Turkmenistan Forcibly Hospitalizes Human Rights Activist to Prevent Her Traveling
Veteran journalist and human rights defender Soltan Achilova was forcibly hospitalized in Turkmenistan, an apparent attempt by authorities to prevent her from leaving the country for an international event in Geneva. The incident was highlighted in a recent article by Rachel Denber, Deputy Director of the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. Achilova, aged 75, was set to attend an event organized by the Martin Ennals Foundation in recognition of her nomination in 2021 as a finalist for the award. On the morning of November 20, hours before her flight from Ashgabat, four men in medical uniforms arrived at her home. Claiming suspicion of an infectious disease, they forcibly removed her from her residence, confiscated her keys, and transported her to an infectious disease hospital. Shortly after, Achilova's daughter and son-in-law arrived at the scene, only to find one of the men still at the apartment, who demanded they undergo medical examinations due to "contact" with the allegedly infected Achilova. At the hospital, Achilova was subjected to a blood test but was not informed of the specific illness she was purportedly carrying. Officials later declared the test "positive," requiring her indefinite hospitalization. Achilova, along with her daughter and son-in-law, remained at the hospital overnight. This incident reflects a long-standing pattern of repression by Turkmen authorities, who frequently use such tactics to restrict human rights activists from traveling abroad. In 2023, Achilova and her daughter were also barred from traveling to Geneva when officials claimed their passports were damaged. International organizations and human rights defenders have called on Turkmenistan's government to release Achilova and her relatives immediately, cease their forced hospitalization, and allow her to travel freely. Achilova’s ordeal is emblematic of the systemic harassment faced by independent journalists and human rights activists in Turkmenistan. Over the years, she has endured various forms of intimidation: being followed near her home, having her property vandalized, and suffering physical assaults, including attacks by police and unidentified individuals. Achilova's unwavering commitment to human rights has made her a target of state repression. Despite ongoing threats, she continues to raise awareness about the plight of ordinary citizens under Turkmenistan’s authoritarian regime led by President Serdar Berdimuhamedov.
After Long Search, Turkmenistan Finally Finds a New Gas Customer – Iraq
Turkmenistan is reconfiguring its natural gas export options. Despite holding the world’s fourth largest gas reserves, Turkmenistan is exporting less of its gas today than it was 16 years ago. The big gas pipeline projects conceived nearly 30 years ago – a trans-Afghan pipeline to supply gas to Pakistan and India and a trans-Caspian pipeline to send gas to Europe - remain unfeasible for political reasons. Russia has been a leading customer for Turkmen gas for most of those three decades, but now Russia is competing for some of the same buyers as Turkmenistan. Stymied in its search for new markets at seemingly every turn, Turkmenistan is now planning on selling gas to Iraq, via a swap arrangement with Iran that includes bring Iranian companies to Turkmenistan to construct a new pipeline. Running Out of Options Turkmenistan is always looking for new gas customers. Iraq was never a potential gas buyer until recently, and in fact, the defunct Nabucco gas pipeline project of some 15 years ago considered Iraq to be a possible supplier of gas for Europe. Turkmenistan’s deal with Iraq appears to be the only deal possible at the moment, and it is an interesting arrangement. The two countries are not connected by any pipelines, so Turkmenistan will ship up to 10 bcm of gas to Iran, and Iran will send 10 bcm of its gas to Iraq. Turkmenistan signed what was described as a “binding agreement” for gas shipments after Iraq agreed to “an advance payment scheme and tax concessions.” In recent years, about 40% of Iraq’s gas imports came from Iran. After some 20 years of conflict, Iraq’s gas industry is still recovering, and gas imports are needed to operate the country’s power plants. However, sanctions on Iran made it difficult for Iraq to make payments for that gas. A Rocky Gas History There are already two gas pipelines connecting Turkmenistan’s gas fields to northern Iran. At the end of December 1997, the 200-kilometer Korpeje-Kurdkui pipeline with a capacity of some 8 bcm of gas was launched. In January 2010, the Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline with a capacity of some 12 bcm started operation. Turkmenistan was never close to shipping the 20 bcm combined capacity. Exports ranged from 6-8 bcm annually for years. Iran usually paid for its Turkmen gas in barter, sending a variety of goods, from food to engineering goods and services to Turkmenistan. In late 2016, a dispute developed between Turkmenistan and Iran over gas. Turkmenistan claimed Iran owed some $2 billion for gas supplies received in the winter of 2007-2008. Iran responded that Turkmenistan was inflating the price. The winter of 2007-2008 was especially cold causing severe gas shortages in 20 Iranian provinces. One Iranian media outlet reported on December 31, 2016, “Turkmenistan pounced on the occasion to demand a nine-fold hike which yanked the price up to $360 from $40 for every 1,000 cubic meters of gas.” On January 1, 2017, Turkmenistan halted gas supplies to Iran. The two countries took their cases to international arbitration, which was eventually settled in Turkmenistan’s favor in June 2020. Since 2017, the two countries have cooperated in a swap agreement with Azerbaijan, but that only called for some 1 bcm of gas. Turkmen and Iranian officials have been in talks on gas, but after nearly eight years, Turkmen exports to Iran have not resumed. A Rare Contract To ship 10 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan to Iran requires maintenance and repair on the two largely dormant pipelines connecting the two countries. Iranian and Turkmen officials met in early July 2024 to sign a contract for the transfer of gas. That agreement called for “Iranian companies [constructing] a new 125-kilometer gas pipeline along with three gas pressure booster stations in Turkmenistan aimed at boosting annual shipments of gas to Iran to 40 bcm.” The Iranian companies taking part in the project were not identified, but it is an unusual step for Turkmenistan. The only other foreign company to have a contract to build pipelines on Turkmenistan’s territory was the China National Petroleum Corporation for the three gas pipelines to China (Lines A and B – 15 bcm each, and Line C - 25 bcm). Increasing shipments to Iran to 40 bcm requires construction of a new pipeline with a capacity of 20 bcm of gas, doubling the current combined capacity of the two existing pipelines. Reports mentioned that increasing Turkmen gas shipments to Iran was a “long term” goal, but provided no timeframe. Another matter that is unclear is only 10 bcm of that gas is going to Iraq. There was no information about the final destination of the remaining 30 bcm Iran plans to receive. Not Much Choice Turkmenistan has been trying to sell gas to anyone who would be interested. Among the countries Turkmen officials named just this year as potential customers are Azerbaijan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, and vaguely, the European Union. China is currently Turkmenistan’s main gas customer. Turkmenistan exports about 35 bcm to China via three pipelines with a combined capacity of 55 bcm that also run through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. For nearly 20 years after independence in 1991, Russia was Turkmenistan’s main gas purchaser. Turkmen sold some 45 bcm of gas to Russia in 2008, which represents the zenith of Turkmen gas exports. Russia drastically scaled back imports of Turkmen gas starting in 2009, and in July 2024 the two countries allowed their biggest contract, for 5.5 bcm, to expire after price negotiations failed. This was not surprising since Russia has become Turkmenistan’s main competitor for regional customers. After Russia launched its full-scale war on Ukraine, European countries responded by drastically cutting back on imports of Russian gas. Russia turned to Asian markets and signed deals to supply gas to Turkmenistan’s neighbors Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Worse, after several straight winters of power shortages, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are reorienting their gas production for domestic use. Each country has the right to pump up to 10 bcm of its own gas into the pipelines that cross through their territories running from Turkmenistan to China. Since neither country is currently in a position to export its full allotment, Russia has a deal to take the spare capacity and ship its gas to China via the Turkmenistan-China pipelines, despite Turkmenistan having sufficient gas to replace Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s share of pipeline space. Gas exports to Afghanistan remain improbable due to a lack of foreign investors. Turkey and Azerbaijan are enthusiastic about helping transit Turkmen gas to Europe, but the infrastructure still does not exist to accomplish this. The 40 bcm referred to in reports about the recent Iran-Turkmen agreement could indicate Iran will be purchasing Turkmen gas again in the future, and in larger quantities than previously. For now, however, the surest deal Turkmenistan is able to find to increase its gas exports is the agreement with Iraq. Whether this swap arrangement involving Iran can deliver the promised 10 bcm remains to be seen.
Central Asia Gears Up For Another Trump Term
Leaders in Central Asia have congratulated Donald Trump on his election to another term as U.S. president, a development that governments in the region will watch closely for its impact on trade, geopolitical tensions and other priorities. Central Asian governments generally seek to balance their relationships with the West alongside more entrenched ties to nearby Russia and China, and are likely to be sensitive to any disruption of the status quo as the United States transitions from the Biden administration to another Trump term. Trump defeated Vice President Kamala Harris in the election on Tuesday, making an extraordinary political comeback and promising that he will deliver “the golden age of America.” Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev sent a message of congratulations to Trump in which he reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s commitment to “deepening the strategic partnership” with the United States, Mirziyoyev’s press office said in a statement. “In his letter, he emphasized shared goals for enhanced cooperation across trade, security, and regional stability, marking a new chapter” in relations between Uzbekistan and the United States, the statement said. Last week, Uzbekistan wrapped up talks with the United States as part of its campaign to join the World Trade Organization by early 2026. President Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan sent a similar message, according to media reports. "I believe that your leadership experience and deep knowledge will create opportunities for further deepening of comprehensive cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the United States of America, based on the principles of mutual respect,” Japarov said. In comments relayed to Trump, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev “expressed confidence that bilateral cooperation in the areas of security, nuclear non-proliferation, and investment would continue to develop consistently,” his office said. Tokayev wished Trump success in efforts to ensure “global stability and security.” There is likely to be basic continuity on matters such as anti-terror cooperation and a stated commitment to trade relations between the U.S. and Central Asia. However, one area of uncertainty is Trump’s warning that he will intensify tariffs on U.S. imports of goods from China, a major economic player across Central Asia. That, in turn, could lead to major fallout for the global economy. Another prominent question is whether Trump will push Western-backed Ukraine to reach a peace deal with Russia nearly three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion. Central Asian nations – specifically, the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – have sought a position of neutrality, maintaining their relationships with Russia without offering clear support for the Russian military campaign. Relationships in the region might be due for recalibration if Russian President Vladimir Putin emerges emboldened from any Trump initiative in the conflict. Tokayev has already called for peace efforts to bring the war to an end, describing Russia as “militarily invincible.” There are concerns that Trump will erode U.S. democratic institutions in his second term, a potential disappointment for groups that would like to see the U.S. campaign harder for democratic freedoms in Central Asia. Trump has also promised mass deportations and other tough policies on immigration, which could have an impact on the increasing number of Central Asian people trying to reach the United States through the southern border and by other means.
Mixed Picture: Perceptions of China in Central Asia
China’s growing presence in Central Asia is seen as an economic opportunity by many in the region, but is also viewed with concern by others who fear so-called debt traps and land grabs. A new report on those perceptions of China stresses that there is no overarching Central Asian viewpoint and points to nuance in attitudes among the different countries. The study by the Central Asia Barometer, a polling group that has said it will suspend operations on December 1 because of insecurity and other obstacles to carrying out its work, is significant because a lot of news about China and Central Asia focuses on official pronouncements by governments and business groups. Assessing public opinion can be more of a challenge in countries with a top-down tradition of leadership. “Favorability towards China varies widely across countries, with younger generations in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan generally viewing China’s involvement more positively, particularly in areas like technology and investment,” the Central Asia Barometer said. “Older generations in these countries tend to be more skeptical, though. In Turkmenistan, the older population is more optimistic about China’s role, especially with regard to Chinese workers and investment.” The non-governmental group also noted “a decline or even negative favorability” in perceptions of China among people in Uzbekistan. The study, titled “Beyond the Silk Road” and released on Friday, is based on multiple surveys of opinions of China between 2017 and 2023 in four Central Asian states -Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. There was no data from Tajikistan. Perceptions of China depended on demographic factors such as ethnicity, age and gender, as well as the impact of specific Chinese infrastructure projects, and sources of information. Content on social media, for example, tended to improve attitudes toward Chinese business ventures. As of 2024, China has surpassed Russia as the top trading partner for most countries in Central Asia and is a major source of foreign investment and loans, a potential windfall that is tempered by concern about a lack of transparency in Chinese business practices. A Caspian Policy Institute analysis that was published in August explored negative perceptions of China. In July, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, architect of the Belt and Road economic initiative, traveled to Kazakhstan for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security group whose founding members include several Central Asian countries. There, Xi celebrated Chinese collaboration with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, the region’s other traditional power. Then he visited Tajikistan, a security partner that borders China and Afghanistan. The Central Asia Barometer said its data indicated a decline among some Central Asian populations in favorable views of Russia, coinciding with a change in feelings about China. “In 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an upward shift in favorability toward China in Kazakhstan was observed while at the same time a pronounced drop in Russia’s favorability was noted,” it noted. Even so, China is not expected to supplant Russia’s longstanding influence in Central Asia. A commentary published by the Royal United Services Institute in early 2023 said that Russia, despite a reduction in power, remained “a key security and economic actor and has powerful tools at its disposal that can affect the policies of countries in the region.”
How Central Asia Is Shifting From Russia Towards Turkey
For Turkey, a NATO member and EU hopeful, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an instrument that helps Ankara increase its presence in the strategically important region of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the Turkish-dominated group seems to be a tool that allows them to achieve their economic goals, while also continuing to distance themselves from Russia. Although Moscow still has a relatively strong foothold in Central Asia, it does not seem able to prevent the growing role of the Organization of Turkic States in the post-Soviet space. This entity – whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hold observer status – has the potential to eventually serve as a counterbalance not only to Russian, but also Chinese influence in the region. Since its foundation in 2009, the OTS has held ten summits of its leaders. Over this period, the intergovernmental organization’s working bodies have also convened dozens of times. On November 5-6 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, the OTS heads of states will meet for the eleventh time to discuss the future of the Turkic world. Although the agenda has yet to be announced, it is believed that the OTS leaders will seek to strengthen economic cooperation between its members. Currently, their major trade partners are nations outside the bloc. For instance, Turkey’s largest trading partner is Germany, Azerbaijan’s is Italy, while China has recently become Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner with bilateral trade hitting $31.5 billion. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, China and Russia remain the most important economic partners. One of the group’s major problems is the fact that its members, excluding Turkey, are landlocked countries heavily-dependent on Russia and China geographically. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as major energy exporters, rely on oil and gas pipelines traversing Russian territory to reach their customers in Europe. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Organization of Turkic States governments’ agreed in September to create a simplified customs corridor, aiming at reducing the number of documents required for customs operations and customs procedures between OTS member states. In other words, they plan to increase trade among themselves. According to Omer Kocaman, OTS Deputy Secretary-General, the Turkic nations are also looking to “continue cooperation to stimulate positive changes in their financial systems.” That is why the organization has recently launched the Turkic Investment Fund – the first joint financial institution for economic integration of the Turkic countries, with an initial capital of $500 million. Kyrgyzstan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced on October 17 that, starting in January 2025, the Turkic Investment Fund will begin financing major joint projects in OTS nations. However, in July, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the current structure of the Organization of Turkic States does not meet its established goals, and that its budget is insufficient for their implementation. In order to change that, on October 19, ministers of economy and trade of the OTS nations met in Bishkek to discuss how to strengthen cooperation and the economic development of member states. The economy is undoubtedly an important aspect of the OTS members’ cooperation, but it is not the only one. Culture – including language as its essential part – and history also play crucial roles in the Turkey-dominated group’s ambitions to create a unified Turkic world. It is the Turkic language that connects Turkey with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which is why Ankara has reportedly been pressuring Astana and Bishkek to give up on using Cyrillic and switch to the Latin alphabet instead. In January 2021, the Kazakh government announced its plans to transition to a Latin-based alphabet, although to this day Cyrillic remains widely used in the largest Central Asian country. Most recently, on September 11 the Organization of Turkic States agreed to adopt a common Latin alphabet consisting of 34 letters. But Kyrgyzstan, reportedly under pressure from Moscow, aims to maintain the use of Cyrillic – at least for now. In the long-term, however, if Moscow continues to lose influence in Central Asia, Cyrillic is likely to become a thing of the past in the region that has traditionally been in Russia’s geopolitical orbit. Meanwhile, Turkey is expected to continue using the Organization of Turkic States as a mechanism that could help Ankara crowd Russia out not only of Central Asia, but also of the South Caucasus. The OTS leading member does not hide its ambitions. In 2021, the leader of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahceli, gifted a map of the Turkic World – which includes a significant portion of the Russian Federation – to Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Such a move drew criticism in Moscow, where many analysts are now unhappy about Ankara’s plans to replace the phrase “Central Asia” with “Turkestan” in its history curriculum. What seems to worry them more is the tendency to present Russia’s historical role in Central Asia in a rather negative light through the education system in most, if not all regional countries. But the Kremlin, preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, does not seem to be in a position to effectively compete for the hearts and minds of Central Asians. Fully aware of that, Turkey is seeking to achieve its geopolitical goals in the region by developing closer ties with regional actors through the Organization of Turkic States – a tool that Ankara is expected to continue using in various fields, from education and the economy to foreign policy and even military affairs.
Turkmenistan’s Unexplained Shortage of Gasoline
For months now, areas in eastern Turkmenistan have been facing a severe gasoline shortage. The lack of fuel at the pumps is having a knock-on effect that is raising food prices and shutting down public transportation. Turkmen officials have not acknowledged there is any problem, so the people of the affected regions have no idea why this happening or for how long this situation will continue. Gasoline shortages are not new to Turkmenistan. They have been occurring sporadically in recent years, usually during in late summer when harvesting of crops starts. This latest deficit is unprecedented for Turkmenistan in its duration and severity. Long lines and purchase limits By late June, there reports from Lebap and Mary provinces about lines of cars of waiting at petrol stations. Often there was not enough gasoline for everyone. By mid-July, filling stations in at least five districts and several of the big cities in Lebap Province were often completely out of higher-grade gasoline – A92 and A95. Before the end of July, Lebap authorities imposed a 10-liter limit per customer, per day on gasoline purchases. At the start of July there were areas in the northeastern Dashoguz Province that were totally without gasoline, even the cheapest and most environmentally harmful A-80 grade (which is banned in many countries, including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) was unavailable. In Mary Province, A-92 and A-95 gasoline ran out in July and by early August authorities had limited purchases of A-80 to 20 liters per customer, and even that was unavailable in many areas of the province. In October, Radio Free Europe’s Turkmen service, known locally as Azatlyk, posted a video of a line of vehicles some three kilometers long outside one of the few filling stations operating along the Turkmenabad-Mary highway. Azatlyk’s sources in the region said there were similar lines at filling stations throughout the province and in the provincial capital Turkmenabad. Some people are reportedly arriving at filling stations at 4am to get a place in line as close to the pumps as possible when the stations open. In Mary Province, some car owners said they were phoning family members to bring them food and water while they waited in line. Prices going up at the pumps and other areas Turkmenistan has some of the least expensive gasoline in the world with an average of $0.428 per liter, roughly a third of the world average of $1.30 per liter. The official rate of Turkmenistan’s national currency, the manat, is 3.5 to $1. The state regulated cost of one liter of gasoline is 1.15 manat for A-80, 1.35 for A-92, 1.5 for A-95, and 1 manat for diesel. There have been incidents where filling station employees have been illegally selling gasoline at 5-6 manat per liter to those who can afford it. The shortage is having an effect on public transportation. Most buses are assigned to bringing people to and from the cotton fields once harvest starts toward the end of August or early September until harvesting ends in late October or early November. These buses apparently are receiving all the gasoline they need, whilst the few city buses still operating face the gasoline deficit. One person in Turkmenabad - who spoke under the condition of anonymity for fear of repercussions, as did all respondents - said buses were not operating at all in his neighborhood and even cars passing by were rare. “It feels like being in a cemetery,” he said. A teacher in Turkmenabad confirmed buses had stopped running and complained it complicated arriving at school on time. The teacher explained his tardiness to the school director. “There are no buses on the roads at all,” the teacher said, “The government is not addressing the problem at all, so what can we do?” The director replied, “Are you against the policy of our [president]?” The privately-owned vans that are used as buses in nearly every city across Central Asia are still operating but the cost has doubled, and in some cases tripled for passengers. Taxis in many places in Lebap, Mary, and Dashoguz provinces have also at least doubled their fares due to the problems obtaining gasoline. Even those who do not need a vehicle are affected. The shortage of gasoline has increased prices for transporting food. In Turkmenabad, the price of sugar has increased from 16 to 19 manat, sunflower oil from 20 to 30, and goods like macaroni, butter, and cereals are all two or three manat more expensive than in the spring. The cause Turkmen officials have not mentioned the gasoline shortage, and the reply of the director to the teacher in Turkmenabad is an example of the pressure all Turkmen citizens feel about complaining over anything in Turkmenistan. In Turkmenistan, public displays of discontent are often severely punished. Turkmenistan is known for having vast reserves of natural gas, at least 18 trillion cubic meters, but the country also has oil reserves of some 600 million barrels, easily enough for a country with a population of some 5-6 million people. However, the Turkmen government has a reputation of putting profits ahead of the plight of the country’s people. There have been frequent shortages of basic goods, including bread, for nearly a decade in Turkmenistan. In March 2022, authorities told farmers and agricultural businesses to prepare for an increase in exports of fruits, vegetables, meat, and other goods to Russia, which had just come under international sanctions for its full-scale war on Ukraine. The situation is similar now with gasoline. In 2023, Turkmenistan’s oil sales to the European Union amounted to some 1.05 billion euros, up from some $165 million euros in 2022. In the first quarter of 2024, the amount was 107.2 million euros. The State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange reported at the end of July that the previous week it “recorded 21 trading operations for a total amount of more than $38.723 million,” most of which was gasoline and other petroleum products. On September 11, Turkmen and Afghan officials gathered at the border for a ceremony launching the start of several bilateral projects, including power transmission lines, fiber optic cables, and a gas pipeline. The Turkmen side of the border was Mary Province, one of the areas hit by the gasoline shortage. As a gesture of good will, the Turkmen authorities announced they were sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan in the form of food, gasoline, and other goods. It is unclear how much gasoline Turkmenistan sent to Afghanistan. Residents of Turkmenistan’s Dashoguz, Lebap, or Mary provinces might say any was too much, as that gasoline is needed at home. This current gasoline shortage is already unusually long and since the government has not officially recognized there is a problem, there is no telling when, or if, the petrol problem will end soon or become a common feature of life. It is curious that in Balkanabad and Ahal, the other two of Turkmenistan’s five provinces, there does not seem to be any problem with supplies of gasoline. Why the issue seems confined to the northeast and eastern part Turkmenistan remains unclear.
Central Asia: Working Together on Border Landscapes
Talk of closer cooperation among Central Asian countries has ebbed and flowed as far back as the period after independence from Soviet rule in the early 1990s. The goal of a more unified region is a work in progress, though one promising area of collaboration is a plan to restore and protect damaged ecosystems in border regions. The first regional meeting on the topic, held this month in Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s capital, brought together government officials from the host nation as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The portfolios of the delegates were nature preservation, protected areas, emergencies, agriculture, and forestry. They talked about coordinating on wildfire alert systems in cross-border areas, erosion control, tree-planting and nature-oriented tourism in protected areas and other sites shared by Central Asia countries, according to the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, a non-profit group based in Almaty, Kazakhstan that promotes regional dialogue on the environment. The group, which organized the Tashkent meeting, was created in 2001 by the five Central Asian states as well as the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme. The initiative is supported by a $256 million World Bank program to restore degraded landscapes in the region. The World Bank has noted big progress toward poverty alleviation and economic growth by Central Asian countries in the last decades. However, it has cautioned that oil and gas extraction in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have taken a heavy environmental toll, while soil erosion and water scarcity have accompanied land development in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Arid conditions exacerbated by climate change and inefficient management threaten transboundary water resources, a problem that is becoming increasingly severe. “A key example of tragic impacts on livelihoods and health of communities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and across the region are massive sand and salt storms originating from the land areas once covered by the Aral Sea,” the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia said. It cited an international disaster database as saying more than 10 million people in Central Asia have “suffered from land degradation-related disasters” since 1990, inflicting damages estimated at around $2.5 billion. Central Asian countries also seek to collaborate on early warning systems and other emergency precautions as they face a variety of natural hazards, including floods, landslides and droughts. Supported by United Nations agencies, the heads of the national emergency departments of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan convened in August at a lakeside resort town in northern Kyrgyzstan. There, they shared information and experiences.
Central Asia’s Increasing Profile in Global Climate Policy
Between 11 and 22 November, the 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. In the run-up to this global event, Central Asian countries have been continuing their integration into the cooperative implementation of the global energy and environmental agenda. Such measures include, but are not limited to, commitments to reducing methane emissions, contributions to green supply chains, and — for Kazakhstan in particular — its nuclear policy based on multi-vector diplomacy. One may anticipate their especially enhanced presence in view of the fact that several them have strategic-partner relations with Azerbaijan, which is cooperating with them also in the implementation of the Trans-Caspian International Trade Corridor (TITR or "Middle Corridor"). The Central Asian states are using their implementation of global energy and environmental priorities as an instrument to integrate further into the international system. Following their participation at COP28 (30 November – 23 December 2023, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates), all five of them signed the Global Methane Pledge to reduce methane emissions by at least 30% by 2030. They have also stepped up their contributions to green supply chains, signalling their ambitions to become more important players in global geoeconomics. At the same time, these initiatives also seek to promote domestic economic diversification. Kazakhstan, in particular, continues to play a central role with its multi-vector approach, notably in the nuclear energy sector, positioning itself at the intersection of sustainability and global energy security. Kazakhstan holds 12% of global uranium reserves. It became the world’s leading producer in 2009 and in 2022 accounted for 43% of global production. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan has a Rosatom-sponsored NPP project under way, as does Kyrgyzstan. Along with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in particular actively engaged in discussions on climate policy at COP28, acknowledging the need to balance their resource-rich economies with global sustainability goals. One of the key outcomes was the region's collective involvement in the Global Methane Pledge. Global environmental policy bodies have assessed that methane emissions are a significant concern for global climate policy. The effect of this assessment will be to load still greater financial burdens on oil and gas companies by making development of hydrocarbon deposits, and the transmission of hydrocarbon resources to market, more expensive. Kazakhstan’s commitment to cutting methane emissions by 30% by 2030 exemplifies this shift, signalling a readiness to reform domestic industries in line with global climate targets. Turkmenistan has the highest methane emissions intensity in the region, but challenges remain in terms of monitoring and implementation. Uzbekistan’s leadership was also highlighted at COP28. The country’s ambitious plans to scale up solar and wind energy by 2030 align with broader regional goals of reducing dependence on hydrocarbons. This is Tashkent's (and the region's) way of enhancing their profile as "good global citizens" as policy decisions by political bodies at the international level increasingly emphasize decarbonization. Uzbekistan has made strides in "green supply chains" by focusing on the renewable energy sector as a driver for sustainable industrial development. This aligns with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s broader economic modernization agenda, which sees renewable energy as a pathway to enhance regional cooperation and economic integration while reducing environmental harm. In addition, Central Asia is emerging as a key player in the global shift toward green energy not only through its potential for renewable energy production, but also due to its wealth in rare earth elements (REEs). Here, Kazakhstan leads the way with over 56 identified deposits of REEs, including vital materials like lithium and cobalt, which are essential for battery technologies in renewable energy systems. With reserves exceeding 450,000 tons, Kazakhstan is set to become a major supplier for the growing green tech industry. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which may possess substantial undiscovered REE deposits, are also getting growing attention. Beyond methane pledges, Central Asia’s contribution to the development of green supply chains has emerged as another key element of its integration strategy. Kazakhstan has been at the forefront of these developments, with projects such as the implementation of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route that can bring green metals to market. This involves the construction of new segments as well as the modernization of existing infrastructure. This route connects China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, and it will continue to play an increasingly critical role in global logistics and trade. It is expected that investments in eco-friendly transport systems and renewable energy infrastructure along the corridor will be targeted at minimizing and reducing carbon emissions. The Northern Corridor (i.e., through Russia) has faced infrastructure bottlenecks that can slow down transit times and increase emissions. The Middle Corridor offers also carbon-related advantages over the Northern (i.e. Russian) corridor. Longer distances and potential delays caused by border crossing issues and geopolitical instability can also make the Middle Corridor less carbon-inefficient than the Northern Corridor. A notable outcome of the Central Asian states' increasing cooperation was the adoption of the "Regional Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation" at the Central Asia Climate Change Conference held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in May 2024. This conference brought together national governments, regional entities, and international actors to foster collaboration and share best practices for climate adaptation. It outlines cooperative measures among the five Central Asian nations to tackle climate impacts until 2030. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector energy policy, a cornerstone of its foreign and domestic strategy, remains pivotal to the region’s engagement with the global system. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s government has adeptly navigated the complexities of balancing relations with global powers — Russia, China, the U.S., and the EU — while advancing its energy security through a diversified approach. A key element of this strategy is Kazakhstan’s leadership in nuclear energy. As the world’s largest producer of uranium, Kazakhstan has leveraged its resources to not only secure its energy future, but also to contribute to global nuclear energy supply chains. The country has built a sophisticated nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining to enrichment, positioning itself as a reliable partner for countries looking to develop low-carbon nuclear energy. The shared challenges of water management, pollution control and sustainable resource use have prompted countries in the region to engage in multilateral initiatives supported by international actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union. Regional collaboration on projects such as the management of the Aral Sea basin and efforts to mitigate desertification will continue to become increasingly prominent.
Sunkar Podcast
Kazakhstan’s Return to Nuclear Power
