Repatriating Islamic State Fighters and Families: Balancing Security and Humanity

With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, repatriating foreign fighters is a pressing issue at the intersection of global security, humanitarian principles, and national responsibility. Central Asian governments — namely, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan — have emerged as proactive players in repatriating their citizens from camps in northeastern Syria. While these efforts are laudable, they come with challenges and unanswered questions. Tens of thousands of people, many of them women and children associated with former ISIS or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - a terrorist organization known for its extreme ideology and violent actions of its’ fighters — remain trapped in the camps of northeastern Syria. Their lives are defined by squalor and uncertainty, and they face a bleak future. Central Asian nations have stepped up where many others have faltered, asserting their responsibility to help their citizens who languish there. Yet, this commitment is not without its limits. Repatriating men — many of whom were fighters — remains a challenge that even the most ambitious programs have struggled to address. This issue looms large, as it intertwines with broader questions. These include reintegration, security risks, and the potential for radicalization, both in prison systems and broader society. The scale of efforts undertaken by four of the Central Asian countries is significant. Together, they have repatriated around 2,200 citizens: Kazakhstan, the most, 754 individuals, followed by others with numbers ranging from 381 to 533. These figures represent more than just logistical achievements. They reflect these governments' commitment to humanitarian principles. However, the path has not been entirely smooth, as some of the repatriated women and children have returned back to conflict zones. As counterintuitive as this may seem, they might do so out of ideological commitment, social ties, coercion or threats, trauma bonding, or difficulty reintegrating into their home societies. All this suggests cracks in reintegration programs that must be addressed. The strategies employed by the Central Asian states, despite their common goal, differ in focus and execution. Kazakhstan’s “Operation Zhusan” is often mentioned as a model of coordination and commitment. It has gone beyond mere repatriation to a vision embracing comprehensive reintegration, including other services, such as DNA testing to identify orphaned children. Yet such efforts rely heavily on state resources and long-term political will, neither of which can be taken for granted. Uzbekistan’s Mehr ("Kindness") initiative has particularly focused on protecting children and supporting the unification of families. Yet even with international appreciation, Uzbekistan faces the same challenges as its neighbors: how to sustain this momentum and address lingering societal stigmas toward returnees. Kyrgyzstan paused its repatriation operations in Iraq due to legal roadblocks and has turned its attention to Syria. However, Kyrgyzstan relies significantly on international cooperation, as its own economic resources for such activities are comparatively limited. So far, it has repatriated 511 citizens. Tajikistan’s steady progress highlights even more pointedly the role of international cooperation with organizations like UNICEF and the European Union. The Tajik authorities have worked closely with these partners to provide psychological and educational support for returnees. Questions remain about the long-term success of reintegration, particularly for individuals who may struggle to find acceptance in their communities. However, repatriation is not just a strategic necessity, but a moral obligation. For women and children, the barriers to reintegration include societal stigma, mental health struggles, and the absence of economic opportunities. Repatriated men face a different set of concerns. Not least, the risk of radicalization can be significant in instances of incarceration. Even outside of the prison system, ISIS sentiments and the urge to impose or fight for extremists and oppressive ideologies may persist. The countries of Central Asia have taken constructive steps to address such challenges where others have hesitated: in Europe and North America, repatriation efforts have frequently been delayed or limited by debates over security risks, public opinion, and resource allocation. Many Western nations have opted for a case-by-case approach or declined broad repatriation. The much more comprehensive Central Asia approach, by contrast, demonstrates both responsibility and the presence of compassion in governance. Important international observers have considered such efforts as a global model for balancing security and humanitarianism. Thus, even NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, critical of other aspects of Central Asian governance, have noted the humanitarian focus of these repatriation efforts. Likewise, respected think-tanks such as the International Crisis Group, have highlighted Central Asia's approach as noteworthy; and UN agencies like UNICEF have praised aspects of reintegration and repatriation programs, particularly those aimed at children and vulnerable populations. Yet, the Central Asian experience demonstrates the importance of looking beyond repatriation to focus on long-term reintegration. Central Asia has shown that progress is achievable, but also fragile. It requires continuous investment, not just in financial terms, but in terms of societal and political commitment, as well as continuing international assistance. Time and again, we are reminded that terrorism is a global challenge, indifferent to borders. Without opportunities for integration and a shared future within civil society, those disconnected from it will continue to pose a threat globally.

Deportations of Central Asians from the U.S. Increased in 2024

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has released its Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Report, detailing the agency’s accomplishments over the past year. The report highlights how ICE’s directorates and program offices met their mission objectives. Established in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, ICE is tasked with protecting the American public, ensuring public safety, and promoting national security.

According to the report, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) deported 271,484 non-citizens with final orders of removal to 192 countries. This total includes 88,763 individuals charged with or convicted of criminal offenses, 3,706 known or suspected gang members, 237 known or suspected terrorists, and eight human rights violators. More than 30% of those deported had criminal histories, with an average of 5.63 convictions or charges per individual. ERO also assisted in identifying and arresting individuals wanted in their home countries for serious crimes, including terrorism and torture.

The Times of Central Asia examined the report with a focus on Central Asian countries.

In 2024, the US deported 572 Uzbek nationals - a dramatic increase compared to 88 in 2013, 21 in 2021, and 55 in 2022.

Deportations of Tajik citizens also surged, reaching 77 in 2024 compared to only four annually in 2019, 2020, 2022, and 2023.

Kazakhstan saw the deportation of 23 of its citizens this year, up from 14 in 2023.

Deportations to Kyrgyzstan also spiked, with 69 individuals removed in 2024. By comparison, only three Kyrgyz citizens were deported in 2020, eight in 2021, one in 2022, and 14 in 2023.

Meanwhile, deportations of Turkmen nationals remained low, but still showed an upward trend. In 2024, five Turkmen citizens were deported, compared to four in 2019, one in 2022, and three in 2023.

Fear Returns to Tajikistan’s Konibodom Area

A series of murders in spring had residents in the area around Tajikistan’s northern city of Konibodom on edge for weeks. Thirteen people were killed between late March and late May, apparently by someone who broke into their homes at night. The victims ages ranged from young children to elderly people; they were ethnic Tajiks and Kyrgyz (Konibodom is located near the border with Kyrgyzstan), and the crimes happened in different areas around the city. The murders stopped, and later the Tajik authorities said they had captured the suspects, but on December 9, the nightmare started again with six people being killed, and on December 16, four more people were found dead in their homes.   The Killing Starts Again On December 9, the bodies of six people were found in the Shurkurgon neighborhood of Konibodom. All six were members of the Nematov family. Thirty-seven-year-old Naimjon was found hanged on a tree in the courtyard of the family’s home. His body showed signs of a struggle. His 33-year-old wife and four children, the youngest only two years old, were all strangled inside the family’s home. Local authorities and police have not commented on the killings. On December 16, reports said the bodies of 35-year-old Gaibullo Majidov and his 28-year-old wife Zarnigor were found in their home in Konibodom’s Hisorak neighborhood. Their three children were reportedly unharmed. On the same day in the same neighborhood, the bodies of 70-year-old Oyisha Shokirova and her 44-year-old son Javlon were found. Reports said all appeared to have died violent deaths, but the exact cause was not given. Police have also not commented on these murders. Prior to these latest killings, it appeared the police had caught at least some of the people responsible for a wave of murders in the spring that had local residents talking about “men in black” who prowled the streets in the middle of the night.   The Authorities’ Version On July 31, Konibodom Mayor Abdusalom Tukhtasunzoda said a suspect had been caught for the May 28-29 killings of six people in the village of Sanjidzor, on the outskirts of Konibodom. Tukhtasunzoda did not give any details about the suspect or the motive, except to say the person had been detained the week before. The Konibodom mayor said the murders in May were not connected to the earlier killings of five members of the Sharipov family in March, or to Muzaffar Urmonov and his wife Inoyat Urmanova in April. Tukhtasunzoda also dismissed the tales being told of men dressed in black clothing and masks being responsible for any of the murders. “There were no people ‘in black’ in the city of Konibodom,” Tukhtasunzoda said, “The video, which is distributed on social networks, was not filmed in Konibodom. Such footage is being circulated to frighten people.” On August 8, First Deputy Interior Minister Abdurahmon Alamshozoda told a press conference the was “nothing sensational” about the murders in Konibodom the previous spring. Alamshozoda said the incidents in March and April were the result of family quarrels, that suspects had already been arrested, and the killings in May were still being investigated. Alamshozoda said he could not reveal any more information since the investigations into all the killings were still ongoing. It seemed clear from Alamshozoda’s and Tukhtasunzoda’s comments that authorities considered the crimes solved. At the end of November, 42-year-old Marat Sattorov was convicted of killing Mahbuba Ahmedova and her two children, and the murders of Zulho Ibragimova, her brother and brother’s wife in the village of Sanjidzor at the end of May. Sattorov was sentenced to life imprisonment. On December 12, 68-year-old Sharifjon Ashurov was convicted of the killing of Muzaffar Urmonov and his wife in April, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In both cases, relatives of the defendants and the victims expressed doubts that the authorities had caught the right people. Sharifjon Ahsurov’s family claims he was tortured and continually proclaimed his innocence during the trial.   Murderers Still on the Loose? These latest six murders show that either the authorities have not caught the people responsible, or all the people responsible, or there is a copycat killer or killers now on the loose. What facts are known show similarities between the killings in spring and those just committed. When the first murders happened in March, police initially believed the 65-year-old head of the Sharipov family had killed his wife, daughter-in-law, and two grandchildren, then hanged himself. Later police determined the man was hanged by the killer, who tried to make it look like a suicide. In the murders on December 9, Naimjon Nematov was found hanged. Most of the victims of the series of killings in spring were strangled, which also appears to be how most of the victims on December 8-9 were killed, whilst the cause of deaths in the December 16 incident have not been made public. Authorities seem anxious to resolve these murders, but their explanations do not add up. At least 23 people in the Konibodom area have been murdered in 2024, a huge number for one area in such a short period and difficult to ascribe to domestic quarrels. And despite two people being convicted for the March-May killings, ten more murders were just committed in the same area.

A Final Deal Along Central Asia’s Deadliest Border

It took some 33 years, but on December 4, Kyrgyz and Tajik officials reached a final agreement on delimitation of the last sections of their 972-kilometer border. It is a relief for the entire Central Asian region. In those 33 years the five Central Asian countries (including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have been independent, the only open conflicts between the armed forces of two Central Asian countries happened between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the southern Kyrgyz city of Batken on December 4, Kyrgyz security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov announced an agreement that Tajik state news agency Khovar said “fully completed the delimitation of the remaining sections of the Tajik-Kyrgyz state border.” Most of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border runs through the Pamir Mountains. The eastern part, approximately two-thirds of the common frontier, passes through remote and sparsely inhabited areas. Agreement on where the dividing line between the two countries was easy to reach in this section. The remaining one-third of the border in the west proved far more difficult to find compromises. [caption id="attachment_26293" align="aligncenter" width="2256"] Road near the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai. On one side of the road is Tajikistan, the other side, Kyrgyzstan; image: Bruce Pannier[/caption] Kyrgyz and Tajiks are two of the oldest peoples in Central Asia. Their ancestors lived in what is now the border area many hundreds of years before there were any borders. The Soviet Union changed that when it created the Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics, not only drawing lines on a map, which were redrawn more than once, but also including enclaves on either side of the border. Roads in the area zigzagged back and forth, one minute through Kyrgyzstan, and few minutes later through Tajikistan, over and over again. As border tensions began to appear toward the end of the 2000-2010 period, both countries started building roads to avoid crossing into the neighboring state, but the terrain is rugged, limiting possibilities for alternate routes. Also, new road construction is expensive and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both poor countries. [caption id="attachment_26294" align="aligncenter" width="2256"] The entrance to Tajikistan's Vorukh enclave; image: Bruce Pannier[/caption] The lone road leading from Batken to the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai and the Tajik enclave of Vorukh weaves through both countries several times and in some places, the road is the border. Visible from any village in this area are the snow-capped mountains, but down in the valleys, water has always been a problem. Like the roads, small rivers and canals meander across both sides of the border, and unsurprisingly, water use is a major source of tensions and has been a significant obstacle in deciding where the border should be. The first hints of trouble came after 2000 and involved petty vandalism, usually children throwing rocks at passing vehicles with license plates from the neighboring country. This escalated and after 2010, when incidents of physical altercations between members of border communities started, followed by vandalism targeting homes and businesses in border villages. Since much of the border was not demarcated, arguments and fights often broke out whenever one country attempted to make any road repairs or build new structures in disputed areas. On January 11, 2014, a gun battle started between border guards of the two countries. Tajik forces used grenade launchers and mortars to attack the Kyrgyz forces. Several servicemen on both sides were wounded, but after that incident the use of firearms in border disputes increased and after several years exchanges of fire became common when tensions flared up between border communities and border guards. Both sides sent more troops with heavier weaponry, including artillery and armored vehicles. Scuffles that previously involved throwing sticks and stones, turning into  brief but often deadly fire-fights. The situation continued to grow gradually worse until April 28, 2021, when the militaries of the two countries engaged in fighting that included mortar and artillery fire and lasted for three days. At one point Tajik forces crossed into Kyrgyz territory. Tajik helicopter gunships also fired on Kyrgyz villages. Thirty-six Kyrgyz citizens and 19 Tajik citizens were killed. Thousands of people were evacuated from communities on both sides of the border, and there was extensive damage to homes and other structures on both sides of the border. As bad as that was, the fighting that broke out on September 14, 2022, was worse and occurred over a wider area than in 2021. Again, Tajik forces briefly crossed into Kyrgyz territory, and Kyrgyz authorities had to evacuate some 150,000 of its citizens from the area. Kyrgyzstan also used its recently acquired Turkish military drones to attack Tajik positions. At least 83 people on the Tajik side were killed, and 63 on the Kyrgyz side. At that time, some 664 kilometers of the 972-kilometer border had been demarcated. After the conflict of 2022, both countries were more serious in their efforts to reach a border deal. Delegations from the two countries have met almost every month since September 2022 to agree on new sections of the border, and Tashiyev and Yatimov met more than a dozen times. At the December 4 meeting in Batken, both Tashiyev and Yatimov noted the agreement still needed to be ratified by their countries’ parliaments and there are other procedural matters that need to be worked out. It is a positive development, but ultimately, the success or failure of the deal will be decided by the villagers living along the border. Animosity between communities along the border has grown in the last decade, often fueled by local officials who rejected giving even one square centimeter of what they considered their land to the other country. Will these villagers abide with the decisions of their governments when water is scarce or when land they have used for years for farming or herding is given to the neighboring country?

Kyrgyz, Tajik Delegations Finalize Border Deal After Long Dispute

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have fully agreed on the demarcation of their border, Kyrgyz officials said Wednesday, in a major step toward ending the conflict between the two Central Asian countries that spilled into violence as recently as 2022.  Delegations from the two nations “reached agreements and fully completed the description of the remaining sections of the Kyrgyz-Tajik state border,” Kyrgyzstan’s state-run Kabar news agency reported. It cited the press service of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan. The delegation chiefs of the two sides ordered working groups to finalize documents on the border agreement, Kabar said. It published photos of the meeting in the Kyrgyz town of Batken, including an image of the delegation chiefs in military uniform and shaking hands with each other.  The Kyrgyz-Tajik border is nearly 1,000 kilometers long and the agreement followed months of negotiations over various stretches of the mountainous territory.  In 2014, the border between the two countries was closed to Kyrgyz and Tajik citizens following clashes over a bypass road in disputed territory; mortars were fired and both armies suffered casualties. Violence broke out again in 2021 and 2022, resulting in more casualties and the evacuation of more than 100,000 civilians. 

Tajik Lawyer Jailed After Exposing Alleged Corruption in Prosecutor’s Office

In Tajikistan, 74-year-old lawyer Faizi Oli, also known as Faizali Yuldoshev, has been sentenced to 2.5 years in prison after raising allegations of corruption within the prosecutor’s office. The Sino District Court in Dushanbe delivered its verdict on November 29. Oli was found guilty of “knowingly making a false denunciation” against employees of the prosecutor's office. However, he asserts that he merely exercised his right to file complaints with anti-corruption bodies, the Security Council, and the presidential administration, detailing what he described as evidence of corruption. A Controversial Case According to Oli’s lawyer, his complaints should have prompted an investigation, not legal proceedings against him. The court considered his advanced age when issuing the sentence, which fell below the minimum term of five years prescribed under Article 346 of the Tajik Criminal Code. The prosecution had sought a six-year prison term. Oli was arrested immediately after the verdict. Over the course of the five-month trial, he consistently maintained that the charges were baseless, and that filing complaints with the authorities is a legal right. This is not the first time Oli has been involved in a high-profile case; he previously defended his colleague, Saidnuriddin Shamsiddinov, who was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison on similar charges of false denunciation. At that time, Oli stressed the right of citizens to address grievances directly to the president and the Prosecutor General’s Office, a principle he believes is now being criminalized. Broader Context International human rights organizations have frequently criticized Tajikistan for targeting lawyers and human rights defenders. Many prominent figures, including Buzurgmehr Yorov, are serving lengthy prison sentences under controversial circumstances. Oli, known for his outspoken social media presence and comments on government operations, believes his activism may have influenced the court’s decision. He has announced plans to appeal the verdict after receiving the court’s written decision. The Prosecutor General's Office declined to comment on the case.

Russian MP Blames Central Asians for Ruble Depreciation

Mikhail Matveyev, a member of Russia’s State Duma, has attributed the depreciation of the Russian ruble in part to remittances by labor migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. In a statement on his Telegram channel, Matveyev argued that millions of migrants working in Russia transfer their earnings abroad, removing significant sums from the Russian economy. According to him, these remittances fuel demand for foreign currencies, such as the dollar, thereby weakening the ruble. Citing statistics, Matveyev claimed that in 2023, labor migrants sent $5.7 billion from Russia to Tajikistan - nearly half of Tajikistan’s GDP. Kyrgyzstan received remittances equal to about one-third of its GDP, while Uzbekistan received over $14.5 billion, accounting for 12-15% of its GDP. Other significant recipients included Georgia (over $2 billion), Armenia (over $3 billion), and Kazakhstan. Matveyev also criticized some of these countries for their stance on Western sanctions against Russia. He noted that several countries in the Eurasia region have joined sanctions targeting Russian banks and refuse to process transactions using the Russian Mir payment system. This, he said, forces migrants to withdraw cash dollars from Russia to transfer home, exacerbating the pressure on the ruble exchange rate. The MP’s remarks came amid a sharp drop in the ruble’s value against the dollar last week. For more than 30 years, millions of Central Asian citizens have migrated to Russia for work. However, recent trends indicate an increase in return migration, driven by Russia’s deteriorating economic conditions, stricter immigration rules, worsening attitudes toward Central Asian workers, and attempts by Russian authorities to recruit immigrants - both with and without Russian citizenship - for military service in Ukraine.

CSTO Leaders Tackle Regional Security, Nuclear Energy, and Afghan Border Concerns

Astana hosted a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), gathering heads of member states to discuss pressing regional and international issues. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev chaired the session of the CSTO Collective Security Council. Attendees included Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and CSTO Secretary-General Imangali Tasmagambetov. In his address, President Tokayev highlighted the CSTO’s pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability in Eurasia. “Amid modern challenges, the CSTO consistently demonstrates its relevance as a guarantor of security for all member states. Our coordinated actions, mutual trust, and support strengthen our collective ability to tackle complex and large-scale tasks. The CSTO is not merely a military partnership but a unique mechanism that unites our efforts and resources to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Tokayev stated. CSTO’s Response to Kazakhstan’s 2022 Crisis Tokayev reflected on the CSTO’s rapid deployment in January 2022, when Kazakhstan faced unrest over rising gas prices, which escalated into violent confrontations. Within 24 hours, CSTO forces were deployed to stabilize the situation. Russian troops secured strategic facilities in Almaty, while Kazakh forces restored order, marking a critical demonstration of the organization’s operational capability. Putin Unveils "Oreshnik" Missile System Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed ongoing tensions with Ukraine, signaling the potential use of the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile system in response to Western-supplied long-range missiles targeting Russian territory. According to Putin, the Oreshnik has the destructive power of nuclear weapons, and can penetrate heavily fortified targets. “The temperature of the striking elements reaches 4,000 degrees. At the explosion's epicenter, everything is reduced to elementary particles, essentially turning to dust,” he explained. Putin also announced that serial production of the missile had begun, with several units ready for deployment. Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Project Discussions also turned to Kazakhstan’s plans to build its first nuclear power plant. Tokayev has proposed an international consortium, and Putin expressed Russia's willingness to participate through Rosatom, emphasizing its extensive experience with international collaborations. “Rosatom is ready to work with specialists from other countries,” Putin remarked, leaving the door open for multilateral cooperation. Armenia’s Absence and CSTO’s Future Noticeably absent from the summit was Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, following Armenia’s decision to freeze its CSTO membership earlier this year. Yerevan cited concerns over its sovereignty as the reason for the suspension. Secretary-General Tasmagambetov remained optimistic about Armenia’s return, calling it a valued ally. “This is the decision of an independent and sovereign state, which no country or organization can influence. Nevertheless, we view Armenia as an ally and hope it will return to full participation in the CSTO in the foreseeable future,” Tasmagambetov stated. Key Summit Outcomes During the session, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) also reflected on Kazakhstan's presidency in 2024, highlighting significant milestones achieved under its leadership. President Tokayev reported that approximately 60 activities were conducted within the CSTO's statutory areas of cooperation during Kazakhstan’s presidency. This included advancing coordinated approaches to key international issues in collaboration with member states, as noted by political analyst Marat Shibutov. One of the most notable achievements of the summit was the adoption of a pivotal document over a decade in the making - a targeted interstate program for the development of the Tajik-Afghan border. Shibutov emphasized that this program will facilitate a collaborative approach among CSTO member states to enhance border security, thereby bolstering the stability of the entire Central Asian region. Political scientist Daniyar Ashimbayev also highlighted an important remark by Russian Security Council Secretary, Sergei Shoigu, ahead of the summit. Shoigu is said to have commented that Russia’s “nuclear umbrella” extends to protecting all CSTO allies. The CSTO countries also underscored the importance of addressing the Afghan situation. On the one hand, they acknowledged the need for economic integration and interconnection with Afghanistan, viewing this as a means to foster regional peace and stability. On the other, the formal adoption of the targeted program for the Tajik-Afghan border represents a decisive step toward enhancing collective security measures.