Turkmenistan Plans to Raise Conscription Age
Turkmenistan plans to raise the age of military conscription from 27 to 30, Turkmen News reports. A decree has reportedly been prepared, but President Serdar Berdimuhamedov has yet to sign it. Avoiding the draft in Turkmenistan is difficult. Men who study abroad must report to military office upon their return. Without a military ID, they face restrictions on employment, housing, and official registration. Since late December 2024, reports have indicated that military offices have largely stopped issuing “white tickets” - documents that confirm an individual's fitness for service without requiring enlistment. This policy shift leaves potential conscripts with fewer options: staying abroad leaves them in legal limbo while returning home runs the risk of immediate conscription. The Turkmen army has long struggled with a shortage of soldiers. Changing conscription rules appears to be an attempt to bolster the ranks, but it may only deepen young men’s reluctance to serve. Conscripts often endure poor living conditions, inadequate supplies, and mistreatment by senior soldiers. Corruption remains a significant issue, with funds allegedly being misappropriated and discipline deteriorating. Defense Minister Begench Gundogdyev has been criticized for failing to address these problems. In other Central Asian countries, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the conscription age remains at 27.
Simurgh Self-Help: Slavs and Tatars’ New Show Rethinks National Symbolism
“It’s interesting that in Western symbolism you never see a delicate female eagle,” notes Payam, one-half of the artist collective Slavs and Tatars, from his studio in Berlin. “But the central-Asian Simurgh is gender-fluid, metaphysical. It doesn’t belong to this world.”
The mythological figure of the Simurgh is the focus of Slavs and Tatars’ latest show at the gallery The Third Line in Dubai called “Simurgh Self-Help”. The show speaks of the importance of reclaiming and reframing cultural memories in a fractured world, and an invitation to think beyond the artificial, top-down confines of nationalism, to find cultural unity.
[caption id="attachment_28951" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Slavs and Tatars Samovar Vacuum-formed plastic, acrylic paint; Image: Courtesy of the artist and The Third Line, Dubai[/caption]
The exhibition extends a lineage of conceptual inquiry, drawing upon the mystical bird Simurgh, ever-present in Persian and Central Asia mythologies, as a counterpoint to the ubiquitous, secularized eagle of Western heraldry.
A constant companion of Zeus in Greek mythology, the eagle is a recurring symbol in the Western world: “Everywhere you look in the West, you find eagles,” notes Payam. “It’s on the German flag, on American football teams, on the Albanian flag. It’s a tired, secularized symbol, heavy with the weight of imperial history.” In contrast, the Simurgh exists on a different plane, one that rejects hierarchies in favor of collective transformation.
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Slavs and Tatars Samovar Vacuum-formed plastic, acrylic paint; Image: Courtesy of the artist and The Third Line, Dubai[/caption]
Today the Simurgh is going through a similar secularization to the Western eagle, with Turkish SIM cards and Azerbaijani soccer teams called Simurgh. "It's easy, in some sense, for as an artist to take something which is very high and important, let's say spiritual or religious, and make it make fun of it, bring it down in a caricatural way,” says Payam. “What's very hard as an artist is to take something which has been debased and make it high again."
In the show, we see works that go in either direction, presenting an alternative mythology, one that shows that cultures are fluid and interconnected. “Simurgh Self-Help,” which had previous iterations in Warsaw, Athens, and Baden-Baden, was originally started two years ago as a conceptual echo of Marcel Broodthaers’ Musée d'Art Moderne: Département des Aigles. This was a conceptual museum/artistic project created by the Belgian artist in 1968, full of artworks referenced by Slavs and Tatars in their show.
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Slavs and Tatars, Soft Power_2023, Woolen Yarn; Image: Courtesy of the artist and The Third Line, Dubai[/caption]
The Simurgh, Payam explains, traverses territories from Kazakhstan to Ukraine, yet remains absent in Poland. “It’s a question of defining a region not through imposed political structures but through the myths that bubble from the ground up,” remarks Payam. The Simurgh becomes a cipher for alternative cartographies, a challenge to the top-down imposition of nationhood.
If the eagle stands for conquest and dominance, the Simurgh stands for the dissolution of categories and unity with the whole. The myth, present in Attar’s poem The Conference of the Birds, speaks of a journey — a dissolution of the self in pursuit of the divine. “In the traditional story a number of birds seek the Simurgh,” Payam reflects, “and when they arrive, they find a pond where they can see their own reflections. This a very Sufi concept, by which God is within. They are the Simurgh. It’s an act of annihilating the ego, of merging with the infinite.”
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Installation View, Slavs and Tatars, Simurgh Self-Help, 2025, The Third Line. Photo: Altamash Urooj[/caption]
The exhibition unfolds through a number of glassworks, carpets, installations, and text-based works, in an interplay of languages that are both visual and textual. The craft element is very present, as the collective closely works with artisans with the idea of continuity: “We work with the same artisans repeatedly, ensuring quality and deepening relationships.”
Payam has recently come back to the cold temperatures of Berlin from the warmth of Jeddah to participate in the second edition of their Islamic Biennial. As Slavs and Tatars will also join the forthcoming first edition of the Bukhara Biennial, the artist is encouraged to reflect on how different versions of Islam enter the secular world and open up to the contemporary art public.
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Installation View, Slavs and Tatars, Simurgh Self-Help, 2025, The Third Line. Photo: Altamash Urooj[/caption]
“As artists, we have always been interested in religion as a repository of knowledge,” Payam asserts. “If you claim to be interested in knowledge, you cannot ignore the metaphysical. We have so many different types of knowledge, the rational, the mystical, the analytic, the emotional, the digestive even. You can’t say you are interested in one, and reject the others.”
Well, what a Simurgh-like thing to say.
Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States
Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters.
A Historical Perspective
Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires.
Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.
Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.”
Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020.
The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric
Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership.
Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region.
While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence.
Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist.
Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead.
Turkey’s Role in the OTS
According to Kazakh political analyst Marat Shibutov, Russia tends to overstate Turkey’s sway in Central Asia. “Russia significantly overestimates Turkey's influence in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, not realizing that historical connections are minimal. A thousand years have passed since the Seljuks left, and the region only reconnected with Turkey after the exile of the Meskhetian Turks under Stalin,” Shibutov wrote.
In reality, the OTS serves primarily as a logistical and economic tool for Astana and Tashkent. In other sectors, China is a more attractive partner for technology, while Russia remains key for investment and industrial cooperation.
The Turkic Council officially became the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2021, amid the COVID-19 pandemic and increasing logistical disruptions. The Ukraine War and Russia’s growing isolation have further accelerated economic cooperation among Turkic nations. At the 10th OTS Summit in Astana (November 2023), discussions largely focused on financial and logistical matters, particularly the expansion of the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian transport route. Notably, Kazakhstan, not Turkey, was designated the Financial Center of the Turkic World.
Turkey’s military influence within the Turkic world, meanwhile, has largely stemmed from two factors: Azerbaijan’s military successes in Karabakh, achieved with Turkish support, and Ukraine’s early use of Turkish Bayraktar drones in the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, Turkey’s military reputation has waned as the effectiveness of Bayraktar drones declined over time.
A Geopolitical Challenger?
While Russia perceives Turkey as a geopolitical challenger in Central Asia, the reality is far more nuanced. Even within the OTS, Turkey’s role is limited, as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain wary of external forces seeking to dominate. The economic and logistical priorities of the OTS nations, meanwhile, favor China and Russia over Ankara.
Ultimately, the OTS remains an instrument for regional cooperation rather than a geopolitical bloc, and Turkey’s leadership ambitions face significant resistance from within.
Central Asia’s Growing Domestic Drug Problem
It’s in the headlines every few days now in Central Asian countries. February 1 – Uzbekistan’s law enforcement agencies report raiding a laboratory producing synthetic drugs, and seizing narcotics worth more than $800,000. February 3 – Uzbek law enforcement announces that their latest counter-narcotics operation has resulted in the seizure of 111 kilograms of illegal drugs. February 10 – police in Kyrgyzstan’s northern Chuy region seize 1.5 kilograms of hashish and 1 kilogram of marijuana. February 11 – Kazakhstan’s Committee for National Security (KNB) announces it had uncovered a laboratory in Almaty region that was producing synthetic drugs. More than 15 kilograms of these synthetic drugs were seized and 200 liters of precursor materials. In the first decade after the five countries of Central Asia became independent in 1991, many of the reports from foreign media were about Central Asia being a major transit route for narcotics coming out of Afghanistan that were for buyers in Russia and Europe. Thirty years later, drugs are still coming into Central Asia from Afghanistan, but it is no longer just opium and heroin. And now it seems a good portion of these illicit narcotics are being consumed in Central Asia. Made in Central Asia Drug-producing laboratories are multiplying, and while there are no precise figures for the number of addicts, it is clear an increasing number of young people in Central Asia are using drugs. Ashita Mittal, the regional representative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Central Asia, said in January 2025 that during the “last several years in just Kazakhstan, law enforcement agencies have uncovered and destroyed 87 laboratories producing synthetic drugs, and in Kyrgyzstan about 11-12.” Law enforcement agencies in Kazakhstan said earlier in January that they had destroyed 63 laboratories producing illegal narcotics just in 2024. Tajikistan’s Agency for Narcotics Control said at the end of its Kuknor-2024 counter-narcotics campaign in December 2024 that it had confiscated more than 1 ton of synthetic drugs. The synthetic drugs most often mentioned in these seizures are mephedrone, a type of amphetamine and stimulant that causes euphoria, and a-PvP, another stimulant. However, there are many types of synthetic drugs now available in Central Asia. Batum Estebesova, director of Kyrgyzstan’s Sotsium drug rehabilitation center, said the variety of synthetic drugs is increasing quickly. “We can’t keep up with all the new drugs to add them to the list of prohibited substances,” Estebesova said. UN Office on Drugs and Crime representative Mittal said part of the problem comes from Afghanistan. Mittal noted in 2023, there was a 95 percent reduction in heroin production in Afghanistan, but at the same time there was an “exponential growth” in the production of methamphetamines crossing into the bordering Central Asian countries – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In May 2023, Uzbek border guards noticed some strange marking on several boxes of pomegranate juice coming from Afghanistan. Testing showed bottles of juice in those boxes contained methamphetamine. Apparently, the buyers intended to evaporate the liquid and then collect the methamphetamine residue. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, officials have spoken about the use of the internet to sell synthetic drugs. Alzhan Nurbekov, an official in Kazakhstan’s prosecutor general’s office, said in June 2023 that “any 12-year-old school kid can buy drugs through a Telegram channel and have them delivered quicker than a pizza.” Strange seizure figures Afghanistan continues to be a source of what could be termed “traditional” illegal narcotics; cannabis-based and opiates. In November 2024, Uzbekistan’s Interior Ministry said raids around the country in October netted more than 255 kilograms of illegal drugs – 99 kilograms of marijuana, 67 kilograms of heroin, 63 kilograms of hashish, 15 kilograms of synthetic drugs, and 11.7 kilograms of opium. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan report seizures of marijuana and hashish regularly, though the origin of these drugs is not given and some of it might be locally produced. Interestingly, the countries bordering Afghanistan are reporting lower seizure figures than one would expect. Uzbekistan has not provided any figures for the total amount of narcotics confiscated in 2024. In October, Uzbekistan’s State Customs Service said it had seized some 888 kilograms of illegal drugs in the first nine months of 2024. This does not include drugs confiscated by Uzbekistan State Security Service or Interior Ministry, neither of which, as of mid-February 2025, has posted figures of total narcotics seizures in 2024. The director of Tajikistan’s Agency for Narcotics Control, Zafar Samad, said at the start of February that 4.381 tons of narcotics were confiscated in 2024, down from the 5.282 tons seized in 2023. This reported reduction seems at odds with other information. On November 18, 2024, unknown assailants fired on workers at a gold-mining operation in southern Tajikistan, near the Afghan border. A Chinese national was killed and five other workers were wounded. Tajik authorities said it was likely that drug smugglers were responsible. One report referred to a Tajik Interior Ministry official, speaking under condition of anonymity, saying the gold mine was located in an area that was along the “most profitable route for drugs from Afghanistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-Georgia and Europe.” Officials in neighboring Uzbekistan say drugs are being smuggled into the country from Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and Tajik citizens were caught with drugs in Uzbekistan several times in 2024. Three Tajik citizens were detained in Uzbekistan’s counter-narcotics operations in early 2025 after they brought nearly 11 kilograms of opium into Samarkand region. It could be that Tajikistan’s counter-narcotics efforts are not very effective. Stranger still, reported narcotics seizures in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two Central Asian countries that do not directly border Afghanistan, are higher than in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan’s Service for Combating Narcotics reported on January 15, 2025, that more than 15 tons of illegal drugs were seized in Kyrgyzstan in 2024. Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry said on January 13 that some 22 tons of illegal narcotics were confiscated in 2024. Turkmenistan does not release figures on drug seizures and only reports on the annual burning of unspecified amounts of illegal narcotics every December. Tougher punishment Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are responding to the growing narcotic problem by passing tougher laws. Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev signed a law on January 2, 2025, that changes the prison sentence for manufacturing illegal narcotics from 10-15 years, to 15-20 years, and includes the possibility of life imprisonment. Curiously, the same law reduces the sentences for those convicted of drug dealing. Previously, convicted dealers faced five to 10 years in prison. The new law makes that five to eight years. Also in January, in Kyrgyzstan, Member of Parliament Ernis Aydaraliyev proposed canceling possibility of parole or amnesty for those convicted of producing illegal narcotics. Only getting worse It is difficult to obtain even rough figures for the number of drug addicts in individual Central Asian states. In June 2023, the press service for Kazakhstan’s prosecutor general’s office said it recorded some 18,300 citizens with drug dependencies. In November 2024, Kazakhstan’s Health Ministry said there were “more than 18,000” registered drug addicts in the country, but added the actual figure could be closer to 200,000. The Health Ministry also noted that the average age of drug users in 2017 was 25-30 years old, while now it is increasing among 16-year-olds. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan as of May 1, 2024, there were 6,768 people registered as being drug dependent, but officials noted that many people treated for addiction in hospitals were not registered as drug addicts due to hospital confidentiality rules. Zafar Samad, the head Tajikistan’s Agency for Narcotics Control, said in late July 2024, there were 4,066 registered drug addicts in the country, which he claimed was down from 4,138 registered at the same time in 2023. There are no figures from officials in Turkmenistan, but a report from March 2020, noted drug use was on the rise after having been largely eliminated after former President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov initially came to power in late 2006. Similarly, Uzbekistan has not provided any recent figures for drug addicts. The number in Uzbekistan was going down, from some 21,000 in 2008 to around 8,000 in 2017, to some 5,000 in 2021. However, that was before the large influx of synthetic narcotics seen lately around Central Asia. One report from November 2024, noted the drug problem among young people in the capital Tashkent has become bad enough that police are raiding schools. The growing frequency of reports in local media about illegal narcotics shows Central Asia’s drug problem is becoming worse. What the governments in these countries can do to combat this problem is less clear.
Turkmenistan Ranked Worst in Central Asia in 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index
Turkmenistan has once again ranked among the world's most corrupt countries, placing last in Central Asia in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2024. According to the index, Turkmenistan ranked 165th out of 180 countries, scoring 17 out of 100 points. This marks a decline from the previous year, when the country scored 18 points and was ranked 170th. Among other Central Asian nations, Tajikistan ranked 164th with 19 points, while Kyrgyzstan placed 146th with 25 points. Uzbekistan ranked 121st with 32 points, and Kazakhstan was the highest-ranked in the region at 88th place with 40 points. Russia, with 22 points, was ranked 154th. The report highlights that authoritarianism and weak judicial systems remain key drivers of corruption in Central Asia. Denmark, Finland, Singapore, New Zealand, and Luxembourg topped the index as the least corrupt countries. Meanwhile, Yemen, Syria, Venezuela, Somalia, and South Sudan were ranked among the most corrupt, with South Sudan finishing last at 180th place. Transparency International warns that corruption remains a significant global threat, even in efforts to combat climate change. According to the organization, corrupt practices hinder emissions reductions, slow adaptation to climate change, and severely impact sustainable development. "While 32 countries have significantly reduced corruption since 2012, in 148 nations the situation has either remained unchanged or worsened. The global average remains at 43 points, and more than two-thirds of countries score below 50. As a result, billions of people continue to live in environments where corruption undermines their rights and quality of life," Transparency International stated in its report.
Turkmenistan to Start Natural Gas Shipments to Turkey
Long-discussed shipments of Turkmen natural gas to Turkey could be just weeks away. Several options have been discussed for bringing gas to Turkey, but news since February 10 indicates Turkmenistan and Turkey chose a swap agreement involving Iran. Turkmenistan’s state information agency TDH reported the head of the country’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian by phone. During that call, Berdimuhamedov “announced the agreement with (Turkey’s) BOTAS company on the transit of Turkmen natural gas through Iran to the Republic of Turkey..." Since there is no pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Turkey, the agreement involves a swap deal whereby Turkmenistan ships its gas to Iran and Iran makes a like amount of its gas available to Turkey. However, on February 11, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar posted on X (formerly Twitter) confirming an agreement between BOTAS and Turkmengaz. Bayraktar said “… gas flow is planned to start on March 1, 2025.” There were no details about the volume of gas to be delivered, but Turkish officials have previously been mentioning an initial volume of some 2 billion cubic meters (bcm). Turkish officials have been pushing for this deal for more than two years, with the ultimate aim of turning Turkey into a gas hub to shipments to Europe. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev traveled to Turkmenistan in December 2022 to meet with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov (the son of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov). Erdogan and Aliyev were hoping for an agreement on construction of a pipeline to carry Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan and from there to Turkey. Those talks were inconclusive, but did lead to a series of other meetings of officials of the three countries to discuss alternative means to ship Turkmen gas to Turkey. The swap arrangement involving Iran was one of the possibilities raised during these meetings. However, Turkey is still clinging to the plan for construction of a pipeline that would eventually boost Turkmen gas supplies to Turkey up to 15 bcm. Turkish Ambassador to Ashgabat Ahmet Demirok said in September 2024 that his country was looking to purchase 300 bcm of Turkmen gas over the next 20 years. The agreement is good news for Turkmenistan, but it also shows again how dependent Turkmenistan is becoming on Iran for gas exports. When Turkmenistan became independent in late 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the only gas pipelines in Turkmenistan led north to Russia. Turkmenistan was exporting gas to Russia for most of the years after independence, but in 2024 the latest agreement between the two countries expired and both countries indicated they would not renew Turkmen gas exports. The first post-Soviet pipeline built in Turkmenistan connected to Iran. That pipeline started operations at the end of 1997. Another pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran was launched in 2010. The two pipelines have a combined capacity to carry some 20 bcm, but a pricing dispute between Turkmenistan and Iran in late 2016 led Turkmenistan to halt gas shipments to Iran at the start of 2017 and they have still not resumed. The only other gas pipelines from Turkmenistan lead to China, which is currently Turkmenistan’s only gas customer, purchasing somewhere around 35 bcm annually. The last of those three Central Asia-China pipelines was completed more than 10 years ago. No other pipelines from Turkmenistan have been built since then. With no other export possibilities for its gas, the Turkmen has been forced to turn to Iran for swap deals with third countries. For several years now, Turkmenistan has an on-again-off-again arrangement to supply Azerbaijan with 1-2 bcm of gas via a swap agreement with Iran. In late 2024, Turkmenistan reached a deal to supply Iraq with 10 bcm, again using a swap arrangement with Iran, though it is unclear when those shipments will start. There is still a question about the condition of the pipelines from Turkmenistan to Iran that have been largely dormant for eight years. Iranian companies will perform maintenance on the two pipelines and build a new 125-kilometer pipeline to allow boosting Turkmen gas shipments to 40 bcm. There is no timeframe for when this work will be completed. Iran needs Turkmen gas. The northern part of Iran is not connected to the pipeline network leading to the gas fields in southern Iran and the Persian Gulf. The swap deals effectively resolves the problem of Turkmen gas imports for northern Iran. Turkmenistan could stand to gain from the swap arrangements with Turkey and Iraq as the country’s economy is stagnant and gas exports account for some 80 percent or more of revenues. But these deals rely on aging pipelines in both Iran and Turkmenistan and on those two countries maintaining friendly ties, which has not always been the case in the last 10 years. There is also the fragility of the Iranian regime that spent huge amounts of money supporting proxies in the Middle East such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Bashir Assad regime that fell in Syria in November. Depending on the Iranian regime to be willing and able to carry out Turkmenistan’s swap agreement with third countries is risky.
Rosenberg King Prawns to Be Bred in Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan’s Elin Balyk fish farm is expanding its operations by introducing the breeding of Rosenberg freshwater king prawns.
Located in the Ak Bugday district of Ahal province, on the Karakum River, Elin Balyk has been engaged in fish farming for over a decade.
The farm operates on a 130-hectare site, granted for free use for 99 years. It features 20 ponds covering a total area of 400 square meters, along with six indoor rearing facilities that house shrimp and fish at various growth stages - from larvae and fry to mature commercial stock and breeding specimens. A newly launched hatchery, equipped with technology from Russia, Iran, and Europe, enhances production capabilities.
The facility employs modern aquaculture methods, including a closed water circulation system that limits water loss to just 10%. The intensive fish farming process avoids antibiotics and chemicals while ensuring optimal oxygenation levels.
As part of its diversification efforts, Elin Balyk has begun breeding Rosenberg freshwater shrimp, a species native to Thailand. These prawns can grow up to 100 grams in weight, with body lengths comparable to an adult’s palm.
Looking ahead, the company plans to introduce Vannamei shrimp, a saltwater species, and has trained its specialists in Iran and Thailand to master the necessary aquaculture techniques. An additional land plot is expected to be allocated for this expansion.
Turkmen Civil Servants Could Lose Jobs for Misusing Newspapers with Pictures of Berdimuhamedovs
Authorities in Turkmenistan have warned civil servants that they could face dismissal for misusing state newspapers featuring images of President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and his father, former President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Officials have been explicitly banned from using these newspapers as toilet paper, food packaging, or firewood.
Government employees are now required to sign pledges to “carefully keep the pages” containing photographs of the ruling family. According to civil servants, they have been instructed to ensure that images of the Berdimuhamedovs do not end up in the trash or repurposed for household use.
Authorities are reportedly even considering introducing QR codes on each page of newspapers to track subscribers and monitor how printed materials are used.
“Now we are afraid that children might accidentally tear or throw away a newspaper with the president’s image - because you can lose your job for that,” said one civil servant, who spoke anonymously for fear of reprisals.
Human rights organizations, including Reporters Without Borders (RSF), consistently rank Turkmenistan among the world’s worst countries for press freedom. Since Serdar Berdimuhamedov succeeded his father as president in 2022, the country’s media environment has remained tightly controlled. Despite officially stepping down, Berdimuhamedov Sr. continues to wield significant influence over decision-making in the government.
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