Tajikistan’s External Debt Reaches $3.25 Billion
As of October 1, Tajikistan’s external debt stood at $3.25 billion, according to a report by Asia-Plus citing the Ministry of Finance. This represents a modest 0.2% increase, or $7.1 million, compared to January 1. Approximately 96% of the debt comprises direct government debt, incurred to meet state obligations, while $138.8 million is under state guarantees. Tajikistan’s external debt-to-GDP ratio is 27%, which is considered a favorable level. The largest creditors include the World Bank ($370 million), the Asian Development Bank ($260 million), the Islamic Development Bank ($212 million), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ($167 million). A significant portion of the debt, $500 million, consists of Eurobonds issued in 2017 to finance the completion of the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant. While the government adheres to the repayment schedule for these bonds, only interest payments have been made so far. Next year, Tajikistan is expected to seek additional loans from development partners to continue work on the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant. This move is anticipated to substantially increase the country’s external debt. By way of comparison, The Times of Central Asia recently reported that neighboring Uzbekistan’s public debt is projected to reach $45.1 billion by the end of 2025.
A Synthesis of Sounds: How the Silk Road Became the Melting Pot of Music in the Soviet Empire
As a DJ, radio podcaster and music enthusiast, I love discovering hidden retro gems like Nuggets-style compilations. There is an unspoken agreement on an era’s sounds depending on the artist’s breaking into the mainstream at the time. Then there are the obscure cuts and one hit wonders that for some reason didn’t make it big upon release, but dated well or were ahead of their time and found an audience at a later date. On other occasions, it’s about geography; if it had been premiered in a different part of the world, it would have been successful or far more celebrated than it was. In my search for such sounds, I feel it shouldn’t be limited by location; good music has no boundaries.
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Yalla band, commemorative stamp, Uzbekistan, 2021 [/caption]
There are many compilations touching upon niche genres and moments in time which can transport one to sonically experience a particular era. As a Westerner trying to peek behind the Iron Curtain to gauge the music and arts scene of the 1970’s and 80’s, what flickered across the Cold War barriers seemed controlled, state-approved, and mostly a mystery. It was a delight to learn that under this supposed monochromic blanket, a dynamic underground music scene was flourishing in regions that had a long history of cultural fusion. SYNTHESIZING THE SILK ROADS: Uzbek Disco, Tajik Folktronica, Uyghur Rock & Crimean Tatar Jazz from 1980s Soviet Central Asia features musicians from countries such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, who were creating a unique sound that stood apart from anything else being produced in the USSR. TCA spoke to Ostinato record label boss Vik Sohonie about the release.
TCA: How does this statement by Peter Frankopan quoted in your liner notes - “The bridge between east and west is the very crossroads of civilization” - relate to or define the music you chose?
The music itself is the greatest evidence we have to this argument, because you can hear the cultures of Europe, South Asia, East Asia, West Asia - the Middle East - all mixed into it. Indeed, Central Asia was influenced by all of these regions musically given its unique geography, but it has also influenced the cultures of so many of those parts of the world. During the era of the Silk Roads and the "golden age" of the region, its musical theory, as stated in the liner notes, influenced the music of Europe.
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Natalia Nurumkhamedova album cover[/caption]
TCA: How did World War II and Stalin create the circumstances behind the Tashkent and Uzbekistan scene?
When the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin put the best and brightest minds on trains bound for Soviet Central Asia, mainly Uzbekistan and its capital, Tashkent. There were recording engineers on board who went on to set up one of the biggest press plants in the Soviet Union that produced millions of records. A little-known story of World War II - the evacuation from the Eastern European front to Central Asia set in motion what would later form the tracks that make up this album.
TCA: Nikita Khrushchev was important in fostering a new creative drive and easing of censorship within the Soviet Union. Jazz, which Khrushchev compared to “having gas in the stomach,” was the biggest winner in the new, less restrictive atmosphere; can you explain how jazz was important?
Jazz was seen as a tool of American subversion, and perhaps with good reason. Jazz was used by the United States during the Cold War as a way of spreading the gospel of the United States and combating the reality of racism that defined the image of the U.S. amongst many post-colonial nations. A distinctly Black American art form, jazz was both a cultural export and a tool of statecraft - this is how the Soviets viewed it. Nevertheless, jazz's power made its way to the cities of the Soviet Union and jazz clubs were the first outlets that sprung up in the 50s and 60s that then allowed rock and disco clubs to take shape.
TCA: Why and how did the music in the Tashkent scene move away from Soviet norms?
As a sanctuary city, a safe haven for artists from across the Soviet Union, given its millennia-old reputation as a welcoming hub, there was a freedom within Tashkent that perhaps artists in Moscow didn't enjoy. But as mentioned in the liner notes, one of the women artists declared that Uzbekistan's time as a Soviet republic was a golden era for the arts and music.
TCA: How did the “Deep Purple Generation” and disco play a role in the USSR’s unraveling?
Disco and rock clubs became the equivalent of, let's say "free trade zones." This is where Soviet censors and doctrine couldn’t control the message or the business model. Within these clubs, private and illicit commerce thrived, Western norms, sense of fashion and music also found a receptive space. This opened imaginations and allowed new ideas to influence the Soviet youth, many of whom developed pro-Western attitudes, and some went on to become leaders of ex-Soviet republics, reorienting them towards a more Western aligned stance.
TCA: You suggest that “discos had become a space for early alternative culture, as well as private commerce” in the Soviet Union, and I love the term “disco mafia”. Can you elaborate on this mafia and how disco was both subversive and advocated commercialism?
Because there was so much money being made at these discos - from the sale of alcohol, cigarettes, possibly even drugs, as well as Western clothing, music and other paraphernalia - a mafia emerged to profit off the revenue streams. It can also be argued that the powerful mafias that emerged in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union after 1991 found their nascence in these disco clubs, building networks to the West and understanding how to create captive markets they could control and profit from.
TCA: Given the time period and the political backdrop, some of the artists on the compilation have pretty tragic stories; when did you become aware of that and can you tell us more about it?
The more tragic stories were gleaned from our interviews with the artists or their families, and from newspaper clippings that we found from the era that details their arrest, torture, detention and the like.
TCA: I was fascinated by Enver Mustafayev, the “founder of Minarets of Nessef and an ethnic Tatar whose music had an American touch and often included lyrics in Crimean Tatar, a criminalized language;” why was this language criminalized?
Crimean Tatars consider themselves the indigenous people of Crimea and have long advocated for an independent state, one in which Tatar would be the official language. Since Tatars did not form a great deal of the leadership in Moscow or among the secret police, communication in this language could be (and was used) to foment separatism, according to the Soviet authorities. Hence, it was criminalized.
TCA: “More than a sanctuary, Tashkent was a crucible of sound. Nestled between Europe and Asia, its legacy as a key hub along the ancient Silk Roads gave it a cosmopolitan flair for centuries. As a mainstay of Soviet recording, it welcomed artists from across the Asian expanse of the USSR, like Uyghur bands from Kazakhstan via Xinjiang in western China.” Can you elaborate on this?
The sound you hear on the record is not only a sound that was formed during the Soviet era, but the sound of Uzbekistan and Central Asia is distinct and houses many cultures given that travelers and traders have been traversing the region for centuries to move peoples and goods between Europe and Asia. During this ancient trade, musical ideas also left their imprint.
In the Soviet era, Tashkent was a sanctuary, and artists found a welcoming home and a sense of creative freedom. So, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Tatars, Koreans, and many ethnicities that formed the rich ethnic tapestry of the Soviet Union made Tashkent something like Brooklyn, London, or Berlin today. Tashkent opened its doors to everyone without exception, from our research, and this gave rise to the rich music scene we tried to capture.
TCA: Some musicians, like Davron Gaipov, founder of the cult Uzbek band Original, faced harsh punishment during routine law enforcement at the height of the disco club era in the 1980s. Despite being a “disco divo,” Davron was incarcerated in a hard labor camp in the Ikurst region of Siberia for five years on charges of “repeatedly organizing events accompanied by the use of alcohol and narcotic substances.”’ In the U.S., where disco originated, it was considered a musical movement associated with black and queer/LGBT artists and clientele. Was that the case in the Soviet Union? Were there similar prejudices in the Soviet Union towards non-ethnic Russians or Central Asians? Did disco offer more opportunity for Central Asians to excel against any such prejudices? Was there an early gay culture associated with Soviet and Uzbek disco? If so, were artists or people involved in the scene also persecuted for their sexuality by the Soviet Union?
We did not come across any information regarding the LGBT scene in Soviet Uzbekistan, nor did the artists discuss this.
As for attitudes and prejudices - this is an interesting phenomenon in the Soviet Union. It did not share the rigid racial hierarchies that exist in the United States. In fact, one of the legacies of the Soviet Union in Uzbekistan was a strong culture of anti-discrimination when it came to things like getting a job or renting an apartment. Musically, there was a political imperative to celebrate all cultures in order to create a strong connected identity within the Soviet Union to prevent separatism, which was a constant risk given the sheer size and diversity of the USSR.
Having said that, this is in practice, but one would be lying if they said there was no discrimination or there wasn't some sort of ethnic stratification. It just did not operate, or perhaps was not as severe, as it does in the settler Anglosphere (United States, Canada, Australia, etc.). The Soviet Union also had a history of aiding countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in their liberation struggles as well as educating their youth at universities, so it had garnered a reputation in many non-Western countries as a tolerant society. From our time in Uzbekistan, one of its most endearing qualities was its sheer diversity and what we saw as a strong sense of national identity that surpassed ethnicity.
TCA: Can you tell us more about the Tajik women artists?
Tajikistan remains a more conservative country than Uzbekistan, according to what we were told while in Tashkent, hence Tajik women artists found greater freedom, appreciation and a more liberal atmosphere across the border. All of the Tajik women artists included on this record came to Uzbekistan to record - which in itself says something.
It’s worth getting this collection for the liner notes alone. They’re meticulously researched, with historical events and political circumstances woven to paint a vivid picture. If you love music and history, and how they form the zeitgeist, this is a must read as well as a must listen. You can buy this amazing time capsule capturing this sonic Soviet underground movement here SYNTHESIZING THE SILK ROADS.
Visit Osinato Records Bandcamp here: www.ostinatorecords.bandcamp.com
Ola is a DJ and radio broadcaster Ola’s Kool Kitchen, and you can listen to her show here.
Russia Looking to Export Gas to China via Kazakhstan
Russia continues to try to reorient its natural gas exports from Europe to Asia and is planning a new pipeline route to China that would pass through Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan stands to benefit not only from transit fees, but could also import some Russia gas for regions in northeastern Kazakhstan that are desperately in need of more energy sources. The Russian plans are bad news for Turkmenistan as China is Turkmenistan’s main gas customer and Turkmen authorities were hoping to sell China even more gas. On November 15, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak mentioned the pipeline plan on the sidelines of a Chinese-Russian forum in Kazan, Russia. Novak said such a project is still only being discussed, but Russian media outlet Kommersant wrote on November 18 that there are already three options for the pipeline. All three possibilities pass though northeastern Kazakhstan, but Kazakhstan’s level of participation in the pipeline is different in each variation. One of the projects would require Kazakhstan to build a pipeline for gasification of the northeastern Pavlodar, Abai, and Karaganda provinces. A second proposal would include only the Abai and Zhetysu provinces. Russian gas giant Gazprom’s financial obligation also changes depending on the pipeline project selected. The most expensive option for Gazprom would cost more than $10 billion to construct and would not operate at full capacity until 2034. All versions foresee at least 35 billion cubic meters of Russian gas (bcm) shipped via the pipeline with Kazakhstan receiving some 10 bcm, which would greatly alleviate recent power shortages in northeastern Kazakhstan. Despite Novak saying the pipeline project was only being discussed, Kazakhstan and Russia appear well along in their planning. In early May, Kazakh Ambassador to Russia Duaren Abayev gave an interview to Russia’s TASS news agency and mentioned there was a “roadmap” for supplying 35 bcm of gas to China via Kazakhstan. Russia already exports gas to China via the “Sila Sibiri” (Power of Siberia) pipeline and expects that in 2024 the pipeline will for the first time reach its full capacity of 38 bcm. Construction of Sila Sibiri-2 with a planned capacity of some 50 bcm has been delayed due to China’s reluctance to loan Russia money for construction, differences over price, and China’s increasing purchases of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Novak commented on Sila Sibiri-2, saying the pipeline project involving Kazakhstan was separate and the Russian government will continue to negotiate with China about construction of Sila Sibiri-2. Russia is seeking to replace its former main customer, the European Union. Prior to the Kremlin launching its full-scale war on Ukraine in February 2022, the EU was buying between 150-160 bcm of Russian gas annually. The EU sharply cut back on Russian gas imports in response to the invasion of Ukraine and in 2023 imported less than 43 bcm. Russia’s pivot to Asia for gas exports targets the Chinese market, but Gazprom is looking to take any possible Asian customers and has found some in Central Asia. Russia’s surge into the Asian gas market comes at the expense of Turkmenistan, the country with the world’s fourth largest gas reserves. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have traditionally been gas exporters, but both countries have suffered severe gas shortages in recent years, particularly during the winter, and are focused on using domestic gas for domestic consumption. Both were in talks with Turkmenistan to buy Turkmen gas. Uzbekistan signed a deal in December 2022 to buy some 1.5 bcm of Turkmen gas and signed a short-term contract for 2 bcm in August 2023. Gazprom, though, has swooped in and signed deals with both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, supplying Kazakhstan with some 7.25 bcm and Uzbekistan with 1.22 bcm in 2023. Gazprom later signed a contract to annually supply Uzbekistan with up to 11 bcm as early as 2025. Turkmenistan’s contract to sell some 5.5 bcm of gas to Russia just expired and will not be renewed, forcing Turkmenistan to arrange a complicated gas swap deal involving Iran to sell some 10 bcm to Iraq. China has been Turkmenistan’s largest gas customer for 15 years, and with the expiration of the Turkmen-Russian gas contract, is really the only significant customer for Turkmen gas. In recent years, China has been purchasing up to some 35 bcm annually, but this agreement is now in jeopardy. One of the possible routes for shipping Russian gas to China involves using the pipelines that carry gas from Turkmenistan to China (Central Asia-China pipeline). The Kommersant article reported that some 25% of those three pipelines’ capacity is currently not being used. Since the pipelines pass through the territories of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, both of those countries can export up to 10 bcm each of their own gas. However, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan now need to import Russian gas to meet domestic needs, and neither is exporting much of their gas to China. Turkmenistan has more than enough gas to fill the spare capacity, but seems to have been outmaneuvered by Russia. If China decides to buy 35 bcm of Russian gas through the Central Asia-China pipeline, Turkmenistan’s share of gas shipments could drop to 20-30 bcm. Turkmenistan has also been hoping for years that the fourth strand of the Central Asia-China pipeline would be realized. Line D from Turkmenistan would pass through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan before reaching China and would carry 30 bcm of solely Turkmen gas. China now has a choice; if Beijing opts to boost gas imports via pipeline from the east, Gazprom probably will need a loan from China, but will also likely spend some of its own money from the time construction starts on pipelines to the Chinese border. Turkmenistan and the other three Central Asian countries through which Line D is planned to pass will all need substantial loans from China, covering nearly the entire cost of pipeline construction. Turkmenistan paid for the construction of its sections of Lines A, B, and C, as well as Chinese development of gas fields in Turkmenistan, through its gas shipments to China. Beijing simply took some of the Turkmen gas as payment for the loans and could do so again, not only in the case of Turkmenistan, but also with Russia. It will be more difficult, especially for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to repay Chinese loans for construction of the pipeline through their territories. Both countries are already deep in debt to China for other projects China has funded and built during the last 20 years. China has no urgent need for more gas and has already diversified its sources of gas import both for pipelines - there is also a pipeline from Myanmar - and LNG suppliers. That leaves China in an excellent position to bargain over the price of either Russian or Turkmen gas, but leaves Turkmenistan at a disadvantage that could see its gas revenues plummet if Russia’s plan for exporting gas through Kazakhstan is accepted by China.
Tajik MMA Fighter Chorshanbiev, Imprisoned For Criticizing Authorities, Faces New Charges
In Tajikistan, the well known MMA fighter and prominent blogger Chorshanbe Chorshanbiev, already serving an 8.5-year prison sentence, has been handed an additional four years on new charges. Journalist Anora Sarkorova reported the development on November 18, which was later confirmed by sources at Radio Ozodi. Chorshanbiev, known for criticizing Tajik authorities in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region while residing in Russia, was deported to Tajikistan in December 2021. By May 2022, he was convicted of “public calls for violent change of the constitutional order” and sentenced to 8.5 years in prison. Details of the additional sentence remain unclear, but it is speculated to be related to either violations of prison regulations or involvement in a fight. Recently, Chorshanbiev was transferred from a penal colony in Khujand to a pre-trial detention center in Dushanbe. Chorshanbiev’s legal troubles began in December 2021 when he was deported from Russia for traffic violations. Upon his arrival in Dushanbe, he was arrested, and the Tajik prosecutor's office initiated charges against him, alleging incitement of social and national discord and calls to overthrow the state system. However, during the investigation, the first charge was dropped. His trial garnered significant public attention. Prominent athletes in Russia voiced their support for him, and his defense team argued that the case rested on a single piece of evidence: a video recorded in November 2021. In the video, Chorshanbiev commented on violent clashes in Khorog, during which three people were killed and dozens injured. The prosecution claimed his statements amounted to incitement of protests against the government. A political scientist’s analysis, presented during the trial, characterized Chorshanbiev’s remarks as a call for rebellion. However, his lawyers contested this interpretation and requested a re-evaluation of the video. In court, Chorshanbiev maintained that he had no intention of destabilizing the country. Despite the divided expert opinion, Chorshanbiev was convicted, and his case continues to provoke debate.
Fueling Growth: IFC Strategic Initiatives for Sustainable Development in Central Asia – An Interview With Hela Cheikhrouhou
With its headquarters in Washington, D.C. the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in 1956 as the private-sector arm of the World Bank. The institution offers advisory, and asset-management services to promote investment in developing countries. Recent ventures in Central Asia include solar power projects in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and an entrepreneurship scheme for women and young people in Tajikistan. TCA spoke with Hela Cheikhrouhou, IFC Vice President for the Middle East, Central Asia, Türkiye, Afghanistan, and Pakistan about the IFC’s work in Central Asia. TCA: Can you please give us an overview of IFC's performance in Central Asia for fiscal year 2024 (July 1, 2023, to June 30, 2024)? IFC had a pivotal year in Central Asia, making strides in sustainable development and inclusive growth across the region. Our efforts concentrated on climate finance, infrastructure, agriculture, and supporting smaller businesses. By coupling investments with advisory support, we helped expand the role of the private sector, creating jobs, promoting financial inclusion, strengthening infrastructure, and supporting the region's green transition. In the fiscal year 2024, IFC committed over $1 billion to Central Asia. This includes about $400 million in long-term financing from our own account, $600 million in mobilization, and $35 million in short-term trade and supply-chain finance to facilitate trade flows. Alongside these financial commitments, we engaged in advisory projects focused on improving financial inclusion, developing innovative public-private partnerships (PPPs), and advancing climate initiatives and gender equality. Our results this year underscore our commitment to fostering sustainable, inclusive growth, and enhancing the resilience and sustainability of Central Asian economies. TCA: Can you highlight some of the IFC’s key achievements in Central Asia this year? In addition to the strong financial commitments mentioned earlier, IFC expanded its presence in various sectors, including finance, capital markets, renewable energy, agriculture, and infrastructure. Through our advisory services, we helped structure impactful PPPs at the sectoral level. A major focus this year has been strengthening local financial markets. IFC invested $228 million across ten financial institutions in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Up to half this amount was dedicated to supporting women entrepreneurs and rural enterprises. We also helped these financial institutions expand portfolios related to their micro, small, and medium enterprise (MSME) businesses, advance climate finance, foster digital transformation, and issue the region’s first sustainability, social, and green bonds. Supporting MSMEs has enabled entrepreneurs to grow their businesses and generate employment. In the past fiscal year alone, IFC-supported projects created around 35,000 direct jobs, including opportunities for over 13,000 women across the region. These efforts have been further bolstered by targeted investments and projects in individual countries across the region. In Uzbekistan, IFC, together with the World Bank, financed a new solar plant equipped with the country’s first battery energy storage system. Once completed, the plant is expected to provide electricity access to around 75,000 households in the Bukhara region. As part of its broader support for the Uzbek government’s efforts to reform its chemical sector, IFC assisted the State Asset Management Agency in privatizing Ferganaazot, a local nitrogen-based fertilizer producer. The asset was acquired by Indorama Corporation, an experienced international investor and partner of IFC, which plans to invest around $100 million in modernizing and upgrading Ferganaazot’s production facilities. Additionally, we financed Anglesey Food LLC, the country’s leading grocery retailer operating the Korzinka chain, to support the construction of a state-of-the-art ‘green’ distribution center, facilitating the expansion of Korzinka’s retail store network. With IFC’s support, the company recently became the first in Central Asia to obtain EDGE gender certification, marking a significant milestone in promoting gender equality in the workplace. In Tajikistan, IFC invested in the nation’s first green bond, issued by Eskhata Bank, which will support climate-smart initiatives and MSMEs engaged in environmental projects. As a strategic advisor, IFC assists the Tajik government in structuring a PPP to mobilize private sector expertise and capital for its inaugural 200-megawatt solar plant in the Sughd region. This landmark project is expected to significantly enhance Tajikistan’s solar energy capacity, mobilizing up to $200 million in private financing. In Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, IFC is not only focused on enhancing financial inclusion but also actively pursuing a diverse range of opportunities. These initiatives include PPPs in areas such as drinking water supply, renewable energy – including networked geothermal solutions for heating and cooling - railway projects as part of the Middle Corridor development, and introducing the first municipal green bonds in Central Asia. Additionally, IFC supports Kazakhstan's accelerated methane abatement efforts in line with the Global Methane Pledge. These achievements underscore IFC's commitment to driving sustainable and inclusive development in Central Asia. We will continue collaborating closely with our partners to foster the region's growth and resilience in the years ahead. TCA: What are some of the opportunities and challenges in Central Asia? Central Asia has made impressive progress in its development over the past two decades, underpinned by robust growth, averaging more than 6% per annum. Going forward, the economic opportunities for Central Asian countries are ample. By embracing economic openness, fostering mutually beneficial cooperation, and coordinating efforts, the region can achieve a qualitative breakthrough in its development while reducing vulnerability to external shocks through the promotion of internal growth drivers. Looking ahead, Central Asia's strategic significance in the Eurasian space is poised to grow, positioning it as an important player for neighboring countries and key economic partners. The region has a historic opportunity to leverage its transit position and expand into external markets through emerging international transport corridors. With its abundant energy resources and considerable potential for renewable energy, implementing energy projects – particularly in renewable sectors – will enhance the energy mix and create opportunities for future electricity exports. However, unlocking the region's economic potential requires coping with several challenges. These include landlocked geography, reliance on commodity exports, low levels of financial development, and exposure to the negative impacts of climate change. While overcoming these obstacles is crucial, it is equally important to seize opportunities in the global economy and develop and adapt digital and green technologies. Going forward, creating new and better jobs is critical for Central Asia. As young countries, the region’s states need to create many jobs quickly. For example, by 2030, Uzbekistan will have the fifth-largest labor force in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region. The Kyrgyz Republic’s potential workforce is growing at about 2% per annum – faster than some of its neighbors in the ECA region. Job creation, though, has not kept pace with the increasing population. Job creation offers the surest path out of poverty, and I want to further collaborate with partners in Central Asia to ensure we achieve progress on this agenda. Addressing infrastructure bottlenecks in transport, water, and energy will enhance productivity, expand trade and economic partnerships with the neighboring countries, and diversify production and exports. Improving governance and institutional environment remain vital for accelerating structural economic transformation across the region. Central Asia is highly vulnerable to climate change, which poses risks to food security, water supply, and the energy mix. Biodiversity conservation is also a pressing concern. To address these issues, the region must undergo a green transformation by investing in resource-saving innovations, modernization of water and agriculture sectors, and reverse desertification. Collaboration among Central Asian countries is essential for overcoming structural development challenges, particularly in enhancing transport and logistics infrastructure and mitigating climate-related risks. Joint efforts in the water and energy sectors are equally vital given the increased pressure on energy systems and shared river basins. TCA: Looking ahead, what are IFC's priorities for Central Asia in the next fiscal year? In recent years, we have intensified our efforts in the region, maintaining a strong focus on key development challenges such as limited access to finance, significant infrastructure gaps, weak diversification, and unlocking the potential of the private sector. Simultaneously, we are committed to addressing cross-cutting issues like climate change and gender inequality. IFC aims to deepen its engagement in Central Asia through a combination of investments and advisory services, anchored around three strategic pillars: activating private sector development, enhancing infrastructure connectivity, and facilitating a green transition. While these are common themes across the region, we customize our approach to align with each country's unique profile and circumstances, informed by thorough research and analysis and discussions with governments, partners, and clients. We look forward to continuing our collaboration with governments, investors, and development partners to help Central Asia achieve its ambitious development goals and promote sustainable and inclusive growth. This effort will be transformative not only for the region’s economies but also for its people.
Tajik Activist Ergashev Tried to Commit Suicide Before Deportation from Germany, Reports Associate
Tajik opposition activist Dilmurod Ergashev has attempted suicide before his expected deportation from Germany to Tajikistan. The Insider reports this quoting Ergashev's associate, Sharofiddin Gadoev. According to Gadoev, Ergashev was found in his deportation prison cell with wounds on his stomach, body, and arms, as well as slashed veins. He was taken to a hospital, where he received stitches. “Ergashev realizes that returning to Tajikistan would mean imminent reprisals and repression from Emomali Rahmon's regime. He would rather die than fall into the hands of a regime known for its cruelty to political opponents,” Gadoev said. Gadoev's Reform and Development of Tajikistan movement appealed to the international community and human rights organizations to intervene to prevent Ergashev's deportation. “We demand that the German authorities reconsider their decision and grant Dilmurod Ergashev the protection he deserves as a political refugee. The activist's fate should not be held hostage to bureaucratic decisions. This is a critical moment when the international community must demonstrate unity and determination in defending the rights of those fighting for freedom and justice in their countries,” the statement said. The Times of Central Asia wrote earlier that the deportation order was issued by the Kleve administrative court on October 28, shortly after the activist was detained. The court ordered Ergashev to be deported by November 7, despite his application for political asylum, which is still pending in another court. Ergashev actively opposes the regime of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and is a member of the opposition Group of 24. He joined the Reform and Development of Tajikistan movement in 2024 and has lived in Germany for 13 years.
Central Asia Gears Up For Another Trump Term
Leaders in Central Asia have congratulated Donald Trump on his election to another term as U.S. president, a development that governments in the region will watch closely for its impact on trade, geopolitical tensions and other priorities. Central Asian governments generally seek to balance their relationships with the West alongside more entrenched ties to nearby Russia and China, and are likely to be sensitive to any disruption of the status quo as the United States transitions from the Biden administration to another Trump term. Trump defeated Vice President Kamala Harris in the election on Tuesday, making an extraordinary political comeback and promising that he will deliver “the golden age of America.” Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev sent a message of congratulations to Trump in which he reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s commitment to “deepening the strategic partnership” with the United States, Mirziyoyev’s press office said in a statement. “In his letter, he emphasized shared goals for enhanced cooperation across trade, security, and regional stability, marking a new chapter” in relations between Uzbekistan and the United States, the statement said. Last week, Uzbekistan wrapped up talks with the United States as part of its campaign to join the World Trade Organization by early 2026. President Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan sent a similar message, according to media reports. "I believe that your leadership experience and deep knowledge will create opportunities for further deepening of comprehensive cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the United States of America, based on the principles of mutual respect,” Japarov said. In comments relayed to Trump, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev “expressed confidence that bilateral cooperation in the areas of security, nuclear non-proliferation, and investment would continue to develop consistently,” his office said. Tokayev wished Trump success in efforts to ensure “global stability and security.” There is likely to be basic continuity on matters such as anti-terror cooperation and a stated commitment to trade relations between the U.S. and Central Asia. However, one area of uncertainty is Trump’s warning that he will intensify tariffs on U.S. imports of goods from China, a major economic player across Central Asia. That, in turn, could lead to major fallout for the global economy. Another prominent question is whether Trump will push Western-backed Ukraine to reach a peace deal with Russia nearly three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion. Central Asian nations – specifically, the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – have sought a position of neutrality, maintaining their relationships with Russia without offering clear support for the Russian military campaign. Relationships in the region might be due for recalibration if Russian President Vladimir Putin emerges emboldened from any Trump initiative in the conflict. Tokayev has already called for peace efforts to bring the war to an end, describing Russia as “militarily invincible.” There are concerns that Trump will erode U.S. democratic institutions in his second term, a potential disappointment for groups that would like to see the U.S. campaign harder for democratic freedoms in Central Asia. Trump has also promised mass deportations and other tough policies on immigration, which could have an impact on the increasing number of Central Asian people trying to reach the United States through the southern border and by other means.
Germany Deports Tajik Political Activist Dilmurod Ergashev
Germany has decided to deport Dilmurod Ergashev, a political activist and member of the Movement for Reforms and Development of Tajikistan, who had applied for asylum in Germany. This is despite requests from international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the Helsinki Committee not to deport Ergashev because of the risk of him being tortured in Tajikistan. Friends of the activist said Ergashev was told to report to the deportation center and prepare to leave. The activist, who has lived in Germany for the past 13 years, was detained in the town of Kleve on October 28 and taken to the administrative court, where his deportation was ordered. According to associates, the court should have considered that another administrative court was still considering Ergashev's application for political asylum. Sharofiddin Gadoev, leader of the Movement for Reforms and Development, confirmed that the deportation process has already begun. Ergashev is likely to be sent back to Tajikistan on November 6. “The decision to deport Ergashev strengthens the authoritarian system in Tajikistan and increases fear among political activists,” Gadoev said. He said there may be an agreement between Germany and Tajikistan to deport activists forcibly. Ergashev's lawyer has filed an appeal with the Supreme Court but is unavailable for comment. Dozens of Tajik citizens have moved to Europe in recent years, many of whom disagree with their country's policies. Germany has previously deported activists such as Abdullo Shamsiddin and Bilol Kurbonaliev, who were sentenced to long prison terms upon their return home. Also extradited from Austria to Tajikistan in 2020 was Hizbullo Shovalizoda, a member of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. He has been sentenced to 20 years in prison.
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