Why Central Asia Growth Forecasts Differ So Sharply
How fast can Central Asia continue to grow? The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) give markedly different answers. The contrast is sharpest in Kyrgyzstan, where the EDB expects another year of double-digit growth, while the IMF sees a much more pronounced slowdown. Both institutions are looking at the same countries and have access to broadly the same set of macroeconomic data. Their forecasts, however, reflect different assessments of how much of Central Asia’s recent momentum can be sustained. The EDB expects strong investment to keep growth high, while the IMF is more cautious about how long the recent pace of expansion can continue. The EDB is itself a regional development institution. It was established by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006, with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan later becoming shareholders. Uzbekistan joined the bank in 2025. The EDB is headquartered in Almaty. The comparison covers the four Central Asian states that are EDB members; Turkmenistan is not included. Its latest forecast for Central Asia is optimistic. In 2026, the EDB expects growth of 10.2% in Kyrgyzstan, 8.3% in Tajikistan, 7.9% in Uzbekistan, and 5.5% in Kazakhstan. The region’s economy as a whole is expected to grow by more than 6.5%, with its combined GDP exceeding $600 billion for the first time. The IMF gives lower figures. Its latest available country projections put 2026 growth at 4.6% for Kazakhstan, 6.8% for Uzbekistan, 6.1% for Kyrgyzstan, and 6.0% for Tajikistan. These projections were published at different times rather than as a single set of four country forecasts. The largest gap is in Kyrgyzstan, where the forecasts differ by 4.1 percentage points, but there are nevertheless modest percentage point gaps between the forecasts for Tajikistan (2.3), Uzbekistan (1.1), and Kazakhstan (0.9). These differences are large enough to raise the question: why the difference in expectations? Part of the answer lies in how the institutions assess the effect of a more uncertain global economy. The IMF expects the world economy to grow by 3% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027. Its July update said the conflict in the Middle East was weighing particularly heavily on energy importers and warned that renewed conflict or financial-market disruption could weaken the outlook. For the four countries, this means different things. Kazakhstan exports oil and benefits from high prices, although it also depends on the condition of export routes and external demand. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan import a significant share of their fuel, while their economies are closely linked to migrant remittances. Uzbekistan has a larger domestic market and its own resource base. Kazakhstan illustrates the logic of the IMF forecast particularly well. Its GDP grew by 6.5% in 2025, one of its strongest performances in recent years. The Fund does not expect that surge to be repeated. Oil production is expected to stabilize after last year’s increase, with growth slowing to 4.6% in 2026, according to the IMF forecast. This does not mean that the Fund attributes everything to oil. Domestic demand remains strong, while construction and manufacturing helped offset weaker oil production in the first months of 2026. Its caution is more about how long the economy can maintain such growth rates without adding to inflationary pressures. The picture is similar in Uzbekistan. After growth of 7.7% in 2025, the IMF expects 6.8% this year. Consumption and investment remain strong and reforms are continuing, but the Fund has warned that continued strong demand could create overheating pressures. The EDB takes a more optimistic view of the same investment upswing. For Kazakhstan, it forecasts growth of 5.5% not only in 2026 but also over the following two years. It expects expanding manufacturing output to be one of the main drivers, with construction and transport also remaining strong. This logic is even more evident in Kyrgyzstan. Here, the two forecasts diverge particularly sharply. The EDB expects major investment in industry, energy, and housing construction to keep growth at 10.2%. The IMF expects growth to slow to 6.1% as the exceptional boost from re-export trade begins to fade, although large infrastructure projects should continue to support activity. In Uzbekistan, the EDB expects stronger investment and industrial output to push growth to 7.9%, while in Tajikistan it expects strong consumer and investment activity to support growth of 8.3%. The forecasts therefore reflect different judgments about the durability of Central Asia’s recent expansion. The EDB places greater weight on investment now under way and its ability to sustain domestic growth. The IMF sees more scope for unusually rapid recent growth to moderate as some temporary drivers fade and policymakers respond to inflation. The World Bank also expects some cooling across Central Asia. In April, it forecast that Central Asia’s average growth would slow to 4.9% in 2026-2027, in part as oil production in Kazakhstan stabilizes. This makes the picture more interesting than a simple disagreement between the IMF and the EDB. Two global institutions expect some cooling after several strong years, while the regional bank believes Central Asia can maintain faster growth for longer because of developments within the region itself. Recent experience also shows how quickly such forecasts can change. In October 2024, the IMF expected Kazakhstan’s economy to grow by 3.5% that year and by 4.6% in 2025. By January 2025, the Fund estimated 2024 growth at 3.9% and raised its 2025 forecast to 5%. Kazakhstan ultimately grew by 5% in 2024 and 6.5% in 2025. The EDB also underestimated the pace of growth. In June 2023, the bank forecast 4.4% growth for Kazakhstan in 2024. The actual result was 5%. Investment is now doing more of the work across much of the region, including major infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan and expanding industrial capacity in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The EDB believes this will be enough to sustain rapid growth. The IMF and the World Bank leave more room for the possibility that the past few years will prove to have been the peak of a cycle rather than a new normal. For more analysis of the economic trends shaping the region, visit The Times of Central Asia’s newly launched Central Asia Balance Sheet.
Uzbekistan’s $5 Billion Sea Breeze Resort Awaits Environmental Review
Uzbekistan’s environmental authorities have still not received the full set of documents for Sea Breeze Uzbekistan, a controversial $5 billion resort planned on the shore of the Charvak Reservoir. Azerbaijani businessman Emin Agalarov presented the project to Uzbek authorities in late 2024, and Agalarov Development is participating in the venture. Although the government approved the investment project in August 2025 and public hearings were held in January, key technical documents required for the second stage of the state environmental review remain outstanding.
Sea Breeze is planned to cover 577 hectares on the eastern shore of Charvak, around 80 kilometers from Tashkent. The year-round resort is expected to include hotels and residential developments, along with dining and entertainment facilities.
Gayrat Mukhamedov, director of the State Center for Environmental Expertise, told Gazeta.uz that “only the first stage of the procedure,” involving the selection and allocation of land, has been completed. The center has not yet received the documents needed to assess the environmental impact of the complex itself.
The location has been one of the main sources of controversy surrounding the project. Charvak lies in the foothills of the Western Tien Shan and remains one of Uzbekistan’s most popular recreational areas. After the Sea Breeze plans were published, environmentalists and civic activists called for more information about the potential impact of development on the reservoir. In the summer of 2025, the #SaveChorvoq campaign emerged on social media.
On August 1, 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the investment project. It is being implemented by Sea Breeze Uzbekistan LLC, a joint venture established with the participation of Agalarov Development.
One of the conditions is protecting Charvak from pollution. Wastewater must be taken outside the coastal zone and sent to a centralized treatment system, with no discharge into the reservoir. The requirement applies both during construction and during the subsequent operation of the resort.
Mukhamedov said the environmental review center is still waiting for final technical data on the treatment system, including its capacity, as well as definitive figures for the resort’s accommodation capacity and the number of cottages, homes, and other facilities.
Public hearings on the environmental impact assessment for Sea Breeze were held in Bostanlyk District on January 23, 2026. The issues scheduled for discussion included the project’s impact on water, air, and soil, waste management, preservation of green areas, and environmental monitoring.
At the hearings, project representatives discussed the future sewage system, wastewater treatment, and measures to preserve biodiversity. The plan envisaged wastewater being collected through a centralized sewage system for treatment away from the reservoir.
The public hearings, however, do not replace the second stage of the state environmental review. More than six months later, the technical documents for that stage have still not been submitted.
Mukhamedov said the next phase will depend in part on seasonal studies by Uzbekistan’s Institute of Botany and Institute of Zoology into the possible effects on local flora and fauna. The work is expected to span autumn, winter, and spring, while the environmental review will also examine the resort’s master plan and wastewater infrastructure.
“The project has not been completed. For example, we have still not received documents specifying what the treatment facilities will be like, what their capacity will be, how many people the resort will accommodate, or how many cottages and houses will be built,” Mukhamedov told Gazeta.uz.
He estimated that preparation of the detailed project could take roughly another two years. Once the second-stage documents are submitted, the State Centre for Environmental Expertise will have 25 working days to assess them.
For now, activity at Charvak is limited to preparatory work. Mukhamedov said the shoreline is being reinforced, land is being prepared, and trees are being planted, but construction of the resort’s main buildings has not yet begun.
The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules
In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days before being officially confirmed. Mirziyoyev, then prime minister, was appointed chairman of the state funeral commission. Under the constitution, Senate Chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev should have become acting president, but he stood aside and parliament appointed Mirziyoyev instead. During his presidency, Mirziyoyev has transformed Uzbekistan's economy, opened the country to foreign investment, and pursued a far more active foreign policy. Yet the political system has retained its strongly presidential character. The appointment of his daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, as Head of the Presidential Administration in June 2025 has fuelled renewed speculation about possible future succession scenarios, even though the authorities have never publicly discussed the issue. Tajikistan arrived at its current political model by a different route. Emomali Rahmon emerged as the country's leader during the civil war after becoming Chairman of the Supreme Council following the resignation of President Rahmon Nabiyev. When the presidency was restored in 1994, Rahmon assumed the office and has remained there ever since. For years, political analysts and representatives of the Tajik opposition have regarded Rahmon's eldest son, Rustam Emomali – Chairman of the National Assembly and Mayor of Dushanbe – as the most likely successor. Under Article 71 of Tajikistan's Constitution, the president's duties pass to the Chairman of the Majlisi Milli in the event of death, resignation, or incapacity until a newly elected president takes office. Kazakhstan long appeared to be the exception. In March 2019, First President Nursultan Nazarbayev unexpectedly resigned, and under the Constitution the presidency passed to Senate Speaker Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Nazarbayev later acknowledged that he had viewed Tokayev as his preferred successor well before the formal transfer of power. The January 2022 unrest marked a turning point in Kazakhstan's political development. After the crisis, Tokayev significantly strengthened his position, while the reforms that followed eventually culminated in a new Constitution, approved in March 2026 and in force from July 1, which created a vice presidency and further reshaped the architecture of the state. Whether the current model represents another stage in its evolution remains to be seen. In July 2026, the Constitutional Court ruled that Tokayev may seek another presidential term under the new constitutional order, although he has not announced that he will do so. Kyrgyzstan occupies a unique place in this story. President Sadyr Japarov came to power in the aftermath of yet another political upheaval following the disputed parliamentary elections of October 2020. The protests that swept the country led to his release from prison and propelled him to the presidency. One of the central figures behind those events was Kamchybek Tashiyev, who became one of the most influential figures in Kyrgyz politics. Japarov is already the sixth president in Kyrgyzstan's history as an independent state. The 2017 handover from Almazbek Atambayev to Sooronbay Jeenbekov was the country's first peaceful transfer from one elected president to another. Kyrgyzstan has nevertheless experienced repeated presidential upheavals, including revolutions in 2005, 2010, and 2020. For years, Western observers described Kyrgyzstan as Central Asia's "island of democracy." Yet repeated political crises have gradually changed the country's trajectory. The current leadership has steadily strengthened presidential authority, tightened control over political life, and made little secret of its determination to prevent a repeat of past upheavals. The presidential election scheduled for January 2027 is expected to show how firmly that strategy has taken hold. Thirty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has developed its own approach to political succession. It is not a single model. In some countries, continuity increasingly revolves around political families; in others, carefully prepared successors inherit power through established institutions. Kazakhstan has followed a different course, combining constitutional procedures with political reform, while Kyrgyzstan continues to search for a formula capable of delivering stability without repeating the turbulence that has defined much of its modern history. The region's systems differ in form, but they share one objective: ensuring that political transitions remain as controlled and predictable as possible. Perhaps the greatest irony is that Kyrgyzstan – the only Central Asian state where power has repeatedly changed hands through popular protest – is now moving closer to the governance model long associated with its neighbors. How far that transformation will go may become clearer after the presidential election in January 2027.
How the Russia–Ukraine War Is Reshaping Central Asia’s Geopolitical Balance
More than four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict continues to alter political and economic relations across the former Soviet space. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Uzbek political scientist Mukhtor Nazirov examined Moscow’s evolving regional role, Central Asia’s search for wider external partnerships, and the areas in which Russia remains difficult to replace. “The war changed Russia,” Nazirov said. “It became more closed, more militarized, and its political logic increasingly became military. Central Asian countries suddenly found themselves dealing with a Russia that was no longer the same as it had been before the war.” Before 2022, Russia’s relations with Central Asia rested on long-established political, economic, and security ties. Since the invasion, international isolation and wartime pressures have complicated that relationship. “The war consumed everything,” Nazirov explained. “It influenced not only politics and the economy, but also public thinking, the country’s openness, its ideology, and the overall direction of the state. As Russia changed during the war, its dialogue with Central Asian countries became increasingly difficult.” “Central Asian states gained a moral justification to look for other options,” he said. “Russia is no longer the Russia it used to be.” Russia nevertheless remains deeply embedded in the region’s economy. Infrastructure, logistics networks, export routes, and labor migration still bind Central Asian states to the Russian market. Kazakhstan exports most of its oil through Russia’s Novorossiysk port, while trade from Uzbekistan and other countries continues to rely heavily on northern corridors. Millions of Central Asian citizens also work in Russia. “The economic foundation still exists,” Nazirov told TCA. “Much of Central Asia remains part of an economic structure that was formed during the Soviet period. Infrastructure is shared, and many export routes still pass through Russia.” However, the durability of Moscow’s influence is under closer scrutiny as other powers expand their regional presence. “Political closeness alone is not enough,” Nazirov said. “Any partnership eventually comes down to economics. If Russia wants to remain influential, it must have a strong economic foundation. If it cannot provide that, then others will naturally begin filling the gap.” China and the European Union have expanded their economic engagement as sanctions and wartime demands have constrained Russia. Interest has also grown in the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which offers an alternative to routes through Russia. “The rhetoric surrounding the Middle Corridor became much stronger during the war,” he said. “The project already existed, but the war created momentum.” The EU’s Global Gateway initiative and new connectivity financing have given Central Asian governments additional channels for trade, investment, and transport. “This space is being filled partly by China and partly by the European Union,” he said. “They are proposing alternatives, and naturally Central Asian countries are turning toward those opportunities.” Russia remains the main destination for Central Asian labor migrants, although governments are pursuing employment opportunities in South Korea, Europe, and the Gulf states. “I would not say diversification has already taken place,” Nazirov said. “But efforts in that direction are clearly underway.” Sanctions and concern over secondary exposure have added another consideration for governments and businesses across the region. “There is now a perception that cooperation with Russia has become more toxic,” Nazirov said. “In some cases, the reputational and economic risks outweigh the benefits.” Although they have intensified, discrimination and abuse against Central Asian migrants in Russia predate the invasion. Reports of pressure on detained migrants to sign documents leading to military contracts have raised additional concern. “They often do not want to go to war,” he said. “Various methods of pressure are used, and many of their relatives do not even know where they have been sent. People now understand what may happen if they are detained. That is one reason why mobilization among migrants has become more difficult.” The war has also affected Kazakhstan through its oil export infrastructure. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev recently suggested freezing the conflict after attacks damaged facilities linked to the Novorossiysk route, through which more than 80% of Kazakh oil reaches world markets. “The proposal was driven first of all by economic considerations,” Nazirov told TCA. “Kazakhstan’s main export route was affected, and that directly influences the country’s economic interests. Kazakhstan is suffering economic losses because of a conflict that is not its own. That was the main message.” Tokayev’s remarks also raised questions about whether Astana’s position represented a broader political shift. “There is no need to create a hero out of Tokayev,” Nazirov said. “Every politician acts according to the interests of their country, their economy, or their own political legitimacy. In this case, economic interests were the decisive factor.” Uzbekistan has also accelerated work on alternative trade and transport routes, including the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, as governments seek options beyond northern corridors. “Sanctions have affected logistics and trade with Russia,” Nazirov said. “That is one reason why alternative transport projects have become increasingly important.” The push for new transport links has coincided with closer coordination among the five Central Asian states. “Integration is often a reaction to instability,” he said. “As disorder around Central Asia increases, the countries of the region are becoming more united because they have little choice.” China’s role has grown through trade and investment, while Uzbekistan has expanded contacts with Western partners in areas including critical minerals and its bid to join the World Trade Organization. “Tashkent wants to demonstrate that Uzbekistan is a dynamically developing country and attract more international partners. Those signals are directed primarily toward Western investors rather than Russia.” Uzbekistan has also increased economic engagement with Afghanistan since the Taliban returned to power, while pursuing new transport and trade projects. “I think Uzbekistan has actively tried to diversify its trade and economic relations, and the war has been one of the factors encouraging that process,” Nazirov said. Central Asian governments have also sought closer ties with Washington as they broaden their external partnerships. “If cooperation serves American interests today, relations improve, and previous disagreements are quickly forgotten. But if those interests no longer align, the relationship can change just as quickly. It is a temporary alignment of interests rather than a traditional alliance.” Formats such as B5+1 have gained prominence alongside traditional diplomacy. “The emphasis has shifted toward economic cooperation,” Nazirov said. “There is always the question of what happens after Trump. Will these initiatives continue, or will they lose momentum once the officials leading them leave office?!” Across Central Asia, governments are preserving working relations with Russia while expanding cooperation with China, the European Union, the United States, and other partners. Kyrgyzstan faces growing secondary-sanctions risks, while Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are responding to the same shifting external environment from different political and economic positions. The five states have increasingly used regional coordination to present common positions and engage outside powers. “The region is surrounded by instability,” Nazirov told TCA. “Central Asia understands that individual countries are too small to attract sustained international attention on their own. By coordinating more closely, they become a much more significant partner.” The war has accelerated trends already underway across Central Asia, including the diversification of economic partnerships, development of alternative routes, and closer regional cooperation. Russia remains a major political and economic actor, but the region now has more partners and more avenues through which to reduce dependence on any single external power.
Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws
Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law.
Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data.
The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices.
Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage.
The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it.
The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent.
Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies.One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left them alone together, where the man fatally stabbed her. The killing provoked nationwide outrage. More than twenty police officers faced disciplinary measures, several lost their jobs, and the perpetrator was sentenced to twenty years in prison.
The case did not prove exceptional. In April 2021, 27-year-old Aizada Kanatbekova was abducted in broad daylight in Bishkek by a group led by a man who intended to force her to marry him. A witness alerted police, who also had access to security-camera footage, but Aizada was found strangled to death two days later. In September 2024, a Bishkek court upheld the acquittal of the former city police chief on negligence charges connected to the case.
Human rights organizations argue that the problem extends beyond criminal penalties. According to Human Rights Watch, women who survive abduction frequently face pressure from relatives and local communities to withdraw complaints or agree to the marriage. As a result, many kidnappings never lead to criminal investigations, leaving official statistics to capture only a fraction of the cases.
Kazakhstan has faced a different legal challenge. Rather than debating the severity of punishment, public discussion focused for years on the structure of the law itself.
Until September 2025, a person who abducted a woman could avoid criminal liability by voluntarily releasing the victim. In practice, that provision frequently allowed criminal proceedings to be terminated before reaching court. According to International IDEA, approximately 95% of criminal cases involving the abduction of women for forced marriage were closed on those grounds during the previous five years. The figure became one of the principal arguments for legislative reform.
Following a lengthy public debate, Kazakhstan amended its Criminal Code. The exemption from liability for voluntarily releasing a victim was removed, a separate offense of coercion into marriage was introduced, and penalties for abduction were strengthened.
The amendments took effect on September 16, 2025. By early November, the Interior Ministry said police had opened seven cases and detained 15 people. Convictions followed in 2026. In one case, three men abducted a 19-year-old woman in Taraz after she repeatedly refused to marry the man who organized the kidnapping. In May, all three received three-year sentences. These early prosecutions show that the law is being used, although it remains too soon to assess whether it has reduced the prevalence of bride kidnapping.
In Uzbekistan, bride kidnapping can begin with something as ordinary as accepting a lift home. One woman told Kun.uz that a man offered to drive her back, then took her instead to an unfamiliar house. When she tried to leave, an older woman blocked the doorway and warned that stepping over her would bring lifelong unhappiness. She stayed and married the man.
Uzbek law treats such cases as a crime. Article 136 prohibits abducting a woman for marriage, forcing her to marry or remain married, or preventing her from marrying someone of her choice. The maximum sentence is three years in prison. Yet cases continue to surface. In 2021, a 21-year-old woman in the Tashkent region escaped after being taken to a man’s home and pressured to marry him, prompting police to open a criminal investigation. The situation in Tajikistan remains less well documented. Human rights organizations report that many women avoid contacting law enforcement because they fear social stigma or pressure from relatives. Official statistics therefore reflect only a small proportion of cases, making it difficult to estimate the true scale of the problem. Even less information is available for Turkmenistan. Independent research is almost nonexistent, while the country's closed political environment severely limits journalists' and international organizations' ability to investigate such cases. In these circumstances, the absence of official data reflects a lack of information rather than evidence that the practice does not exist. Experience across Central Asia suggests that legislation alone is not enough. Even where criminal penalties have been strengthened or laws rewritten, many cases never reach the police. As long as social pressure, fear of public condemnation, and family expectations discourage women from reporting abductions, official statistics will continue to reveal only part of the picture.
Uzbekistan AI: Can Its Tech Boom Deliver an AI Economy?
Uzbekistan has spent the past several years positioning itself as a fast-growing Central Asian market for IT outsourcing. The government is now seeking to build an artificial intelligence economy on that export-oriented technology sector. While the state is investing in computing infrastructure and public-sector projects, Tashkent is looking to private technology companies to drive much of AI's commercial adoption. The strategy has produced visible activity, but whether it can develop into a sustainable AI economy remains an open question. Over the past five years, the government has expanded IT Park and its incentives, simplified rules for employing foreign specialists, and introduced tax breaks for resident companies. As digital service exports have grown, artificial intelligence has increasingly been positioned as the sector's next stage. According to IT Park, its resident companies were exporting services to more than 90 countries after the first seven months of 2025. North America accounted for 45% of exports, while the Asia-Pacific region and the Commonwealth of Independent States accounted for 26%, and the European Union and the United Kingdom for 24%. The figures show the sector's geographical reach. That export base gives Uzbekistan a plausible route into AI. Local companies can use existing engineering and outsourcing capacity to develop products for foreign clients, while private companies and software exports hold a prominent role in the government's commercial strategy. Uzbekistan has not yet built a fully fledged AI economy. Under targets set by an October 2025 presidential decree, at least 100 AI projects are to be implemented by the end of 2026, AI laboratories are to open at 15 universities, and more than $1 billion in foreign investment is to be attracted for AI infrastructure by 2030. These targets show the scale of the government's ambitions. Success will depend less on the number of approved programs than on whether they produce commercially viable AI products for international markets. Microsoft's Global AI Diffusion in Q1 2026 report estimated that 7.2% of Uzbekistan's working-age population used a generative AI product during the first quarter, compared with a global average of 17.8%. Uzbekistan was nevertheless among several Central Asian countries recording rapid growth from a relatively low base. Government policy is now shifting from creating favorable conditions toward supporting commercially oriented companies. In 2026, Uzbekistan launched the President AI Award, a national program combining startup acceleration with performance-based investment. Financing is linked to measurable business results and companies' ability to bring products to market. The government is also building a venture funding structure for technology startups. IT Park Ventures, established with the support of the Ministry of Digital Technologies, invests in technology startups, with artificial intelligence, fintech, DeepTech, and education technology among its priority sectors. The fund also helps portfolio companies enter international markets and connect with foreign investors. One Uzbek AI company active in this ecosystem is Repli AI. In March 2026, the startup secured $375,000 in cloud credits from Microsoft and Google to further develop its AI-powered sales and customer service platform. These were service credits rather than cash investment: $350,000 came through Microsoft Azure, and $25,000 through Google Cloud. The platform automates sales and customer service interactions on Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp. It uses natural language processing and retrieval-augmented generation, allowing its responses to draw on information provided by a business. The product is currently localized for Uzbek- and Russian-speaking markets, with the credits intended to help the company expand its infrastructure and enter new markets. Repli AI represents the type of company Uzbekistan hopes to cultivate through its emerging AI ecosystem: businesses that develop AI products and seek customers beyond the domestic market at an early stage. Support for such companies is also expanding. After a training phase in May and June 2026, selected teams entered a 10-week AI Incubator program in Tashkent in July. The program brings together engineers, entrepreneurs, and industry experts to refine AI products, develop business models, and prepare for market entry. Local founders and investors have also identified practical constraints. A February 2026 UNDP study, based on consultations with businesses, startups, investors, officials, academics, and industry groups in Uzbekistan, pointed to high computing costs, limited shared GPU capacity, gaps in access to usable data, and modest venture funding. It also said some standard investment instruments, including SAFE agreements and convertible notes, are not yet recognized under local law. The study noted efforts to expand domestic computing capacity, but these constraints can still slow the path from prototypes to commercial scale. Many of the country's visible AI initiatives remain at an early stage. The market for domestically developed AI products is still considerably smaller than Uzbekistan's established exports of traditional IT services. For now, it is more accurate to speak of an emerging AI ecosystem than a mature AI economy. However, recent international rankings suggest Uzbekistan's technology ecosystem is gaining momentum. According to the StartupBlink Global Startup Ecosystem Index 2026, Uzbekistan climbed to 79th place globally, recording the world's fastest annual increase in ecosystem score, and receiving the Country of the Year 2026 award. The report also identified Central Asia as the fastest-growing startup region in the world, with Tashkent emerging as one of its principal growth centers. The country's progress is also reflected in international assessments of government AI readiness. According to Oxford Insights, Uzbekistan rose from 87th place in 2023 to 62nd in 2025. The index measures a government's capacity to adopt and govern AI, rather than actual public use or the commercial success of domestic AI companies. These indicators show that Uzbekistan has assembled many of the institutions associated with an AI ecosystem. Its export-oriented IT sector now operates alongside tax incentives, venture funds, startup accelerators, and government AI programs. Uzbekistan's ability to turn those foundations into globally competitive companies will determine whether the sector develops into an AI economy. Software exports have already shown that local firms can compete internationally. Higher-value AI products that win customers beyond Uzbekistan will provide the clearest measure of progress.
Uzbekistan Turns to Georgia and Iraq as Jet Fuel Demand Rises 27%
Uzbekistan says it has arranged aviation fuel imports from Georgia, Iraq, and other countries as changes in regional air traffic drive up demand. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's office said on August 3 that demand for aviation fuel will reach an estimated 375,000 metric tons from July through December, 27% higher than in the same period in 2025. The government linked the increase to more flights through Central Asia and a rise in services to Uzbekistan, according to an official statement. “Most of this demand will be met by domestic oil refineries,” the president’s office said, adding that alternative import channels, including supplies from Georgia and Iraq, had been established in response to export restrictions imposed by certain partner countries. The statement did not identify the countries imposing the restrictions. It also gave no details about suppliers, import volumes, prices, delivery routes, or whether shipments from Georgia and Iraq have begun. Batumi Oil Terminal resumed handling European-produced aviation fuel in July, while Georgia’s Kulevi refinery does not plan to begin producing aviation kerosene until 2027. Uzbekistan has not said whether the supplies listed as coming from Georgia are produced there or re-exported through the country. State-owned Uzbekneftegaz aims to produce 310,000 tons of aviation fuel in 2026. This is only the company’s production target, not Uzbekistan’s total domestic output. The government has not said how much of the country’s aviation fuel demand will be met by Uzbekneftegaz, other domestic producers, or imports. Uzbekistan's airports handled 64,831 flights during the first half of 2026, up 8% from a year earlier. Passenger traffic rose 16% to more than 8.15 million, according to Uzbekistan Airports data. International services accounted for 47,371 flights and nearly 6.7 million passengers, with Tashkent International Airport handling 40,283 flights, up 7%, while passenger traffic increased 17% to 5.36 million. Tourism is also adding to passenger demand. Uzbekistan recorded 6,565,410 foreign visits for tourism purposes in January-June, up 24.9% from a year earlier, according to the National Statistics Committee. The increase forms part of a wider regional travel boom. However, almost three-quarters of those came from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, which together accounted for 4.9 million arrivals. The total therefore includes substantial land-border traffic and cannot be read solely as an air-passenger figure. Geopolitical disruption is another factor driving demand. The war involving Iran has constricted a main Europe-Asia aviation corridor and forced airlines away from high-risk airspace. Some services are now using a northern arc through the Caucasus and Central Asia, increasing the value of the region’s airspace. Pressure from the north predates the Iran conflict. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many Western carriers have avoided Russian airspace. Uzbekistan Airways began routing Europe services around Russia and Belarus in January 2025. Its Tashkent-Munich route grew by 307 kilometers, adding 30 to 40 minutes to the journey time. Uzbekistan already had a growing air transit base. Uzaeronavigation served 188,000 flights in 2023, including 143,000 by foreign airlines. More than 74,000 flights were handled in Uzbek airspace during January-April 2024 alone. More traffic raises revenue for airports and air navigation providers, but it also increases demand for fuel and ground services, especially when carriers make technical stops or fly longer routes. Meanwhile, Russia introduced a temporary ban on aviation fuel exports on May 30, a restriction that runs through November 30 but exempts deliveries made under intergovernmental agreements. Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry said its bilateral agreement with Russia would keep supplies flowing. The regional market has nevertheless come under pressure. Russian jet fuel shipments by rail to Central Asia and Afghanistan fell by more than 92% in June from May, to 3,800 tons, Reuters reported. Ten days after the Uzbek ministry’s assurance, Uzbekistan Airways reduced frequencies on some routes to Russia. “Due to a shortage of aviation fuel and the increase in its cost, we are forced to reduce flight frequencies on certain routes between cities of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation,” the airline said in a June 12 statement. The airline did not say whether the shortage was linked to Russian deliveries. The August 3 government statement also did not identify which partner countries had imposed the export restrictions that prompted the new supply channels. Tashkent is expanding domestic production and airport storage. A government transport plan has set a target of 600,000 tons of aviation fuel output a year by 2030. Airport storage capacity is due to rise from 49,000 to 80,000 tons, with new facilities planned in Navoi, Andijan, Bukhara, Urgench, and New Tashkent. The Fergana Oil Refinery began serial production of Jet A-1 fuel with a synthetic component from the Uzbekistan GTL plant in June. The blend contains 40% synthetic kerosene and 60% conventional fuel. Operator Saneg JetWhites said initial production could reach 10,000 tons a month, with a later increase to 20,000-25,000 tons. The company said the project could raise the domestic share of Uzbekistan’s aviation fuel supply from 40-50% to 70-80%. Uzbekistan Airports has also signed an agreement linked to a proposed $6.1 billion biofuel project. It is intended to supply sustainable aviation fuel and electro-synthetic fuel from 2030, so will not help meet the immediate rise in conventional demand. Domestic refineries and new imports must cover a 375,000-ton requirement over six months. The government has not published monthly import volumes or contract details, leaving the scale of the Georgian and Iraqi supplies unclear.
Central Asia and Azerbaijan: What the Region’s Leaders Agreed at Issyk-Kul
The Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, briefly became Central Asia’s political capital as it hosted a series of high-level meetings, including bilateral talks between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only a few years ago, such a format would have seemed unlikely. Today, however, regional leaders are discussing joint railway projects, energy security, transport corridors, investment, and foreign-policy coordination rather than managing old disputes. The agreements reached in Cholpon-Ata suggest that the consultative format is gradually evolving from a platform for political dialogue into a mechanism for practical regional cooperation. From Conflict to Alliance Ahead of the informal multilateral meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held bilateral talks that set the tone for the broader regional meeting. Relations between the two countries now stand in sharp contrast to the situation sixteen years ago. Following the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, relations between Bishkek and Tashkent entered one of their most difficult periods since independence. The agenda between the two neighbors has since changed dramatically. Speaking in Cholpon-Ata, Mirziyoyev said relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had reached “a historic peak.” Bilateral trade has increased almost tenfold in recent years, reaching $1.2 billion last year. The two countries now have around 450 joint ventures, operate a joint Development Fund to support cooperative projects, and have established 15 air routes and five bus services linking their cities. Mirziyoyev described the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway as one of the most important joint initiatives between the two countries, arguing that the project would reshape transport links across Eurasia. “This railway will fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape. Those who understand what it took to make this happen know what a major achievement it is,” Mirziyoyev said. The talks concluded with the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two sides also exchanged several bilateral documents, including agreements covering sections of their common border and the joint use of the Chashma spring. A Broader Regional Agenda While the Japarov-Mirziyoyev talks focused primarily on bilateral relations, the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan broadened the discussion to regional integration, transport connectivity, energy security, and foreign-policy coordination. Opening the meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said one of the clearest results of closer regional cooperation had been the Central Asian countries’ growing support for one another on the international stage. As an example, he cited the region’s joint support for Kyrgyzstan’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. Japarov also revived the idea of introducing a single tourist visa for foreign visitors traveling across Central Asia, proposing that the region’s foreign ministries intensify consultations on the initiative. Azerbaijan’s participation as a full member gave the meeting additional significance. Baku joined the consultative format as a full participant in November 2025, reflecting the growing importance of trans-Caspian connectivity and the increasingly close economic ties linking the South Caucasus with Central Asia. During his state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that the two countries had signed a package of bilateral agreements, including a Treaty on Allied Relations, elevating cooperation to a new level. The sides also agreed to increase the capital of the Kyrgyz-Azerbaijani Development Fund from $100 million to $200 million. According to Aliyev, the fund has already financed several projects, some of which are now operational, while considerable scope remains for further investment cooperation. Mirziyoyev argued that Central Asia should now be viewed within a broader geopolitical framework. In his view, a region that was once fragmented is gradually consolidating around a shared development agenda, while Azerbaijan’s participation extends that process beyond Central Asia itself. “A historic opportunity is opening before us to create a common space for development linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Afghanistan. We must seize this moment to build lasting ties and good-neighborly relations in the heart of Eurasia,” Mirziyoyev said. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also emphasized the institutional dimension of regional cooperation. He described the current period as the most successful in Central Asia’s modern history and proposed developing an implementation roadmap for the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the 21st Century, which had previously been signed by the region’s leaders. Transport and Energy Take Center Stage Beyond political coordination, the leaders devoted considerable attention to practical projects aimed at strengthening regional connectivity and reducing Central Asia’s vulnerability to external economic pressures. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon proposed exploring the construction of a large regional oil refinery equipped with modern technologies. He argued that continued volatility in global and regional energy markets had highlighted the importance of energy security as one of the key conditions for sustainable economic development. “Given today’s realities, we should jointly consider this extremely important issue,” Rahmon said. The proposal comes amid continued turbulence in regional fuel markets. In summer 2026, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan experienced fuel shortages and price increases as Russian exports fell, exposing the region’s dependence on external suppliers and lending additional weight to calls for expanding domestic refining capacity. Transport connectivity was another dominant theme. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, highlighted by Japarov and Mirziyoyev during their bilateral talks, was repeatedly presented as a project capable of reshaping trade flows across Eurasia. Together with the continued development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, it is expected to strengthen Central Asia’s role as a major transit region linking Asia and Europe. As the principal gateway across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan has become an essential link between Central Asia and European markets. Transport infrastructure is increasingly emerging as one of the strongest drivers of cooperation between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The Next Meeting Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov announced that the eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan is scheduled for October 8, 2026, in the Avaza National Tourist Zone on Turkmenistan’s Caspian coast. According to Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan has already circulated a draft agenda covering five priority areas: regional security; deeper cooperation between Central Asia and Azerbaijan; energy and transport connectivity; joint efforts to address environmental challenges, climate adaptation, water resource management, and the restoration of the Aral Sea; and expanded cooperation in education, science, culture, and youth exchanges. From Political Dialogue to Regional Integration The informal meeting concluded with the adoption of the Cholpon-Ata Declaration, reaffirming the participating countries’ commitment to expanding cooperation in economic development, transport, energy, security, and humanitarian exchanges. According to Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, the document reflects the level of trust that has developed among the region’s states and their shared determination to deepen cooperation further. Yet the meeting’s significance extends beyond the documents signed. Sixteen years ago, relations between some Central Asian neighbors were overshadowed by border disputes, political tensions, and mutual distrust. At Cholpon-Ata, by contrast, discussions centered on railway construction, transport corridors, energy security, investment mechanisms, and the coordination of regional policies. The meeting also highlighted the changing geography of regional cooperation. Azerbaijan, once viewed primarily as an external partner, is becoming an integral participant in Central Asia’s broader economic agenda. Together with the continued development of the Middle Corridor, this is gradually linking Central Asia and the South Caucasus into a wider economic space built around shared transport, trade, and infrastructure interests. The consultative format has evolved as well. What began as a forum for rebuilding political dialogue is increasingly becoming a mechanism for coordinating practical regional initiatives. Judging by the agreements reached at Issyk-Kul, the emphasis is shifting from declarations of intent toward projects capable of reshaping Central Asia’s economic geography over the coming years.
Short Stories from the Region
