Interview With Sara Raza – Director of the Tashkent Centre for Contemporary Art
Sara Raza is a litmus test for the spirit of the times in the shape of an art curator. In simple terms, art crowds can count on her direction for the Tashkent Centre for Contemporary Art (CCA) to bring the most pressing issues in contemporary art to the foreground.
Indeed, the author of the book Punk Orientalism - and the namesake curatorial studio - has been just appointed as Artistic Director and Chief Curatorial Director of the CCA Tashkent, set to open in September 2025.
It’s a strategic move for the Centre, which has aspirations of becoming a global arts and culture hub and is aiming at international artistic and creative exchanges, which include residencies, exhibitions, workshops, and educational programmes, and contributing to Uzbekistan’s cultural ecosystem.
Transversal in her curatorial approach, London-born, New-York-based Raza is coming from a mixed Central Asian/Middle Eastern background, but she is also steeped in the heart of the Western art system, in institutions such as the Guggenheim – having taken care of a project called UBS MAP Global Art Initiative, curating the Middle East and North Africa section.
Over the years, the curator has worked with artists from Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Europe, and North America, and has curated shows at the Mathaf: Arab Museum of Modern Art in Doha and the Rubin Museum of Art in New York, but it is truly her book, Punk Orientalism: The Art of Rebellion, which brought a fresh approach to the sometimes highly academic field of art criticism.
For Raza, artists from the former-Soviet countries and beyond hold a strong punk DIY ethos, by which they counter the Orientalist gaze they have always been subjected to by both the West and Russia. Their art is often a form of bricolage, an unexpected connection of disparate ideas used to create something entirely new.
Will she bring this original approach to the direction of the museum, too? TCA spoke with Raza to find out about how she’s planning to foster cultural and educational partnerships and to support local, regional, and international artists while engaging with Uzbekistan’s rich cultural heritage.
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Centre for Contemporary Art Tashkent Artist Residencies; image: Namuna[/caption]
TCA: The Centre for Contemporary Art in Tashkent is poised to become a major hub for artistic discourse in Central Asia. As its first Artistic Director and Chief Curator, how do you envision defining the institution’s identity from the ground up?
My vision for CCA is less of a ground up approach, but rather one that builds on an historical and visual cultural foundation established in the 20th century that included a robust relationship with artists, intellectuals and others from the Global Majority World [a collective term for people of African, Asian, indigenous, Latin American, or mixed-heritage backgrounds, who constitute approximately 85% of the global population].
This included relationships between Harlem Renaissance figures [The Harlem Renaissance was an African American cultural movement that flourished in the 1920s and had Harlem in New York City as its symbolic capital], and a film festival and program that included Asia, Africa, and Latin American filmmakers, which lasted from the 1960s-80s in Tashkent. All of this bodes very well for my curatorial work and can be reimagined in interesting and dynamic ways.
TCA: Your curatorial work has consistently challenged dominant art history narratives. How do you see the CCA in Tashkent playing a role in reshaping global conversations about contemporary art?
Reimaging some of the historical and global connections that I mention above in new and fresh ways through the lens of contemporary artists is something I’m very much looking forward to developing. Equally, extending beyond exhibitions to programming, learning, and outreach through our forthcoming research library, public programming, and indoor/outdoor cinema to allow for regional collaboration is also on the agenda.
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Centre for Contemporary Art Tashkent Artist Residencies; image: Namuna[/caption]
TCA: You’ve described the CCA as an "intersectional space for cultural exchange." How do you balance the need for deep engagement with local artistic traditions while ensuring the Centre resonates internationally?
In this context, intersectional also means via ideation, not necessarily just material cultures and traditions. Given that there is already a global history, it's instead a matter of reconnecting and reconfiguring new pathways and other ways of understanding local/global scales, which are also variable since this gap is shrinking and technology is advancing.
TCA: Would you say that Central Asia is experiencing a cultural renaissance? And if so, what excites you most about the current Uzbek and Central Asian art scene?
There is a lot of excitement across the region, owing to its young population. Inside Uzbekistan, spearheading many projects is the chairperson of Art and Culture Development Foundation (ACDF), Gayane Umerova who has mapped a cultural path that includes not only extending the invitation to me to lead the CCA but also the launch of the Aral Culture Summit in Nukus [April 2025] and the forthcoming Bukhara Biennial in September, as well as Uzbekistan PavilionTCA: at the Expo 2025 Osaka and the Venice Biennale of Architecture, amongst other arts and cultural activities.
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Centre for Contemporary Art Tashkent Artist Residencies; image: Namuna[/caption]
TCA: Will you maintain the approach outlined with the book and the curatorial studio Punk Orientalist in your programming for the Centre?
In my curatorial monograph for Punk Orientalism: The Art of Rebellion - which is culled from my curatorial practice - I explore Eastern forms of Orientalism related to art and ideas from the former USSR from a post-Soviet and post-colonial standpoint, spanning Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Arab world, Turkey, and Iran. My practice is very much artist-led, and the book highlights the cross-pollination of art and ideas. It reflects upon thematic curatorial patterns, which will continue to inform the work I do, which relies on shared cultural and intellectual labor with artists, architects, technologists, and thinkers.
TCA: Your curatorial work often engages with themes of post-colonialism, migration, and memory. In a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape, do you see your role at the CCA as inherently political? If so, how?
I wouldn’t say that my role is political with a capital “P,” as it’s more driven in art historical narratives and works to illuminate artistic practices, sometimes involving more complex forms of interaction and oscillation between institutions, artists, and objects.
TCA: How will you ensure that the CCA remains a dynamic, living space that truly connects with the people of Tashkent?
CCA is in a central location adjacent to the Westminster International University in Tashkent, with whom we’re developing an MA program in Creative Industries. Students pursuing curatorial studies will have the opportunity to integrate and learn from the artists, exhibitions, and programs at CCA. This is also a pipeline into employment for the next generation of practitioners. With this important demographic in mind, CCA will offer a broad spectrum of programs and experiences catering to all communities across the city.
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Centre for Contemporary Art Tashkent Artist Residencies; image: Namuna[/caption]
TCA: Do you plan to create an environment where artists feel empowered to push boundaries, even within an institutional framework?
CCA launched its residency program earlier this year, which is an essential feature of CCA’s programming in that it allows space for artists to research and make new work as well as connect with craftspeople and other artists. Some of the work that artists produce during their residencies will be featured in the forthcoming exhibitions as well, which I hope will contribute to the program’s overall dynamic environment.
TCA: You have often spoken about your deep connection to Central Asia and their communication with the broader region. How does this personal history inform your curatorial vision for CCA, and do you see this role as a kind of homecoming?
I’ve had the fortune of working in Central Asia and internationally for two decades; my entire thinking is based on a global framework. I’m also of mixed ethnicity of Iranian and Central Asian origin, which includes ancient Uzbekistan, and was born in London, and am currently based in New York where I teach at both NYU and Yale. My approach to connection is through remixing, reordering, and rearranging art and ideas from different 20th and 21st-century periods horizontally across Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa. CCA offers a space to consolidate two decades of professional practice and personal and autobiographical.
TCA: With the grand opening set for September 2025, what should audiences — both in Uzbekistan and globally — expect from the CCA’s inaugural programming? Can you hint at any upcoming exhibitions, commissions, or collaborations that will set the tone for the Centre’s future?
I can say that the artist-led direction will be very significant in all aspects of CCA’s curatorial approach. From illuminating the Studio KO-designed renovation to re-evaluating histories and programming, the artist’s hand is an important feature.
How Women in Central Asia Celebrate International Women’s Day
March 8, International Women’s Day, holds a special place in Central Asia. Over the years, the holiday has evolved from its Soviet-era roots into a modern celebration that blends tradition with contemporary interpretations. The Soviet Past: March 8 as a Day for Working Women During the Soviet Union, March 8 was more than a celebration of spring and femininity, it symbolized the struggle for women’s rights and equality. The day honored working women, with official ceremonies highlighting their achievements. State-run enterprises and organizations staged formal events and presented flowers and gifts to female employees, and media outlets published articles about the country’s outstanding women. The Transition Period: The 1990s Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries began redefining their identities, which was reflected in how they marked March 8. The holiday took on a more personal and familial character, with less ideological emphasis. While state celebrations continued, they became more subdued. Men still gifted flowers and presents to women, but the political significance of the day gradually faded into the background. Modern Celebrations: Balancing Tradition and New Trends Today, March 8 in Central Asia is primarily a day to recognize women’s contributions and express gratitude. The holiday remains widely celebrated across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, though each country has developed its distinct traditions. Kazakhstan: Major cities host flash mobs, charity events, and cultural programs. In recent years, feminist activism has gained momentum, with some using the holiday to highlight gender inequality. “For me, March 8 is not just about receiving flowers, it’s a reminder that equality is not a privilege but a necessity,” Ainur, 24, from Almaty told TCA. Uzbekistan: The holiday remains warm and family-oriented. Women receive flowers, sweets, and gifts from colleagues and relatives, while government agencies organize concerts and celebrations. “My friends and I always celebrate March 8. It’s wonderful to receive gifts from my brothers, friends, and husband, but I wish there was more year-round appreciation for women,” Madina, 27, from Tashkent told TCA. Kyrgyzstan: Alongside traditional celebrations, women's organizations and activists hold marches and discussions on gender rights, reflecting a shift toward reinterpreting the holiday. “I participate in the women’s rights march every year because this day is not just about flowers; it’s about our opportunities and freedoms,” Gulzat, 23, from Bishkek told TCA. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan: March 8 remains an official holiday, but without any strong political agenda. “For me, this day is a time to gather with family, but I see that younger women are giving it a new meaning,” Zarina, 40, from Dushanbe told TCA. Changing Values and Perspectives Each year, debates over the significance of March 8 grow stronger. Some argue that it should remain a celebration of spring and femininity, while others emphasize its role in promoting gender equality. Regardless of interpretation, International Women’s Day remains an important occasion that unites different generations of women and reinforces the need for respect and support. Over time, the holiday in Central Asia has evolved from a Soviet tradition into a modern celebration, reflecting both historical influences and contemporary challenges. Whether viewed as a day of appreciation or a call for equality, it remains a powerful symbol of women’s contributions to society.
How Trump’s Trade War on China Affects Central Asia
When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on China and the European Union could have severe consequences not only for Brussels and Beijing, but also for economies around the world. Central Asia is no exception, as it could easily be caught in the crossfire. Although no country in Central Asia sees the United States as its major economic partner, Trump’s trade war with the EU and China is expected to impact all Central Asian nations in one way or another. Their strong economic ties with China and the growing EU presence in the region were once seen as a strategic advantage. Now, it seems to represent a double-edged sword. As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, all Central Asian states have sought to strengthen economic relations with Beijing and Brussels. Their partnerships with China and the EU have grown through trade and investments, but Washington’s tariffs on Chinese and European goods could result in a reduction in demand for various items in Central Asia. Trump’s tariff policy could also give Beijing certain leverage over Washington in the strategically important region. According to Mark Temnycky, Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, as a way to counter the impact of U.S. tariffs, the Chinese could increase their trade and energy relations with the countries of Central Asia. “This would further accelerate China’s relationship with Central Asia, and it could result in the regional states becoming more dependent on the Chinese for trade. Given the proximity of China to Central Asia, this may also result in the regional nations reducing their trade relations with the European Union as well as with the United States, as they favor Chinese prices,” Temnycky told The Times of Central Asia in an interview. U.S. bilateral trade in the region has never been particularly strong. The exception is Kazakhstan – the region’s largest economy – which is the only country in Central Asia whose trade with the U.S. exceeds one billion dollars. According to official statistics, in 2024 America’s total goods trade with Kazakhstan was estimated at $3.4 billion. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan combined have a lower trade volume with the United States than Kazakhstan. But all that is just a drop in the ocean compared to the $89.4 billion trade China reached with Central Asian in 2023. “Trump’s tariff policy could lead to an even greater Central Asian states’ dependency on China, potentially creating a Chinese monopoly on Central Asian trade and energy. In other words, regional countries would no longer have a diversified economy and market, thus tightening China's control over the area,” Temnycky stressed. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Beijing will, in the long term, benefit from Washington’s tariff policy. According to Tyler Schipper, an economist and Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas, China is “arguably at one of its economically weakest points in the last several decades,” which means that any trade war with the United States will “further weaken its economy and reduce its demand for energy and mineral exports from Central Asia.” “Both the Biden and Trump administrations have focused on creating relationships to secure access to rare earth minerals. Couple this desire with the current administration’s transactional approach to foreign policy, and there may be some potential to forge new trade relationships between the U.S. and Central Asian economies,” Schipper told The Times of Central Asia. Kazakhstan, with its 15 rare earth deposits and significant raw material base, has a notably larger reserve compared to Ukraine, where rare earth minerals — though less prominent — have been a topic in U.S.-Russia peace negotiations. In fact, it could surpass China. Uzbekistan is also becoming a vital rare earth supplier, partnering with the EU to expand critical material production for green energy and tech. Given that Central Asia is known for its rare earth minerals and energy exports, the United States has been proactive in strengthening ties with Central Asian nations, likely aiming to diversify its critical minerals supply chain and reduce dependency on Beijing. That is why the region, according to Pini Althaus, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer at Kaz Resources, holds significant geopolitical importance to Washington. “In the early days of the Trump administration, executive orders have been issued as it pertains to obtaining critical minerals from mineral-rich countries. The C5 countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are the ‘lowest-hanging fruit’ for the United States due to the deposits that exist there, and the wide range of various critical minerals essential for advanced manufacturing, national security and renewable energy,” Althaus explained in an interview with The Times of Central Asia. In his view, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent phone call with Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister, Bakhtiyor Saidov, in which critical minerals and the C5 were discussed and prioritized, further demonstrates that the region remains of strategic importance to the United States. Does that mean that Trump’s tariffs on the EU and Chinese goods will lead to a growing American economic presence in Central Asia? “Current tariffs are part of a broader isolationist mood in Washington. It seems unlikely that private U.S. investment will materially increase in Central Asia under such conditions,” Schipper said. As he sees it, the potential for additional tariffs against American trade partners, both big and small, will further deter new investment in markets with less U.S. presence, such as Central Asia. “This will leave China, and potentially Russia – if it concludes its war in Ukraine – as the most likely sources of foreign direct investments in the region,” Schipper added. There is no doubt that further economic decoupling between the U.S. and China will have consequences for Central Asia. It remains to be seen who will be the primary beneficiary of this shift – Washington, Beijing, Russia, or perhaps other emerging powers in the region.
Central Asia’s AI Pursuit: A Tale of Ambition and Progress
The term “rare earth metals” has become a buzzword in the modern geo-economic lexicon, popularized by U.S. President Donald Trump in contexts where American investments are expected. However, before that, “artificial intelligence” (AI) had already emerged as a global symbol of technological advancement and economic competitiveness. At least four of the five Central Asian republics have joined the race to implement AI technologies, though, until recently, two of them lacked the necessary prerequisites for such a leap. Kazakhstan Sets the Pace A key factor for the successful adoption of AI is the level of digitalization, an area in which Kazakhstan has made significant progress. The country’s digital transformation began with the banking sector and later expanded to public services, with nearly 100% of government services now available online. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this shift, making digital access to state institutions and banks a necessity. Since 2022, when AI became synonymous with technological leadership, exemplified by developments in China and the U.S., Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has actively promoted AI initiatives. In the summer of 2023, the government adopted the Concept for the Development of Artificial Intelligence for 2024-2029. During discussions on this initiative, officials reviewed measures already in place, such as Smart Data Ukimet, a centralized system integrating data from 93 government databases. Plans include deploying a supercomputer, expanding data processing centers, launching a national AI platform, and enhancing fiber-optic networks. Additionally, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education is working on a large language model (LLM) focused on the Kazakh language and cultural heritage. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov has set a clear goal: “By 2029, the number of AI-based products should increase fivefold. The share of educational programs related to AI must also expand. We need qualified specialists in this field, and it is crucial to consider the needs of domestic companies, which will have a multiplier effect on the economy.” Bektenov also emphasized the role of the National Center for AI in fostering youth involvement, developing human capital, and promoting AI culture. Furthermore, he instructed the Ministry of Justice to enhance legal frameworks for AI regulation. In December 2024, President Tokayev presented Kazakhstan’s first Kazakh language AI model, KazLLM, expressing satisfaction with its development: “We have taught artificial intelligence to think, analyze, and communicate in Kazakh. This achievement opens new prospects for our language in the digital sphere. We must build a Multimodal Language Model, capable of processing various data types simultaneously.” On March 3, 2025, Kazakhstan’s Mazhilis (lower house of parliament) reviewed a draft law, On Artificial Intelligence. If passed, it will be the world’s second AI law after the European AI Act. Uzbekistan's Ambitious Strategy Uzbekistan, another Central Asian country vying for AI leadership, has similarly prioritized digitalization. However, it lags slightly behind Kazakhstan in implementation speed. On October 14, 2024, Uzbekistan adopted its Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Technologies Until 2030, which outlines several ambitious targets:
- Increasing AI-driven software and services to $1.5 billion
- Expanding AI-powered government services on the Single Portal of Interactive Government Services (my.gov.uz) to 10% of total services
- Establishing 10 AI research laboratories and high-performance computing servers
- Achieving a top-50 ranking in the Government AI Readiness Index
- Developing a big data repository by September 1, 2025, ensuring compliance with cybersecurity regulations
- Deploying computing infrastructure for AI research by May 1, 2026
- Developing local AI products
- Enhancing cross-sector cooperation
- Addressing societal challenges with AI solutions
Uzbekistan Ratchets Up Drive Against “Evil” of Corruption
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced a major shakeup of Uzbekistan’s campaign against corruption on Wednesday, ordering the dismissal of the heads of anti-corruption bodies in 117 ministries and departments and saying many officials had fostered mistrust by failing to deliver clean government as promised. Mirziyoyev, who took office in 2016, described corruption as an obstacle to Uzbekistan’s efforts to reform its economy. He said that, while there had been progress toward transparency, virtually every sector in the nation, including the media, schoolteachers, non-governmental groups and neighborhood authorities, should mobilize alongside the state to fight the scourge. “Corruption is such an evil that it undermines people's trust in the state, the Constitution and laws, and becomes a serious threat to sustainable development and security,” Mirziyoyev said at a meeting of the National Anti-Corruption Council, which was established in 2020 to lead efforts to curb graft. International groups that study corruption have long said that autocratic tendencies, opaque bureaucracy and weak justice systems in Central Asia make it hard for those countries to get a comprehensive grip on the problem and hold the powerful – regardless of their political allegiances - to account for any wrongdoing. Even so, Kazakhstan has taken some notable steps, expanding its outreach to other countries in an effort to recover stolen assets and considering the establishment of a public register of officials convicted of corruption-related offenses. Uzbekistan has similarly made advances, while falling short on enforcement and other pledges. A 2024 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development noted that prosecution of corruption offenses in Uzbekistan “is generally ensured, but more efforts should be directed at countering high-level corruption;” that there is no specialized legislation related to the protection of whistleblowers; and that while Uzbekistan has a business ombudsman institution, “companies do not report cases of corruption for fear of negative repercussions from the state.” Mirziyoyev’s remarks, which included scathing criticism of the alleged passivity of some officials, appeared designed to give new momentum to the kind of openness that his government deems essential to a successful, diversified economy. “The Prime Minister was instructed to dismiss the heads of the "internal anti-corruption control" structures in 117 ministries and departments and replace them with honest, dedicated and professional personnel, and to set clear tasks for them,” Sherzod Asadov, the presidential press secretary, said in an account of the meeting that he posted on Facebook. Ministers will directly employ regional compliance officers and “take political responsibility and personally answer for corruption in the entire system,” according to the account. Uzbekistan’s Minister of Emergency Situations, Abdulla Kuldashev, was recently fired because of fire safety bureaucracy and legal violations, the president said. He also expressed frustration that he had to personally instruct measures against wasteful spending in investment and healthcare programs last year, resulting in the saving of several hundred million dollars. "But why should these works begin after the president gives an order?" he said. One measure that Uzbekistan previously introduced is an index that rates the openness of state agencies. In the 2023 index, the statistics agency scored highest and the regional administration of Andijan, near the border with Kyrgyzstan, was at the bottom. Uzbekistan’s government has had an often fraught relationship with journalists and bloggers who say they fear persecution if they report on alleged wrongdoing by high-ranking officials or comment critically on sensitive issues. But the government appears to welcome a growing role for the media in calling attention to corruption. “Previously, this topic was completely closed to journalists,” Asadov said on Facebook. “Currently, the current situation has completely changed in the direction of openness and transparency.”
How the Middle Corridor Is a Game-Changer for Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan has been working to enhance its role in the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). This push reflects Uzbekistan’s strategic aim to diversify trade routes and reduce dependence on Russia. However, it is not just a diversification effort. It is an aspirational strategic pivot whereby Tashkent seeks to recalibrate its position and enhance its resilience within the ongoing geoeconomic restructuring of Eurasian trade. In January 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined a five-year plan to upgrade infrastructure and streamline trade. The measures enumerated in the decree include improving road and rail connectivity, expanding truck stops, and enhancing border-crossing efficiency at key points. Uzbekistan’s infrastructural investments, diplomatic realignments, and institutional relations with regional stakeholders reinforce one another. Moreover, they are co-dependent mechanisms in a larger recalibration of Eurasian trade. Azerbaijan is a case in point. The diplomatic realignment under way was exemplified in August 2024, when Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan signed their bilateral Treaty on Allied Relations, which supports infrastructure projects and the amelioration of trade coordination. In this connection, Uzbekistan is currently investing $18 million in construction of logistics terminal in the Poti Free Industrial Zone in Georgia, an initiative that could streamline transit to Europe, provided that regulatory alignment keeps pace. The country’s increased reliance on Georgian ports has paralleled efforts to coordinate rail administration across multiple transit states. So in September 2024, Uzbekistan took a decisive step by co-founding the Eurasian Transport Route Association along with Austria, Azerbaijan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. These partners are converging on a framework to standardize freight policies, minimize regulatory unpredictability, and optimize throughput along the corridor. As a demonstration of the corridor’s expanding logistical reach, Uzbekistan dispatched its first block train to Brazil in December 2024, demonstrating the potential for new international market connections through modular trade integration. The container train carried 28 tons from Tashkent through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia before reaching Brazil by sea. Following a similar strategy, earlier this year, at the end of January in Ankara, Uzbekistan participated in its second trilateral meeting with Turkey and Azerbaijan, focusing on developing trade, investment, and transport links through the Middle Corridor. A set of interdependent “adaptive constraints” (in systems-theory language) constrains the Middle Corridor’s long-term viability. For example, infrastructure bottlenecks do more than cause delays. They exacerbate cost unpredictability, instilling hesitation among investors, who remain wary of investment to an unpredictable transit network. Such reluctance to commit capital in turn limits the very infrastructure improvements needed to resolve the said bottlenecks. To overcome these challenges, Uzbekistan is investing in infrastructure improvements, in the expectation that these will help attract foreign direct investment while also improving trade efficiency over time. Yet beyond the standard geopolitical risks of political instability in transit countries, shifting geoeconomic alignments, and competition from other routes, there are infrastructural and operational challenges. Broadly summarized, these include bottlenecks (such as just mentioned), regulatory inconsistencies, and environmental concerns. External assessments nevertheless suggest long-term structural advantages for Uzbekistan’s deeper engagement in the Middle Corridor. A 2023 World Bank report, for instance, published in November 2023, highlighted the advantages of Uzbekistan’s deeper participation in it. According to the report, Uzbekistan can also expand its labor migration destinations, reducing reliance on Russia, by enhancing its connectivity with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Uzbekistan’s economic trajectory will depend on whether infrastructure expansion, capital flows, and labor mobility will interact as dynamically as projected, or whether the system’s inherent inertia will act as a brake upon the process. For Uzbekistan, the Middle Corridor is both an opportunity and a logistical constraint. It promises faster transit but still operates under capacity limitations. For example, it decreases transit time between China and Europe from 35–45 days via sea routes to 13–21 days. Being approximately 2,000 kilometers shorter than the Northern Corridor through Russia, it also increases the country’s European market access, which now accounts for only about 3 percent of its exports and 13 percent of its imports. At present, however, the Middle Corridor has lower capacity compared to the Northern Corridor, with estimates suggesting it handles only about 5 percent of the Northern Corridor's volume, while transportation costs are also higher ranging from $3,500–4,500 per 40-foot container, compared to $2,800–3,200 for the Northern Corridor. Despite such remaining challenges as infrastructure modernization and coordination with neighbors, Uzbekistan’s efforts signal a strategic pivot toward becoming a significant hub in the emerging Eurasian trade network. The Middle Corridor’s flexibility—integrating rail, maritime, and road systems—supports Uzbekistan’s goals of diversifying supply chains and enhancing economic resilience. Increasing trade volumes through the Middle Corridor would offer Uzbekistan expanded access to European and Asian markets, and the reduction of its dependence on traditional routes would provide resilience against geopolitical shocks. Increased trade and economic activity along the corridor would, in addition, create new employment opportunities for Uzbekistan's workforce. Uzbekistan’s Middle Corridor ambitions reflect more than a simple trade-strategy shift. They signal an adaptive test as to whether Uzbekistan can transform its geographic constraints into economic leverage. As supply chains evolve, the country is adapting by investing in infrastructure, strengthening diplomatic ties, and improving logistical efficiency. By strengthening infrastructure, improving trade partnerships, and increasing its role in Eurasian supply chains, the country is positioning itself as a key transit hub.
Obituary – Young Uzbek Reporter Loved Journalism, but Grew Frustrated: “There’s No Point Anymore.”
Alisher Ruziokhunov, an Uzbek journalist who had worked for Kun.uz and other online news organizations in Uzbekistan, has died of an illness in his early 30s, according to several outlets that used to employ him. In a tribute, a former colleague said Ruziokhunov drifted away from journalism in recent years because he found it difficult to report freely despite government commitments to loosen restrictions on the media. Kun.uz described Ruziokhunov as a talented journalist who wrote hundreds of articles about “the development of the state and society” and started big projects such as the Munozara Club, which “brought together representatives of government institutions for discussions.” Ruziokhunov traveled widely, attending events as a journalist and conference participant. He visited Armenia, Ukraine and Kenya, as well as the U.S.-Mexico border and the Moody College of Communication at The University of Texas at Austin. “Why does journalism mean a lot to me? I believe media and true journalism make our world a better place to live in,” Ruziokhunov said on social media. “Don’t be afraid to stand out among everyone with your thoughts, appearance, or goals,” he said in another post. Despite his talent, passion and growing experience, Ruziokhunov had doubts. Ilyos Safarov, an Uzbek journalist who reported Ruziokhunov’s death in an emotional social media post on Wednesday, said in a later message that his close friend had dropped out of Uzbekistan’s media scene in recent years because he was disillusioned. Safarov said Ruziokhunov preferred to go into education, believing that Uzbek journalism had reached “the limit” because a journalist who published critical commentary could easily face retaliation from people in power. “There’s no point anymore,” Safarov remembered his friend saying. “I often argued against him, challenging his views,” Safarov said. “At times, just to push his buttons, I even accused him of cowardice. But deep down, I knew he was right. And the truth is, today, we really are powerless. Forget about defending others—journalists can’t even protect themselves.” “By now, everyone has realized that the brief period of relative freedom over the past 3-4 years was merely a façade, designed to allow people to criticize the past era more openly,” said Safarov, who works for Vatandosh TV. By past era, he appeared to be referring to the more authoritarian era of Uzbek leader Islam Karimov, who died in 2016. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who took over after Karimov’s death, has periodically spoken in support of freedom of speech, though some journalists and bloggers say they have faced prosecution and intimidation because of their work. The law in Uzbekistan says the spread of false information that leads to the denigration of “a person´s dignity” or threatens “public order or security” can lead to prison sentences; advocates of freedom of expression say such regulations are overly broad and are used to muzzle criticism of the government.
Powering the Future: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Race to Tackle Energy Crises with Nuclear Plans
Kazakhstan has officially designated the site for its first nuclear power plant (NPP), while Uzbekistan has also identified a location and announced plans to establish an international consortium. Despite severe power shortages in densely populated regions, concrete timelines for construction remain unclear. Kazakhstan Finalizes NPP Site Selection On February 25, Kazakhstan formally approved the construction site for its first NPP. A decree signed by Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov designated the Zhambyl district in the Almaty region as the site for the facility. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev reiterated in January 2025 that Kazakhstan would likely require multiple nuclear power plants, and urged the government to accelerate the construction process. International Consortium Considered for Construction Kazakhstan has yet to finalize its choice of technology and contractor. In 2024, Tokayev stated that multiple foreign companies should collaborate on the project through an international consortium. Tokayev emphasized the need for cutting-edge technology from global players. Several companies and technologies are currently under consideration, including:
- CNNC (China) - HPR-1000 reactor
- Rosatom (Russia) - VVER-1200 reactor
- KHNP (South Korea) - APR-1000, APR-1400 reactors
- EDF (France) - EPR1200 reactor.
Sunkar Podcast
Repatriating Islamic State Fighters and Families: Balancing Security and Humanity
