Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be discussing the impact on Central Asia of the war centered on Iran, its impact on trade routes, and diplomacy among the C6. I’ll be appearing on the show as a guest alongside Alex Vatanka of the Washington-based Middle East Institute.

Central Asia and Britain Launch CA5+UK Ministerial Track

On February 26, 2026, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in London with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper at Lancaster House for the inaugural “Central Asia–UK” (CA5+UK) ministerial. Official statements described it as the first time since independence that all five Central Asian foreign ministers have met jointly with a UK foreign secretary in a single forum. They also presented the meeting as the start of a structured ministerial channel, intended to convene regularly, that can carry regional priorities while leaving bilateral agendas in place. The United Kingdom is framing the new CA5+UK channel as a replacement for scattered bilateral visits: a single ministerial venue can set shared priorities and route them into investment and services work. For the five Central Asian states, it adds another external track, widening options without forcing institutional choices. Public statements point to a practical agenda focused on trade and investment, transport connectivity, energy transition, and critical minerals, with security present chiefly as background context. The enabling layer of finance, standards, education, and professional services is also included. How the London Program Unrolled On February 25, meetings took place at the British Parliament as part of the London schedule. The five ministers met with House of Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle and held a session with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Central Asia, chaired by Pam Cox.  The meetings in Parliament complemented the ministerial session at Lancaster House by widening contact beyond foreign ministries. The discussion emphasized committee-to-committee contacts, visits, and exchange of legislative practice as a complement to intergovernmental diplomacy. Parliamentary relationships and staff channels can carry attention between ministerial sessions, assisting with follow-up after cooperative contacts have been publicly established. They represent a second continuity layer: implementation often turns on routine access and working familiarity rather than on formal statements alone. Between the parliamentary program and the ministerial delegations, they also met with the United Kingdom business community at a reception in London. This was a practical companion to the new format, aiming at the conversion of diplomatic intent into projects that can be financed and executed. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev cogently highlighted the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which operates under English common law with an independent court and arbitration system and British judges in the AIFC Court. Beyond the plenary session, a ministerial working lunch provided a venue to follow up on such initiatives. Early deliverables were not multilateral but bilateral. Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom signed a strategic roadmap on critical minerals through 2027 and paired it with education moves, including a licensed Coventry University campus in Almaty and plans involving British secondary and higher education institutions. Uzbekistan reported a Memorandum of Understanding on healthcare services that it presented as a platform for building pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, alongside separate discussions with investment and finance counterparts in London. Turkmenistan cited a 2026–2027 cooperation program between foreign ministries, and Tajikistan continued to emphasize investment and cooperation in science and education. CA5+UK Launches with Bilateral Packages The CA5+UK forum launches another “plus-one” mechanism in a region where major partners are now structuring their engagement through repeatable formats. In line with that engagement, the UK initiative concerns not so much building a new institution as attaching deal-enabling capacity to already existing projects. Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry underscored the breadth of the bilateral agenda and noted that ratification of the 2024 Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement would widen the platform for cooperation. At the CA5+UK, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev confidently presented Kazakhstan as the region’s connectivity hub, noting that 13 major transit corridors cross Kazakhstan and that about 85% of overland cargo between Europe and Asia moves through its territory. For the five delegations, the practical payoff is direct access to counterparties that can price risk, mobilize capital, and sustain follow-up between ministerial sessions, without narrowing external options. The schedule described by Uzbekistan’s foreign ministry paired political meetings with implementation-oriented discussions, including the healthcare MoU mentioned above, and separate talks with Standard Chartered Bank on financing large industrial projects as well as with Benoy on urban and transport planning, including New Tashkent and regional master plans. Kyrgyzstan used the Kyrgyz-British Business Council meeting to widen the investor pipeline around critical minerals and banking cooperation, with the emphasis on market access and capital-raising, rather than on a single signed headline document. Even in a UK-facing commercially oriented format, once banks, insurers, and logistics providers are involved, projects are shaped by compliance screening, sanctions exposure, and risk pricing. Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev warned that unilateral restrictive measures could affect trade, economic, and financial cooperation with the United Kingdom and called for dialogue to keep commercial ties from being pulled into political disputes. The practical effect is a tilt toward projects with clearly identified counterparties, documented compliance pathways, and predictable dispute-resolution procedures acceptable to financiers. Transactions that raise screening burdens close more slowly or at higher cost; taking these conditions into account, Kosherbayev described the new track as results-oriented and stressed “tangible results.” CA5+UK in the “Plus-One” Field The CA5+UK joins several other “plus-one” formats that Central Asian governments can sequence against one another. Germany’s Z5+1 has been presented as a tool-driven work channel that can move through German instruments while remaining compatible with European Union programming. The United States–led C5+1 is framed as a standing diplomatic platform for regional solutions and joint work across multiple agencies. China has relied on leader-level summitry and formal political upgrading, including a treaty-based umbrella for long-horizon cooperation. The UK format is different: it can succeed without a heavy institutional superstructure if it repeatedly converts priority sectors into financeable transactions under UK documentation and risk standards. It will look viable if it becomes a routine mechanism rather than an annual event. What is needed for that is an early decision on the next ministerial date, accompanied by the naming of contacts to carry the work between meetings. A small but visible pipeline of projects that reach financing and implementation steps would be another indicator, even if no project is a big headline. For the Central Asian five, the CA5+UK is useful if it increases execution capacity without narrowing external options or forcing institutional lock-in. The format can give them access to instruments that make projects financeable, particularly where counterparties depend on legal predictability and transaction support. The potential cost is that a larger number of channels increases the premium on intraregional coordination, because different timetables and financing terms can complicate the coordination of project selection and messaging.

Middle East Conflict Tests Central Asia’s Trade Routes and Energy Security

The escalating conflict between Iran, the United States, and their regional partners is raising economic concerns across Central Asia. Turkmenistan shares a long border with Iran, while other Central Asian economies depend on energy markets and trade routes that pass through or around the Persian Gulf. A wider conflict there could ripple across Central Asia through higher fuel prices, disrupted logistics, and pressure on key transport corridors. For countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the most immediate risk is rising fuel prices. Both depend heavily on imported fuel. Kyrgyz security expert Taalaibek Jumadylov has warned that Kyrgyzstan could face rising prices for food, clothing, and other essential goods. For Tajikistan, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would significantly increase import costs. Tajik media reports that trade between Tajikistan and Iran has grown rapidly over the past five years. Tajik-Iranian trade turnover increased from $377.7 million in 2024 to approximately $484 million in 2025, a rise of around 28%. Tajikistan’s exports totaled about $113 million, while imports from Iran exceeded $371 million, giving Iran a 4.5% share of Tajikistan’s total foreign trade turnover. If global oil prices rise significantly, Tajikistan could also face additional pressure on its budget. There are indirect risks as well: a slowdown in the economies of Russia, China, or other major partners could affect Tajikistan through trade, investment flows, and remittances. In Uzbekistan, analysts note that in recent years Iran has actively pursued transport diplomacy with Central Asia, seeking to strengthen its position as a regional logistics hub. Uzbek analyst Nargiza Umarova says this trend aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Iran and China signed a 25-year cooperation agreement in March 2021, a deal widely described as deepening Iran’s role in Belt and Road-linked connectivity. Kazakh economist Almas Chukin highlighted the logistical advantages of transport routes through Iran. “If we take the point where the Turkmenistan railway connects with Iran and the route to the Persian Gulf, it is about 1,200-1,500 kilometers. This is comparable to the distance from Astana to Almaty. Once you cover this distance, you reach the Persian Gulf and its major ports, where you can handle anything from oil transshipment to grain shipments. From there, sea transport to Rotterdam takes about three to four weeks,” he stated. Chukin added that such routes could simplify exports compared with transporting oil through Russia to Novorossiysk and then via the Black Sea, the Bosphorus Strait, and the Mediterranean. According to his estimates, a rail route to Europe through Iran would be about 3,500 kilometers from the Turkmen border. The economist suggested that if Iran’s political system changes and sanctions are lifted, Central Asia could benefit significantly. “This would be a huge shift for Central Asia: a region with a population of 80 million, abundant resources, and a young workforce, but constrained by geography, suddenly gaining direct access to global markets,” Chukin argued. Some analysts also point to emerging competition among regional transport corridors. In the South Caucasus, a proposed Zangezur corridor has been promoted as an alternative logistics route linking the Caspian region to Turkey and Europe. Kazakh officials, however, currently see limited direct risks from the escalation in the Middle East beyond possible volatility in global oil markets. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin said Kazakhstan has historically used logistics routes to the Persian Gulf sparingly. “The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing for some time, and logistics have already adapted to it. As for the Persian Gulf, this direction has not been widely used. We have very rarely relied on ports in the Persian Gulf, for example, Bandar Abbas. There were shipments, but not enough to significantly affect us now, as access there has always been quite complicated,” he said. According to Zhumangarin, the main risk for Kazakhstan is volatility in the tenge exchange rate driven by changes in global oil prices. “Oil price fluctuations will naturally affect the exchange rate, and exchange-rate volatility is not good,” he said. Swedish Pracademic and International Business Strategist Alex Matrsson believes that Central Asia, historically a bridge between East and West, is once again gaining strategic importance. During periods of geopolitical turbulence, land transport corridors become increasingly valuable, and Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy and a key transit hub, plays a central role. Mattsson noted that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s recent contacts with Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar and other Gulf leaders demonstrate a strategy of diversifying partnerships and expanding trade corridors. “By diversifying trade ties, investing in infrastructure, and strengthening diplomatic relations, Kazakhstan is protecting its economic future and securing Central Asia’s place in a fragile global economy,” Mattsson said. Bauryzhan Iskakov, an economist and associate professor, shares this view. He believes Kazakhstan could strengthen its position as a regional transit hub, particularly through the Trans-Caspian route. “This route runs through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Europe. Given instability in maritime shipping in the Persian Gulf region and potential risks to northern routes, Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, could play an important role in shaping alternative export and logistics flows,” he said. However, Iskakov noted that the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route still requires further development. “The Trans-Caspian infrastructure does not yet have the scale or capacity of major sea routes or key oil pipelines, so its development must be supported by investment, technical solutions, and new logistics projects,” he said.

Taken together, these factors highlight how closely Central Asia’s economic outlook is tied to developments beyond its borders. Even without direct involvement in the conflict, the region could feel its effects through higher energy prices, disrupted supply chains, and shifting trade routes.

At the same time, the crisis may accelerate efforts across Central Asia to diversify transport corridors. As geopolitical tensions reshape trade flows between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the region’s position at the crossroads of Eurasia may become both a vulnerability and an opportunity.

Turkmenistan Opens Additional Crossings as Uzbekistan Evacuates Citizens from Iran

Turkmenistan has opened several additional checkpoints on its border with Iran to allow foreign citizens to leave the country as fighting in the Middle East continues. The Russian Embassy in Ashgabat said the Turkmen authorities have opened four additional crossings along the Turkmen-Iranian frontier: Artyk–Lutfabad, Gaudan–Bajgiran, Akyayla–Incheburun, and Altyn Asyr–Incheburun. These operate alongside the Sarakhs crossing, which had already been used for evacuation transit. The move expands an overland route through Central Asia for foreigners seeking to leave Iran while air travel across parts of the Middle East remains disrupted. Uzbekistan has begun using this corridor to assist its citizens. The country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said diplomatic staff and official vehicles have been deployed to the Sarakhs crossing to receive Uzbek nationals arriving from Iran and organize their onward transport across Turkmenistan toward Uzbekistan. Uzbek outlet Daryo reported on March 4 that Uzbekistan had already repatriated 13 citizens from Iran via Turkmenistan. Russia has also pointed citizens toward the Turkmen route. The Russian Embassy in Ashgabat said its citizens unable to leave Iran by air could exit through Turkmenistan and should register with the Russian Embassy in Tehran, which is coordinating assistance for citizens inside Iran. The embassy noted that Turkmenistan maintains strict entry rules and normally requires special permits for foreign visitors. Despite those restrictions, the country has previously allowed evacuation transit from Iran during earlier regional crises. The additional crossings create another evacuation corridor alongside the route from Iran into Azerbaijan through the Astara border crossing on the Caspian coast. Foreign nationals have already used that crossing to leave Iran in recent days, including citizens from Central Asia. The Turkmenistan route provides a more direct path back into the region for evacuees traveling toward Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. Turkmenistan shares a 1,148-kilometer border with Iran. Ashgabat, the Turkmen capital, sits only about 25 kilometers north of the frontier, and several transport links connect the two countries. Sarakhs functions as an established rail and road gateway used for trade and freight movement between the two countries. In recent years, Turkmenistan and Iran have also discussed expanding rail and freight transit through the Sarakhs crossing as part of broader regional transport corridors linking Central Asia to southern markets. Turkmenistan also exports natural gas to northern Iran under swap arrangements in which Tehran delivers equivalent volumes to Azerbaijan, which could disrupt regional logistics and energy flows. The expansion of border crossings increases the capacity for organized departures from Iran and provides foreign governments with an additional land route when other exit corridors become congested. For Central Asian governments, the immediate priority remains the safe movement of their nationals out of the conflict zone. The opening of additional Turkmen checkpoints provides another corridor linking Iran to Central Asia and may ease pressure on evacuation routes through the South Caucasus.

Middle East Conflict May Slow Growth, but Gold and Oil Dynamics Could Cushion Impact

The escalating conflict in the Middle East could weigh on Uzbekistan’s economic growth if it persists, though higher gold prices and oil-driven gains in key partner economies may soften the impact, according to Uzbek economist Mirkomil Kholboyev. Kholboyev shared his analysis on his Telegram channel, examining both the direct and indirect channels through which the crisis could affect Central Asia’s largest economy. “Several days of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have already turned into open military confrontation,” he wrote. “It is still difficult to say how long this situation will last. If it is short-term and the previous status quo is restored, the impact on our economy will likely be limited and temporary. But if the war continues for a longer period, the consequences could be more significant.” Direct trade exposure appears limited. According to data from Uzbekistan’s national statistics portal, the country exported $157 million worth of goods to Iran in 2025, accounting for just 0.5% of total exports. Imports from Iran totaled $421 million, or 0.9% of overall imports. Trade with Israel was even smaller, with exports of $33 million and imports of $22 million. “Even a complete halt in trade with these countries would not significantly affect total exports,” Kholboyev wrote, though he noted that export and import growth could slow. Iran also plays a role as a transit hub. Its ports are part of broader regional logistics networks, including the Central Asia-India corridor via Chabahar and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). According to a regional analytical report, Uzbekistan accounts for 5.5% of total traffic along this route, compared with 61.1% for Kazakhstan and 29.4% for Turkmenistan. Kholboyev pointed out that while some of Uzbekistan’s trade passes through Iranian ports, the country is less dependent on them than other Central Asian countries. Still, he cautioned that prolonged fighting would inevitably disrupt both direct trade and transit flows. “I do not have precise data on how much of our total foreign trade passes specifically through Iranian ports,” he wrote. “That makes it difficult to assess the full effect. But if the war continues, both direct trade and transit through Iran will suffer serious damage.” Even if trade with the wider region, including Iran and other countries affected by hostilities, were to stop entirely, Kholboyev estimates the impact would remain moderate. The region accounts for about 2.4% of Uzbekistan’s exports and 1.5% of imports. A complete halt could slow export growth by roughly 3% and imports by about 2.5%, reducing overall GDP growth by around 0.6 percentage points. A 50% reduction in trade with the region would shave an estimated 0.2-0.3 percentage points off GDP growth. Energy markets represent a more significant risk channel. As trading resumed after the latest escalation, global oil prices rose by about 9%, driven by concerns over potential disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption passes. “If tensions escalate further and oil flows are restricted, or if prices continue rising amid uncertainty, this could slow the global economy,” Kholboyev wrote. He cited estimates suggesting that a 10% increase in oil prices can reduce global economic growth by 0.1-0.2 percentage points. China’s exposure is also relevant. Around 10-13% of China’s oil imports come from Iran. Given that China is one of Uzbekistan’s main trading partners, slower Chinese growth would likely have spillover effects. “At the same time, higher oil prices may create relatively favorable conditions for Russia, which is one of our main labor markets and key trading partners,” Kholboyev noted. Improved economic conditions in Russia could support faster growth in remittances to Uzbekistan and stronger demand for Uzbek exports. Kazakhstan, another major partner, could also benefit from elevated oil prices. Inflation presents another risk. Disruptions in global supply chains could accelerate price growth domestically. Kholboyev recalled that although inflation in Uzbekistan slowed to 10% in 2021, it rose to 12.3% in 2022 following the outbreak of Russia's war in Ukraine, according to data from the Central Bank. Annual inflation stood at 7.2% in January this year. “Supply chain disruptions resulting from the war could accelerate inflation, and the Central Bank may respond by tightening monetary conditions,” he wrote. Gold, however, may act as a counterbalance. Heightened geopolitical uncertainty typically pushes gold prices higher. Gold is Uzbekistan’s main export commodity; in 2025 the country exported $10 billion worth of gold, accounting for 30% of total exports. “If continued uncertainty leads to a 10% increase in gold exports, this could directly accelerate GDP growth by around 0.7 percentage points,” Kholboyev said. A 20% increase in gold exports could raise growth by as much as 1.4 percentage points. Overall, Kholboyev described the current situation as a factor likely to slow global growth and exert negative direct and secondary effects on Uzbekistan’s economy. At the same time, he emphasized that rising gold prices and improved economic conditions in oil-exporting partner countries could help offset part of the external shock.

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central Asian languages. ISKP propaganda frequently highlights and promotes the idea of Central Asian militants and targets Uzbek- and Tajik-speaking audiences. This suggests that its intended audience extends far beyond the territory of a single state. Extremist networks actively engage with the cultural and linguistic space of the region. The proximity of Afghanistan amplifies these factors. Even without direct infiltration across borders, the risks of ideological influence and localized radicalization remain. As the region becomes more open and integrated, the need for coordinated security cooperation increases. The key conclusion is clear: no country in Central Asia can afford to view itself as an outside observer. In the context of networked threats, isolation is not an option. A threat may not be visible today. It may appear distant. Yet in the digital age, security is increasingly interdependent. This does not mean that Central Asia is on the verge of destabilization. On the contrary, in recent years, the region has demonstrated an ability to coordinate policies and pursue pragmatic approaches. However, the evolving nature of security threats requires constant adaptation, particularly as networked extremist structures move beyond traditional security models. Relying solely on force is no longer sufficient. A comprehensive strategy is required, including information sharing, monitoring financial flows, countering online propaganda, and addressing the social drivers of radicalization. In a broader sense, it is important to remember that attempts to treat extremist networks as potential proxy forces almost always produce unintended consequences. Over time, such structures begin operating according to their own logic and spiral beyond control. This pattern is universal and not confined to any specific region or political context. For Central Asia today, the challenge is not only responding to threats but also assessing their true nature. In some cases, the greatest danger lies not in the threat itself, but in the belief that it can be controlled.   The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.

UK Expands Strategic Engagement in Central Asia Amid Growing Global Competition

The world’s largest economies have recently increased their focus on Central Asia. The United Kingdom, alongside the U.S., the European Union, and China, is seeking to strengthen partnerships in a region that was previously not among its top foreign policy priorities. Britain Replicates an Established Format Throughout the years of independence, Kazakhstan and its regional neighbors were often perceived as operating within Russia’s sphere of influence. The war in Ukraine and broader geopolitical shifts have altered international attitudes toward Central Asia. Major powers are now intensifying dialogue with the region, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation. At the end of February, foreign ministers met in London under the Central Asia-UK (CA5+1) format. Although this was the first meeting of its kind in the British capital, the format mirrors similar mechanisms already used by the U.S., the European Union, Russia, China, and Japan. Participants noted that the CA5+1 format has proven to be an effective mechanism for structured and substantive engagement with external partners. The regional agenda is addressed comprehensively, reflecting Central Asian priorities while creating additional opportunities to advance economic initiatives and implement joint projects. Particular attention has been paid to trade diversification, industrial cooperation, sustainable infrastructure development, and unlocking Central Asia’s potential in critical minerals and renewable energy. The meeting also covered economic growth prospects, key challenges facing Central Asian economies, and the expansion of trade and investment. Logistics was a central topic, including the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, widely known as the Middle Corridor. British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper emphasized the strategic importance of Central Asia as a dynamically developing region characterized by sustained economic growth, expanding regional cooperation, and a growing role in international affairs. According to the British participants, the region’s countries are pursuing a pragmatic approach, strengthening connectivity and expanding their participation in shaping a modern architecture of economic and political cooperation. Education and Finance Interest in British education continues to grow across all five Central Asian countries. Four branches of British universities are operating in Kazakhstan, and nearly 6,000 students have earned British degrees through the Bolashak international scholarship program. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have announced plans to establish international financial centers modeled on the Astana International Financial Centre in Kazakhstan. British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Timothy Smart said that work is underway to create an international financial center in Tashkent based on international arbitration standards. Like the Astana model, the new center will operate under English common law. British Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Nicholas Bowler highlighted London’s role in assisting with legislation for the International Dispute Resolution Center, which will operate under English law and be located in the Issyk-Kul region. Greater participation by Central Asian companies on the London Stock Exchange is also anticipated. Logistics and Resources British diplomats have placed particular emphasis on cooperation in critical minerals, a priority within the United Kingdom’s global strategy. Projects are underway across the region, accompanied by new agreements and industrial partnerships. Agreements have reportedly been reached between the Kazakh producer Zhezkazganredmet and the British company Maritime House to produce rhenium and introduce technologies for extracting rare and rare-earth metals at the Zhezkazganredmet facility, according to the Kazakh government. However, analysts note that British firms will face competition from the European Union, the U.S., and South Korea for access to Kazakhstan’s mineral resources. Astana has already concluded, or is planning to conclude, contracts with these major consumers in the extraction and processing of critical raw materials. London has also expressed readiness to support Kazakhstan’s role as a regional transport hub, participate in developing transport corridors and urban planning in Uzbekistan, promote digital services in Tajikistan, and assist in modernizing Turkmenistan’s railway network. Kazakhstan remains Britain’s largest trading partner in the region. According to Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev, 516 British-owned companies operate in the country. In 2025, bilateral trade reached $1.62 billion, an increase of 83.6% compared with 2024. Trade with Uzbekistan is also expanding steadily. Geopolitically, Central Asia sits at the intersection of Russia’s, China’s, and the European Union’s strategic interests. The UK is seeking to position itself within this landscape by diversifying economic engagement. In this context, the Middle Corridor has gained particular significance. The route represents not only an infrastructure project but also an institutional ecosystem requiring legal predictability, digital solutions, insurance mechanisms, arbitration procedures, and transparent financial transactions. Analysts argue that these are areas in which the UK holds comparative advantages. A Competitive Arena for Global Powers Journalists working at the BBC argue that Britain will have to compete if it aims to benefit from Central Asia’s growing strategic and economic significance. During the 1990s and 2000s, the five Central Asian countries were largely peripheral to British foreign policy, with limited high-level engagement. Some British scholars continue to frame the region through the lens of the so-called “Great Game”, the 19th-century rivalry between the Russian and British empires for influence in Central Asia, suggesting that London currently lags behind its competitors. Following the events of 2001, Central Asia became an important partner for Western countries in counterterrorism efforts due to its proximity to Afghanistan. However, after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, much of that cooperation was curtailed. Today, the British government maintains that it must articulate a clear, values-based policy toward Central Asia, not by directly competing with China or Russia, but by offering alternative options to regional leaderships. Nevertheless, Russia and China continue to hold dominant positions in Central Asia. Russia maintains deep cultural and economic ties and remains involved in numerous transboundary resource projects. China, for its part, has become the leading trading partner for most countries in the region.

Iran War Tests Emerging C5–Azerbaijan Solidarity

In an effort to coordinate responses to the Mideast conflict, the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries, as well as Azerbaijan, have spoken together by telephone about the widening crisis. The call marked one of the clearest signs yet that the Central Asian “C5” format is evolving beyond economic coordination into an operational diplomatic mechanism during external crises. While the group has met frequently in recent years with major partners, direct coordination over a fast-moving conflict on its periphery reflects a shift toward more structured regional crisis management. The consultation also builds on the expansion last year of the Central Asian consultative format to include Azerbaijan, sometimes referred to as the “C6,” a shift that has increasingly aligned Caspian corridor strategy with regional diplomatic coordination. “During the conversation, the ministers exchanged detailed views on the evolving military and political situation in the Middle East, noting the importance of maintaining close coordination and prompt interaction amid the crisis,” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Monday. Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev of Kazakhstan thanked his counterparts from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which border Iran, for their help in the evacuations of people fleeing Iranian territory. U.S. and Israeli air strikes have hit targets across Iran, whose military has fired retaliatory waves of missiles and drones at Israel as well as U.S. military facilities and civilian areas in Gulf countries. Azerbaijan’s participation underscores its growing integration into Central Asia’s diplomatic orbit. As a Caspian state bordering Iran and a critical link in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, Baku has become an indispensable partner in both evacuation logistics and broader corridor security. The call reflects growing cohesion among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. The region is seeking more robust trade routes linking Asia and Europe, while maintaining solidarity and balancing relationships with larger powers, including China, Russia, and the United States. In addition to Kosherbayev, the foreign ministers on the call were Jeyhun Bayramov of Azerbaijan, Jeenbek Kulubaev of Kyrgyzstan, Sirojiddin Muhriddin of Tajikistan, Rashid Meredov of Turkmenistan, and Bakhtiyor Saidov of Uzbekistan. The ministers said they were committed to political and diplomatic means as a way to solve conflicts. “At the conclusion of the call, the parties expressed their readiness to continue providing the necessary support in organizing the possible evacuation of citizens, as well as to maintain close working contacts through the foreign ministries,” the statement from Kazakhstan stated. Notably, the ministers’ language avoided assigning blame or aligning with any side in the conflict, instead emphasizing diplomacy and stability. That careful wording reflects the region’s longstanding strategy of balancing relations with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and regional powers without being drawn into geopolitical confrontation.