Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Send Humanitarian Aid to Iran
Tajikistan is sending a convoy of 110 trucks carrying humanitarian aid to Iran, which has been targeted by heavy U.S. and Israeli air strikes in a war that started on February 28. The dispatch of aid follows similar deliveries by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Central Asian countries are aiming for neutrality in the Mideast war, maintaining ties with the Iranian government even as they profess support for Gulf Arab states that have been targeted by Iranian drones and missiles. Iran’s relationships with countries to the east range from the close cultural affinity that it enjoys with Tajikistan to sometimes tense interactions with Azerbaijan, which has a military partnership with Israel. The trucks from Tajikistan left for Iran on Wednesday and “will soon arrive in the friendly and brotherly country,” Tajikistan’s government said, without providing details about how the aid will be distributed. The convoy would likely travel through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to reach the northeastern Iranian border. The aid “comprises 3,610 tons of cargo, including 45 tons of medicines, a large volume of sanitary and hygienic products, children's clothing, various food products, household items, bedding, tents, building materials, and other necessary supplies,” Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon posted a photo on social media that showed a long line of aid trucks on a highway. Turkmenistan, which shares a border with Iran, has said it sent humanitarian aid, mainly for distribution to children. It appeared to allude to the war, saying that “supporting and assisting close neighbors in difficult times is a noble tradition of the Turkmen people, rooted in ancient times.” Uzbekistan has sent trucks carrying flour, rice, sugar, pasta, sunflower oil, canned goods and medical supplies to Iran. Azerbaijan, which borders northwest Iran, has also dispatched truckloads of humanitarian aid to Iran, according to Ali Alizada, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Iran. Azerbaijan previously said it was evacuating staff from its embassy in Tehran as well as its consulate in the Iranian city of Tabriz, after accusing Iran of drone attacks on its territory.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will examine accelerated plans to relocate people from the area around Tajikistan's Rogun hydropower plant, with guests from the Coalition for Human Rights in Development, including Eugene Simonov.
Hormuz Crisis: Transit Routes Through Afghanistan, Pakistan Would Be an Opportunity for Central Asia
The Strait of Hormuz has long been regarded as a central artery of global energy trade. A substantial share of oil and gas exports moves through this corridor, and regional crises are often framed in terms of energy security. For Central Asia, however, current tensions carry broader implications. They may increase demand for alternative food supply chains and transit routes linking the region to the Arabian Sea and Gulf markets. Recent tensions involving Iran also point to the strait’s growing role in food logistics. For Gulf states, Hormuz remains an energy chokepoint and a vital route for essential goods. For Central Asian policymakers, this shift matters. Any prolonged disruption could raise the region’s importance as both a supplier of agricultural commodities and a transit hub. Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are among the world’s most import-dependent food markets. According to Reuters, between 80% and 90% of food consumed in GCC countries is imported. This reliance creates external demand that could increasingly draw Central Asia into Gulf food security planning. At the same time, the geography of these supplies remains relatively concentrated. Analysts estimate that more than 70% of the region’s food imports transit the Strait of Hormuz. This pattern could heighten interest in Central Asia as a source of food exports and a transit route. Amid ongoing regional tensions, this dependence has attracted growing attention from experts. Reuters described recent developments as “the greatest test of the Gulf countries’ food strategy since the 2008 global food crisis.” In recent years, regional governments have sought to diversify suppliers and build strategic reserves. Analysts nevertheless warn that stockpiles and diversification measures may provide only limited protection. If disruptions persist, logistical constraints could drive up prices and extend delivery times. This would create both a market shock and new commercial opportunities in Central Asia. Under such conditions, GCC food security depends on access to global markets as well as the resilience of transport routes. This is where Gulf vulnerabilities begin to intersect more directly with Central Asia’s economic geography. The infrastructure of major regional ports plays a central role in this system. One of the key logistics hubs is Jebel Ali Port in Dubai, the largest container port in the Middle East and a major re-export center. A substantial share of food shipments destined for GCC states and neighboring markets passes through this facility. Estimates suggest that disruptions at major logistics hubs such as Jebel Ali could affect supply chains on which tens of millions of people depend. This concentration of logistics flows increases the region’s strategic exposure to maritime instability. For Central Asian economies, this raises the strategic value of diversified overland and multimodal routes. Food security concerns are also linked to agricultural inputs. Industry analyses suggest that roughly 25–30% of global nitrogen fertilizer exports transit the Strait of Hormuz, including about 31% of global urea trade. During the initial weeks of heightened tensions, urea prices in Middle Eastern markets reportedly rose by about $70–80 per ton, from roughly $470 to $550–590 per ton, an increase of 17–20%. These shifts have broader implications. Disruptions in fertilizer supplies affect both the cost of imported food and the future cost of agricultural production worldwide. The crisis therefore impacts food systems through two channels at once: logistical constraints and rising input costs. Central Asia is exposed on both sides of this equation. Against this backdrop, discussion has intensified around alternative transport routes that could reduce dependence on Hormuz. In this context, Central Asia’s relevance reflects its location as well as its agricultural output, existing transport infrastructure, and growing focus on export diversification. One proposed configuration involves a multimodal corridor linking Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to ports on the Arabian Sea, with onward connections to Oman and GCC markets. In this setup, Central Asia serves as the northern anchor of an alternative supply corridor rather than a peripheral segment of a broader Eurasian route. Within this structure, the region could supply key agricultural exports, particularly grain, while also serving as a transit link between northern Eurasian markets and the Indian Ocean. For Kazakhstan, and for Uzbekistan’s broader logistics ambitions, this could expand southbound export options and strengthen the region’s bargaining position in Eurasian trade. This potential rests on tangible, though uneven, regional capacities. Kazakhstan already has significant agricultural export potential, especially in grain and flour, while Uzbekistan has increasingly positioned itself as a logistics and manufacturing hub with an interest in expanding southbound connectivity. Across the region, existing rail networks, dry ports, storage facilities, and trade corridors provide a foundation for deeper integration, even if they were not originally designed for a Gulf-oriented food route. In that sense, Central Asia’s role would not start from zero. The region already possesses part of the infrastructure needed to support such a corridor, though substantial improvements in coordination, border management, and transport reliability would still be required. Elements of such a system already exist, including transport links between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar, and Oman’s logistics infrastructure. The concept therefore centers on expanding and institutionalizing existing connections rather than creating an entirely new route. For Central Asian states, this distinction matters. The challenge is not to create a new route, but to make the southern vector commercially viable. Oman could play a particularly important role. Its deep-water ports at Sohar, Duqm and Salalah provide direct access to the Indian Ocean and are integrated into global shipping networks. They also create additional logistics options that help diversify supply routes alongside existing Persian Gulf infrastructure. For Central Asian exporters, these ports could provide additional maritime access to Gulf and global markets. The principal obstacle to this scenario remains persistent tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In recent years, their border has seen periodic clashes, mutual accusations, and temporary closures of trade crossings. For transit projects, such instability poses a significant risk. As long as relations between Kabul and Islamabad remain strained, establishing reliable trade flows will be difficult. From a Central Asian standpoint, any opportunity tied to southbound connectivity remains inseparable from security risk. At the same time, economic incentives could influence political behavior. If transit becomes a meaningful source of revenue, all parties may have a stronger interest in maintaining a minimum level of stability. This does not imply a comprehensive political settlement. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic approach in which economic interests may help limit escalation and sustain functional cooperation. Even a limited degree of predictability could prove significant if it allows cargo flows to continue. For Central Asian states, the implications would be practical: expanded export outlets, increased infrastructure investment, and reduced reliance on existing transport corridors. For GCC states, the priority would remain securing stable food supplies and managing price risks. Infrastructure investment, transit agreements, insurance mechanisms, and financial guarantees could all form part of such a strategy. Diplomatic dynamics also merit attention. Under current conditions, China may be better positioned than GCC countries to play a mediating role between Afghanistan and Pakistan, given its economic influence and regional engagement. In this scenario, GCC states could act as financial and commercial stakeholders in a transit corridor, while China assumes a more active political role. This would present both opportunity and risk for Central Asia. Gulf capital could support corridor development, while Chinese involvement might help manage instability but also deepen external dependence. The development of such a corridor would likely unfold in stages, each involving a different balance between commercial gain and political exposure for Central Asian states. In the short term, initial measures could include guaranteed transit windows for cargo, expanded transport insurance, expedited customs procedures, and priority clearance for food shipments originating in or passing through the region. Over the medium term, a more stable transit regime could emerge, with regular freight services, expanded dry port infrastructure, and the development of specialized cold chain logistics across key Central Asian nodes as well as along the Afghan–Pakistani segment, building on existing but fragmented capacities. In the longer term, broader cooperation could take shape through an international infrastructure consortium involving GCC states, Central Asian countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and international financial institutions. Such a framework could support investment in transport corridors, logistics hubs, and storage facilities, while consolidating the region’s role in broader supply chains. If realized, this process could gradually transform parts of the trans-Afghan corridor from zones of instability into components of Eurasian trade networks. This would give Central Asia a more direct and diversified connection to Arabian Sea trade. Ultimately, the key question is whether economic incentives can outweigh political tensions. For Central Asian states, the issue is whether this corridor can become a credible channel for exports, diversification, and regional leverage rather than another unrealized connectivity project. For GCC states, the priority remains supply stability and price pressures, while Afghanistan and Pakistan would weigh transit revenues against the economic costs of recurring border disruptions. Logistics systems evolve slowly, but once established, transport routes and infrastructure can shape regional economic relationships for decades, often outlasting acute political crises. This is why even limited progress along the southern vector could carry implications that extend well beyond the immediate Hormuz crisis.
Why Central Asia Cares About the Middle Corridor–South Caucasus TRIPP Route
Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on March 11 and said he has no intention of delaying TRIPP, the newly proposed South Caucasus route through southern Armenia to be integrated into the existing Middle Corridor. He described the project as being “in the crystallization stage,” said that the Armenia–U.S. implementation framework (signed on 13 January) was already in place, and added that the two countries will “[i]n the near future ... sign the relevant agreements, and the practical implementation of the project will begin.” While mentioning that developments in Iran and the wider Middle East could shade an otherwise positive regional picture, Pashinyan explicitly did not connect that to any actual delay in the corridor project. This accords with the view of the EU itself, which treats the Middle Corridor and its South Caucasus segment, as does the World Bank, as an increasingly necessary connection between Central Asia and Europe through the South Caucasus and Turkey. Pashinyan’s statement should thereby reassure not just European governments but also the investors and shippers that want and need the route. From Declaration to Implementation Pashinyan tied TRIPP to the Washington Declaration of August 8, especially to its provisions on reopening communications and establishing a U.S.-supported framework for unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. The Washington meeting produced a joint declaration by Armenia and Azerbaijan and the text of the initialed peace agreement, while also making clear that signing and ratification still lay ahead. In Strasbourg, according to Pashinyan's own words, the Washington Declaration “essentially established peace” between Armenia and Azerbaijan. He also gave pertinent indicators. Pashinyan stated there had been eight months of complete peace on the border and that 2025 was the first full calendar year since independence without casualties or injuries from Armenian–Azerbaijani shooting. He also said that in November 2025, for the first time since independence, a train (carrying wheat from Kazakhstan) reached Armenia through Azerbaijan and Georgia after Azerbaijan lifted restrictions on that rail route. Azerbaijan has since sent fuel and other commodities through Georgia to Armenia. Such transits have now become a regular occurrence. Since 2020, Armenia has turned toward Central Asia as part of its effort to reduce dependence on Russia. Kazakhstan has become the clearest practical partner in that effort as this turn has accentuated in recent months. During Pashinyan’s 21 November 2025 visit to Astana, the two sides upgraded relations to a strategic partnership and signed 15 intergovernmental and interagency documents, including a trade and economic roadmap for 2026–2030 that projects cooperation in agriculture, digitalization, healthcare, industry, science and education, and peaceful uses of atomic energy. While the cooperation with Kazakhstan is a continuation of previous trends, the sharpest diplomatic change is with Uzbekistan. After Pashinyan’s 12 July 2023 telephone call with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, stressing the need to convene the first intergovernmental commission to move practical projects forward, that commission met in Tashkent on 3–4 August 2023, with a modest but real result in foreign trade growth. Armenia's outreach to Central Asia exemplifies how the country's broader diplomatic profile under Pashinyan complements the country's eventual participation in the Middle Corridor through TRIPP. Why Central Asia Cares The Middle Corridor is correctly seen as a source of resilience and route diversification for trade between Asia and Europe. The World Bank describes it this way, while EU materials frame the South Caucasus and Turkey as the bridge through which Europe’s links with Central Asia are to be strengthened. This is all the more the case now that Iran-crossing options from Central Asia to Turkey, for example through Turkmenistan, have receded from feasibility for the foreseeable future. The same is true of the route agreed between Azerbaijan and Iran in October 2023 for access to Nakhchivan through northern Iran, which was never completed. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states thus have an interest in maintaining the perception that the South Caucasus continuation of the Middle Corridor is viable enough to deserve policy attention, commercial planning, and further investment. In pursuit of cooperation from all interested parties, Kazakhstan has recently engaged in outreach to Gulf partners that point the same way, as Central Asian governments manage corridor risk diplomatically as well as commercially. Azerbaijan began its own programmatic connectivity outreach to the Gulf countries several years ago. At issue is not just transit efficiency but strategic optionality. The westbound corridor through the Caspian and the South Caucasus has become perhaps the main instrument through which Central Asian countries widen their room for geoeconomic maneuver without pretending that older routes will simply disappear. An EU study released last month places this logic squarely in a Europe–Central Asia framework. The World Bank report makes a related point in more economic language, arguing that the Turkey–South Caucasus corridor can increase resilience and help reorient supply chains. In Strasbourg, Pashinyan reflected this logic, saying that Armenia was ready at once to provide road transit between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and between western Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, using existing Armenian infrastructure. The problem here is that such a route through Armenia would currently be extremely circuitous and does not necessarily have guaranteed security. But at the same time, Pashinyan stressed that this expressed readiness was not meant to delay, disrupt, or replace the Washington understandings that undergird the future TRIPP. His purpose here appears to be to show that continuing momentum does not depend on a final diplomatic architecture and is indeed integrated within that larger framework. Wider Strategic Consequences The question for Central Asia is whether Iran’s shadow over the South Caucasus is strong enough to damage confidence in the westbound TRIPP route that major IFIs and other state actors now regard as strategically necessary. By the evidence Pashinyan offered on 11 March, the answer is no. When Pashinyan insisted that Armenia had no reason to delay implementation, he was defending the investment logic of the TRIPP segment at a time when external observers might begin to wonder whether the Iran crisis could freeze momentum. Even after current hostilities end, it is unlikely that Iran-crossing routes will function at full commercial scale due to insurance and payments constraints. The political momentum behind TRIPP has thus not been overturned, not least because Central Asian states need supply-chain redundancy. The same goes for the broader Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process that makes this segment of the Middle Corridor possible. This assessment emerges from Pashinyan's first-person testimony, recent practical movement in Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization, and the fact that Europe and international financial actors now treat the South Caucasus bridge as part of a serious Europe-Central Asia connectivity project. In addition to Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves, almost all external actors will benefit from TRIPP, although their strategic benefits differ. For the European Union, enhanced South Caucasus transit reinforces a connection to Central Asia that does not depend on Russia. For the United States, it moves forward the American diplomatic initiative to shape the region's post-conflict order after the Washington breakthrough on the basis of mutual benefit. For China, any stable westbound connection across the Caspian and Caucasus adds redundancy to Eurasian transit without displacing Beijing’s other routes. Even Russia has come to support the TRIPP route, because it increases connectivity with Armenia, Turkey and Europe through existing Azerbaijani rail infrastructure. This configuration of interests represents the gradual consolidation of the route's forward movement. Iran is objectively the only state or nonstate actor opposing the consolidation of this peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus, with benefits stretching from Central Asia to Europe. However, Tehran’s capacity for influence here is eroding as quickly as its military infrastructure.
Iran War Quietly Raises the Strategic Value of Central Asian Airspace
The war in Iran has disrupted one of the main aviation corridors linking Europe and Asia. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued safety bulletins warning of high risk to civilian aircraft in Iranian airspace and surrounding regions affected by military activity, missile launches, interceptions, and air defense operations. A separate EASA bulletin covering Iran, valid through March 31, describes a high risk to civil flights at all altitudes within the Tehran flight information region.
The consequences reach far beyond the Middle East. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, most Western airlines have been unable to use Russian airspace. With Iranian airspace now considered unsafe for normal commercial transit, the map for long-haul traffic between Europe and Asia has become extremely tight. Reuters mapping of global flight paths shows airlines diverting north via the Caucasus or taking longer southern routes through the eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula. Many passengers traveling between Europe and Asia still transit through Gulf hubs. However, airports across the region, including Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait, and Bahrain, have faced disruption and unstable schedules during the conflict.
Central Asia sits just beyond that northern bypass. It is not replacing the Gulf as a passenger hub, and is not suddenly becoming the main bridge between Europe and Asia, but the region’s airspace is increasingly strategically valuable as the number of efficient alternatives shrinks. The war has made Central Asia more important as part of a wider arc stretching from Turkey and the Caucasus across the Caspian basin and onward toward South and East Asia.
[caption id="attachment_45218" align="aligncenter" width="1290"]
Live flight-tracking map (image taken at 840am EST) showing aircraft routes avoiding Iranian airspace during the crisis. Many flights between Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia are being diverted north over the Caspian Sea and across Central Asia instead of flying over Iran; source: Planes Live[/caption]
Kazakhstan is the clearest example. Local airlines had already begun to adjust before the current escalation reached its present level. In January, The Times of Central Asia reported that Air Astana had rerouted flights to Sharm el-Sheikh, Dubai, Doha, and Medina to avoid Iranian airspace. After the conflict widened, Air Astana canceled flights to several Middle Eastern destinations following the closure of Iranian airspace and rising regional tensions. Kazakhstan also imposed a temporary ban on flights over or near the airspace of Iran, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.
Uzbekistan also moved quickly. As early as October 2024, Kun.uz reported that Uzbekistan Airways was avoiding Iraqi airspace and western Iranian airspace on safety grounds. After the latest escalation, on March 4, Uzbekistan suspended flights to six Middle Eastern countries. The pattern is clear: Central Asian carriers are not immune to the crisis; they are already adjusting networks, schedules, and commercial risk, with the broader economic consequences of the conflict emerging across regional supply chains.
However, the region’s aviation systems clearly now carry far greater strategic and economic importance than they did only a few years ago. On its official site, Kazakhstan’s air navigation provider Kazaeronavigatsiya states that in the first half of 2025, it served 216,616 flights, including 161,029 operated by foreign airlines and described as transit and landing traffic. Kazakhstan’s aviation sector is also growing fast. In 2025, the country’s airports handled 31.8 million passengers, while Kazakh airlines carried 20.7 million. These figures point to an aviation system with real regional significance rather than a marginal market.
Uzbekistan is moving in the same direction. The government has made aviation expansion part of a broader transport strategy, with plans for a new major airport in the Tashkent region reflecting ambitions that go far beyond domestic demand. Tashkent is not Dubai, but it is steadily emerging as an important regional hub at a time when established corridors to the south are under growing strain.
None of this means Central Asia will see a sudden windfall. Longer detours increase fuel burn, crew expenses, insurance premiums, and schedule risk. Much of the region’s added strategic value may first be felt in overflight planning, air traffic management, and route resilience rather than headline passenger numbers. Nor does it mean airlines will quickly shift large volumes of passengers through Central Asian hubs. Gulf airports still possess far larger networks, deeper fleets, and more developed connecting systems.
But geography has become harsher and more political. Iranian airspace is unsafe, and parts of the Gulf corridor have been disrupted. In that environment, countries able to offer stable airspace, competent air traffic control, and reliable infrastructure gain importance.
That is where Central Asia now finds itself. For years, the region’s governments have spoken about the strategic value of their territory for rail, road, and trade corridors. The war in Iran has quietly added aviation to that argument. In a world where established east-west routes are narrowing, the skies over Central Asia matter more than they did before.
Informal OTS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Tests Limits of Turkic Coordination
Escalating tensions linked to the widening conflict in the Middle East have tested the political cohesion of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), according to Kazakh political commentator Dzhanibek Suleyev. Recent incidents affecting both Azerbaijan and Turkey — including drone strikes in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and a missile intercepted by Turkish air defenses — have raised security concerns across the wider region. Suleyev argues that developments of this scale might normally prompt an urgent summit of heads of state. Instead, Turkey convened an informal meeting of foreign ministers and senior diplomatic representatives from OTS member states. The gathering took place on March 7, when officials convened at the invitation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. According to Turkish media, ministers later met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during their visit. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, Suleyev drew attention to how the meeting was covered in the media of Central Asian member states. “In the Uzbek press, coverage was limited, and even on the website of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is not a single word about the informal summit of OTS foreign ministers. Kazakhstan, moreover, was represented not by Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev but by his deputy Alibek Bakayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry issued four notes about the trip of its minister Jeenbek Kulubaev to Istanbul, three of which were devoted to the summit, but without any particular details,” Suleyev said. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry published a short summary of the meeting, noting in broad terms that representatives discussed cooperation among Turkic states and regional developments. According to Suleyev, the joint statement adopted after the meeting was difficult to find outside of Azerbaijani media. One of the few outlets to publish the text in full was Azerbaijan’s APA news agency. Much of the statement focused on the incidents affecting Azerbaijan and Turkey, stressing that “any threat to the security of OTS member states causes concern for the entire Organization… The ministers strongly condemned the attacks carried out from the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including strikes against civilian facilities and the territory of the Republic of Turkey,” the statement continued. “The rest of the statement boils down to destabilization in the Middle East could lead to a global economic crisis, the Palestinian conflict must be resolved taking into account UN resolutions, and so on,” Suleyev told TCA. One notable event during the meeting was the foreign ministers’ reception by President Erdoğan. Official summaries released by participating governments described the discussion in diplomatic terms. “Kazakh sources wrote that ‘prospects for the development of cooperation within the framework of Turkic cooperation were discussed,’” Suleyev said. Kyrgyz statements used similar language, stating that the “President of Turkey… noted the importance of regular dialogue on current regional and international issues and expressed interest in further developing multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Organization.” “In short, these are streamlined diplomatic formulations without specific details,” Suleyev said. According to a press release from the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry, the discussions also addressed issues beyond the Middle East. Ministers exchanged views on tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as concerns related to potential sanctions affecting Kyrgyzstan. “The discussion of sanctions noted that unilateral restrictive measures negatively affect global trade and the stability of economic ties. The position of the Kyrgyz Republic on the need to observe the principles of international law and the inadmissibility of unilateral measures outside the framework of the United Nations Security Council was emphasized,” the ministry stated. For Suleyev, the restrained tone of official statements and limited coverage in the region’s media point to deeper structural limits within the organization. “These nuances and the minimal coverage in the press of the interested states indicate the inability of Ankara and Baku to ensure significant progress in integration even within the OTS itself,” he said. Suleyev also pointed to the organization’s broader ambitions to expand cooperation with outside partners through formats sometimes described as OTS+. According to Suleyev, these initiatives appear aimed primarily at Hungary, an EU member state that has previously shown interest in cooperation with the organization. “That interest is connected with the search for an alternative to Russian hydrocarbons,” Suleyev said. Originally founded in 2009 as the Turkic Council, the OTS brings together Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, with observer states including Hungary and Turkmenistan. In recent years, the organization has expanded its agenda beyond cultural cooperation toward economic and transport connectivity across the Turkic world.
Uzbekistan Repatriates Over 21,700 Citizens from Middle East
Uzbekistan has repatriated 21,712 citizens from several Middle Eastern countries as of 07:00 on March 9, the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said, as evacuation efforts continue amid regional instability. Most of those returned came from Saudi Arabia, where 17,963 citizens were brought back to Uzbekistan. Additional repatriations included 3,290 people from the United Arab Emirates, 378 from Qatar, 47 from Iran, 27 from Bahrain, and seven from Oman. The ministry said the return of Uzbek citizens is being carried out “systematically and in stages,” with authorities continuing to coordinate transport and logistics for those seeking to return. Officials noted that many repatriation flights are currently being organized through countries whose airspace remains open to civilian aviation.
Uzbekistan’s evacuation reflects the scale of its citizens’ presence across the Gulf. In recent years, the country has expanded labor migration agreements with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, sending thousands of workers into construction, hospitality, and service sectors. Saudi Arabia has also become a major destination for religious travel from Uzbekistan, with large annual flows of pilgrims traveling for the Hajj and Umrah.
Kazakhstan has also evacuated citizens during the crisis, bringing 8,585 people home from Middle Eastern countries since the operation began. Central Asian citizens travel widely to Gulf states for work, tourism, and pilgrimage, leaving thousands affected when conflicts disrupt flights and close regional airspace.
The number of returned citizens has risen steadily over the past several days. According to the foreign ministry, 19,347 Uzbek citizens had returned home as of 07:00 on March 8. Uzbek diplomatic missions in the region have also issued safety guidance to citizens who remain abroad. In a statement published by the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Israel, citizens were urged to follow official security instructions issued by local authorities. The embassy said red alerts issued by Israel’s civil defense authorities indicate a dangerous situation and require people to stay near protected shelters and immediately enter them if warning sirens sound. Blue alerts indicate that the threat has passed, and people may leave shelters. Other Central Asian countries have also organized evacuations of their citizens. According to Tajik media outlet Asia-Plus, more than 300 citizens of Tajikistan returned home on March 8 on two flights from Dubai. One charter flight brought 130 Tajik citizens to Dushanbe in the morning, while a later flight operated by Somon Air transported another 180 passengers. The charter operation was organized with support from the Tajik embassy in the United Arab Emirates, local authorities, and the airline Flydubai. About 550 Tajik citizens have returned home from Abu Dhabi and Dubai on charter flights in recent days amid the ongoing regional conflict.
Central Asia Faces an Arc of Instability to the South
Until a few weeks ago, looking south from Central Asia, observers of the region saw nothing but opportunities for connectivity. Admittedly, Iran on one side and the area between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other have never been known for their stability. However, the current situation sees two serious conflicts on the southern border of Central Asia, which risk representing an arc of instability that will be difficult to overcome. While the global energy implications of the ongoing war in the Middle East, which began following the joint attack by the United States and Israel on Iran, are likely to be felt for months to come, the greatest risk for the Central Asian region is related to connectivity. This could also compromise significant efforts made in this regard by regional governments. Consider, for example, the recent trip to Pakistan by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, which focused on the possibility of building a railway from Pakistani ports to Kazakh territory via Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. For much of the past decade, Central Asian governments have invested heavily in opening southern trade routes to global markets. Railways through Afghanistan, port access through Iran, and new logistics corridors to Pakistan were meant to reduce dependence on northern routes and expand the region’s economic options. The sudden emergence of conflicts along the southern frontier now raises questions about how secure those connections will be. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Peter Frankopan, author and Professor of Global History at Oxford University, about the potential implications of the two wars on Central Asia’s southern border. According to him, the main risk is not related to connectivity, but to contagion: “The key issue is about the safety of civilians and the protection of infrastructure in Central Asia,” he told TCA. “In times like these, nothing can be ruled out. With Iran lashing out at neighbors and realizing that attacks on oil, gas and more give it leverage, it is not hard to see what might come next. Second, of course, are threats to national economies. Wars create winners and losers. One can see a boom for some people in Central Asian states, but plenty of pressures, especially on inflation.” Indeed, the economic repercussions of the Middle East conflict are already being felt in the region, particularly in Turkmenistan, which maintains some of the closest trade ties with Iran and shares a long border with the country. Frankopan does not see any particular differences in terms of the danger to Central Asia posed by what is happening in Iran and between Pakistan and Afghanistan: “Clearly, instability in Afghanistan is an immediate concern, but it is not related to Iran and will have its own velocity and rhythms. But the risks of expanding violence and terrorism, of refugees, of narcotics and other illicit trafficking are real - and may well get worse.” Regarding connectivity, one of the topics that Central Asian governments pay the most attention to, according to Frankopan, the current situation should not be considered an insurmountable obstacle: “This is simply testimony to turbulence as competing ideas of the present and future jostle and take shape. A few weeks ago, everyone was talking about middle corridors and a new golden era of exchange; now they are talking about breakdowns and dislocation. Both of those cannot be right - or wrong. People, states, and businesses cooperate when they want or need to, and when it suits all sides. Like all relationships, it works as long as it works, but it can all suddenly stop. The question now is who wants to collaborate and work together, why, and about what.” Another aspect that could potentially jeopardize the difficult balancing act of the Central Asian republics, particularly Kazakhstan, should not be overlooked: increasingly narrow political margins. Consider, on the one hand, the fact that Uzbekistan has recently collaborated with India and Iran on a project such as the International North–South Transport Corridor, which has - or perhaps it would be more accurate to say “had” - a very important hub in the port of Chabahar, a collaboration that the current close relationship between the U.S. administration led by Donald Trump could make very costly to maintain. On the other hand, the increasingly close relations between Kazakhstan and Israel could prove difficult to maintain in light of the increasingly assertive regional policies of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Regarding this dimension, and with particular reference to Kazakhstan, Frankopan adopts a longer-term perspective, stepping back from the constant flow of news coming from the frontline. “Tokayev is a shrewd operator, and one who evaluates risk carefully. I don’t know how he is assessing the current situation, but I would pay close attention to it and think his analysis would be worth listening to. Kazakhstan has to balance multiple competing interests and pressures. Some of us think that experience helps in these circumstances; if you take a historian’s view, those run deep. So, balance and risk management are everything.” In recent years, Central Asia has demonstrated great resilience and the ability to adapt quickly to an ever-changing international landscape. Although the situation on its southern border is becoming increasingly alarming, it remains possible that the pragmatism of regional leaders in international relations will once again prevail.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
