Information Sovereignty? Central Asia Tightens Control Over Its Information Space
Across the post-Soviet space, governments are adopting new measures that affect the scope of free expression. Similar trends are visible in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe, reflecting wider global shifts in how states manage their information environments. In Central Asia, where journalism has long faced political constraints, recent policies indicate a renewed emphasis on controlling the flow of information. From Georgia to Kazakhstan: Pushback Against Foreign Narratives Recent events in Georgia highlight these changes. The adoption of a controversial “foreign agents” law, widely described as a Russian-style or “pro-Russian” measure, reflected the ruling party’s growing hostility to foreign-funded media and NGOs, many backed by European donors, and triggered mass pro-EU protests in Tbilisi. Similar dynamics are emerging in Central Asia, where officials increasingly view foreign narratives as interference in domestic affairs. In Kazakhstan, legislative restrictions on so-called "LGBT propaganda" have sparked both domestic protests and criticism from international partners. At the same time, well-known media figure Gulnar Bazhkenova, editor-in-chief of Orda.kz, has been placed under house arrest, an episode that underscores the tightening environment for journalists. The Bazhkenova Case: A Turning Point for Kazakh Media Bazhkenova, a prominent editor known for critical coverage of Kazakhstan’s political elite and security services, came under scrutiny after Orda.kz falsely reported the arrest of Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, an unverified claim that was quickly debunked. Although Nurtleu remained in his position immediately afterward, he was dismissed later in September, prompting speculation that the incident had political consequences. Soon after his departure, law enforcement launched an investigation into Bazhkenova. On December 1, Almaty police searched her residence and the offices of Orda.kz. Authorities stated that a 2024 article had disseminated false information regarding a law enforcement officer allegedly caught accepting a bribe, an incident that officials assert never occurred. Another article reportedly misrepresented details in a property dispute, allegedly damaging the business reputation of the involved party. The Almaty police have since opened additional investigations into past publications from Orda.kz that may contain misleading content. Media organizations have largely responded with condemnation, urging the authorities to decriminalize the dissemination of false information and instead treat such cases under civil law. However, the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan issued a pointed statement calling on media professionals to “treat the preparation and dissemination of information responsibly. Individual cases for the dissemination of inaccurate information cast a shadow on the entire journalistic community of our country,” the organization said. An implicit acknowledgment, perhaps, that Bazhkenova’s actions may have crossed legal or ethical boundaries. Parallel Cases and Regional Patterns While suppression of the media in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan has long been widespread, Kyrgyzstan - long considered the most politically open country in Central Asia - has also moved to tighten control over its information space. In early 2024, authorities introduced a controversial “foreign representatives” law requiring NGOs and media outlets receiving international funding to register under a special status, echoing legislation seen in Russia and Georgia. Independent outlets such as Kloop, Temirov Live, and Azattyk (RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz service) have faced lawsuits, blocked websites, or forced suspension of activities under charges ranging from extremism to spreading false information. Journalists and media advocates warn that these measures, combined with new restrictions on “false” online content, represent a significant rollback of Kyrgyzstan’s traditionally pluralistic media environment and signal the government’s growing interest in asserting information sovereignty. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also recently come under scrutiny for what some view as selective crackdowns tied to geopolitical alignments. This autumn, both countries detained bloggers seen as sympathetic to Russia's geopolitical narrative. In Kazakhstan, blogger Aslan Tolegenov, known online as "Northern_Kazakh", was convicted in November for inciting interethnic hatred, receiving a sentence of three years and nine months. Tolegenov was known for videos expressing pro-Russian views on the war in Ukraine and presenting himself as defending Russian speakers against what he called “Russophobia” in Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan, blogger Aziz Khakimov, known as "Comrade_Aziz," was first fined in August for spreading false information about a university rector. A month later, prosecutors added charges including incitement of interethnic hatred, defamation, and war propaganda. The investigation was initiated after journalist Nikita Makarenko accused Khakimov of slander in a video. If convicted, Khakimov faces up to 10 years in prison. A Region Redrawing Its Media Boundaries Russian media outlets supportive of the so-called "Russian World" ideology have decried these arrests as betrayals by supposed allies. Yet, the broader trend suggests that regional governments are increasingly prioritizing what they view as information sovereignty. Whether targeting liberal media outlets, pro-Russian influencers, or independent journalists, the common thread is a concerted effort to control narratives within their borders. From Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan, these actions reflect a growing consensus among Central Asian elites: foreign narratives, whether from Russia, the West, or elsewhere, are increasingly seen not as pluralism but as threats to national unity.
China’s Power Play in Central Asia’s Energy Sector
China is steadily expanding its influence in Central Asia’s oil and gas sector through multi-billion-dollar investments, long-term supply agreements, and a growing network of strategic partnerships. From Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan, Beijing’s state-backed companies are securing key upstream and midstream assets, financing new petrochemical and pipeline projects, and positioning themselves as indispensable players in the region’s resource development.
This expansion is driven not only by China’s rising energy demand, but also by Beijing’s ambition to establish durable overland energy corridors that reduce reliance on maritime routes vulnerable to disruption. Central Asia’s existing and planned pipelines provide China with rare direct access to oil and gas fields across its western frontier, making the region a focal point of its broader energy-security strategy and a cornerstone of Beijing’s efforts to diversify supply while deepening political and economic footholds across Eurasia.
Kazakhstan Eyes Chinese Investment Amid Lukoil Sanctions Kazakhstan may seek to transfer Russian company Lukoil’s stake in the offshore Kalamkas-Khazar oil and gas project to a new partner, with some industry channels, including the Telegram channel Energy Monitor, speculating about possible Chinese interest. Lukoil, which has been targeted by Western sanctions, is reportedly planning to exit Kalamkas-Khazar Operating LLP, a joint venture with KazMunayGas (KMG). Each company currently holds a 50% stake. Some commentators have suggested that a Chinese investor could step in, but no replacement has been officially confirmed. Seconded engineers from KMG Engineering are expected to be withdrawn from the project as of January 1, 2026, with several Kalamkas-Khazar staff members temporarily reassigned to other KMG subsidiaries until a new partner is confirmed. The project is considered highly promising, with earlier estimates citing reserves of 81 million tons of oil and 22 billion cubic meters of gas. New exploration has identified additional oil-bearing structures. A final investment decision (FID) worth more than $6.5 billion was originally expected by the end of 2025. However, U.S. sanctions against Lukoil have delayed progress. Located 120 km from the Kashagan field in the North Caspian Basin, the Kalamkas-Khazar block comprises the Kalamkas-More and Khazar fields. The site is situated in Kazakhstan’s Mangistau Region, 60 km from the Buzachi Peninsula. KazMunayGas Chairman Askhat Khasenov previously confirmed that production was expected to begin in 2028-2029, with peak output reaching four million tons annually. Lukoil was sanctioned by the UK on October 15, followed by the U.S., complicating ongoing negotiations. Despite this, major projects where Lukoil holds minority stakes, such as Tengiz, Karachaganak, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, have not been impacted. A Lukoil withdrawal would create a rare opening for China to secure its first significant offshore position in the North Caspian, a zone historically dominated by Western majors and Russian firms. Such an entry would represent a notable shift in Kazakhstan’s offshore partnership landscape. Beijing's Billion-Dollar Energy Deals in Kazakhstan In September 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced a series of energy deals with China valued at $1.5 billion. During his official visit to China, more than 70 commercial agreements totaling approximately $15 billion were signed, several directly involving Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector. The breadth of agreements indicates that Kazakhstan is aiming to move beyond raw-resource exports and position itself as a regional petrochemical and processing hub integrated with Chinese industrial supply chains. Key projects include the construction of a gas chemical complex in the Aktobe Region to produce urea, with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) expected to invest around $1 billion. The China Development Bank has also signaled its readiness to finance the construction of trunk pipelines for transporting ethane and propane in the Atyrau Region, with investment volumes reported at around $530 million. China’s CNOOC has been reported as receiving a contract for exploration and production at the Zhylyoi field in the Atyrau Region in June, and on December 3, KazMunayGas launched a joint venture with Sinopec to carry out geological surveys. In October, KazMunayGas announced a new contract with a Sinopec subsidiary to explore and develop hydrocarbons in the Berezovsky area of the West Kazakhstan Region. During a visit to China in August 2024, KMG Chairman Askhat Khasenov held high-level meetings with CNPC and Sinopec to discuss joint ventures in petrochemicals, geological exploration, refining, and transport. Among the projects was the urea complex, addressing Kazakhstan’s domestic demand of 350,000-400,000 tons annually. Other initiatives include gas processing at the Urihtau field, expansion of the Shymkent Oil Refinery (PKOP LLP), and increasing capacity along the Atyrau-Kenkik and Kenkik-Kumkol oil pipelines. Additionally, talks covered plans to manufacture polyethylene, terephthalic acid (TFC), and polyethylene terephthalate (PET), with total investments that could exceed $8 billion. Many of these projects fall under the China–Kazakhstan Industrial Capacity Cooperation framework, which Beijing uses to export Chinese engineering, technology, and financing models abroad. Despite strengthening ties with Beijing, Kazakh officials stress that the country remains open to investment from the U.S., Russia, and the European Union. The development of Kazakhstan’s fuel and energy complex remains a central pillar of the national economic strategy. China's Deepening Energy Ties with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan China is also solidifying its energy partnerships with Uzbekistan. In October, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy met with a CNPC delegation led by Chairman Dai Houliang to discuss projects such as the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, new gas condensate field development in the Bukhara Region, underground storage construction, and workforce training for the energy sector. CNPC’s direct investments in Uzbekistan now exceed $5 billion. Through its joint venture with Uzbekneftegaz, CNPC has built parts of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, developed the Mingbulak oil field, and modernized the Bukhara refinery. Uzbekistan has embraced Chinese financing as it works to reverse declining gas output and manage recurring domestic shortages, making Beijing an increasingly vital partner in stabilizing the sector. In Turkmenistan, CNPC is developing the fourth phase of the massive Galkynysh gas field, with a planned annual capacity of ten billion cubic meters. This project follows high-level talks between President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in September. China currently imports about 40 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually via three pipeline routes: A, B, and C. With the completion of Line D, total export capacity is expected to rise to 65 billion cubic meters per year. Turkmenistan sends more than 80% of its gas exports to China, giving Beijing unparalleled leverage in the country’s energy sector and making the completion of Line D strategically important for both sides. China’s Emerging Dominance in Central Asia’s Energy ArchitectureTaken together, these developments show how China is embedding itself across the entire Central Asian energy ecosystem, not only as a buyer of hydrocarbons but increasingly as a financier, operator, and industrial partner. Beijing’s state-backed companies are moving upstream into exploration and production, downstream into petrochemicals and refining, and horizontally into pipeline construction, gas storage, and equipment manufacturing. This multi-layered presence is allowing China to shape investment decisions, infrastructure layout, and export routes across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
By leveraging long-term financing, rapid project execution, and integration into Chinese supply chains, Beijing is steadily building structural influence in a region where Russia once dominated and where Western companies now play more selective roles. The result is an emerging energy order in which China is positioned not simply as a commercial actor, but as a central external power capable of setting the pace and direction of the region’s resource development.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Available Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. In the new episode, available now, the team breaks down a flurry of developments reshaping Central Asia's security landscape, from the debut of the new C6 format and the surprise expansion of the once-exclusive C5 grouping, to Vladimir Putin's key trip to Bishkek for the CSTO summit. We examine the alarming collapse in Tashkent's air quality, Astana's decision to withdraw from a decades-long arms agreement, and the escalating pattern of cross-border drone strikes between Tajik and Afghan actors along one of the region's most volatile frontiers. The team is also joined by special guests Edward Lemon and Bradley Jardine to discuss Chinese influence in Central Asia and their new book, From Belt and Road to Backlash.
The New Geoeconomics of Uzbekistan: Insights from ISRS Director Eldor Aripov
The Times of Central Asia presents a two-part interview in Washington, D.C. with Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan. Dr. Aripov sat down with our Washington Correspondent, Javier M. Piedra, to discuss Uzbekistan’s strategic thinking regarding its diplomatic posture, regional integration, and relations with Central Asian and global partners.
The conversation includes commentary on “Great Game” geopolitics, U.S.–Uzbekistan relations, trade, the meaning of “Uzbekistan First,” the historically explosive Ferghana Valley, and water management.
Recognizing the link between investment, a stable geopolitical ecosystem, and the need to de-risk potentially conflictive issues, Aripov further sheds light on Tashkent’s practical approach to internal governance and business development.
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Central Asia on the Front Lines; image: Defense.info[/caption]
TCA: “America First” refers to U.S. policies prioritizing national interests, often associated with non-interventionism, nationalism, and protectionist trade. Given Uzbekistan’s pragmatic foreign policy, can we speak of an “Uzbekistan First” policy? It is certainly not isolationist — but how is it manifested on a day-to-day basis?
Aripov: What you describe as “Uzbekistan First” is, in our understanding, fundamentally about prioritizing national interests – stability and predictability for the people of Uzbekistan. Yet Uzbekistan’s uniqueness lies in the fact that our national interests are closely intertwined with those of the entire region – this means shared upsides at the transactional and strategic levels and thinking long-term. We border every Central Asian country as well as Afghanistan, and therefore any issue — security, trade, transport, or water management — directly depends on the quality of our relationships with neighbors.
From his first days in office, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev — with his strategic vision and deep understanding of regional dynamics — declared that regional unity and mutual benefit stand at the core of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. The essence of his doctrine is to resolve agreeably any historically or materially problematic issues with neighbors, remove barriers to understanding, and create predictable, stable conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation and the free movement of goods, ideas, and people.
That is the true meaning of “Uzbekistan First”: not isolation, but openness, predictability, and regional consolidation.
TCA: How are you realizing “Uzbekistan First” in practice?
Aripov: Uzbekistan is strengthening its economy domestically and global track - putting in place the building blocks for internal sustainable development and accelerating accession to the World Trade Organization. The latter means expanding the geography and composition of exports and increasing the country’s investment attractiveness.
This approach is rooted in the logic of sustainable development within the broader international context: long-term national interests are best served by Uzbekistan integrating into global value chains and markets. The results speak for themselves: in 2024, Uzbekistan’s GDP grew by 6.5%, foreign direct investment increased by more than 50% to reach $11.9 billion, and the target for 2025 is to attract $42 billion. This performance is also a tribute to our style of diplomacy, grounded in respect and having a constructive attitude towards others.
Thus, “Uzbekistan First” represents a modern model of open, dynamic, and diversified growth in which national interests are achieved through cooperation rather than autarky and bullying.
TCA: Many in Central Asia view the United States’ heightened attention to the region as a sign of support that goes beyond rhetoric and small talk. How is this U.S. new engagement manifested? Given that some observers in the West see engagement with Central Asia as part of a larger geopolitical contest, do you expect U.S. interests to materialize tangibly?
Aripov: Neither Uzbekistan nor any country in Central Asia is interested in reviving the logic of the “Great Game.” It runs counter to our interests. Our choice is cooperation, not confrontation; partnership, not rivalry.
Competition exists in the region, but we seek to ensure it remains healthy and conducive to development. What matters most is access to technology, investment, and modern standards of education and governance. These practical needs — not geopolitical maneuvering — explain the growing dynamism of our relations with the United States.
Our engagement with the U.S. is highly practical: human-capital development programs, credit-guarantee instruments, infrastructure modernization, cooperation on energy, water resources, and agricultural technologies.
TCA: What is your response to those who urge Central Asian countries to abandon their balanced, non-ideological diplomacy and take sides in the geopolitical ambitions of others?
Aripov: While I only speak for Uzbekistan, Central Asian states are not guided by ideological or bloc-based considerations. They follow a pragmatic course built on common sense, balance, and diversification. The key principle is pragmatic geoeconomics over ideological geopolitics — the best way to minimize dependency risks and maximize benefits.
The region consistently demonstrates adherence to international norms and commitments, including partnerships with long-standing allies. Attempts to draw Central Asia into confrontational geopolitics lack foundation and are contrary to our way of thinking.
TCA: Given Russia and China’s strategic presence in Central Asia, do these relationships hinder Uzbekistan from deepening its ties with the United States or the European Union?
Aripov: Russia and China are Central Asia’s largest trade and investment partners, accounting for about half of the region’s external trade. They play central roles in transport, energy, and industrial infrastructure.
Western partners fully recognize this reality. “Replacement” is neither feasible nor desired. To be sure, we do not believe in zero-sum engagement.
TCA: What do you mean by zero-sum?
Aripov: Uzbekistan builds its foreign policy not on the logic of “friend or foe” or of “win or lose” but on a “partner-partner” basis – on a win-win attitude. Having said that, we have a three-pillar strategy which includes: diversification of economic and technological partners; non-alignment with military-political blocs; and pragmatic, project-oriented diplomacy grounded in national development interests.
This must be absolutely clear. Such a model strengthens our resilience and strategic autonomy, creating space for deeper and more fruitful engagement with both Eastern and Western partners.
TCA: A recent U.S. readout noted that Presidents Trump and Mirziyoyev announced Uzbekistan’s willingness to invest billions in the United States and in U.S. companies. What concrete steps are being taken to implement this vision?
Aripov: This is not only about Uzbekistan investing in the United States; equally important are American investments in Uzbekistan, new trade deals, access to advanced technologies, integration into global governance standards, and the development of high-tech production capacities inside Uzbekistan.
A clear architecture is being established to implement these agreements and priorities.
An American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council has been created as a new platform to strengthen bilateral trade and investment cooperation. It will be co-chaired by the Head of the Presidential Administration of Uzbekistan and a representative of the U.S. President.
TCA: When will that happen?
Aripov: Starting in 2026, the liberalization of cross-border financial operations will allow Uzbek companies to invest abroad and American companies to operate more freely in Uzbekistan.
Diplomatic and project-coordination capacity is also being enhanced: within Uzbekistan’s Embassy in Washington, a new position of Minister-Counselor representing the Presidential Administration has been established to promote major investment and trade projects.
Institutional support is expanding — EXIM Bank and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) are opening opportunities for large-scale financing.
Meanwhile, the United States is becoming an even bigger market for Uzbek textiles, copper, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and polymers.
Bilateral cooperation is therefore shifting from political dialogue to a deep technological and industrial partnership. That is good news.
TCA: The 7th Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State was held in Tashkent on 16 November 2025. How can Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan strengthen their partnership while balancing the expectations of major regional actors?
Aripov: Azerbaijan’s decision to join the Consultative Format of Central Asian Leaders is truly historic. As President Mirziyoyev noted, a new strategic bridge has emerged between Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
This tie-up is of fundamental importance for our region.
The key structural challenge for Central Asia is transport and logistics: being landlocked makes imported goods abnormally expensive, with transport costs exceeding 50% of final prices.
Azerbaijan plays a pivotal role in the Middle Corridor, opening the way for Central Asia to European markets. The more actively we trade, invest, and develop joint infrastructure, the more resilient the entire region becomes.
Particularly important is President Mirziyoyev’s proposal to transform the Consultative Meetings into a Community of Central Asia — a mature, institutionalized structure capable of shaping rules, standards, and long-term development plans. We are confident this is where the region is heading.
Mirziyoyev Orders Crackdown on Pollution and Waste
Uzbekistan is intensifying its environmental oversight as President Shavkat Mirziyoyev convened a high-level government meeting on December 1 to address mounting pollution, delays in waste-to-energy infrastructure, and preparedness for the winter season. The session highlighted the rising social and economic risks of air-quality deterioration in Tashkent, and chronic failures in waste management nationwide. Officials attributed recent spikes in air pollution in the capital not only to industrial emissions and construction activity but also to a severe cold anticyclone blanketing much of the country. This weather system caused high atmospheric pressure and temperature inversions, trapping fine particulate matter and inhibiting air circulation. In response, authorities launched inspections of construction sites, greenhouses, and vehicle emissions, while emergency measures, such as watering streets, cleaning canals, and activating fountains, were deployed to stabilize air quality. Mirziyoyev ordered regional officials to enforce stricter environmental compliance, eliminate violations promptly, and take proactive steps to prevent further degradation. He emphasized that growing public frustration demands “decisive and coordinated action” from all levels of government. Stalled Waste-to-Energy Projects Under Scrutiny Waste-to-energy development, a cornerstone of Uzbekistan’s sustainability agenda, also came under fire. Although $933 million in investment has been pledged, several regions have yet to launch projects. Existing facilities in Andijan, Namangan, Ferghana, Samarkand, Kashkadarya, and Tashkent continue to face critical infrastructure deficiencies, including inadequate roads, electricity, and water supply. Mirziyoyev instructed officials to remove these bottlenecks and ensure the nationwide rollout of waste-to-energy projects in 2026. The government has set a target of reducing household waste disposal areas by 50% by 2030. To date, 47 landfill sites have been closed and rehabilitated, restoring over 240 hectares of land for environmental use. Yet the majority of Uzbekistan’s 132 active landfills still lack protective barriers, green belts, and basic safety systems. The president ordered the transformation of these sites into “environmentally safe zones” and called for greater public engagement through environmental education. Starting in 2026, the government will allocate at least 150 billion soums annually from the state budget for this initiative. Hazardous Waste and Digital Tracking Industrial and hazardous waste management also remains underdeveloped. Processing rates have improved but still fall short of international norms. Mirziyoyev demanded a full inventory of hazardous waste generation and storage sites and directed each region to launch its own recycling or disposal initiatives. A unified digital platform will be introduced to monitor hazardous waste nationwide. Winter Readiness and Public Safety Winter preparedness was another major focus. Persistent issues with liquefied gas distribution prompted the president to order operational reforms and faster responses to citizen complaints. Authorities reported substandard repairs along 1,800 kilometers of power lines; the Prosecutor General’s Office will investigate, and the Energy Inspectorate has been tasked with strengthening oversight to ensure stable electricity supply during the winter. Mirziyoyev also called for updated fire-safety standards in residential buildings, including a ban on highly flammable façade materials. Presidential Decree and Long-Term Strategy The December 1 meeting followed a presidential decree issued on November 25 introducing emergency environmental measures and creating a special commission to stabilize conditions. The decree was based on proposals presented at an earlier meeting led by Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the Presidential Administration. That session outlined immediate, medium-, and long-term reforms, including tighter regulation of major polluters, expanded greening programs, and the development of a modern air-quality monitoring system supported by scientific infrastructure.
Icy Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Threaten Central Asian Trade Plans
On November 25, the Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of a new round of airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing killed nine children and a woman, injuring several others.
The attacks are the latest escalation in rapidly worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban-led government in Kabul, with key border crossings currently closed, and Afghan refugees being expelled from Pakistan.
At the heart of the crisis is Pakistan’s claim that Kabul is providing support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, or TPP), a militant group seeking to topple Pakistan’s government and impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law. The fallout may ripple beyond bilateral relations, with significant consequences for Central Asian trade, particularly the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan plan for a Trans-Afghan railway.
The planned 647-kilometer line is set to connect the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif with Peshawar in Pakistan. When combined with existing infrastructure, this will mean that trains can travel from southern Uzbekistan all the way to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi, granting landlocked Uzbekistan and Afghanistan a long-sought gateway to the Indian Ocean. But mounting instability, along with Islamabad’s willingness to shut borders as leverage, may now place the project in serious jeopardy.
“The moment a state weaponizes geography, every financier in Tashkent, Moscow, or Beijing prices in risk, delays commitments, and quietly explores alternative alignments,” Anant Mishra, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, told The Times of Central Asia.
So, what are the prospects for salvaging the Trans-Afghan railway? How can Pakistan and Afghanistan de-escalate? And what does this turmoil mean for Central Asia’s wider economic ambitions?
A sudden frost
On July 17, Uzbekistan’s Transport Minister Ilkhom Makhkamov, Pakistan’s Railway Minister Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Afghanistan’s acting Public Works Minister Mohammad Esa Thani signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study for the proposed railway.
Many hoped the railway would presage a new era of fraternal relations between Central and South Asia.
“Civil society, the intelligentsia, media, and business community of Pakistan have been loudly calling for intimate trade relations with the Central Asian Republics,” Khadim Hussain, Research Director at the Centre for Regional Policy and Dialogue (CRPD), Islamabad, told TCA.
For Uzbekistan, which has aggressively pursued diversification of trade routes to reduce reliance on transit through Iran and Kazakhstan, the project promised a cheaper, faster corridor to global markets.
According to Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, the trans-Afghan is one of two high-priority transport projects, along with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – work on which began in April 2025.
But the ink had barely dried on the July accord when tensions between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad began escalating, throwing the ambitious railway into doubt.
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Uzbek passenger and freight trains parked in Andijan; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption]
In early October, Pakistan launched an airstrike in Kabul targeting the leader of the Pakistani Taliban. Kabul denounced what it described as violations of sovereignty, while Pakistan insisted it was acting against TTP militants operating from Afghan territory.
In response, on October 11, Taliban forces attacked military posts along large stretches of the 2,600-kilometre border between the two countries. In early November, a suicide bomber killed 12 people in Islamabad, the first such attack in the Pakistani capital in a decade.
It wasn’t long before the diplomatic fallout began to affect trade. Transit routes have been suspended as Pakistan attempts to squeeze the Afghan economy.
“Most of Afghanistan’s imports and exports have historically moved through Karachi and, to a lesser extent, Gwadar; when Torkham and Chaman border crossings are choked, trucks full of food, fruit, pharmaceuticals, and fuel sit idle, and Afghan traders suddenly have to pay more for longer, more complex routes,” said Mishra.
In November, Afghanistan’s deputy minister for economic affairs, Abdul Ghani Baradar, publicly urged Afghan businesses to secure alternative trade corridors within three months – a sign that officials expect a prolonged freeze.
Why this conflict erupted
At its core, the crisis resembles a classic Frankenstein’s monster dynamic: the force once cultivated as a proxy has turned against its creator. For decades, Pakistan supported the Taliban, providing sanctuary, funding, and political backing. The expectation was that a friendly Taliban government in Kabul would align with Islamabad’s interests.
Instead, Pakistan now faces a movement that rejects its control and is recalcitrant in reining in the TTP.
“Since 2021, the TTP has enjoyed unprecedented operational space inside Afghanistan, using Afghan territory as strategic depth to strike inside Pakistan and then exfiltrate back across the border,” said Mishra. “For Islamabad, this is now the primary national-security threat.”
For its part, Kabul denies supporting the Pakistani Taliban. However, according to Mishra, it has “consistently tolerated TTP mobility along the frontier, partly for ideological reasons, and partly because confronting them would fracture the Taliban’s own internal cohesion.”
Implications for Uzbekistan and Central Asia
Hussain is in no doubt as to the stakes. “Pakistan’s prioritization of relations with Central Asia will largely depend on normalization of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan,” he said.
Mishra sees little prospect of that in the short term. “The most likely trajectory is a prolonged, low-intensity conflict… managed hostility rather than a genuine resolution.”
For Central Asia, the deterioration in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations threatens to derail years of regional planning. But while some fear Uzbekistan’s dream of a southern corridor may be forced back to the drawing board, Umarova takes a more long-term view.
“As soon as things get heated, some theories are immediately put forward that everything is lost, all projects need to be stopped, borders closed, and so on. But that's not how it works,” she told TCA.
“This conflict has existed for many years. It didn't arise yesterday. Naturally, when assessing the risks associated with the Afghan railway, Uzbekistan took into account the relationship between Islamabad and Kabul.” Umarova adds that despite the simmering tensions, “work on this project isn't stopping; on the contrary, it's intensifying”. This, she says, is a mark of the project’s strategic importance both for Uzbekistan and Central Asia as a whole.
Meanwhile, trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan continues to expand independently of Pakistan. Coal shipments from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan have increased significantly this year, with Uzbekistan exporting cement and pharmaceuticals in return.
“The Hairatan-Mazar-e-Sharif rail link from Uzbekistan… already gives Afghanistan a northern outlet,” said Mishra. “As ties with Pakistan sour, more cargo will bleed into those routes.”
From a diplomatic perspective, Tashkent has maintained pragmatic ties with the Taliban, positioning itself as a mediator that can engage all sides.
“It would naturally be naive to indulge in the illusion that Uzbekistan firmly trusts the current government in Afghanistan,” said Umarova, but Tashkent has nevertheless never ceased to maintain diplomatic contact with whoever is in power in Kabul, and has coordinated its approach with other Central Asian states.
She notes that a “unified approach to Afghanistan is gradually crystallizing,” with even hawkish states such as Tajikistan taking a softer line towards Kabul.
Kabul has also invested in diplomatic outreach to all five Central Asian states since 2021, entering into a bilateral agreement over the Qosh-Tepa canal at the provincial level, and even hosting the Uzbek prime minister in Kabul. “This is something Republic-era Afghanistan rarely achieved,” Mishra notes.
He believes that, in the long term, Islamabad’s recent actions will have “predictable strategic consequences” - Afghan trade will realign away from dependence on Pakistan.
“You can already see the shift accelerating. Kabul has openly said it is diverting ‘major trade routes’ from Pakistan towards Iran and Central Asia,” said Mishra. He notes that Kabul is now leaning heavily on Iranian ports, taking advantage of the tariff cuts that Tehran is offering.
Should these routes continue to expand, they could unlock a far larger prize: access to the Indian market. India is a key user of Iran’s Chabahar free port for the same reason that Afghanistan has been using it: its border with Pakistan is closed.
Chabahar has been largely free of U.S. sanctions since 2018, meaning it has the potential to turn into a major regional hub, with both India and Central Asia seeking to benefit. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are all backing a project that will see another railway built through western Afghanistan to Herat before linking with Iran.
Nevertheless, both Umarova and Mishra agree that the trans-Afghan railway still represents an important alternative. Umarova notes the vulnerability of Iranian ports during the conflict with Israel earlier in 2025.
Mishra stresses the importance of having options: “They must build the Trans-Afghan railway, but in a way that can send cargo to Karachi when the region experiences strategic calm, or swing west to Iran and Chabahar when it is not,” he told TCA.
Samarkand’s CoP20 Opens with High-Stakes Debates on Wildlife Trade and Species Protection
The world’s largest conference on wildlife trade opened last week in Samarkand, drawing nearly 3,000 delegates to Uzbekistan for two weeks of critical negotiations that could reshape global conservation policy. The 20th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES CoP20) is being held in Central Asia for the first time, a region increasingly impacted by transcontinental wildlife trafficking routes connecting Africa and Asia.
Hosted by Uzbekistan’s National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change, CoP20 carries the theme “CITES at 50 in Samarkand: Bridging Nature and People,” commemorating five decades of global conservation under the Convention and echoing the city’s legacy as a historic crossroads of commerce and ideas.
One of the central issues dominating this year’s meeting is a series of proposals concerning African megafauna, particularly elephants, rhinos, and giraffes. These proposals, submitted by several African range states, challenge the extent to which legal trade in vulnerable species should be permitted, given decades of poaching and habitat degradation.
Audrey Delsink, Senior Director at Humane World for Animals, warned of the dangers these proposals pose. “All the species proposals concerning African megafauna are highly concerning because of the impact they will have on the respective species and the repercussions on illegal trade should the proposals be accepted,” she told The Times of Central Asia.
Among the most controversial is a joint proposal by Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe to remove most southern African giraffe populations from CITES Appendix II. Delsink cautioned that this would create a fragmented regulatory regime, complicating enforcement. “It is very difficult to differentiate bones and pelts of the different species and subspecies, making it easy to launder endangered giraffe species through the system,” she said. With wild giraffe populations estimated at fewer than 120,000, any weakening of controls could prove disastrous.
Similar concerns surround Namibia’s proposal to sell ivory from registered government stockpiles. Delsink warned that the legal ivory trade has historically masked illicit flows and could trigger renewed poaching. “Legal trade provides a cover for illegal ivory and fuels illegal trade, poaching, and consumer demand,” she said, noting that CITES members have rejected such proposals for nearly two decades.
Central Asian countries, increasingly used as transit corridors for high-value wildlife contraband, are becoming key players in enforcement. Smuggling networks exploit Eurasian air, rail, and road links to move products such as ivory, rhino horn, and exotic animals.
Delsink highlighted the “Samarkand Declaration and Action Plan (2025-2032),” signed this week by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as a major step toward regional coordination. The agreement commits signatories to harmonize laws and improve intelligence-sharing mechanisms.
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Image: National Committee on Ecology of Uzbekistan[/caption]
“Intelligence-led operations and rapid information exchange between agencies can disrupt organized crime networks that exploit porous borders,” Delsink said. She also underscored the need for customs modernization and officer training, supported by organizations such as TRAFFIC and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
Beyond enforcement, Delsink advocated for community-based conservation approaches adapted from African models. These include beehive fences to deter elephants from crop-raiding, chili-based repellents, and local ranger initiatives. “These methods empower local leadership and deliver economic benefits to communities,” she said.
Rhinos remain under intense scrutiny. On November 29, CITES delegates in Samarkand rejected Namibia’s proposals to relax trade protections for Southern white and critically endangered black rhinos, choosing instead to maintain maximum safeguards.
Meanwhile, landmark decisions were reached on marine species. Whale sharks, gulper sharks, manta rays, and devil rays, all affected by severe population declines, received stronger protections.
Whale sharks were uplisted to Appendix I, banning nearly all international commercial trade. Their numbers have plummeted by 92% globally due to overfishing, vessel collisions, and demand for fins and meat. Gulper sharks, valued for their liver oil used in cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, were added to Appendix II. Manta and devil rays, which reproduce slowly and are heavily targeted for their gill plates and fins, also received Appendix I status.
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Lawrence Chlebeck, marine program manager at Humane World for Animals Australia; image: TCA[/caption]
“These sharks are victims of a veracious trade,” said Lawrence Chlebeck, Marine Program Manager at Humane World for Animals Australia. “The new protections throw them a vital lifeline.”
Chlebeck warned that without these measures, “future oceans without these beautiful animals is sadly an inevitability.” He praised the international coalition backing the proposals, which reflect growing global awareness that many shark and ray species are approaching ecological collapse.
Asked about the role of landlocked countries like Uzbekistan, Chlebeck stressed that non-coastal states play a critical role in enforcement and supply-chain regulation. “They can strengthen import controls and ensure that products derived from sharks and rays originate only from sustainable and legal sources,” he said.
Other items on the CoP20 agenda include proposed loosening of giraffe trade restrictions despite a 40% drop in wild populations over three decades; attempts to reintroduce commercial trade in live elephants and rhino horn; and new protections for critically endangered vultures, Galápagos land iguanas, and gecko species vulnerable to the exotic pet trade.
U.S. Waiver of Sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port is Good News for Central Asia
U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman have been on again/off again since 2013, when the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to curb Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities through targeted economic pressure, aka sanctions. In the decade following IFCA’s passage, Washington’s sanctions on Chabahar had a negative impact on Central Asia, largely by complicating its efforts to deepen economic ties with South Asia and the Gulf. But geopolitics are shifting. Washington is increasing its involvement in Central Asia and India, and is doing the same in Afghanistan. These factors may well induce the U.S. Department of State to keep the waiver in place. Washington first waived its sanctions on Chabahar in 2018—a strategic move to support India's role in Afghanistan's post-war development and to provide a crucial trade route for that landlocked country. Six years later, India's Indian Ports Global Limited secured a 10-year deal with Iran to manage Chabahar port, in part, to offset Pakistan’s Gwadar port at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a mere 100 miles from Chabahar. For all the fanfare, Central Asia held little real priority in Washington in those years. Seven years later, the U.S. changed course. It announced on September 16, 2025, much to Central Asia’s surprise and concern, that “the State Department has revoked the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the IFCA”, making individuals involved in Iran’s Chabahar port operations subject to penalties, resulting in another snag in Central Asia’s desire for a southern breakout route. And then, in a swift reversal, the U.S. restored India’s sanctions waiver some six weeks later, on October 30. Whatever might explain the sudden change, Central Asia breathed a sigh of relief, and, by all accounts, now feels confident that the waiver will be evergreened. Time will tell if this confidence is justified. The U.S. waiver enables India to work to enhance Chabahar’s infrastructure and functionality, offering Central Asian exporters a more direct and profitable trade route than those via China, Russia, or the Middle Corridor, which stretches from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. As a result, goods like minerals, cotton, and energy products can reach regional and global markets faster. Central Asian capitals are quietly reveling in Washington’s flexible realpolitik in the face of convulsive U.S.-Iranian relations and heated Indo-Pakistan tensions. Without fear of punitive measures, India can now continue its work at Chabahar. To be sure, the waiver affirms India’s rising global presence and accelerates New Delhi’s drive into Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Washington’s decision signaled to traders, investors, and think tankers that it has no intention of spoiling India’s export ambitions and Central Asia’s desire for north-south economic integration. The waiver shows Washington’s pragmatism—and is welcomed by those who have little or no use for Washington’s penchant for foreign policy moralism. Chabahar Port complements not only the Trans-Caspian corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Asia and Europe by linking China to Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus—but also existing trade routes with Russia, China, and Pakistan. Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan, told The Times of Central Asia that “the waiver removes a major bottleneck to reliable access to the Indian Ocean, giving Uzbekistan and our neighbors one more route for our exports and imports. Diversification—which does not mean exclusivity—strengthens Central Asia’s strategic autonomy.” Afghanistan and Central Asia The waiver comes at a time when Central Asian nations are looking for new trade opportunities with regional partners across South Asia. As trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan sputters, Kabul is looking for alternative routes for its commerce via Iran and India. Central Asia welcomes this. On November 20, 2025, Afghan minister Alhaj Nooruddin Azizi and India’s External Affairs Minister Jaishankar met in New Delhi to deepen commercial cooperation and explore Chabahar’s potential to lessen Kabul’s dependence on Pakistan. In Doha, Ambassador Yerkin Tokumov, Kazakhstan’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, met with Ambassador Faisal bin Abdullah Al Hanzab of Qatar to discuss shared political, security, and humanitarian issues, including trade issues and further economic connectivity. The U.S. sanctions waiver also invigorates the development of various other transport corridors, including the much-ballyhooed Lapis Lazuli transport route (Afghanistan-Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) and the Five Nations Railway Corridor (China-Afghanistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-Iran). The waiver has also given impetus to the 2016 Ashgabat Agreement, a multimodal transport pact between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Oman to develop transit connectivity, despite geopolitical challenges, and link Central Asia, via Chabahar, to the Persian Gulf. As noted by India’s Embassy in Ashgabat in its “Unclassified Brief on India-Turkmenistan Relations” (Nov. 26), trade dominates the agenda of the agreement’s signatories— and Chabahar plays a role in broader connectivity efforts, though the brief does not describe it as the agreement’s central element. The opening of a direct maritime gateway via Chabahar for landlocked Central Asian nations makes them less reliant on Pakistan and enhances their strategic room for maneuver. It lowers political exposure while expanding their economic autonomy. In doing so, it strengthens a cooperative geoeconomic vision built on mutual benefit and shared opportunity. It would seem that the Chabahar sanctions waiver is a fresh tailwind for Central Asia’s future economic development and Eurasian integration. That is good news for Central Asia.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
