Opinion: UK’s C6 Engagement and the Opportunity for British Geostrategic Renewal

Along with Nicholas Spykman, Sir Halford Mackinder is one of the most pre-eminent thinkers in the field of geopolitics. Whilst today geopolitics is a term used interchangeably with “world affairs,” “international relations,” and “foreign policy,” Spykman and Mackinder used the phrase to describe the narrow academic study of how geography influences international relations and the conduct of states. In the 1904 paper, The Geographical Pivot of History, Mackinder theorized that the key to controlling the balance of power in the world rested in a “heartland” of Eurasia, comprising Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Mackinder described the heartland region as the “pivot region” for regional and global hegemony. The word “pivot” has recently been popularized in international relations, with examples including President Obama’s pivot to the Pacific and Britain’s Indo-Pacific pivot in the 2021 Integrated Review. In 1997, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski built on Mackinder’s ideas in his work, The Grand Chessboard. Brzezinski defined a geopolitical pivot as being “determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player. In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region.” To Mackinder and Brzezinski, Central Asia was a crucial geostrategic pivot. Central Asia - comprising the five states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, collectively termed the C5 - is located between China, Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Thus, the near abroad of the region is defined by conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and Israel/U.S., and between Taliban-run Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pragmatic engagement is a necessity for the C5 but has not stopped them from pursuing greater diversification in security and economic arrangements, and they remain committed to U.S.-led diplomatic initiatives. Faced with a regionally assertive superpower in China, risks created by Russia’s war in Ukraine, theocratic Iran, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Central Asia has continued to show its desire to build and deepen its economic and security partnerships from beyond traditional powers – such as China and Russia – to states in the Gulf, the Caucasus, Western Europe, and elsewhere. The United Kingdom has emerged as a new and important partner. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns in the Central Asian states about its regional revisionism, territorial ambitions, and Putin’s reconstruction of the Soviet Union. In 2014, Putin credited Nursultan Nazarbayev with having “created a state in a territory that had never had a state before,” adding that “the Kazakhs never had any statehood.” The remarks sparked anger in Kazakhstan and fed concern about Moscow’s view of post-Soviet sovereignty. Finally, Putin said that it would be best for Kazakhstan to “remain in the greater Russian world.” In The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski predicted that “Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians.” Central Asia has been a target of Russian disinformation campaigns - prevalent across the globe from the Sahel to Western Europe - revealing the region's importance to Russian geostrategy. Although it is outside Central Asia, in November 2025, at the Seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State in Central Asia, C5 Presidents agreed to the accession of Azerbaijan into this regional grouping, expanding the grouping to a C6 format. Azerbaijan is a key part of the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR), and shares a border with the Caspian Sea with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, plus Iran. Brzezinski commented that “Azerbaijan, with its vast energy resources, is also geopolitically critical. It is the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.” On March 18, Israel, as part of its war against Iran, hit several Iranian naval assets in the Caspian, including warships and port infrastructure at Bandar Anzali, showing that the region is not insulated from the spillover effects of conflict in the Middle East. The Caspian is also reportedly a key transport route for war supplies (such as drones) from Iran to Russia, clearly demonstrating the interconnectedness between security in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Euro-Atlantic. Furthermore, the region is a key hub for land trade. The TITR - also called the Middle Corridor - links markets in Southeast Asia to those in Western Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and the Black Sea, importantly offering an alternative route avoiding Russia (the Northern Corridor) and Iran (the Southern Corridor). The Islamic Republic’s disruption of energy exports out of the Strait of Hormuz clarifies Europe’s need to secure trade routes beyond the immediate reach of adversarial states. In 2021, 586,000 tons of cargo volume travelled through the Middle Corridor. In the first 11 months of 2024 alone, 4.1 million tons of cargo passed through the TITR, a year-over-year increase of 63%. This clearly demonstrates the importance of the Middle Corridor, a trend which will only continue and intensify if the world becomes more contested and volatile. The Trump Administration has paid particular attention to Central Asia. Later this year, Secretary Rubio plans to visit the region, following the visit of the U.S. Secretary of the Army to Turkmenistan in January 2026. The United States’ geostrategic interest in preventing the regional domination of Central Asia by Russia and/or China is shared by the United Kingdom. In April 2024, then-British Foreign Secretary (and former Prime Minister) Lord Cameron visited the C5 countries plus Mongolia, becoming the first ever Foreign Secretary to visit Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Cameron was the first Foreign Secretary to visit Uzbekistan since 1997. Cameron’s visit followed a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report that warned Britain’s high-level engagement with the C5 was “persistently inadequate and interpreted by our partners as demonstrating a lack of seriousness from Government.” Cameron explained that “Central Asia is at the epicenter of some of the biggest challenges we face, and it’s vital for the UK and the region that we drive forward its future prosperity.” Central Asia is emerging as a high-growth region, with economic growth recorded at above 6% in 2025. Recently, the Middle Corridor was of vital importance as conflict in Iran and ongoing concerns regarding Russian airspace rerouted air traffic to Central Asia. Cameron announced a £ 50 million increase in development funding for Central Asia, designed to support the sovereignty and independence of the C5. Cameron doubled the funding for Chevening scholarships offered to Central Asian students to study at UK universities and launched a new British Council program to support the teaching of the English language in the region, demonstrating Britain’s soft power capabilities. The Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan, Bakhtiyor Saidov, described Britain as a “time-tested, long-standing and reliable partner of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Our relations are built on mutual respect and the principles of transparency”. In Uzbekistan, Cameron signed a memorandum of understanding plus a Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation that promotes cooperation on defense and security, counterterrorism, climate, and trade and investment. Most significantly, in Astana, Cameron signed the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan, a critical minerals powerhouse, which included broadening and deepening cooperation on critical minerals mining and supply chains. Cameron underscored the purpose of his visit by presenting Britain as an alternative partner for Central Asia, arguing “we are not saying to Kazakhstan or any other country that you have to make a choice, or we’re asking you not to choose your partnership and trade with Russia or China, or with anyone else. We’re here because we believe you should be able to make a choice to partner with us in the way that is good for both our security and our prosperity”. Cameron’s visit to the region was the most proactive geopolitical initiative conducted by a British statesman toward the region since the end of the Soviet era. This engagement has continued following the change of government in the UK. In February 2026, Labour Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper hosted the first-ever CA5+UK Foreign Ministers meeting in London, creating a formal CA5+UK ministerial track. At this meeting, Cooper and the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, Yermek Kosherbayev, signed a critical minerals deal to diversify UK supply chains from China. This continuance of Cameron’s effort is particularly important given, as Kosherbayev himself noted, Kazakhstan produces 22 of the 36 critical minerals identified in Britain's Critical Minerals Strategy, published in November 2025. These minerals include titanium, silicon, rhenium, and uranium (Kazakhstan supplies over 40% of the world's uranium). This deep bilateral engagement produces economic and security benefits for all parties, and should be a consistent theme in British geostrategy. Britain ought to go one step further and include Azerbaijan in this diplomatic grouping, upgrading the CA5 to a C6-UK Ministerial Track. The UK is Azerbaijan’s largest source of FDI, accounting for almost 26% of all FDI inflows. Six hundred British companies operate in Azerbaijan, in particular oil companies such as BP, which has invested $35bn into the oil and gas sector in Azerbaijan. To build on Cameron’s initiative, greater attention ought to be paid to the C6 amongst British policymakers. The strategic objective of Britain’s engagement in Central Asia ought not to be wildly overambitious, but should focus on continuing to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security ties within the context of the C6 regional architecture and the C6’s strategic diversification push to Western partners. Britain should continue to deepen these ties to present itself as an alternative partner, with an alternative market, to Russia and China. Future U.S.-C6 summits could involve Britain, and Anglo-American initiatives in the region could also include the GCC.  Britain should, however, not wait for U.S. leadership, but should use its established relationship with Azerbaijan and its growing ties with the C5 to offer itself as a partner of choice in the region, creating an architecture for continued future engagement in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. As Central Asian states and Azerbaijan pursue a multi-vector, balanced foreign policy, Britain should present itself as a new network node, complicating Chinese and Russian efforts to dominate Central Asia’s external options. This approach to the C6 would also offer the U.S.-UK relationship a template - akin to AUKUS - for addressing shared challenges, jointly working with regional blocs to counter Russia and China, whilst soliciting the involvement of other interested allies to sustain favorable balances and counter unfavorable balances of power in geopolitically vital and contested areas. A revitalized British approach to geostrategy would be a welcome development in addressing structural competition in the international system. Consulting the works of Mackinder and Brzezinski would be ideal - pivotal, even - places to start.   The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be taking a look at Tajikistan's heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, with guests Salimjon Aioub, head of RFERL's Tajik service, known locally as Ozodi, and Edward Lemon, president of the Oxus Society.

Astana Mining Congress to Highlight Kazakhstan’s Role in Critical Minerals

The 16th International Mining and Metallurgy Congress and Exhibition, Astana Mining & Metallurgy (AMM) 2026, will take place on June 11-12 at the Hilton Astana, bringing together mining and metals companies, investors, technology suppliers, government officials, and industry experts. The forum comes as Kazakhstan is trying to strengthen its position in the global critical minerals race. The country already has a large extractive base, but officials and industry groups are increasingly focused on processing, technology, and investment partnerships rather than raw-material exports alone. Kazakhstan’s appeal lies not only in the size of its mineral base, but also in the timing. The U.S. Department of Commerce says the country has substantial reserves of rare earth elements, copper, lithium, tungsten, tantalum, and other materials used in clean energy, advanced manufacturing, and defense technologies. The European Union has also signed a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan on raw materials, batteries, and renewable hydrogen, underscoring Astana’s growing role in efforts to diversify supply chains away from dominant producers. According to Kazakhstan's Bureau of National Statistics, the country's industrial production index reached 107.5% in 2025. Mining and quarrying grew by 9.4%, driven by higher production of coal, crude oil, natural gas, and other minerals. Organizers said the wider mining and metallurgical complex, including related industries such as mechanical engineering, logistics, energy, and industrial services, may account for up to a quarter of Kazakhstan's economy. Against that backdrop, they said the sector needs new investment, technological solutions, and expanded international partnerships. Alongside the congress, an international specialized exhibition dedicated to mining and metallurgical technologies will be held. The exhibition will feature solutions for geological exploration, extraction and processing of raw materials, industrial automation, and workplace safety. Companies from Germany, Kazakhstan, Canada, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Finland, France, the Czech Republic, and Sweden are expected to participate. National delegations from Canada, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Sweden are also expected to attend. Among the new participants announced by organizers are INCO Engineering, ABP Engineering, David Brown Santasalo, and Actuator Service. Last year's event attracted about 2,900 industry professionals, while 50 companies participated in the exhibition. The business program will be held under the slogan “From the Depths of the Earth to the Heights of Intelligence,” with a focus on digitalization and technological transformation in the industry. The first day will include a plenary session on global partnerships in mining and metallurgy, as well as panel discussions on international metals trade, the investment climate, taxation, and critical minerals. Particular attention will be paid to copper's role as a strategic metal. Copper is central to electrification, grid expansion, and data infrastructure, making it one of the metals most closely tied to the energy transition. The critical minerals component gives the event a wider geopolitical significance. Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry said in April that Astana had invited the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg to participate in AMM and the first C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, both scheduled for June in Astana. The C5+1 format brings together the United States and the five Central Asian states. The critical minerals track was launched in 2024 to strengthen cooperation on geological exploration, mining, processing, and investment, areas that have become more important as major economies seek more resilient supply chains. For Kazakhstan, the format offers a way to turn geological potential into investment, processing capacity, and political leverage at a time when Washington, Brussels, and Beijing are all competing for more secure access to strategic minerals. The second day of AMM will focus on practical industry issues, including artificial intelligence in mining and mineral processing, digital solutions for sustainable production, the coal industry, industrial safety, advanced metallurgical processing, and higher value-added products. The forum will also include B2B and B2G meetings. On June 13, delegates will have the opportunity to join an industrial tour of Qarmet facilities. AMM is organized by the Kazakh exhibition company Iteca and ICA Events Group with the support of Kazakhstan's Ministry of Industry and Construction.

Opinion: The Southern Dimension of the Middle Corridor – Afghanistan’s Role in Eurasia’s New Logistics Landscape

Afghanistan’s integration into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is extending beyond local logistics and evolving into one of Eurasia’s key geo-economic projects. Amid the global transformation of supply chains, Central Asia has an opportunity to move beyond its role as a transit periphery and become an active participant in shaping new economic corridors, creating a full-fledged “southern dimension” of Eurasian connectivity. Two Routes: Strategic and Operational Two main directions for Afghanistan’s integration into the Eurasian transport system are currently under discussion, each reflecting a distinct development logic: strategic and pragmatic. The “Eastern Branch” (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) is traditionally viewed as the primary trans-Afghan route. Its key advantage is direct access to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, providing the shortest connection between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, geography makes the project highly complex. The route passes through the central and eastern regions of Afghanistan, including the Hindu Kush mountain range, where long tunnels and bridges would be required. This would sharply increase construction and maintenance costs, extend implementation timelines, and heighten security and infrastructure risks. According to available estimates, the project could cost around $5 billion and handle 15-20 million tons of cargo annually. However, the lengthy investment cycle and dependence on political stability mean implementation remains a long-term prospect. The “Western Branch” (Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak) represents an alternative logistics corridor based on more favorable geography. Western Afghanistan is characterized by predominantly flat, semi-arid terrain, reducing the need for complex engineering structures and allowing the project to be implemented in phases. This significantly lowers capital costs, shortens construction timelines, and reduces infrastructure risks. The western route’s initial capacity is estimated at 7-10 million tons of cargo annually, making it the more realistic option for medium-term planning. An additional advantage is its geo-economic flexibility. Via Herat, the route could be integrated not only southward through Pakistan, but also westward through Iran, providing access to Persian Gulf ports. This would transform it into a multi-directional corridor capable of serving several logistics flows simultaneously. The Eastern Branch, therefore, remains the strategic option offering the shortest route to the ocean but requiring substantial investment and time. The Western Branch, meanwhile, presents a more pragmatic solution: faster to implement and more flexible from a geo-economic standpoint. The Role of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the “Western Maneuver” The implementation of the western trans-Afghan corridor depends on close coordination between two key regional players, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which form the northern foundation of the future route by providing access to the Caspian Sea and, beyond it, global markets. Astana and Ashgabat are effectively creating a new geo-economic framework that could transform Central Asia from an isolated region into a strategic crossroads linking the Caspian Sea with the Indian Ocean. In 2026, Kazakhstan moved toward deeper institutionalization of the initiative, making the route through Herat and Kandahar a government priority. Astana’s strategy is multifaceted. In addition to establishing a permanent interdepartmental commission, Kazakhstan is actively seeking to attract international operators such as the Emirati AD Ports Group. Such cooperation could integrate Kazakhstan’s terminals at Aktau and Kuryk into a single logistics chain linked to the Afghan railway network, while also providing financial stability and international management standards. In this configuration, Turkmenistan serves as a critical entry point without which the western route cannot function. Ashgabat has assumed the role of primary infrastructure donor during the initial phase, transforming the Turgundi border crossing into a major dry port. Modernization of the hub would synchronize cargo flows from Kazakhstan and Russia with the Afghan railway gauge, creating the capacity needed to transport millions of tons of cargo annually. Particularly important is the integration of the route with Caspian maritime infrastructure. Close cooperation between the Turkmen port of Turkmenbashi and the Kazakh ports of Aktau and Kuryk could create a largely seamless multimodal corridor. This would allow for flexible logistics, with cargo transported either by rail through Turkmenistan or by sea, reducing congestion risks and optimizing freight costs for exporters of grain, metals, and energy resources. Economic Impact and Logistical Advantages The launch of full-scale trans-Afghan routes could significantly reshape the economics of Eurasian transit. Most importantly, cargo delivery from Kazakhstani ports to Pakistani ports could be reduced to 10-12 days, roughly 2.5 to three times faster than the traditional maritime route through the Suez Canal, which typically takes 35-45 days. Cost reductions are also significant. Overland transit through Afghanistan could lower logistics costs by at least 15-20% during the initial phase, with potential savings rising to 30-40% once railway capacity expands and customs procedures are streamlined. For Kazakhstan, the route carries strategic importance in terms of export diversification. Kazakhstan's grain and flour exports to Afghanistan have already reached 1.5 million tons annually. Expanded railway infrastructure would not only increase these volumes but also broaden access to South Asian markets, including India. China and the Southern Branch of the Middle Corridor The development of a southern branch of the Middle Corridor through Afghanistan could be of considerable strategic interest to China as part of the diversification of its Belt and Road Initiative. Against the backdrop of geopolitical risks in the Caucasus, as well as infrastructure and environmental constraints linked to the Caspian Sea, the western trans-Afghan branch could provide an alternative framework for logistical resilience. It would reduce dependence on bottlenecks, expand routing options, and enable the flexible redistribution of cargo flows. The significance of the route extends beyond the traditional “North-South” framework. A two-way transit system is emerging in which Afghanistan becomes integrated into Eurasian value chains. On one hand, the route could facilitate exports of Afghan resources to Central Asia, China, and Europe. Given Astana and Kabul’s plans to increase bilateral trade to $3 billion, the corridor could provide a sustainable foundation for that expansion. On the other hand, it would support reverse flows of industrial products, technologies, and investment needed for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and economic development. Afghanistan’s resource base, including copper, lithium, and rare earth elements, is particularly important. Integrating these resources into a broader transport and logistics system could transform the corridor into part of a wider industrial chain encompassing extraction, processing, and export. For China, this would provide access to strategic raw materials and an opportunity to integrate new territories into its production networks.

This would also address several long-term geo-economic objectives for Beijing.

First, it would reduce reliance on maritime routes, particularly the Strait of Malacca, which remains vulnerable in the event of conflict or blockade. The western trans-Afghan branch could create an alternative overland route to the Indian Ocean via Karachi and Gwadar that would be far more difficult to disrupt.

Second, China could improve access to high-tech raw materials. Afghanistan’s reserves of lithium and copper are critical for producing solar panels, electric vehicles, and other advanced technologies, areas in which China remains the global leader. In this context, infrastructure investment becomes a mechanism for securing direct access to strategic resources.

Third, the route would contribute to a more balanced regional logistics system. Beijing has long relied heavily on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, but that route faces both geographic and political limitations. A western trans-Afghan corridor would provide an additional channel, helping distribute risk and increase overall resilience.

Fourth, the Middle Corridor itself would become more diversified. Its current configuration depends heavily on Caspian Sea crossings, which face both capacity and environmental constraints. The southern branch through Afghanistan could partially bypass these limitations or complement existing routes.

Finally, Beijing views regional security through the lens of economic development. Integrating Afghanistan into trade, transit, and resource extraction networks could contribute to the country’s stabilization and reduce instability risks near China’s western borders.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister on Kazakhstan, Trade, and War

As Kyiv works to rebuild ties across Central Asia, Kazakhstan has become one of Ukraine’s most important regional interlocutors. The relationship has been shaped by war, trade disruption, humanitarian support, and the search for new transport routes linking Asia and Europe. The Times of Central Asia has previously reported on Ukraine’s efforts to deepen engagement with Central Asia and on Astana and Kyiv’s attempts to restore trade ties. In an interview with TCA, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha discussed Kazakhstan’s role in this changing landscape, the prospects for economic cooperation, the Middle Corridor, post-war reconstruction, and the humanitarian and cultural ties connecting the two countries. TCA: Against the backdrop of shifts in global politics and Central Asia’s growing role, Ukraine has been deepening its dialogue with the region. How are these relations being translated into practical cooperation in politics, economics, and the humanitarian sphere? Foreign Minister Sybiha: Ukraine and Kazakhstan share a long-standing, traditionally friendly relationship, not only at a governmental level, but also between our peoples. My own family history is directly connected with Kazakhstan. My father worked in your wonderful country, in Kostanay. Many of his friends still live there. He often told me that he dreams of returning one day to see them again. Personally, I associate Kazakhstan with many warm memories, including your unique cuisine. I love qazy; it is an incredibly delicious dish. Kazakhstan possesses a rich and distinctive culture, language, and national identity. I greatly admire how all of this continues to develop in modern Kazakhstan, especially how young people are embracing traditions and striving to preserve and enrich them. This is a sign of a strong nation that knows its roots and therefore has a future. Kostanay is also linked to the story of our outstanding writer, Mykola Khvylovy, who lived and worked there for a period of time. You see how much connects our countries, even if we take just one city as an example. Unfortunately, there are tragic chapters as well. It was in Kostanay that our world-renowned orientalist, Slavic scholar, and one of the founders of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Ahatanhel Krymsky, died in imprisonment. Those were terrible times, a painful past from which we must draw the right conclusions for the present and the future. Turning to politics and global issues, I would emphasize the following: all our efforts are aimed at achieving peace. This war cannot be ended solely on the battlefield; Ukraine understands this very realistically. The question is whether Moscow is finally prepared to understand it as well. It is time to end the war and move toward diplomacy. Today, Ukrainians are defending their homes and their children with weapons in their hands against unprovoked aggression. This is an existential struggle for the future of the next generations and for the right to remain Ukrainian. This struggle did not begin four and a half or even twelve years ago. Russia’s strategic objective is to complete what the Russian Empire began and what the Soviet Union failed to finish: the eradication of national identity and the destruction of the very foundation of our existence as a separate nation. Ukraine and Kazakhstan both remember the tragic pages of our history: bans on language and culture, the destruction of the intelligentsia, deportations, repression, and famines. We cannot allow this to happen again. That is why support from international partners is fundamentally important to us. Ukraine highly values Kazakhstan’s clear position regarding the need to uphold the principles of international law and the UN Charter. For us, this is an important signal. It reflects a shared understanding of the fundamental principles of international relations. Ukraine has practical proposals even on the most sensitive aspects of the peace process. What is needed is the political will of the international community to compel Russia to turn toward diplomacy and peace rather than aggression and terror. One of the essential prerequisites for safeguarding our independence and sovereignty is the development and strengthening of ties with friendly nations. Central Asia is firmly within our focus, and Kazakhstan undoubtedly plays a key role here. We see how the region is emerging as an important component of the Eurasian economic, trade, energy, and logistics system. Kazakhstan’s importance is defined not only by its regional role, but also by its active participation in international organizations and formats, from the United Nations to the OSCE. Kazakhstan is an active participant in a number of regional initiatives and the initiator of its own platforms, including the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Recently, I took part in the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, where President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was also present. I was pleased to have the opportunity to briefly speak with him and convey a message from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. We reaffirmed our readiness to deepen cooperation between our countries. It is extremely important that our dialogue is regaining momentum. Recently, interagency consultations took place for the first time in quite a long period. Business dialogue is also continuing: just a few weeks ago, a joint business forum was held. [caption id="attachment_48780" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Photo courtesy of the Embassy of Ukraine in Kazakhstan[/caption] TCA: Indeed, we have recently witnessed growing engagement between Ukrainian and Kazakh businesses. In this regard, what prospects do you see for increasing trade turnover and attracting Kazakh investment into the Ukrainian economy? Foreign Minister Sybiha: Businesses tend to respond very sensitively to the overall state of bilateral relations. Therefore, I would say that business missions, forums, and sectoral meetings are evidence of a return to more systematic economic interaction. Without this “living fabric” of cooperation, political agreements, frankly speaking, cannot function fully. By the end of this year, we plan to hold at least two more major business events. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we devote considerable attention to economic diplomacy: facilitating direct contacts between companies, supporting business initiatives through the Embassy of Ukraine in Kazakhstan, and assisting in organizing visits, forums, and sectoral dialogues. Today, our diplomatic missions are working much more actively as platforms for identifying partners, supporting projects, and establishing communication between business communities. We are seeing growing interest from Ukrainian companies in the Central Asian market, particularly Kazakhstan, and especially in agriculture, food processing, engineering, IT, and other high-value-added sectors. At the same time, it is crucial that this process remains two-way. A considerable number of enterprises in Kazakhstan were established with the participation of Ukrainian specialists using Ukrainian technologies and equipment. One well-known example is Dmytro Yurchenko, the first director of the Mangystau Atomic Energy Combine (MAEK), who is still remembered and respected in the Mangystau region. Today, Ukraine is also ready to offer partnership in the modernization and technical upgrading of relevant industries. There is also significant potential for expanding cooperation in transport and logistics, particularly in the context of the development of the Middle Corridor, which is increasingly emerging as a key alternative route between Asia and Europe. Ukraine views this not merely as a transit opportunity but also as a space for practical cooperation and for utilizing its own capabilities to build an integrated logistics chain with high added value, including tariff coordination, digitalization of transportation, and port infrastructure development. We are prepared to contribute to these processes by offering our own experience in multimodal transportation, digital logistics solutions, and integration into European transport networks. In this regard, the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) and related corridors creates additional opportunities for trade, and we are interested in ensuring that Ukrainian businesses become active participants in these processes. An important element of this architecture will also be Ukrainian Black Sea ports, which are capable of providing an effective gateway for further transportation of goods into the European Union. With the proper integration of logistics processes, this could significantly increase the corridor’s capacity and reduce delivery times. In this way, Ukraine can serve not only as a destination point but also as a fully integrated participant in the regional logistics system. Kazakhstan’s recent diplomatic engagement with South Caucasus countries is particularly noteworthy, as it is directly aimed at strengthening the western segment of the Middle Corridor. These are not merely political declarations, but concrete infrastructure and institutional decisions, including the development of multimodal terminals, tariff coordination, the creation of digital cargo-tracking mechanisms, and efforts to improve logistics predictability. In effect, an integrated chain is being formed: “China-Central Asia-Caspian-South Caucasus-Black Sea-EU,” with Azerbaijan and Georgia serving as the key western artery of the route. In this context, Ukraine objectively complements this configuration by providing access to European markets through its own port and transport infrastructure. I am convinced that the current intensification of contacts is only the beginning of a much broader stage of economic cooperation that will have very practical consequences from expanded trade and new logistics routes to joint participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction. TCA: What prospects do you see for the participation of Kazakh businesses and investors in Ukraine’s reconstruction processes? Which areas do you consider most realistic for such cooperation? Foreign Minister Sybiha: We view Ukraine’s reconstruction separately and very pragmatically as a long-term process that goes beyond post-war rebuilding alone. In fact, it is shaping a new economic architecture for the country: from investment decisions, joint ventures, and localization of production to infrastructure, industry, logistics, social development, and energy. It is important that Kazakhstan remains one of the key suppliers of energy resources in Eurasia while simultaneously diversifying and modernizing its energy sector. Kazakhstan is also one of the world’s leading producers of uranium, which is a critical resource for nuclear energy generation. This plays an important role in global energy security. Ukraine is open to transparent, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial participation in these processes. In this context, we regard Kazakhstan as one of our natural regional partners, above all because of the already established economic ties, the experience Ukrainian and Kazakh enterprises have gained in each other’s markets, and the historically accumulated human and professional capital. We effectively share a common industrial and technological history, which it is entirely logical to continue today in the form of modernization and new investment projects. For our part, we are interested in seeing Kazakh businesses and investors participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction after the war ends. Importantly, Kazakhstan is among the partner countries with which this dialogue already has practical substance. [caption id="attachment_48802" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Ukrainian children on vacation in Kazakhstan. Photo courtesy of the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan[/caption] TCA: Kazakhstan has consistently pursued balanced relations both with neighboring states and with Western countries. How does Ukraine assess this position, and what opportunities for cooperation does it see in areas of mutual interest, particularly in energy security, transport corridors, and humanitarian interaction? Foreign Minister Sybiha: Kazakhstan is implementing a thoughtful economic strategy aimed at developing infrastructure, energy, and industrial projects in cooperation with a wide range of international partners across different regions of the country. President Tokayev, an experienced statesman and diplomat who has consistently shaped Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and economic development model, plays an important role in strengthening the country’s sovereignty and international standing. The Central Asia Plus (CA+) format has also become increasingly prominent internationally, and nearly all of Ukraine’s key partners have already joined it: the EU, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Japan, and Türkiye. We also positively assess the participation of Azerbaijan’s president in the annual Consultative Meetings of Central Asian leaders. We are interested in launching a “Ukraine + Central Asia” dialogue platform, with transregional transport and logistics connectivity at its core. In our understanding, such a format would in no way be directed “against anyone.” Its primary goal would be to intensify direct dialogue without intermediaries, identify practical mutual benefits, and strengthen the traditionally friendly ties between our peoples. We observe with respect how Kazakhstan is naturally undergoing a process of strengthening Kazakh national identity and historical self-awareness, while at the same time preserving its multinational character and safeguarding the rights and cultural needs of ethnic communities. Ethnic Ukrainians constitute the country’s fourth-largest ethnic group, around 2% of Kazakhstan’s population of 20.5 million. The policy of “Unity in Diversity” is being effectively implemented, and in this context, I would recall President Tokayev’s statement that “Ukrainian culture is an important part of the cultural diversity of the Great Steppe.” There is also an interesting historical parallel. Taras Shevchenko is sometimes described as the first Ukrainian diplomat in Kazakhstan. He is deeply respected and appreciated in Kazakhstan as a Ukrainian who made a significant contribution to the representation and understanding of Kazakh culture. In fact, he became one of the first internationally recognized artists to depict the life of the Kazakh people, their landscapes, everyday life, and the culture of the Great Steppe. Without exaggeration, Shevchenko is a truly unifying figure for our peoples. He spent ten years in Kazakhstan, during which he created a substantial portion of his artistic work, much of it portraying the lives of Kazakhs. We are sincerely grateful to Kazakhstan for preserving Shevchenko’s memory with such respect both in the places connected to him and toward his legacy itself. In Kazakhstan, he is often called Akyn Tarazi. In particular, the city of Fort-Shevchenko, where he spent part of his exile, holds special significance. It is not merely a location on the map, but an important cultural space. It houses a memorial museum, his dugout shelter, and the world’s first monument to Taras Shevchenko, Akyn Tarazi, stands there. This year, Fort-Shevchenko marks the 180th anniversary of its founding, which also creates an opportunity for joint cultural and humanitarian initiatives dedicated to this milestone. With the participation of the Embassy of Ukraine in Kazakhstan, local authorities, and museum institutions from both countries, including the National Taras Shevchenko Museum in Kyiv and the museum in Fort-Shevchenko, a Memorandum of Cooperation has been signed. It provides for exchanges of specialists and work on expanding the museum exhibition through digital copies of Shevchenko’s works. This is especially important because today, only one original portrait painted by Taras Shevchenko is preserved in Kazakhstan. Expanding the digital collection will make the exhibition more complete and accessible to a broader audience. This is not only about preserving memory, but about maintaining a living humanitarian bridge between Ukraine and Kazakhstan: culture, history, and art help people understand one another more deeply. A vast field for joint research also concerns the notorious Stalinist labor camps, ALZHIR, Steplag, and Karlag, through which hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Kazakhs passed. At the end of May this year, an international academic conference dedicated to this topic and to the 80th anniversary of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church by the Soviet authorities will take place in Astana with the participation of the Ukrainian side. Another important direction remains the implementation of exhibition and creative projects that give our cooperation tangible and living substance. TCA: Which humanitarian areas, particularly in education and science, currently form the strongest basis for the sustainable development of Ukrainian-Kazakh interaction? Foreign Minister Sybiha: Humanitarian projects, from supporting people to cultural and educational initiatives, remain the very foundation that sustains trust between our societies despite all existing challenges. If we speak about academic cooperation between Ukraine and Kazakhstan, this has long been a natural and ongoing process of interaction. Today, a significant number of Ukrainian specialists work in Kazakhstan’s universities, both in the capital and in regional institutions. At Alkey Margulan Pavlodar Pedagogical University, there is a unique International Laboratory for the Conservation and Restoration of Cultural Heritage “UMAI,” headed by the Ukrainian researcher, restorer, and archaeologist Tetiana Krupa, who has received both state and professional awards in Kazakhstan for her major contribution to the development of science. This is an example of sustainable professional exchange and the mutual enrichment of experience. Another important bridge between our educational systems consists of Kazakh citizens who graduated from Ukrainian universities. Having once studied in Ukraine, they now ensure continuity in academic ties between our countries, keeping them vibrant and sustainable. It should be noted that before 2019, prior to the pandemic, academic mobility and university exchanges between Ukraine and Kazakhstan were significantly more intensive. Academic exchange programs and distance-learning opportunities were actively utilized. However, because of COVID-19 and later Russia’s aggression and the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, the pace of academic exchanges and the use of existing educational quotas slowed down. Nevertheless, I am convinced that after the war, these educational quotas between Ukraine and Kazakhstan will once again be fully utilized and will likely need to be expanded on both sides. Even so, Ukrainian-Kazakh cooperation in education and science continues to develop. One example is the organization of international scientific and practical conferences, which bring together academic communities from different countries and serve as platforms for sharing experience, building inter-university ties, and developing new joint projects. Within the framework of this professional dialogue, we intend to initiate the establishment of a Council of Rectors of Ukraine and Kazakhstan as an institutional mechanism for systematically strengthening cooperation between higher educational institutions in both countries. Such a format has the potential to improve coordination between universities, foster joint educational and research programs, and deepen academic ties. [caption id="attachment_48782" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Photo courtesy of the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan[/caption] TCA: Interestingly, one of the “Yurts of Invincibility” has been operating for several years near the main building of Taras Shevchenko University. These initiatives also helped Ukrainians survive the winter months. In this context, what human and cultural factors do you believe most strongly unite Ukrainians and Kazakhs today? Foreign Minister Sybiha: The “Yurts of Invincibility,” which provided warmth and food to people during the harshest wartime winters, have been operating in Ukraine for four years already. Such yurts are currently functioning in various Ukrainian cities; if I am not mistaken, there are now eight of them. We remain in constant contact with the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Ukraine, which is also a regular participant in cultural and humanitarian missions. Ukraine is sincerely grateful to Kazakhstan for its warmth of heart, for its real acts of assistance and support. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale aggression, Kazakhstan has provided Ukraine with around 600 tons of humanitarian aid. This has included medicines, essential goods, generators, and other critically important support items. We also highly value the opportunity for Ukrainian children to undergo rehabilitation and recreation in Kazakhstan’s health resorts. In June 2025, a group of children from the Cherkasy region, accompanied by three adults, visited Kazakhstan for rest and recuperation at the Baldauren educational and wellness center. In January 2026, another group of children from the Sumy region arrived in Aktau for rest and recuperation. This program is supported at the presidential level in Kazakhstan and is an example of the kind of human interaction that builds trust and lays the foundation for deeper relations in the future. Ukrainian-Kazakh cooperation is undoubtedly a deep and multilayered relationship that has evolved over many years and possesses enormous potential for further development. It is not only about politics or economics; above all, it is about the living human connection between our peoples, which ultimately defines the strength of our relationship.

Kazakhstan’s Demographic Shift Puts Labor Market Under Strain

Kazakhstan’s population surpassed 20.5 million in the spring of 2026, but the country’s rapid demographic growth is increasingly being accompanied by structural economic imbalances. Kazakhstan is simultaneously facing the effects of declining birth rates, population aging, and a widening gap between the education system and labor market needs. Economists warn that the country is entering a phase in which the large generation born during the baby boom of the 2000s is placing growing pressure on the labor market, even as the share of the working-age population gradually declines. According to Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics, the number of births peaked in 2021, when 446,500 children were born. By 2025, this figure had fallen to 335,000, the lowest level in the past five years. The total fertility rate also declined to 2.57 children per woman, marking the lowest level since 2009. The decline in births has occurred despite a growing number of women of reproductive age. By early 2026, their number had reached a record 4.79 million. Analysts note that the drop in the overall birth rate to 16.43 births per 1,000 people, the lowest level in more than two decades, points to changing household behavioral patterns. In Kazakhstan’s largest cities, including Almaty and Astana, families are increasingly postponing childbirth because of high housing costs and rising debt burdens. The average age of motherhood has approached 30 years, reaching 29.9. High inflation is adding further pressure on households. Annual inflation remained in double digits in early 2026, which, combined with mortgage expenses, has made raising large families significantly less affordable for the urban middle class. Kazakhstan’s demographic dynamics are also becoming increasingly uneven. In the southern and western regions, fertility rates remain above the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. However, in northern regions, fertility has declined to between 1.63 and 1.75, approaching levels more typical of Eastern European countries. Population growth is still supported by rising life expectancy and relatively low mortality, around 6.64 deaths per 1,000 people over the past four years. Nevertheless, demographers warn that the current increase in population masks a gradual future decline in the labor force. One of the key risks is the shrinking share of the working-age population. Over the past decade, it has fallen from 64% to 57.7%, increasing pressure on employed citizens to finance pension and social welfare systems. Experts warn that a decline in the number of contributors paying mandatory social contributions creates long-term risks for Kazakhstan’s Unified Accumulative Pension Fund and the Social Health Insurance Fund. At the same time, an aging population is increasing state healthcare expenditures. Businesses are already facing labor shortages in some industrial and agricultural regions. In the North Kazakhstan Region, employers have reported shortages in agriculture, manufacturing, and other key sectors. Kazakhstan adds more than 350,000 new labor market entrants each year, thanks to the generation born in the early 2000s. However, instead of entering industry or agriculture, many young people are increasingly choosing jobs in the urban service economy, including taxi services, delivery platforms, and online commerce. Research published in early 2026 showed that young workers are becoming increasingly concentrated in trade and services. While this trend helps keep official unemployment low, it also limits the accumulation of skilled human capital. Platform-based employment typically requires a limited skill set and often fails to provide stable pension contributions or comprehensive social protection. As a result, demographic growth has yet to translate into faster development of the industrial and technology sectors. The problem is compounded by imbalances in the education system. Over the past 10 to 15 years, universities have primarily produced graduates in humanities-related fields, while businesses face shortages of engineers, technical specialists, and IT professionals. At the end of April, Minister of Science and Higher Education Sayasat Nurbek announced a redistribution of state educational grants in favor of technical fields, including energy, construction, and water management. Under new rules reported in May 2026, university rankings will play a greater role in the distribution of state-funded places, while some universities will be able to set admission thresholds above national minimums. However, the effects of these reforms are unlikely to become visible until the end of the decade, when the first graduates trained under the new system enter the labor market. Until then, shortages of qualified personnel are likely to remain one of the main constraints on Kazakhstan’s industrial growth.

Kazakhstan Renews Debate Over Stray Animals After Parliament Approves Euthanasia Amendments

Kazakhstan has once again found itself at the center of a heated public debate over how the state should address the country’s growing stray animal problem. Recently approved parliamentary amendments allowing the euthanasia of dogs after a short holding period have triggered strong criticism from animal rights activists, volunteers, and private shelter owners, who argue that the new measures fail to address the root causes of the crisis and instead merely conceal its consequences temporarily. For many involved in the debate, the issue goes beyond animal welfare and points to deeper problems in state governance. For years, responsibility for stray animals in Kazakhstan has effectively been left to private initiatives, including small shelters and volunteer networks that operate largely on personal funds and donations. One such initiative is the Amigo shelter near Almaty, which currently houses around 200 dogs and 80 cats. The shelter did not begin as a business or long-term charitable project, but rather as a spontaneous effort to rescue several animals from capture facilities and the streets. Over time, the number of animals grew, and temporary assistance evolved into a permanent struggle for survival. [caption id="attachment_48766" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: TCA[/caption] “We never planned to create a shelter. It all started with a few rescued animals, and then it became impossible to stop because they were completely dependent on us,” Amigo representatives told The Times of Central Asia. That dependency has become one of the defining features of Kazakhstan’s private shelter system. Unlike many Western countries, where large numbers of animals are adopted through well-developed adoption programs, animals in Kazakhstan often remain in shelters for years; sometimes for the rest of their lives. According to Amigo’s owners, society still approaches shelter animals with caution, while a culture of responsible adoption is only beginning to emerge. The financial burden on such organizations is enormous. In addition to food and veterinary care, shelter owners must independently pay for land, kennel construction, transport, fuel, generators, heating, water supply, sterilization, vaccination, and staff salaries. In many cases, infrastructure must be built entirely from scratch. Amigo’s own history reflects this instability. The shelter was initially located on a small property in Baiserke, but the growing number of animals and expanding residential development made continued operations impossible. The owners took out loans to purchase land near the village of Zhetygen, where they personally built enclosures and installed utilities. Later, after Zhetygen was incorporated into the new city of Alatau, they faced the threat of land seizure for state needs and were once again forced to search for a new location and finance another relocation through debt. [caption id="attachment_48767" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: TCA[/caption] According to shelter representatives, Kazakhstan still lacks a clear legal status for such facilities. Agricultural land is formally designated for livestock rather than cats and dogs, meaning that even privately purchased plots do not guarantee long-term security. For shelters, relocation means far more than changing addresses, it requires transporting hundreds of animals, rebuilding infrastructure, and effectively starting over. Against this backdrop, discussions of mass euthanasia are especially painful for shelter owners. They argue that the stray animal problem does not emerge on its own. In their view, the main causes are the lack of widespread sterilization programs, weak oversight of pet owners, and near-total impunity for abandoning animals. “If animals are simply destroyed without addressing the causes of their appearance, the streets will quickly fill with new ones,” Amigo representatives said. According to the shelter, many residents continue to breed animals irresponsibly before abandoning unwanted puppies and kittens, shifting the burden onto the streets, volunteers, and shelters. Supporters of tougher measures, meanwhile, point to public safety concerns. In recent years, attacks by stray dogs have repeatedly sparked national debate in Kazakhstan, while authorities face growing pressure from residents demanding a reduction in the number of animals on the streets. However, shelter owners argue that policies based solely on capture and euthanasia cannot deliver long-term results. As an alternative, they advocate year-round free sterilization programs, substantial fines for abandoning animals, and tighter regulation of breeding practices. In their view, only a combination of these measures can gradually reduce the stray population without perpetuating the cycle of new animals appearing on the streets. [caption id="attachment_48769" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: TCA[/caption] The precarious position of private shelters themselves remains another major issue. Most operate through the efforts of just a handful of people working without days off and often sacrificing their own finances, health, and personal lives. Amigo’s owners admit they do not see a sustainable future for a system built entirely on the commitment of individual citizens. “People grow older, get tired, and burn out. If something happens to the owner of a shelter, it is often unclear what will happen to the animals afterward,” they said. According to shelter representatives, the government should treat private organizations as part of the broader animal welfare system rather than as a complete substitute for state responsibility. Without official legal status, financial support, and a long-term state policy, many shelters could close within the coming years, they warn. For volunteers themselves, meaningful change would require systemic measures: free sterilization programs, greater owner accountability, state support for shelters, and a shift in public attitudes toward animals. Until then, Amigo representatives believe Kazakhstan risks returning to the same debate again and again, responding to the consequences of the crisis while leaving its causes unresolved.

IPO as a Lifeline: Who Will Pay for Kazakhstan Railways’ Growing Debt?

The planned IPO of Kazakhstan’s national railway operator, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), once presented by the authorities as one of the largest public offerings in Central Asia, is increasingly being viewed as an attempt to stabilize the company’s balance sheet amid rapidly rising debt. The share sale, expected in late 2026, may turn out to be less a growth story than a mechanism for refinancing the obligations of the state-owned carrier. During parliamentary hearings on April 24, company executives acknowledged that one of the key objectives of the IPO is to raise funds to service KTZ’s growing debt burden. According to official company and government data, KTZ’s nominal debt has risen sharply. It stood at about $5.7 billion in early 2024, and roughly $8 billion by 2025. By April 2026, it had reached 4.7 trillion tenge, or about $10.4 billion. The increase reflects heavy borrowing for rolling stock, infrastructure modernization, and the expansion of Kazakhstan’s transit capacity, including projects linked to the Middle Corridor. It also reflects the cost of maintaining below-market tariffs for socially important domestic freight. Kazakhstan’s Supreme Audit Chamber warned as early as 2024 about risks related to the company’s financial sustainability. However, the authorities and KTZ management argue that large-scale borrowing was necessary to prevent an infrastructure crisis. According to official estimates, borrowed funds include about $4.9 billion for renewing rolling stock, including locomotives and railcars, and about $2.3 billion for modernizing railway infrastructure. The currency structure of the debt represents an additional vulnerability. More than half of the company’s obligations are denominated in foreign currencies, making KTZ highly sensitive to fluctuations in the tenge. Any weakening of the national currency automatically increases debt servicing costs and reduces the operator’s profitability. Potential investors face another challenge: historically, KTZ has served not only as a commercial company but also as an instrument of state social policy. A substantial share of revenues from China-Europe transit freight is used to subsidize unprofitable domestic passenger transport and the transportation of socially important goods within Kazakhstan. This cross-subsidization mechanism limits the company’s ability to generate free cash flow. Grain transportation under regulated tariffs alone generated losses of approximately $95 million (44 billion tenge) for KTZ in 2024. In an effort to improve the company’s attractiveness ahead of the IPO, KTZ has initiated large-scale tariff increases for mainline railway services. Beginning in April 2026, transportation tariffs for coal, grain, and iron ore were doubled. However, the move risks adding to costs in Kazakhstan, where railway tariffs directly affect the cost of food, electricity, and industrial goods. Annual inflation stood at 12.2% in January 2026, adding to concerns that higher railway tariffs could feed into wider price pressures. Additional inflationary pressure may come from the expiration of the government’s moratorium on utility tariff increases, after which household utility bills in some regions could rise by 10-20%. Against this backdrop, analysts do not rule out a return to tighter state regulation of tariffs, a development that could once again limit the ability of natural monopolies to generate returns on investment. The planned KTZ listing is therefore increasingly perceived as an attempt to spread financial risk beyond the state rather than as a classic growth-oriented IPO. In practice, the burden could fall on investors, freight customers facing higher tariffs, consumers exposed to price increases, and the state, which remains responsible for politically sensitive transport services. The involvement of minority shareholders could provide the sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna with additional political justification for unpopular reforms, including further tariff liberalization and efforts to improve the company’s commercial efficiency. The main investment thesis will likely center on KTZ’s role in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, the so-called Middle Corridor. The route links China and Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and onward routes through Turkey or the Black Sea. Interest has increased since Russia invaded Ukraine, as shippers and governments look for alternatives to northern routes through Russia.

That gives KTZ a credible growth story. Middle Corridor freight volumes have risen, and international lenders have identified Kazakhstan as one of the countries that could benefit from better rail, port, and logistics links. But the same corridor also requires heavy spending on infrastructure, equipment, coordination, and bottleneck removal. In other words, the Middle Corridor is both the main reason investors may look at KTZ and one reason the company still needs capital.

For investors, KTZ offers exposure to one of Eurasia’s most important transit networks. But unless Kazakhstan separates the company’s commercial operations from its social obligations and creates clearer compensation mechanisms for regulated transport, the IPO may look less like a straightforward bet on the Middle Corridor than an invitation to help refinance a state company’s problems.