Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at the role of clusters in Uzbekistan's farming sector, which is key to understanding what Mirziyoyev's comments about farmers receiving some $1 billion in profits from this year's cotton harvest really means. Special guest: Umida Niyazova, the director and founder of the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights.
What Berlin Can Offer to Finance Kazakhstan’s Oil Routes
Kazakhstan has formally asked Russia to restore oil deliveries to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline after a six-month suspension. Russia suspended transit on May 1, citing unspecified technical constraints. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said on November 4 that he had delivered the request personally. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Chancellor Friedrich Merz had discussed increasing Kazakhstan’s oil supplies to Germany at their September 29 meeting in Berlin. Merz described Kazakhstani crude as a means of diversifying supplies after Germany stopped buying Russian oil. On November 6, Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said no deliveries to Germany were planned via Druzhba for November or December, but resumption could be considered if the unspecified technical restrictions were resolved and transport conditions secured. Germany imported about 10.3 million metric tons of crude from Kazakhstan in 2025, according to UN Comtrade data. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry puts deliveries through Druzhba to the PCK refinery at Schwedt at 2.1 million tons that year. Druzhba therefore accounts for only part of Germany’s oil trade with Kazakhstan. Restoring Druzhba deliveries and developing additional routes would strengthen Kazakhstan’s access to European markets and give German buyers more options during disruptions. That shared interest gives Berlin a reason to consider helping finance the capacity needed to make this trade more reliable. Purchase Commitments and Transport Access In October 2025, KazMunayGas (KMG) extended its supply agreement with Rosneft Deutschland through the end of 2026. The contract provided for monthly deliveries from Karachaganak Petroleum Operating resources to rise from 100,000 to 130,000 tons; KMG also reported supplies from other fields. Russia’s Druzhba suspension followed in May 2026, despite that purchasing commitment. Any additional purchase commitments by German buyers would need corresponding arrangements for transit. Kazakhstani oil also travels across the Caspian Sea to Baku and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. KMG’s annual report identifies work with Azerbaijan’s state oil company, SOCAR, to reduce tariffs, make charges transparent, and assess how Kazakhstani crude affects the Azeri Light blend. Renewed talks on higher volumes were reported in November. Negotiations over tariffs and crude quality would condition the delivered price of Kazakhstani oil for German buyers. Longer purchase agreements could support investment if producers undertake to supply the oil and if operators reserve the capacity to carry it. Lenders could assess whether the expected revenues would cover the facilities’ costs and how long repayment would take. Contracts would then have to establish who pays for unused capacity and bears losses from interrupted deliveries. The German government’s trusteeship over Rosneft Deutschland and RN Refining & Marketing, exercised through the Bundesnetzagentur, was extended indefinitely in February 2026. This gives Berlin a role on the purchasing side: it could encourage the companies to negotiate longer supply commitments with Kazakhstani producers. It could bring not only buyers and producers but also operators into these negotiations. At the receiving end, Germany has budgeted €400 million for 2025–2029 to improve the Rostock–Schwedt pipeline and the port of Rostock and make the adaptations needed to process non-Russian crudes from Kazakhstan and other suppliers. Nevertheless, the Finance Ministry’s June 2026 monitoring report stated that no funds had been spent under the program in 2025. It also noted delays in the European Commission’s process for approving state aid. Schwedt’s access to Polish pipeline capacity depends on other refineries’ requirements and the terms agreed with the operators. In August, the German government estimated the capacity of Poland’s Gdańsk–Płock pipeline at about 30 million tons annually. Actual utilization figures remain commercially confidential. The line supplies Płock and connects to the Druzhba network serving the refineries at Schwedt, on the border with Poland, and Leuna, in the former East Germany. Berlin could help negotiate access with Warsaw, but securing capacity at the European end would still leave Kazakhstan’s export constraints to be resolved. The Limits of Public Financing KfW IPEX-Bank, the international project and export finance subsidiary of Germany’s state-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, offers suppliers working capital through pre-export financing against future commodity revenues. KfW’s September 2026 guidelines permit such trade finance to include crude oil sales within portfolio limits. However, its ordinary financing rules exclude crude oil pipelines and terminals. Germany’s untied loan guarantee scheme applies separate criteria governing which raw materials may receive support. Crude oil is normally excluded here because Germany considers supplies obtainable through a functioning global market without additional state backing to secure access. The scheme therefore already takes the availability of replacement crude into account when assessing the need for state backing. The EU’s taxonomy sets criteria for determining which economic activities qualify as environmentally sustainable. Activities outside that classification can still receive financing. Germany has drawn on the taxonomy’s criteria, alongside International Energy Agency scenarios, to develop its own rules governing eligibility for export guarantees. The EU’s Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) framework separately excludes new oil infrastructure from its own support arrangements. If financial support qualifies as state aid, Germany would normally have to notify the European Commission and obtain approval before implementation, unless an applicable exemption or existing authorization covers the measure. Selective advantages granted to companies through state resources can constitute state aid if they distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between EU member states. Support provided on ordinary market terms may not constitute aid. KfW’s guidelines permit exceptions to its ordinary financing restrictions for certain federally mandated transactions. They also allow exceptions for financing explicitly requested by the responsible ministry on behalf of the federal government. Such financing would remain subject to the EU requirements applicable to the transaction. The Case for Public Support The case for German support rests on the value of additional transport capacity during disruptions. Kazakhstani oil shipped across the Caspian Sea to Baku and through BTC to Ceyhan could reach Gdańsk or Rostock by tanker, then continue by pipeline to Schwedt. This would provide an additional supply route without transiting Russian territory. Kazakhstani oil transported via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route and then by tanker from Novorossiysk to those ports would still rely on Russian transit. On October 28, PCK said replacement crude supplies had been secured despite the interruption of Druzhba deliveries from Kazakhstan. Management reported that the refinery was operating above 86% of capacity. The cost of the replacement oil was not disclosed. Refiners like PCK need to weigh any reduced risk of disruption against potentially higher delivery costs and the length of purchase commitments. Long-term contracts could support investment but limit a refinery’s freedom to switch suppliers. Financial guarantees could cover specified losses or borrowing risks, but they cannot ensure physical delivery. Buyers would also have to examine the vulnerabilities of any alternative supply route. A route that remained open during disruptions elsewhere could improve European supply security, even if refiners normally had less expensive purchasing options. Such a route could also serve European buyers outside Germany. Berlin could seek joint commitments under which buyers reserved transport capacity while participating governments shared the cost of making it available. Financial contributions could be linked to that reserved capacity, and agreements could specify access rights to it during disruptions. Germany could therefore encourage longer purchase commitments, help negotiate transit access, or support a specific transport investment where financing rules permitted. Commitments from companies and other participating governments would establish how much of the cost and risk they were prepared to bear. Berlin would then have to judge whether more secure supplies for German buyers and more reliable market access for Kazakhstan justified its own financial exposure, taking account of the alternative supplies available and the disruption risks remaining along the proposed route.
CSTO Without Armenia: What Keeps Yerevan From Leaving and What the Summit Means for Central Asia
Armenia has effectively stopped participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but has not formally withdrawn from the military alliance. At the November 11, 2026, summit in Moscow, Armenia lost its voting rights because of unpaid membership dues, while the CSTO's five other members — Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus — agreed to develop collective aviation forces and mobile air defense units. Kazakh political analyst Maksim Kaznacheyev explained to The Times of Central Asia why Armenia's leadership is reluctant to sever ties with the CSTO and what the new military agreements could mean for Central Asian countries. Why Armenia Has Not Left the CSTO Yerevan froze its participation in the organization in February 2024, accusing its allies of failing to ensure Armenia's security during armed clashes with Azerbaijan. Armenia stopped paying membership dues and sending representatives to CSTO bodies. At the November 11 summit, CSTO members decided that Armenia would lose its voting rights and the ability to nominate candidates for senior positions because of unpaid contributions. CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov said, however, that the organization was not considering expelling Armenia. Kaznacheyev attributes Yerevan's reluctance to sever ties with the CSTO to Armenia's domestic political situation. "If Armenia leaves the CSTO or the EAEU, pro-Western actions could trigger an internal crisis and destabilize the country," Kaznacheyev said. He believes Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to avoid deepening divisions within Armenia as his government pursues closer ties with the European Union. Yerevan, however, has pursued different policies toward the two organizations. Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO but continues to operate within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). On November 5, Pashinyan said the country was not preparing to leave the EAEU. The CSTO has experienced the departure of member states before. Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, declined to renew it in 1999, rejoined the CSTO in 2006, and suspended its membership again in 2012. Kaznacheyev believes Armenia's situation is substantially different. "Uzbekistan's experience does not apply to Armenia because Uzbekistan had a unified political elite when it left the CSTO," Kaznacheyev said. He noted that Tashkent also had a bilateral security agreement with Russia, allowing it to maintain military cooperation outside the CSTO. For Kazakhstan, Armenia's dispute with the CSTO does not create an immediate security threat. Kaznacheyev said Astana's restrained position reflects its limited direct interests in Armenia and its growing transport links through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Turkey. "That is why Kazakhstan maintains a restrained, neutral position," he said. What the New Air Defense Agreements Mean for Central Asia At the Moscow summit, CSTO members agreed to develop the organization's Collective Aviation Forces and approved plans for mobile air defense units to protect joint military formations. Plans call for incorporating combat aviation units alongside transport and special-purpose aircraft. Kaznacheyev believes the agreements could expand Russian military-technical assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He argues that Russia could help other CSTO members modernize their air forces and air defenses, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose capabilities are more limited than Kazakhstan's. Such assistance could include additional military equipment and aviation technology, he said. CSTO allies have long had the opportunity to purchase Russian weapons and military equipment on preferential terms. The new agreements do not, in themselves, mean that deliveries of missile systems or transfers of aviation technologies have begun. Kaznacheyev believes Russia's military role determines the nature of relations within the CSTO. "It is Russia's geopolitical project," he said, arguing that other members depend heavily on Moscow for military assistance. He cited the CSTO's intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022 as an example. During the mass protests and unrest in Kazakhstan, the CSTO deployed approximately 2,000 troops to guard strategic facilities. Russia provided the largest share of the contingent. It was the organization's first deployment of collective forces in response to an internal crisis in a member state. For Kazakhstan, the January operation remains an example of the CSTO's security mechanisms being put into practice. Armenia's experience has been the opposite: Yerevan did not receive the military assistance it requested following clashes with Azerbaijan on Armenian territory in 2022. The Caspian Sea: Does the CSTO Need Additional Forces? In the final declaration of the Moscow summit, CSTO members expressed concern about attacks on commercial vessels and port infrastructure involving uncrewed systems, including in the Caspian Sea. For Kazakhstan, security in the Caspian has direct economic implications. The country's seaports handle freight moving along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which connects Central Asia with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and European markets. The Caspian route also plays a role in Kazakhstan's efforts to diversify its oil exports. Kaznacheyev sees no need to establish separate CSTO forces to protect the sea. In his view, the Caspian littoral states can address the main security challenges through existing cooperation arrangements. The analyst acknowledges potential risks from the war in Iran and the possibility of strikes against its Caspian coastline. He believes, however, that Tehran has an interest in maintaining good relations with its Caspian neighbors, which provide important trade routes. "There may be isolated incidents, such as drones accidentally entering neighboring airspace," Kaznacheyev said, but he does not believe these warrant deploying additional CSTO forces in the Caspian.
Russian Rail Curbs Put Up to $470 Million in Kazakh Coal Exports at Risk
Transit shipments of Kazakh coal through Russia toward European markets fell by 97% in two months, from 1 million metric tons in August to 30,000 in October 2026, according to figures cited by economist Yernar Serik. Russian Railways approved no requests to ship Kazakh coal to Baltic ports for October or November, despite an agreement that gives qualifying shipments priority. Kazakh economist Yernar Serik estimates that up to 3.5 million metric tons of coal exports, worth $400 million to $470 million, could be at risk by year-end. The problems began in August, when shipments of Kazakh coal through Russia’s Black Sea port of Taman stopped. That left Baltic ports as the main maritime export route for Kazakh suppliers. Serik put September shipments at about 500,000 metric tons. The remaining October shipments went by rail toward Belarus and Poland, bypassing Russia’s Baltic ports. Priority Status That Failed to Secure Shipments In November 2025, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement on rail transit and cargo handling for exports to third countries. Under Russia’s rules on access to railway infrastructure, freight volumes agreed under such treaties qualify for the fourth priority category, a relatively high ranking when the railway allocates capacity. On October 19, Kommersant reported that Russian Railways planned to cut October coal shipments to the Oktyabrskaya Railway in northwestern Russia by 80%. The newspaper obtained minutes of a Russian Transport Ministry meeting at which officials discussed the proposal. Its sources said suspending priority transit for Kazakh coal was also under discussion. Disruptions to shipping through Russia’s Black Sea ports during the war in Ukraine have led exporters to redirect freight to the Baltic, where the rail lines approaching the ports have struggled to absorb the extra traffic. Russian coal producers also face limits. The energy consultancy NEFT Research said the railway capped November coal shipments to Ust-Luga at 55% of the route’s capacity. Russia has announced no formal ban on Kazakh coal transit. Russian Railways has declined to comment on its plans for individual routes. How Much Could Exporters Lose? In 2025, Kazakhstan transported 11.7 million metric tons of coal through Russia to third countries, an increase of 27% from the previous year. The October 19 report put shipments in the first half of 2026 at 6.7 million metric tons, up 34% year over year. According to the pricing agency Argus Media, Kazakhstan shipped 4.7 million metric tons of coal through Ust-Luga and 2.6 million through Taman between January and July. Both ports handled shipments primarily for markets in Europe and Türkiye. Serik calculated the potential shortfall using August’s shipping volume as the monthly benchmark for the rest of the year. He assumed an export price of $115 to $135 per metric ton. The estimate represents the potential value of shipments that may not take place. The actual loss to producers depends in part on how much coal they can sell in other markets and what it costs to reroute it. "In effect, Russia is not directly banning Kazakh coal exports. But restricting rail transit produces virtually the same result: the product exists, the buyer exists, but delivering it becomes impossible," Serik said. Costs are rising for suppliers that retain access to the ports. Serik put coal handling charges at Ust-Luga at $19.80 per metric ton, about 150% higher than in July. NEFT Research reported that in early October, northwestern Russian ports charged $15 to $25 per metric ton to handle coal. The Price Benchmark Center estimated that the average cost of handling coal at Baltic ports rose 65% from September to October. For Kazakh exporters, transportation already accounts for a substantial share of the delivered cost of coal. Higher charges could make some contracts unprofitable. Why Export Statistics Have Yet to Show a Decline Kazakhstan’s railways carried 86.7 million metric tons of coal between January and October 2026, up 1% from the same period in 2025, according to the Ministry of Transport. Export shipments totaled 28 million metric tons, virtually unchanged from a year earlier. Of the 58.6 million metric tons shipped domestically, most went to combined heat and power plants. The rest supplied households and municipal users. The ten-month statistics include shipments made before the sharp decline in Baltic transit, as well as deliveries to neighboring countries that do not require access to Russian seaports. These figures measure the volume dispatched and do not establish how much coal reached foreign buyers under individual contracts. In 2025, Kazakhstan produced about 115.9 million metric tons of coal and exported around 30 million. Russia was the largest buyer, importing about 16.6 million metric tons, and the main transit route for Kazakh coal bound for third countries. Why Alternative Routes Cannot Easily Solve the Problem Redirecting several million metric tons of coal to other markets in a short period would be difficult. Eastern railway routes already handle substantial freight volumes bound for China and other Asian countries. Increasing shipments would require additional railcars, route approvals, and new sales contracts. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor, connects Kazakhstan with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and European markets. Transporting coal along this route would require rail delivery to the Caspian Sea, port handling, a maritime crossing, and onward transportation through the Caucasus. Each additional transfer increases delivery costs. For a bulk commodity with a relatively low value per metric ton, those expenses could make the route uneconomical. Kazakh coal exporters would also have to compete for transportation capacity with exporters of grain, metals, and other commodities. Market participants cited by Serik say restrictions on the Russian route could persist into the first quarter of 2027. This could delay deliveries to customers in Türkiye and European countries, including Poland and the Netherlands. Prolonged disruptions could prompt buyers to revise contracts and seek alternative suppliers. Domestic demand for coal is expected to rise in Kazakhstan. In March, the government approved a national project to develop coal-fired power generation through 2030, with investment of at least $15.5 billion. It calls for eight new power facilities and upgrades to 11 existing power plants, covering 7.8 gigawatts of generating capacity in all. The government projects that by 2030, the plants will need an additional 20 million metric tons of thermal coal a year. Plans to meet that demand include expanding the railcar fleet and modernizing railway infrastructure.
U.S. Financing Uncertainty Emerges for Kazakhstan Tungsten Project
Two U.S. government lenders are not currently pursuing up to $1.6 billion in financing for a major tungsten project in Kazakhstan, raising questions about construction funding for a venture intended to supply critical minerals to American industry and defense. The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) have no current plans to finance the project, according to a November 10 Reuters report. Developer Cove Kaz Capital Group maintains that work is proceeding on schedule and that it has not yet formally applied for construction financing. The proposed financing comprised up to $900 million from EXIM and $700 million from DFC. Both agencies issued preliminary letters of interest, but neither approved a loan. A DFC official told Reuters that the project had not advanced beyond the first stage of the agency’s four-stage review process. Reuters also reported that EXIM has no current plans to provide financing. The development creates uncertainty over a potential source of construction funding, although no previously approved loans have been withdrawn. Cove Says Development Remains on Schedule Cove has disputed suggestions that the lenders’ positions represent a definitive rejection of its financing plans. In a statement reported by Forbes Kazakhstan, the company said the project remains in the engineering and feasibility stage. Its definitive feasibility study is expected to be completed in 2027, after which it intends to seek construction financing. Cove said financing for its current development activities is secured and that it continues to consider commercial lenders, strategic investors, and potential customers as sources of capital. The company also maintained that its discussions with U.S. officials indicated continued support for the project. In its statement to Reuters, Cove said the project had received support under both the Biden and Trump administrations. Kazakhstan’s Position in Critical Minerals The project covers the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan’s Karaganda Region. Cove Kaz acquired a 70% interest in Severniy Katpar LLP in April 2026, while Kazakhstan’s national mining company, Tau-Ken Samruk, retains 30%. The deposits represent a substantial undeveloped tungsten resource. Cove plans to develop mining operations and processing facilities producing ammonium paratungstate, an intermediate material used in manufacturing tungsten products. Tungsten is important to aerospace manufacturing, industrial machinery, and defense equipment. China dominates global production, making alternative supplies a priority for Washington. Kazakhstan is already a significant supplier of critical minerals to American industry. Kazakh-origin uranium accounted for 28% of deliveries to U.S. civilian nuclear power plant operators in 2025, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan also supplies titanium to major aerospace manufacturers, including Boeing and Airbus, as highlighted by Kanat Sharlapayev, chairman of the presidium of Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, at the B20 USA Summit in Washington on November 10. Financing and Political Implications Cove announced on November 2 that it had abandoned its planned merger with Skyline Builders and would instead pursue a direct U.S. stock-market listing during the first half of 2027. The company also announced a $32 million equity investment commitment from American Ventures, involving four million shares at $8 each. The proposed investment remains subject to closing and would support further development work. The lenders’ current position could also ease concerns about potential U.S. taxpayer-backed financing for a venture in which members of President Donald Trump’s family reportedly hold small indirect stakes. For Kazakhstan, the immediate issue remains the project’s financing. Cove says its current development work is funded, while the proposed equity investment would support further preparations. Construction financing remains to be secured. The company’s next challenge will be completing its feasibility study and securing binding construction financing. The outcome will determine whether the project can move from development into production.
Kazakhstan Detains Heads of Samruk-Kazyna and National Railways in Corruption Probe
Kazakhstan's National Security Committee (KNB) has confirmed the detention of the heads of the state-owned Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund and the national railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ). Nurlan Zhakupov and Yelzhas Otynshiyev are suspected of involvement in a corruption-related offense. Both organizations play a central role in Kazakhstan's economy: the fund manages some of the country's largest state-owned assets, while KTZ operates its railway network, including freight transit between China and Europe. According to the KNB, which announced the detentions on November 12, the two executives were taken into custody the previous day during an operation conducted by the KNB's Anti-Corruption Service. Other individuals were also detained. The agency said investigative procedures were underway but declined to disclose details of the alleged offense, citing Article 201 of Kazakhstan's Criminal Procedure Code, which restricts the disclosure of information from pretrial investigations. The KNB said its anti-corruption efforts were continuing in accordance with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s instructions and the government’s “Law and Order” principle. Nurlan Zhakupov had headed Samruk-Kazyna since April 2023. The sovereign wealth fund holds assets in the oil and gas, energy, transportation, and telecommunications sectors. Its portfolio includes the national oil and gas company KazMunayGas, uranium producer Kazatomprom, KTZ, and other major Kazakh enterprises. In March 2025, Zhakupov briefed President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on the fund's investment portfolio, which comprised 130 projects worth more than $100 billion. Yelzhas Otynshiyev became head of KTZ on July 20, 2026. He previously held senior positions at Samruk-Kazyna, overseeing strategy and asset management. The fund is the railway company's sole shareholder. KTZ manages Kazakhstan's mainline railway network and is involved in developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor. The route connects China with European markets through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, allowing freight to bypass Russia. The company is also preparing for an initial public offering (IPO), which would open it to private investors. Otynshiyev's detention coincided with the introduction of new Stadler passenger railcars into service. On November 11, the first train equipped with the new cars departed Astana for Almaty after repeated launch delays. The operator received the first 51 cars in December 2025, but technical issues, including concerns about the braking system, delayed their entry into service. According to KTZ, Stadler Kazakhstan will compensate the railway company for additional costs arising from the delay. The contract calls for the delivery of 557 railcars by 2030. The next service using the new cars is scheduled for November 13 on the Astana–Semey route. Kazakhstan's Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov had previously criticized Samruk-Kazyna's management on November 4 for delays in implementing investment projects. However, the KNB has not suggested that either the investment-project delays or the Stadler contract is connected to the investigation. As of November 12, law enforcement authorities had not disclosed the specific nature of the alleged corruption offense or announced formal charges against Zhakupov and Otynshiyev. Their detention does not constitute a finding of guilt. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that, according to World Bank estimates, developing the Middle Corridor through 2040 will require at least $25 billion to modernize transportation infrastructure and another $30.5 billion for logistics centers, industrial zones, and related projects. The bank has also recommended improving governance at state-owned transportation companies, including more transparent tariffs and greater private-sector participation.
Russia Tries to Keep the CSTO Relevant in Central Asia
Russia used the November 11 CSTO summit in Moscow to promote closer military cooperation with allies increasingly looking elsewhere for partners. Plans to develop the collective aviation force and supply equipment for Tajikistan's Afghan border would keep their militaries working with Russia, but Armenia's estrangement shows how far confidence in Russian protection has fallen. The summit barred Armenia from voting and appointing representatives to senior posts in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced the restrictions, citing its failure to meet its membership obligations. Armenia remains a member, but has withheld contributions and frozen participation after accusing the alliance of failing to defend it. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan continue to participate. They still want military training, cooperation against terrorism, and help securing the region's southern border with Afghanistan. Moscow can offer those services, even as the Ukraine war damages its standing and China, Europe, and the U.S. expand their economic presence. At the previous summit in Bishkek, Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian weapons and closer military integration. The Moscow meeting continued that effort. Equipment and joint operations keep Russia involved in its neighbors' defense planning, while agreed declarations allow it to claim diplomatic support beyond Belarus. The Damage in Armenia Armenia's break with Moscow developed through successive security failures. The CSTO provided no military assistance after Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian territory in 2022, leading Yerevan to freeze its participation in 2024. The dispute over unpaid contributions followed the loss of confidence in the alliance, rather than causing it. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict deepened that rupture. Russian peacekeepers deployed after the 2020 war did not prevent Azerbaijan's September 2023 offensive. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, leaving Moscow's claim to be a reliable protector badly damaged. Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory and fell outside the CSTO's collective-defense guarantee. Russia's peacekeeping mission there was separate from the alliance. But that distinction offered little reassurance to an Armenian government that had already failed to obtain military assistance after attacks on Armenia itself. Kazakhstan has a different experience. During the January 2022 unrest, CSTO troops guarded key facilities. Moscow can therefore point to an actual deployment when arguing that membership remains useful, though Armenia's experience makes it harder to promise that help will arrive whenever another member requests it. The Border Program in Tajikistan Tajikistan takes over the CSTO chairmanship in January 2027, and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon used the summit to call for closer attention to carrying out existing commitments. Strengthening the organization should rest on “mutual trust, consideration of the interests of member states and consistent fulfillment of commitments undertaken,” Rahmon said. The Afghan border program has taken years to negotiate. The CSTO decided to develop it in 2013, but leaders approved it only in November 2024. Its published timetable assigned preparations to 2025, priority deliveries to 2026–2027, and further reinforcement through 2029. The border equipment program was still awaiting financing arrangements in April. On October 21, Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said Tajikistan had selected suppliers and agreed order values, with initial shipments expected before year-end, according to Radio Azattyq. Suppliers included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Belarus. Summit accounts did not confirm completed deliveries, disclose equipment quantities, or provide a total funding figure. What Moscow Can Still Offer The leaders adopted decisions on collective aviation and a counterterrorism strategy through 2030. Discussions also covered mobile air-defense units to protect collective forces during joint operations. The joint staff's account described plans to include different combat aviation formations in the collective aviation force, outlining proposed military arrangements rather than confirming that new units had been deployed. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's summit remarks focused on terrorism, drug trafficking, and information security, including risks associated with artificial intelligence. Kazakhstan had set out its diplomatic position the previous day. At a separate collective security forum, Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi argued that international order could not rest solely on the balance of power. He called for international law and negotiation, warning against confrontation and new dividing lines in Eurasia. The emphasis on negotiation was consistent with Tokayev’s earlier call to freeze the war in Ukraine and resume peace talks, a proposal he made alongside Putin in July. Confirming Kyrgyzstan’s readiness to host CSTO activities in 2027, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov highlighted military training and cooperation against cross-border crime. His proposals on Afghanistan also included economic recovery and humanitarian assistance. Putin presented the talks as evidence of agreement among allies. “On virtually every issue discussed, complete mutual understanding was reached,” he said in his opening remarks to the expanded session. The final declaration reaffirmed members' sovereignty and territorial integrity, and backed work on a Eurasian charter on diversity and multipolarity. It also expressed concern about military infrastructure approaching CSTO borders. China has overtaken Russia as Central Asia’s largest trading partner, with trade reaching $106.3 billion in 2025. Moscow’s military relationships now coexist with a regional economy increasingly oriented toward Beijing. Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russian transit has also become a liability. Repeated disruptions to oil exports have strengthened the case for expanding shipments across the Caspian through Azerbaijan. Alongside that effort, Kazakhstan is investing in the Middle Corridor, including $462 million in transport agreements announced with European partners in June. These routes reduce exposure to Russia, although alternative oil shipments remain a fraction of the volumes carried through Russian territory. Russia retains enough influence to secure those joint positions, but its Central Asian partners are building relationships that give them more choices. In an interview with TCA, Uzbek political scientist Mukhtor Nazirov described how the Ukraine war has encouraged governments to look beyond Russia. Chinese, European, and U.S. investment offers alternatives, while Russian transport routes and labor markets keep existing dependencies in place. Discussing efforts to find alternative labor markets, Nazirov said: “I would not say diversification has already taken place. But efforts in that direction are clearly underway.” The three Central Asian members have not followed Yerevan out of active cooperation, but Moscow must convince its remaining allies that it can protect them, despite its failures in Armenia.
Kazakhstan Highlights Mining and Processing Strengths at Washington B20 Summit
Kazakhstan already produces materials central to U.S. critical minerals supply chains, from uranium used by American nuclear power plants to titanium supplied to major aerospace manufacturers, Kanat Sharlapayev told the B20 USA Summit in Washington on November 10. “We’re not just resource-rich; we’re a processing country,” said Sharlapayev, chairman of the presidium of Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs. Sharlapayev identified four advantages for attracting U.S. investment: substantial mineral resources, investor protections, established transport infrastructure, and a skilled domestic workforce. The discussion, moderated by Jennifer Miel, vice president for the Middle East, Central Asia and Türkiye at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, also featured Vinay Chawla, the U.S. State Department’s Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs, and Andrew Wilson, executive director of the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). Kazakhstan is a major producer of uranium, copper, zinc, lead, and ferroalloys. Sharlapayev highlighted the country's importance to the U.S. nuclear fuel supply, saying that approximately a quarter of the uranium supplied to the United States comes from Kazakhstan. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Kazakh-origin uranium accounted for 28% of deliveries purchased by American civilian nuclear power plant operators in 2025, second only to Canada, as previously reported by The Times of Central Asia. Kazakhstan also accounts for approximately 20% of the global aerospace titanium market, according to the Kazakh government. Its Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant is an approved supplier to manufacturers including Boeing, Airbus, Safran, and Rolls-Royce. Sharlapayev also cited the country's capabilities in producing high-purity manganese sulfate, a material used in battery manufacturing. At a separate Kazakhstan–U.S. business roundtable on November 9, Sharlapayev cited PepsiCo and Wabtec as examples of manufacturing investment extending beyond the country's traditional commodity industries. Kazakhstan's Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code, adopted in 2017, introduced a licensing system influenced by Western Australian practices. Sharlapayev emphasized the importance of protecting companies' exploration rights as they move toward developing the deposits they discover. Sharlapayev said 23,000 kilometers of railway lines crisscross Kazakhstan, giving mining operations access to established transport routes for moving extracted minerals to processing facilities and export markets. He also said Kazakhstan produces approximately 3,000 geologists and mining engineers annually, a substantial number for a country of roughly 20 million people. Kazakhstan's mines are staffed overwhelmingly by local professionals, with very few expatriates, he added. Financing Mining and Processing Projects Chawla acknowledged Kazakhstan’s existing mining rules, while emphasizing the importance of “contracts that are honored, predictable licensing, and rules that don’t change after the money arrives” for investment across Central Asia. He argued that capital was not necessarily the main obstacle to developing critical minerals projects. Reliable pricing and long-term purchasing commitments were also needed to make investments commercially viable. Chawla said the United States supports processing in Central Asia and suggested that guaranteed payments for processing capacity could help make projects bankable. He cited the $1.8 billion Orion Critical Mineral Consortium, backed by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Orion Resource Partners, and Abu Dhabi's ADQ. The consortium targets mineral assets already producing or approaching production. Chawla identified Central Asia as a potential destination for such investment. Referring to the agreements announced in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in October, Chawla said: “Ultimately, those were agreements, and I would admit that an agreement is not a shipment of minerals. Our job now is financial close.” Chawla also highlighted the Trans-Caspian corridor and the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity through Armenia as complementary routes that could improve access to European markets for Central Asian minerals. Wilson, whose organization is a U.S. Chamber of Commerce affiliate and one of the National Endowment for Democracy’s four core institutes, identified several obstacles to mining investment across Central Asia. Much of the geological information held by regional governments is outdated, while smaller mining companies struggle to finance drilling and feasibility studies. Licensing procedures, stable fiscal terms, and timely government decisions also require attention, he said. Wilson urged greater regional coordination on processing and transport through the B5+1 business dialogue, whose next regional forum is scheduled for April 20–21, 2027, in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. “Reliability wins, and sustainability in the supply chain wins,” Sharlapayev said, arguing that dependable supplies should take precedence over price in developing diversified mineral supply chains. “Mining is a slow business,” he said. “But if you don’t start today, there’s zero expectation that we’re going to get something out of it tomorrow.” Asked what he wanted to see over the next 12 months, Sharlapayev called for faster exploration, financing, and production. “Accelerate, accelerate, and accelerate.”
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