Iran Sanctions and European Energy Security: Compliance Considerations for Caspian Trade
On February 6, 2026, the United States announced a new round of sanctions targeting Iranian petroleum shipping networks, designating 15 entities, two individuals, and 14 vessels involved in transporting Iranian oil and petroleum products in circumvention of existing restrictions. Taken pursuant to existing executive authorities and aligned with National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2), the measures reflect an intensified U.S. enforcement focus on maritime intermediaries and logistics networks, including Iran’s “shadow fleet.” While the sanctions target Iranian petroleum trade, they reinforce existing risk considerations in shared maritime spaces where sanctioned and non-sanctioned trade operate in proximity, including jurisdictions in formal compliance with U.S. and international sanctions regimes. Today’s announcement is an extension of the U.S. Treasury’s existing sanctions measures against Iranian petroleum shipping and associated logistics networks, with implications for compliance and due-diligence processes. It does not impact lawful energy exports and commercial trade via the Caspian Sea that involve other littoral states including Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, or Turkmenistan, whose energy exports and financial institutions operate in compliance with applicable Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations. Recent additions to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List include individuals and entities linked to 18 jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, Turkey and the UAE, with one entity co-domiciled in Kazakhstan and Georgia, the latter being a corridor country bordering Azerbaijan. As Central Asia’s largest oil and gas producer, Kazakhstan relies heavily on the Caspian Sea as a critical route for energy exports and associated cargo. While most Kazakh crude reaches global markets via pipelines, the Caspian remains essential for regional trade connectivity, particularly through the port of Aktau and related terminals. Kazakhstan is also a significant supplier of crude oil to European markets, contributing to the continent’s diversification away from Russian energy sources and making the reliability of its export routes relevant to European energy security. Kazakhstan’s exposure to sanctions risk in the Caspian Sea is fundamentally structural rather than policy-driven and is shared with other non-sanctioned shoreline states, namely Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Bordered by Russia and Iran—both of whom are heavily sanctioned by the U.S. and EU— the Caspian’s shared maritime space places regional infrastructure in an operating environment where vessels, cargoes, and service providers may be indirectly affected by international restrictions on Russian and Iranian trade. These spillover risks extend across the basin regardless of the compliance posture of individual entities or the policy intent and regulatory efforts of the host states. Recent U.S. policy developments, including NSPM-2, have increased the relevance of these structural conditions by clarifying enforcement priorities under existing sanctions authorities with a focus on the conduct of non-sanctioned actors whose activities may be seen as facilitating sanctioned revenue generation. Enforcement practice emphasizes facilitation, awareness, and the adequacy of compliance controls—and increasingly encompasses maritime intermediaries such as ports and port operators, shipping companies, transshipment facilities, insurers, financiers, and other logistics service providers. As a result, Caspian transit pathways may face heightened compliance and due-diligence expectations in certain scenarios, even when handling non-sanctioned cargo for lawful trade. Operational indicators suggest that Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, as well as their businesses, continue to face a more conservative compliance environment, reflecting longstanding scrutiny of Caspian-linked transactions. Banks with access to U.S. dollar clearing and Western correspondent networks have applied more rigorous guidance from US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) to such activity, resulting in longer processing timelines and higher compliance costs for lawful trade, consistent with the designation of additional Iranian-linked entities and vessels. Kazakhstan’s ability to manage these pressures is supported by its comparatively strong anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing (AML/CFT) framework, as assessed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) including in the 2023 Mutual Evaluation Report. Relative to other Central Asian and Caspian states, Kazakhstan demonstrates higher levels of technical compliance and institutional effectiveness and is not designated as a strategically deficient jurisdiction by FATF. While this does not entirely eliminate exposure arising from geographic proximity to sanctioned jurisdictions and shared transit environments, it provides a stronger institutional basis for meeting heightened due-diligence expectations and for signaling regulatory reliability to international partners. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan occupy a dual position in the Caspian as both operators in a complex regional environment for crude transport and maritime logistics and as key non-Russian energy suppliers to European markets. Turkmenistan, a major gas producer, operates in the same Caspian maritime environment. For all three, the challenge is primarily operational, requiring heightened transparency, due diligence, and oversight of intermediaries linked to Russian and Iranian trade. Effective management of these requirements supports access to international finance and reinforces the role of Caspian states as reliable energy and transit partners for European markets.
Kazakhstan Bets on Pakistan for Central Asian Connectivity
In early February, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made a historic visit to Pakistan. The last such visit was a two-day trip in 2003 by then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev, during which he met with the Pakistani president at the time, General Pervez Musharraf. Kazakhstan’s outreach to Pakistan reflects a broader recalibration of its connectivity strategy, as Astana looks to secure more reliable southbound trade routes amid shifting geopolitical and logistical constraints across Eurasia. The topic of connectivity was already on the table in 2003, and it was also one of the most important issues during the latest visit, with Tokayev discussing the issue with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The trip culminated in the signing of 37 agreements in various fields, including strategic sectors such as mining and, more generally, trade, with the aim of increasing trade from the current $250 million to $1 billion. Official statements indicate that both sides are aiming to reach that target within approximately the next two years. From a political point of view, the bilateral relationship has been elevated to the rank of Strategic Partnership. In an official statement released following the visit, great importance was placed upon the issue of connectivity and logistics between South and Central Asia. From this point of view, the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway took center stage. If completed, the project would connect Kazakhstan to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar and allow Pakistan to be included in the North–South International Transport Corridor and Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor logistics routes. Speaking to the Pakistani media in the days leading up to Tokayev's trip, the Kazakh ambassador to Pakistan, Yerzhan Kistafin, stated Astana's willingness to fully finance the construction of the infrastructure, at a total cost of around $7 billion. Kazakhstan's move represents an acceleration of a logistical competition in this arena involving various players, with some at the forefront, such as Pakistan and Iran, and others further behind, such as China and India. It has been talked about for some time, but the backbone of the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway has only recently begun to take shape, as confirmed to The Times of Central Asia by Dr. Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), Uzbekistan: “In 2024, Kazakhstan joined the project to construct a railway through Afghanistan, also known as the western trans-Afghan route. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) railway corridor is designed to integrate the transport systems of Central and South Asia, which will stimulate trade and economic ties between the two regions. The TAP railway, which runs through western Afghanistan to the border with Pakistan, could be extended to Pakistani ports on the Indian Ocean. This would provide Central Asian countries with an alternative route to the open seas in addition to the southern ports of Iran.” Pakistan's importance as the destination for Kazakhstan's logistics ambitions was confirmed by Dr. Marriyam Siddique, Assistant Professor at the Pakistan Navy War College in Lahore: “Pakistan serves as the primary maritime gateway for Kazakhstan’s 'land-linked' strategy, offering the shortest geographical access to the Arabian Sea,” she told TCA. “By providing deep-sea port facilities at Karachi and Gwadar, Pakistan enables Kazakhstan to diversify its trade routes away from traditional reliance on Russia and China.” A possible rail link along the north-south axis is also highly regarded by Islamabad, as emphasized by Dr. Adilbek Yermekbayev, Associate Professor at the Center for Regional Affairs of the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty: “For Pakistan, the development of transit links with Kazakhstan is economically and strategically attractive, as it provides access to Central Asian markets and, in the longer term, potentially to the markets of Russia and Belarus,” he told TCA. “From Islamabad’s perspective, such connectivity would strengthen Pakistan’s position as a regional transit hub linking South Asia, Central Asia, and parts of the post-Soviet space.” The potential is clear, as is the main risk associated with the railway. “Afghanistan is geographically indispensable but politically and institutionally fragile as a transit link between Pakistan and Kazakhstan,” stated Yermekbayev. “From Kazakhstan’s perspective, however, it is the current Afghan authorities that may be able to provide a minimum level of security along key transport routes.” This is a vision echoed by Dr. Siddique, who told TCA that, “The project’s viability depends entirely on Afghan stability.” Pakistan's growing role could ultimately undermine Iran's position. In recent years, Iran had emerged as one of the most promising countries in terms of Central Asian connectivity, but now the situation could be set to change. “Iran’s port infrastructure competes with Pakistan’s maritime transport capabilities,” Umarova said in assessing the current situation. “There are two strategic ports in southern Iran: Bandar Abbas and Chabahar. Both are used by Central Asian countries to access global trade markets.” The fact that Tehran is ahead of Islamabad in this regard was also highlighted by Yermekbayev: “Iran plays a more practical and institutionally established role in providing southern transit options for Kazakhstan. Through existing railway and multimodal corridors, Iran already offers Kazakhstan access to ports on the Persian Gulf, making this route significantly more operational than the still largely prospective Pakistan–Afghanistan corridor. At the same time, this role is constrained by both external and internal risks. Consequently, Astana treats the Iranian route as one element within a broader diversification strategy rather than as a single dominant solution.” According to Siddique, Astana's recent moves could suggest that this process of “replacement” is already well advanced: “While Iran’s International North-South Transport Corridor is currently more established, Kazakhstan’s offer to fully finance the rail link to Pakistan could shift the competitive balance by removing Islamabad’s capital constraints. If Kazakhstan successfully secures the Afghan segment, the Pakistani route may emerge as a faster, more cost-effective alternative to the Iranian ports.” As Russia becomes a less predictable partner, including in logistics, and Iran faces renewed internal and external pressures, Kazakhstan’s engagement with Pakistan marks a notable acceleration in a connectivity agenda that has long produced more plans than completed projects.
Kazakhstan Proposes Restrictions on Social Media Access for Minors
An active and ongoing debate is taking place in Kazakhstan over proposed amendments to legislation that would ban children under the age of 16 from using social media. The initiative has been raised repeatedly by lawmakers, although many experts believe teenagers would still find ways to circumvent such restrictions. The primary objective cited by lawmakers is to protect children from harmful content, including violence and pornography, and to reduce cyberbullying. The Ministry of Culture and Information has already prepared draft amendments that would affect the regulation of social media. Mechanisms for verifying users’ ages will be developed jointly with the Ministries of Education and Digital Development. Specifically, the proposals under discussion would introduce a ban on registering users under the age of 16 on social media platforms, with an exception for instant messaging services. Education Minister Zhuldyz Suleimenova said the working group is considering measures, including SIM card registration for children under 14 as an initial step toward access control, monitoring the content minors consume, and stronger digital and media literacy education in schools. Lawmakers argue that the issue is becoming increasingly urgent. In February, officials reported that around 200 registered cases of bullying and cyberbullying involving children were recorded in 2025. The figures were cited by Yulia Ovechkina, deputy chair of the Committee for the Protection of Children’s Rights. According to Ovechkina, these statistics primarily reflect improved detection and reporting rather than the full scale of the problem. She also noted that administrative liability for bullying was expanded in 2024. Officials say the number of teenagers experiencing harassment on social media continues to rise. In November 2025, police in Astana reported a sharp increase in cyberbullying complaints nationwide, particularly among female students and individuals active in public life. Law enforcement agencies note that forms of digital violence are evolving rapidly and becoming less visible. The most common manifestations include cyberbullying, stalking, the publication of personal data, extortion involving intimate materials, and the growing use of deepfake technologies. Increased online activity among teenagers heightens their vulnerability to such threats, police say. At the same time, experts question whether a blanket ban would be effective or meaningfully improve child safety. According to educational psychologist and Gestalt consultant Olga Tretyakova, building trusting relationships with children, openly discussing the dangers of harmful content, and conducting sustained preventive and educational work are far more effective than simply passing restrictive legislation. While such efforts require significantly more resources, she argues they are the only measures likely to produce lasting results. Skepticism also stems from the deep integration of social media into everyday communication, education, and adolescent development. Attempts to isolate minors from these platforms through legal measures risk cutting them off from a social environment they perceive as normal. Children are likely to register using other people’s phones, false names, or fake dates of birth, said Gabit Umirbekov, deputy chairman of the Chamber of Legal Advisors of the Republic of Kazakhstan. For many minors, especially those who are socially isolated or vulnerable, social networks serve as an important channel for communication, learning, and self-expression. Restrictions could push children toward VPNs or less regulated platforms, experts warn. Despite these concerns, a number of countries have already moved to restrict minors’ access to social media. In Australia, new rules took effect in December 2025 requiring platforms to take reasonable steps to prevent under-16s from holding social media accounts. Media reports say the restrictions apply to around ten platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Threads, TikTok, X, YouTube, Reddit, Kick, and Twitch. In Spain, the government has also moved toward tighter controls on minors’ online activity, with lawmakers advancing proposals to raise the minimum age for social media use to 16 and to strengthen age-verification and parental-consent requirements, though no nationwide ban has yet entered into force. Similar initiatives, ranging from parental-consent rules to age-verification requirements, are under discussion in France, Denmark, and parts of the United States. In January 2026, the authorities in Azerbaijan also raised the possibility of restricting children’s use of social media.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode – Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Reform – Coming Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will take a deep dive into Kazakhstan's new draft constitution with guests Yevgeniy Zhovtis, a Kazakhstan human rights activist and director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, and Aiman Umarova, a prominent lawyer in Kazakhstan and a member of the constitutional commission.
Tokayev Praises Trump’s ‘Common-Sense’ Governance, Backs U.S.-Led Peace Initiatives
Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has offered rare and explicit praise for the domestic and foreign policies of U.S. President Donald Trump, describing him as a strong leader whose governance model prioritizes national interests, law and order, and pragmatic diplomacy. In an exclusive interview with The News International during his visit to Islamabad, President Tokayev described President Trump’s leadership as “forward-looking,” pointing to what he characterized as strong economic performance and ongoing transformative reforms in the social sphere in the United States. “President Trump is a strong and forward-looking leader who puts the national interests of his country first,” Tokayev said, pointing to what he described as strong economic performance and transformative reforms in the social sphere. He added that Trump’s emphasis on law and order resonated with Kazakhstan’s own governance philosophy, which prioritizes compliance with the law and respect for state institutions. Tokayev said that in an increasingly complex global environment, governments must ensure internal stability by enforcing the rule of law. “All citizens must comply with the law and respect law-enforcement agencies while avoiding any obstruction,” he noted, drawing a direct parallel between Washington’s and Astana’s domestic policy approaches. Support for the Abraham Accords The Kazakh president also defended his country’s decision to join the Abraham Accords, an initiative launched during Trump’s presidency to normalize relations between Israel and several Muslim-majority countries. Describing the accords as “a truly forward-looking initiative,” Tokayev said Kazakhstan’s participation reflects its long-standing commitment to peace, stability, and international dialogue. He stressed that diplomacy remains the most effective instrument for resolving conflicts and fostering long-term regional and global stability. While reaffirming Kazakhstan’s strong relations with Israel, Tokayev underscored that Astana continues to support the Palestinian people and advocates a two-state solution. From a national interest perspective, he said, joining the Abraham Accords creates opportunities to attract foreign investment, advanced technologies, and concrete economic benefits. He also expressed hope that Kazakhstan’s accession would help broaden Arab–Jewish rapprochement into a wider Muslim–Judaic dialogue. Board of Peace and the UN Framework Addressing criticism surrounding the newly established Board of Peace, which he co-founded with Pakistan’s prime minister, amongst others, Tokayev rejected claims that the initiative seeks to undermine the United Nations. He said President Trump had personally emphasized that the Board of Peace is designed to complement, not replace, the United Nations, which he acknowledged is currently facing institutional strain. Tokayev highlighted that the initiative implements United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, reinforcing the principle that peace efforts must combine international legitimacy with effective leadership. According to Tokayev, the Board of Peace aims to deliver swift and practical outcomes through flexible mechanisms for conflict resolution, positioning it as a pragmatic addition to existing global peace architectures. Gaza and the Limits of Diplomacy On the prospects for peace in Gaza, Tokayev offered cautious realism. He said proposals put forward by U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and senior adviser Jared Kushner appeared ambitious, structured, and grounded in development-oriented thinking. However, he warned that no plan can succeed without genuine political will. “Without a move toward a two-state solution, no plan can be truly sustainable,” Tokayev said, describing it as the only viable framework for ending recurring cycles of violence and instability.
Kazakhstan’s Draft Constitution and the Reordering of State Authority
Kazakhstan’s current constitutional reform is no longer limited to parliamentary redesign. A draft updated basic law has been released for public discussion, and it presents the effort as a review of the state’s political architecture culminating in a nationwide referendum. The draft is described as the product of months of work initiated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, with large-scale changes proposed for the country’s political system. A replacement-style text, an explicit state-architecture rationale, and a referendum endpoint together signal a reform agenda that reaches beyond legislative mechanics to the overall distribution of authority, the protection of fundamental rights, and strengthening of the rule of law. Kazakhstan’s current constitution was adopted by referendum in August 1995, replacing the January 1993 basic law. It has been amended repeatedly, including significant revisions in 1998, 2007, 2011, and 2022. The 2022 referendum package was a particularly extensive set of amendments. It presented a model of a presidential republic with a strong parliament, redistributed selected powers from the presidency to parliament, and created new parliamentary mechanisms. It also strengthened the ombudsman, enabled direct citizen appeals to the Constitutional Court, established a commissioner framework for socially vulnerable categories, established a ban on the death penalty, and set a single seven-year presidential term without the possibility of reelection. From Proposal to Draft Basic Law The current draft emerged from a process launched under Tokayev in late 2025. In September 2025, he proposed moving to a unicameral parliament, which set the reform’s initial direction. A working group was established in October 2025 to develop proposals, and in January 2026, a commission was formed to carry the work forward. The commission was chaired by Elvira Azimova, head of the Constitutional Court of Kazakhstan, linking the drafting process to the institution that reviews the basic law. The commission’s work moved beyond incremental amendments. It reviewed proposals affecting seventy-seven constitutional articles, about 84% of the current text, and that breadth drove the decision to prepare a fundamentally new basic law rather than another package of revisions. Rewriting most of the operative text shifts the reform from a parliamentary adjustment to a redesign of the state’s governing framework. The resulting draft is structured as a replacement-style document, with an updated preamble and a reorganization into eleven sections and ninety-five articles. The institutional centerpiece of the draft is a shift from a two-chamber parliament to a single chamber and to proportional representation for electing deputies. The proposed supreme legislative body, the Kurultai, would have 145 deputies, slightly fewer than the combined 148 members of the current Mazhilis and Senate of Kazakhstan. The draft also grants the Kurultai expanded powers, pairing structural consolidation with a change in how legislative authority is organized, including oversight, political accountability, and approval of key state appointments and conciliation procedures. Alongside the proposed legislature, the draft creates a national dialogue platform, the People's Council of Kazakhstan, described as the highest advisory body representing citizens’ interests and granted the right of legislative initiative. This adds a second channel for agenda-setting with a formal pathway into lawmaking. In that context, the reform is framed as enhancing institutional resilience within a redesign broader than a parliamentary upgrade. It intends in this way to secure a new configuration of political authority through a clearer allocation of responsibility across branches of government The draft constitutionalizes a Vice President as the designated successor, with the stated aim of making executive transfer more rule-bound and predictable. Parliamentary involvement in the appointment is meant to locate the office within the system of institutional counterweights rather than treat it as an exclusively presidential device. It then specifies a new line of succession—Vice President, Chair of the Kurultai, then Prime Minister—in place of the current default under which the Senate chair assumes presidential powers. By entrenching that order in the constitution, the reform reduces ambiguity over interim authority and lowers the risk of a temporary institutional vacuum. Rights, Values, and Governance Boundaries The draft’s preamble elevates language about rights to a first-order constitutional commitment. For the first time, it declares that human rights and freedoms are the state’s main priority. It identifies sovereignty, independence, the unitary character of the state, and territorial integrity as immutable values, and it defines the foundations of statehood to comprise unity, solidarity, and interethnic and interfaith harmony. By placing these commitments in the preamble, the draft treats the reform as a statement not only about how institutions will operate but about what the state is for and what it holds to be inviolable. It reaffirms freedom of expression, the prohibition of censorship, and an unconditional ban on torture and cruel or degrading treatment as basic constitutional norms. All this is framed by the accountability of public authority within a law-based state. The draft constitutionalized foreign policy by extending statehood principles to Kazakhstan’s external orientation. It defines foreign policy as peaceful and pragmatic, reaffirms commitment to the UN Charter and international law, and emphasizes strategic stability. Regionally, it frames Kazakhstan as a responsible Central Asian actor, prioritizing stability, transit connectivity, and energy security. By embedding these commitments in the basic law, the draft treats foreign policy as an element of constitutional identity and aims to increase predictability for external partners and investors by constraining policy shifts. Alongside rights and statehood commitments, the draft adds programmatic priorities to the basic law. It introduces the principles of justice, law, and order into the constitution for the first time. It also elevates education, science, culture, and innovation as constitutional priorities, linking these values to long-term human-capital development. The draft constitution makes environmental protection and the responsible use of natural resources state responsibilities, bringing sustainability into the core of state obligations. The new draft also puts procedural constraints on state power directly into the constitutional text, tightening legal safeguards. It bars the retroactive application of new laws that would increase punishment or otherwise penalize citizens, and it establishes the double-jeopardy rule that citizens cannot be repeatedly prosecuted for the same offense. It also introduces direct procedural guarantees upon detention (including access to legal counsel and clear notification of rights) and, for the first time, a dedicated article on the legal profession, giving it constitutional standing. It treats access to qualified legal representation as a constitutional matter, and not an administrative detail. The same package reinforces the protection of intellectual property and guarantees of private property and the freedom of entrepreneurship, enhancing the legal certainty and predictability for investors. The draft also uses constitutional text to define boundaries in social policy and modern governance. It reinforces the separation of religion and the state and affirms the secular character of education and upbringing. It defines marriage as a voluntary and equal union of a man and a woman, placing this norm in the basic law rather than leaving it to ordinary legislation. For the first time at the constitutional level, it also introduces a norm on protecting citizens’ rights in the digital environment, including personal data protection and privacy. Regime Renewal and Referendum Legitimacy The political meaning of the current reform becomes clearer when juxtaposed with the 2022 referendum package and the subsequent effort to unwind Nursultan Nazarbayev-era constitutional arrangements. The 2022 amendments already modified relations among key state institutions, strengthened rights-protection channels, and established a single seven-year presidential term without reelection, reducing the likelihood of excessive concentration of power. Later de-Nazarbayevization measures removed Nazarbayev’s special constitutional status and restricted his relatives’ access to high office, indicating that regime renewal accompanied institutional redesign. Far beyond any refinement of parliamentary procedure, the replacement-style basic law, to be adopted by referendum, is intended to establish a higher order of legitimacy for a new allocation of authority and a revised set of state values. The draft limits constitutional amendments to nationwide referenda requiring territorially balanced support, increasing long-term legal predictability for international partners. With a replacement-style draft now in public discussion, Kazakhstan is moving toward a referendum that would adopt a new basic law. The package combines institutional redesign with programmatic constitutional content: a restructured legislature and electoral system, new agenda-setting mechanisms, and a preamble that elevates rights and statehood commitments, alongside provisions that strengthen procedural guarantees, give the legal profession explicit constitutional standing, protect private property and freedom of entrepreneurship, and address rights in the digital environment. The result makes clear that parliamentary restructuring is only one component of a broader effort to define authority, responsibility, policy predictability, and the state’s declared priorities.
What the U.S. Really Wants in Central Asia: Behind the B5+1 Forums
The B5+1 business forum continued in Kyrgyzstan’s capital on February 5, as government officials, regional business leaders, and a sizable U.S. delegation met to discuss trade, investment, and regulatory barriers shaping economic ties between Central Asia and the United States.
As Washington signals a more pragmatic, commercially driven approach to the region, questions persist over why U.S. investment has lagged behind political engagement and which markets are truly seen as priorities. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Dmitry Orlov, director of the Strategy: East–West analytical center, about the structural obstacles deterring American capital, the shift in U.S. policy thinking, and how Central Asian states are positioned within Washington’s evolving economic calculus.
TCA: What serious U.S. capital investments in Central Asia can we talk about today? ORLOV: It is important to understand the main point. Talk of large investments, the arrival of American business, and long-term economic cooperation only makes sense in one case: if the U.S. repeals the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which was adopted back in the 1970s and extended to all former Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR. Today, it remains a formal and, in many ways, psychological obstacle to a fully-fledged business partnership. At the same time, it is necessary to establish contacts at a business level right now. This is because if the amendment is repealed - and such statements are regularly heard in Washington - it is difficult to predict which countries in the region will receive investment flows and in what volumes. Recent international forums, including Davos, have shown that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are of the greatest interest to the U.S. in Central Asia. Their economies are developing more dynamically, and they can offer large-scale projects and a clear export base. The other countries in the region, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are still perceived by investors as lower priorities. TCA: Previously, the U.S. actively promoted a political agenda in the region, including human rights and freedom of speech. Now these are rarely mentioned. Why do you think this is the case? ORLOV: The approach has become more pragmatic. The history of U.S. foreign policy shows that strategic and economic interests have always taken precedence. If a territory is attractive in terms of resources or transit routes, a format for cooperation will be found. In Europe, relatively speaking, the rule of law prevails. In Asia, the situation is different, and the Americans understand this perfectly well. Issues of ideology and human rights can move to the background if economic expediency comes first. This is especially true in Central Asia, where many issues are resolved through personal agreements and informal connections. Washington understands this. TCA: What exactly can Central Asia offer the U.S.? ORLOV: In terms of individual countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are again in the lead. They offer oil, gas, and, no less importantly, control over transit routes. There is currently a lot of discussion about rare earths and critical minerals, but their development is always long and expensive. As a result, interest in them is largely political and declarative. First and foremost, it is about signaling presence and intent. It may take decades before such projects actually materialize. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also have a resource base, but developing deposits there is difficult and costly. Turkmenistan stands apart as a special case. A significant share of its gas volumes has already been contracted by China in exchange for earlier infrastructure loans. At the same time, it has a petrochemical industry, transport arteries, and logistics potential. TCA: What does Central Asia expect from the U.S.? ORLOV: Beyond investment and technology, political balance is important for the region. Against the backdrop of talk about possible EU sanctions against Kyrgyzstan, diplomatic activity has intensified. In my view, the key question for the U.S. is what it can offer that Russia and China, already deeply integrated into the region’s economy, cannot. U.S. trade turnover with Kyrgyzstan, for example, does not even rank in the top ten. Therefore, there is not only economic but also political logic at work, an attempt to strengthen its presence in the region. Central Asia today is a space where the interests of China, Russia, Iran, and the West intersect. None of these actors has a monopoly on influence. That is why the region remains an area of balance. American and European companies extract oil in Kazakhstan. Chinese companies do as well. Russian companies are also present. So far, these interests have not come into direct conflict. As a result, we should not expect open confrontation between global players, at least in the near future. TCA: How realistic is it that repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment could change the investment landscape in Central Asia? ORLOV: For now, it is more of a political signal than an economic calculation. Western media have barely discussed potential investment volumes in the event of its repeal. No concrete figures are being cited. This resembles a situation in which a decision has ostensibly been “made,” but real steps remain distant. The amendment has been discussed since the Clinton administration, yet it has never progressed beyond declarations. In essence, it remains a carrot dangling in front of a donkey. TCA: Would it be fair to say, then, that regional forums, including the B5+1, are largely symbolic? ORLOV: Exactly. The first forum in Almaty in 2024 was a stage of familiarization and mutual assessment. The meeting in Bishkek is an attempt to outline the contours of possible cooperation. The key questions for both sides today are extremely pragmatic: what are we being offered, and what can we get in return?
Rubio Hosts Critical Minerals Meeting; Central Asia Is Key to U.S. Vision
The United States welcomed delegations from dozens of countries to a meeting in Washington, D.C. on Wednesday that was aimed at strengthening and diversifying supply chains for critical minerals. With large reserves of these minerals, Central Asia is emerging as a key player in U.S. plans to secure components deemed necessary for advances in technology, economic development, and national security. "I don’t need to explain to anybody here that critical minerals are vital to the devices that we use every single day,” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in his opening remarks at the minister-level conference. “They power our infrastructure, our industry, and our national defense… Our goal is to have a global market that's secure, a global supply that's enduring and is available to everyone, every nation, at an affordable price.” U.S. Vice President JD Vance also spoke at the event, saying the United States wants to form a trading bloc among allies and partners that expands production of critical minerals in an environment of stable prices and supply chains immune from disruption. “By regulating imports to preserve free and fair competition within the preferential trading zone, we will elevate our nation’s miners and refiners, our investors and producers alike,” Vance said. “We are all on the same team, and we need to create the economic incentives that reward people for investing and building in our countries.” The United States is seeking to counter China’s dominance of the critical minerals market. China is a key trading partner for Central Asia, whose countries aim to diversify their relationships among the major powers. Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev of Kazakhstan was among those slated to attend the critical minerals conference in the United States. The visit follows intensifying discussions involving the United States and Central Asian countries on how to develop trade and investment. On Wednesday, business leaders and government officials from Central Asia and the United States gathered in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, for the start of the second B5+1 Business Forum.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
