, when people see my works, they often say it feels like I was taught as an architect. TCA: How did you first encounter contemporary art practices? Abdukakharova: During my third year at university, a professor invited me to do a summer internship at a museum studio connected to both architecture and contemporary art. The head of the studio is an architect and curator, and that environment introduced me to contemporary artistic practices. From there, with two friends, we created a collective called Ten Points. We participated in a local festival for three years while we were studying. After graduation, we stopped working as a group, but I continued my path in the arts. TCA: Your work frequently incorporates textiles and felt, materials deeply embedded in Kyrgyz nomadic traditions. How did you begin working with those mediums? Abdukakharova: I started with textiles. I bought myself a small loom, and I began weaving abstract works. I showed those pieces in a group show, and that was the starting point. In 2018, I took a short course in wet-felting. A woman who is now a very close friend gave us a basic knowledge of working with wool and making felt. I really enjoyed it. Today, I continue to explore those techniques through collaborations with local craftspeople. I’m working with a local manufacturer called Tumar. They helped me enlarge my drawings using the technique of ala-kiyiz, which is a very ancient Kyrgyz wet-felting technique for carpets, which is now under threat of disappearing. TCA: Your work often engages with social and political realities in Bishkek, yet it rarely does so in a direct or didactic way. How do you approach political themes in your practice, and what role does art play for you in addressing these issues? Abdukakharova: Politics is both part of my art and my life. I think it’s important to talk about social and political issues in the country, especially because today there are fewer possibilities to express disagreement publicly. A few years ago, there were peaceful demonstrations in Bishkek. These were not aggressive protests, just quiet collective walks to show that people cared about certain issues. But in the last couple of years, demonstrations have been prohibited in the city. Because of that, I feel that speaking about these topics through art, or even just continuing to discuss them with people around me, becomes increasingly important. Even in everyday conversations, I sometimes realize that people around me may not fully recognize certain problems, and I feel a responsibility to keep raising these questions. TCA: One of these concerns is air pollution in Bishkek, which you address in your ongoing series, Smog Parallel City. How did this project begin? Abdukakharova: In winter in Bishkek, the air pollution becomes extremely heavy, and yet many people still don’t seem to realize how serious it is. Sometimes I walk through the city and see young mothers outside with their babies in strollers while the air is full of smoke, and it makes me feel very sad, because it can really affect people’s health. For me, it is also very personal - my daughter has allergies, and I often think about how the polluted air might influence children growing up in the city. At first, I approached smoke purely as a physical condition, as the visible pollution that surrounds us; but over time, I began to understand that it could also function as a metaphor. Now I often speak about “political smoke” as well, a kind of atmosphere of obscurity or confusion that surrounds our daily lives. So, in an abstract manner, the series continues to refer to very real environmental problems, but at the same time, it reflects a broader feeling about the conditions in which society exists today. TCA: Migration is another central theme in your practice, particularly in the project Kyrgyzstan: Country of Migrants. What inspired that work? Abdukakharova: The project was born from a reflection on national postage stamps. Usually, they show things a country is proud of: flowers, buildings, and famous athletes. There is a lot of labor migration to Russia. Many people live in very poor conditions there. Sometimes, twenty people sleep in one room, and they endure these conditions in order to send money home. They support families and keep the economy of Kyrgyzstan alive. That’s why I dedicated the stamps to professionals, like cleaners, waitresses, delivery workers, and taxi drivers. I feel migrants are the national heroes of Kyrgyzstan. TCA: Another work of yours, Up on Manas, Down on Sovetskaya, reflects on the many cultural and political influences shaping Bishkek today. How did you translate these ideas into the textile form? Abdukakharova: The idea came from the titles of bus routes in Bishkek. On the buses, street names are often shortened, and when you read them, you start noticing how many different historical layers exist in the city at the same time. For example, people still say Sovetskaya or Moskovskaya; Soviet-era names that officially no longer exist, but remain in everyday language. At the same time, there are other references, like Silk Way Street, which points to connections with China, or Manas Street, named after the Kyrgyz national hero. Seeing these names together made me think about the different influences shaping the country today: the Soviet past that still lingers in people’s memories, the increasing presence of Chinese businesses and their cheap goods in Bishkek, the growing influence of religion in rural communities, and the nationalist rhetoric in public space. In the work, I translated these ideas into textiles using patchwork and embroidery. I stitched together pieces of fabric and incorporated the names and symbols into the surface, almost like assembling fragments of a map. The process relates to traditional Kyrgyz textile practices, where different fabrics are sewn together by hand, but here the composition becomes a way of reflecting on these overlapping histories and directions. This got me thinking about how global political tensions reach even a small country like Kyrgyzstan. Around the war between Russia and Ukraine, for example, with friends taking different sides; I feel that for us, living in such a small country, it is important to remain united. What matters most is that our home remains a home. At the same time, I also feel concerned about how rapidly capitalism is entering Bishkek, because it sometimes seems that we’re losing things that are essential to this place. I’m not talking about nationalism, but about protecting what’s unique about our culture, and thinking about what we want to preserve and pass on to future generations. TCA: What role does the community in Bishkek play in sustaining your art practice? Abdukakharova: Most of my exhibitions are in this local context. I know that for an artist’s career, this is not considered very good, because you don’t earn much money. But the local community of artists is very important for me. They are the people who keep me here in Bishkek. I’m also very inspired by the older generation of artists. Even when the situation becomes very difficult, they remain calm and continue creating art.

Informal OTS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Tests Limits of Turkic Coordination

Escalating tensions linked to the widening conflict in the Middle East have tested the political cohesion of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), according to Kazakh political commentator Dzhanibek Suleyev. Recent incidents affecting both Azerbaijan and Turkey — including drone strikes in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and a missile intercepted by Turkish air defenses — have raised security concerns across the wider region. Suleyev argues that developments of this scale might normally prompt an urgent summit of heads of state. Instead, Turkey convened an informal meeting of foreign ministers and senior diplomatic representatives from OTS member states. The gathering took place on March 7, when officials convened at the invitation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. According to Turkish media, ministers later met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during their visit. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, Suleyev drew attention to how the meeting was covered in the media of Central Asian member states. “In the Uzbek press, coverage was limited, and even on the website of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is not a single word about the informal summit of OTS foreign ministers. Kazakhstan, moreover, was represented not by Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev but by his deputy Alibek Bakayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry issued four notes about the trip of its minister Jeenbek Kulubaev to Istanbul, three of which were devoted to the summit, but without any particular details,” Suleyev said. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry published a short summary of the meeting, noting in broad terms that representatives discussed cooperation among Turkic states and regional developments. According to Suleyev, the joint statement adopted after the meeting was difficult to find outside of Azerbaijani media. One of the few outlets to publish the text in full was Azerbaijan’s APA news agency. Much of the statement focused on the incidents affecting Azerbaijan and Turkey, stressing that “any threat to the security of OTS member states causes concern for the entire Organization… The ministers strongly condemned the attacks carried out from the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including strikes against civilian facilities and the territory of the Republic of Turkey,” the statement continued. “The rest of the statement boils down to destabilization in the Middle East could lead to a global economic crisis, the Palestinian conflict must be resolved taking into account UN resolutions, and so on,” Suleyev told TCA. One notable event during the meeting was the foreign ministers’ reception by President Erdoğan. Official summaries released by participating governments described the discussion in diplomatic terms. “Kazakh sources wrote that ‘prospects for the development of cooperation within the framework of Turkic cooperation were discussed,’” Suleyev said. Kyrgyz statements used similar language, stating that the “President of Turkey… noted the importance of regular dialogue on current regional and international issues and expressed interest in further developing multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Organization.” “In short, these are streamlined diplomatic formulations without specific details,” Suleyev said. According to a press release from the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry, the discussions also addressed issues beyond the Middle East. Ministers exchanged views on tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as concerns related to potential sanctions affecting Kyrgyzstan. “The discussion of sanctions noted that unilateral restrictive measures negatively affect global trade and the stability of economic ties. The position of the Kyrgyz Republic on the need to observe the principles of international law and the inadmissibility of unilateral measures outside the framework of the United Nations Security Council was emphasized,” the ministry stated. For Suleyev, the restrained tone of official statements and limited coverage in the region’s media point to deeper structural limits within the organization. “These nuances and the minimal coverage in the press of the interested states indicate the inability of Ankara and Baku to ensure significant progress in integration even within the OTS itself,” he said. Suleyev also pointed to the organization’s broader ambitions to expand cooperation with outside partners through formats sometimes described as OTS+. According to Suleyev, these initiatives appear aimed primarily at Hungary, an EU member state that has previously shown interest in cooperation with the organization. “That interest is connected with the search for an alternative to Russian hydrocarbons,” Suleyev said. Originally founded in 2009 as the Turkic Council, the OTS brings together Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, with observer states including Hungary and Turkmenistan. In recent years, the organization has expanded its agenda beyond cultural cooperation toward economic and transport connectivity across the Turkic world.

OTS Faces Security Test from Turkey to Central Asia

Iran's widening war has now reached the institutional space linking Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey said on March 4 that NATO air defenses destroyed an Iranian ballistic missile entering Turkish airspace, while Azerbaijan said the next day that four Iranian drones crossed into Nakhchivan, injuring four people, and damaging civilian infrastructure at the exclave’s airport. Iran denied targeting Nakhchivan; in the Turkish case, the missile’s intended target has not been fully clear in public reporting. Even so, the combined effect was unmistakable. By March 7, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) had become more than a bystander to a Middle Eastern war that had earlier seemed outside its main agenda. This is what gave the OTS foreign ministers’ meeting in Istanbul its significance. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on March 6 that the informal meeting of the OTS Council of Foreign Ministers would be held in Istanbul on March 7, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosting. After the meeting, the ministers adopted a joint statement declaring that threats to the security of any OTS member are a matter of concern for the whole organization. That language does not make the OTS a military alliance. It does, however, show the organization moving more openly into collective political-security signaling when member states come under attack. Why Nakhchivan Matters Nakhchivan is central to the logic of this story. The exclave is an integral part of Azerbaijan, but is separated from the rest of the country. It borders Armenia, Iran, and Turkey, making it significant out of proportion to its size. A military strike there is not a routine border incident. It reaches one of the most sensitive nodes in the wider Turkic political space: it is a meeting point for Azerbaijani sovereignty, Turkish strategic concern, and Iranian proximity. Until recently, Nakhchivan’s special status and borders were anchored in the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, which gave Turkey and Soviet Russia a formal say over the exclave’s autonomy and, it could be argued, its external security. But last year, Baku folded Nakhchivan more tightly into Azerbaijan’s domestic legal order by removing those references (along with other changes) from the constitution of the exclave, which has suddenly become a target in a much wider regional confrontation. Baku’s response to the Iranian attack showed that it saw the incident in political as well as tactical terms. President Ilham Aliyev said Azerbaijan would prepare retaliatory measures. Reuters later reported that Azerbaijan had ordered the evacuation of its diplomats from Iran, citing safety concerns. This is understandable, particularly in light of the January 27, 2023, incident when an armed attacker entered Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran and opened fire, killing the head of the embassy’s security and wounding two other staff. Baku called this a terrorist attack, evacuated most of its diplomatic personnel, and suspended embassy operations. Azerbaijani officials also said the March 5 attack on Nakhchivan violated international law, rejecting any implication that it could have been a technical mishap. The stakes widened further after that. On March 7, Azerbaijan said that it had foiled several sabotage plots linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (hardly being the first of their kind), including an alleged plan to attack the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was, according to one Indian report, subsequently attacked by a drone in Georgia. Reuters reported that other targets in Azerbaijan included the Israeli embassy, an Ashkenazi Jewish synagogue, and a leader of Azerbaijan's Mountain Jews community. Beyond this, once infrastructure such as the BTC enters the picture, questions arise concerning corridor security, energy transit, and regional economic exposure. What the OTS Response Means Central Asia enters the story more clearly with that in mind. No Central Asian OTS member was directly struck. But the March 7 joint statement said that threats to any OTS member’s security concern the entire organization. It warned that continued hostilities could disrupt trade routes, energy markets, food security, and migratory flows. Central Asia's exposure to threat is not directly from military engagement but indirectly through OTS member-state security, regional stability, and the wider consequences of conflict. The OTS secretariat, for its part, moved quickly. On March 5, the secretary general condemned the UAV attacks on civilian facilities in Nakhchivan, saying they had been carried out from the territory of Iran. He also called for restraint and for avoiding further deterioration in the regional situation. The OTS’s own institutional center thus already elevated the issue beyond bilateral diplomacy before the ministers assembled in Istanbul. It necessarily became an OTS matter, not just a Baku–Tehran confrontation. The ministers’ joint statement on March 7 gave that instinct a clearer political form. The text declared that any threats to the security of member states concern the entire organization. It condemned attacks targeting Turkey and Nakhchivan, including civilian facilities, and it expressed support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of Turkey and Azerbaijan. These formulations create a collective political frame for what might otherwise have remained two separate national incidents. They show that the OTS is willing to speak in the language of solidarity when violence reaches one of its members. At the same time, the ministers emphasized restraint, diplomacy, and a return to negotiations. The OTS did not evoke a military response but answered by widening the political scope of the problem. This is still an institutional development worth noting. The organization is not becoming like NATO, but it is becoming more explicit about the security implications of regional instability for its member states. The Next Test That brings Central Asia onto the stage. The March 7 statement does not create any formal security obligations for the Central Asian states, but it does establish a precedent. If threats to one member’s security concern the whole organization, then future crises involving transport corridors, border violence, or attacks on critical infrastructure will be harder to treat as purely local matters. The expectation of organization-wide consultation has now been created. The immediate question is whether the Iran-related incidents stop here or widen further. Turkey’s missile episode and Nakhchivan’s drone strike may still prove to be limited spillover events rather than the beginning of a sustained pattern. How quickly a new Supreme Leader is selected in Iran will make a difference here. But the institutional threshold has already shifted: The OTS has publicly stated, during ongoing military hostilities, that member-state security concerns are collective concerns. That statement will outlast the news cycle. For that reason, the most important result of the Istanbul meeting may not be any operational step taken today. It may be that the OTS has defined its own political horizon somewhat more broadly than before. The organization now finds itself speaking about attacks, sovereignty, corridor vulnerability, and regional instability in one connected register. The next test will show whether that language remains episodic solidarity or develops into more regular coordination from Turkey to Central Asia.

Middle East Conflict Disrupts Logistics Routes for Deliveries to Kyrgyzstan

Military activity in the Middle East has caused serious disruptions to logistics routes used to deliver goods to Kyrgyzstan. In particular, the transit of cargo through Iran has completely stopped. This was reported to The Times of Central Asia by the Association of International Freight Forwarders of Kyrgyzstan. According to industry representatives, the auto parts market is already experiencing some of the most significant consequences. A substantial share of goods from the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East is delivered to Kyrgyzstan via the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The port is considered a key transit hub through which a large volume of international cargo passes. However, due to the escalating situation in the region, maritime transport along this route has effectively been halted. As a result, many goods that have already been paid for and are intended for delivery to Kyrgyzstan remain stuck in ports of departure or transit zones. “A large volume of cargo used to be transported through the port of Bandar Abbas. We used this route for transit to the Emirates, to Dubai and Sharjah. Now we are effectively cut off from maritime transport. All the countries of the Persian Gulf are closed to us, and there are serious problems with air traffic in this region. A lot of cargo normally goes from Sharjah and Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, but these deliveries have now been suspended,” Igor Golubev, deputy chairman of the Association of International Freight Carriers of Kyrgyzstan, told The Times of Central Asia. According to him, equipment, auto parts, perfumes, and other goods are supplied to Kyrgyzstan from the countries of the Persian Gulf. If the conflict continues and logistics chains are not restored, Kyrgyzstan could face shortages of certain types of products. “Ships from all over the world used to arrive at the port of Bandar Abbas. It served as a transshipment hub from which we received a wide range of goods. Now this transit hub is effectively closed,” Golubev said. The disruptions have affected not only imports but also exports. According to the Association of Carriers, the transit of Kyrgyz cargo to Turkey and Europe, which previously passed through Iranian territory, has completely stopped. At present, more than 30 Kyrgyz trucks carrying goods remain in northern Iran, and their drivers are unable to return home. Additional difficulties have emerged due to fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kyrgyz logistics companies actively use the port of Karachi in Pakistan, and some cargo has traditionally been delivered to Kyrgyzstan through Afghanistan. This route is now also effectively closed. According to the Association of International Freight Carriers, negotiations are currently underway with Chinese partners on the possible use of alternative logistics corridors. The state-owned organization Kyrgyz Export told The Times of Central Asia that it is closely monitoring the situation and remains in constant contact with carriers. Authorities are also holding talks with Iran and other states in the region while considering alternative routes to restore the import and export of Kyrgyz goods.

Iran War Highlights Central Asia’s Vulnerable Southern Trade Corridors

The widening war centered on Iran is reverberating far beyond the Middle East, exposing a structural vulnerability in Central Asia’s economic geography: the region’s reliance on transport corridors that pass through or near Iran and the Persian Gulf. As fighting escalates and shipping risks spread across the region, insurers, shipping companies, and logistics firms are reassessing operations across the Gulf. War-risk insurance premiums have surged while some commercial carriers have scaled back bookings to parts of the region amid growing security concerns. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have already pushed shipping costs higher as governments and logistics firms weigh the risks of operating in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. For Central Asia’s landlocked economies, the crisis highlights how much regional connectivity strategies still depend on southern access routes linking the region to global markets. The conflict has also edged closer to the transport routes linking Central Asia with Europe after what were alleged to be Iranian drone strikes on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan region, damaging facilities at the exclave’s airport and prompting diplomatic protests from Baku. While the strike did not directly disrupt trade corridors, it underscored how quickly the conflict could spill over into the South Caucasus, a key segment of the Middle Corridor. Nakhchivan is a landlocked Azerbaijani exclave bordering Iran and Turkey, separated from mainland Azerbaijan by Armenia, and lies at the frontier where Iranian territory meets the transport networks of the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus also hosts energy infrastructure with wider geopolitical significance. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transports mostly Azerbaijani crude through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, from where it is shipped to global markets. In 2025, Azerbaijani oil accounted for 46.4% of Israel’s crude imports, most of it moving through this supply chain before being shipped onward by tanker. The pipeline also carries limited volumes of Kazakh crude - 2-3% of Kazakhstan’s overall exports - making it far more significant for Israel’s energy supply than for Kazakhstan’s export system. Iran’s armed forces have denied responsibility for the drone incident, instead accusing Israel of attempting to provoke tensions and disrupt relations between Muslim countries. The Geography of Connectivity Since independence, Central Asian governments have sought to overcome the constraints of geography. Landlocked and long dependent on Soviet-era transport networks running north through Russia, the region has spent three decades developing alternative corridors in multiple directions. Routes leading south have held particular appeal, offering the shortest overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Iran sits at the heart of several connectivity initiatives designed to connect Central Asian rail networks to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Ashgabat Agreement — a multimodal transport framework linking Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and designed to connect Central Asia with ports on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman — was created specifically to facilitate international trade and transit between Central Asia and global shipping routes. For countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, rail routes running south through Iran provide one of the shortest overland connections to maritime trade. The Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway, opened in 2014 and linking Uzen in western Kazakhstan with Iran’s rail network via Bereket and Gorgan, created a continuous north–south corridor connecting Central Asia to ports on the Persian Gulf. The line forms part of a broader network of transit routes intended to move Central Asian commodities and manufactured goods toward Iranian ports and onward to global shipping lanes. Iran’s port of Chabahar has long been promoted as a potential gateway for Central Asian trade, providing access to the Indian Ocean while bypassing some of the more congested maritime routes further west. In May 2024, India signed a long-term deal with Iran to develop and operate the port, which New Delhi views as a strategic link connecting Central Asia and Afghanistan to global shipping lanes. The port previously received limited exemptions from U.S. sanctions because of its role in facilitating trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia, allowing India to continue with the project despite broader restrictions on Iranian infrastructure. The current war is now casting doubt on how reliable those routes may be during periods of geopolitical crisis. Trade Routes Under Pressure Even without a formal closure of the Strait of Hormuz, conflict in and around the Gulf is already altering shipping patterns. Rising insurance premiums and heightened security concerns are prompting vessels to reroute, delay voyages, or avoid the area altogether. Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil normally passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making instability in the waterway a major risk for global energy markets and freight costs. Tensions in the strait have already led major importers such as China to call for additional security protections for vessels operating in the area, as concerns grow about the safety of commercial shipping. For Central Asian exporters, the effects are indirect but significant. Freight moving across Eurasia ultimately depends on maritime shipping once cargo reaches ports, meaning instability in the Gulf can quickly ripple back into rail corridors thousands of kilometers away. This vulnerability is particularly acute for landlocked economies. Unlike coastal exporters that can shift cargo between nearby ports, Central Asian states must move goods across long overland routes before reaching maritime shipping lanes. Any disruption at the maritime end of those corridors, therefore, magnifies logistical uncertainty across the entire supply chain. The Limits of Diversification For more than a decade, Central Asian governments have sought to mitigate such vulnerabilities by investing in alternative transport corridors that connect the region with global markets in multiple directions. The most prominent of these initiatives is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, widely known as the Middle Corridor. The route links Central Asia to Europe through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, creating an east-west connection that bypasses both Russia and southern maritime chokepoints. Cargo volumes along the corridor have increased significantly since 2022, but the route still faces logistical bottlenecks, particularly limited shipping capacity across the Caspian Sea and congestion at ports such as Aktau. Freight moving along the route typically travels by rail across Kazakhstan to ports such as Aktau or Kuryk before crossing the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and continuing toward Georgia and Turkey. Kazakhstan has played a particularly active role in promoting the corridor as part of its broader connectivity strategy. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, governments and investors have accelerated efforts to expand capacity along the route as geopolitical tensions reshape Eurasian logistics networks and encourage companies to diversify supply chains. The corridor has also attracted increasing attention from Western governments seeking more resilient transport links between Asia and Europe as companies attempt to diversify supply chains away from routes disrupted by geopolitical tensions. Cooperation between the United States and Central Asian countries has expanded in areas such as infrastructure development, critical minerals supply chains, and regional transport connectivity, as reflected in growing engagement through frameworks such as the C5+1 partnership. A Reminder of Geography Even as investment in the Middle Corridor expands, southern routes through Iran continue to occupy an important place in the region’s connectivity landscape. Iran’s geography gives it a unique position linking Central Asia with the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. In stable conditions, that location offers Central Asian states a comparatively direct path to global maritime trade. The current conflict underscores the geopolitical risks that accompany transport corridors crossing politically volatile regions. Infrastructure projects designed to shorten trade routes can also expose supply chains to geopolitical shocks when tensions escalate. Central Asian governments have therefore pursued a multi-vector connectivity strategy, developing transport links in multiple directions to avoid overreliance on any single corridor. Southern routes through Iran remain a valuable component of that network. At the same time, uncertainty created by the conflict reinforces the rationale behind expanding alternative corridors across the Caspian and toward Europe. The war has not closed Central Asia’s southern trade routes, but it has exposed the strategic fragility that can emerge when geography, logistics, and geopolitics collide.