Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Send Humanitarian Aid to Iran

Tajikistan is sending a convoy of 110 trucks carrying humanitarian aid to Iran, which has been targeted by heavy U.S. and Israeli air strikes in a war that started on February 28. The dispatch of aid follows similar deliveries by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan.  Central Asian countries are aiming for neutrality in the Mideast war, maintaining ties with the Iranian government even as they profess support for Gulf Arab states that have been targeted by Iranian drones and missiles. Iran’s relationships with countries to the east range from the close cultural affinity that it enjoys with Tajikistan to sometimes tense interactions with Azerbaijan, which has a military partnership with Israel.   The trucks from Tajikistan left for Iran on Wednesday and “will soon arrive in the friendly and brotherly country,” Tajikistan’s government said, without providing details about how the aid will be distributed. The convoy would likely travel through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to reach the northeastern Iranian border. The aid “comprises 3,610 tons of cargo, including 45 tons of medicines, a large volume of sanitary and hygienic products, children's clothing, various food products, household items, bedding, tents, building materials, and other necessary supplies,” Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.   Tajik President Emomali Rahmon posted a photo on social media that showed a long line of aid trucks on a highway.  Turkmenistan, which shares a border with Iran, has said it sent humanitarian aid, mainly for distribution to children. It appeared to allude to the war, saying that “supporting and assisting close neighbors in difficult times is a noble tradition of the Turkmen people, rooted in ancient times.” Uzbekistan has sent trucks carrying flour, rice, sugar, pasta, sunflower oil, canned goods and medical supplies to Iran.   Azerbaijan, which borders northwest Iran, has also dispatched truckloads of humanitarian aid to Iran, according to Ali Alizada, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Iran. Azerbaijan previously said it was evacuating staff from its embassy in Tehran as well as its consulate in the Iranian city of Tabriz, after accusing Iran of drone attacks on its territory.

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will examine accelerated plans to relocate people from the area around Tajikistan's Rogun hydropower plant, with guests from the Coalition for Human Rights in Development, including Eugene Simonov.

Global Internet Freedom Rankings: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan Far Ahead of Eurasian Neighbors

The 2026 Global Internet Freedom Rankings, published this week by the research agency Cloudwards, have revealed that the five countries of Central Asia have significantly less internet censorship than all of their Eurasian neighbors. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s online environments emerge as particularly encouraging cases. Cloudwards defines internet censorship as the banning or restricting of online content or services, such as social media platforms, VPN apps, and certain political or religious messaging. It also covers the more welcome deletion of harmful content. Censorship can be done by governments, or initiated by a country’s internet service providers and other businesses. The internet freedom rankings do not measure state censorship per se. Cloudwards' research scored 171 countries on a scale of 0-100, rating their overall levels of internet censorship using five key criteria: torrenting availability; adult content accessibility; social media platforms; access to varied political and religious content; and VPN regulations. Eleven nations returned the highest score of 92, including New Zealand, Belgium and Timor Leste. While North Korea scored 0, the next four worst countries for internet censorship – each scoring just 4 – all border Central Asia: China, Pakistan, Iran and Russia. Tajikistan’s score of 56, while only middling in the global context, means that its internet is subject to significantly less interference than almost anywhere in the wider Eurasia region. The Times of Central Asia reported last year that the country has repealed a law that allowed citizens to be prosecuted for ‘liking’ posts on social media that are critical of the government. The only Eurasian country to rival Tajikistan is its northern neighbor Kyrgyzstan, which has the second freest internet in Central Asia, scoring 52 in Cloudwards' ranking. For comparison, 52 is also the overall score given to the United Kingdom and Brazil. Kazakhstan scored 36 – above Singapore and South Korea, which both received a mark of 32. Uzbekistan scored 24. While Turkmenistan’s mark of 16 places it firmly among the world’s worst countries for internet censorship, this is nonetheless higher than countries including India and Turkey (both 12). Turkmen netizens still experience fewer restrictions than internet users in the aforementioned China, Pakistan, Iran and Russia. The authors of the Cloudwards report, British editors Kit Copson and Sandra Pattison, commented: "The reasons behind online censorship range from protecting people targeted by hate speech to quelling political dissent. In especially restrictive locations, censorship and internet monitoring are tools commonly to control narratives." They added: "The consequences for breaching government-imposed censorship laws depend on the country. They could include fines or even arrest or imprisonment for those in highly restrictive locations."

Growing Trade Disputes Test the Eurasian Economic Union

Trade disputes within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are as old as its creation. Restrictions on the import and export of certain goods have long been common practice. However, analysts increasingly warn that tensions have reached a point at which the organization risks losing its core function, ensuring the free movement of goods across borders and maintaining simplified conditions for migrant workers. Mounting Restrictions The EAEU currently comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Economic integration among several post-Soviet states began in 2000 with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2006, but suspended its participation in 2008. The foundation of this organization was the Customs Union agreement, intended to abolish customs duties among member states. The structure of the integration project has since evolved. The EAEU treaty was signed in 2014 and entered into force on January 1, 2015. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not join, while Armenia became a member in 2015. More than two decades after the first integration agreements, however, many of the bloc’s original promises remain only partially fulfilled. Experts have long argued that protectionist measures remain widespread within the bloc and that full freedom of movement for all categories of goods, including strategic products, has not been achieved. They also point to pronounced economic asymmetry: Russia accounts for approximately 85–87% of the union’s combined GDP, whereas Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 9–10%. Russia’s significantly larger population and political influence have further reinforced perceptions of structural imbalance. Moscow is now preparing new regulatory measures affecting its partners. From April 1, 2026, a national system for confirming the arrival of goods will be introduced for road imports from EAEU countries. According to the Russian authorities, shifting key control procedures to the pre-border stage is intended to improve transparency in the administration of indirect taxes. Previously, such checks were conducted after goods entered the country through desk and field audits. At the same time, Russia has intensified selective customs controls on its borders with Kazakhstan and Belarus, officially citing efforts to combat counterfeit goods. Particular scrutiny is being applied to product labelling and accompanying documentation. Controls were tightened last summer, when mobile checkpoints were established along the Kazakh-Russian border, followed by the inspections of vehicles leaving Belarus in the autumn. Full-scale checkpoints are now operating on the Kazakh-Russian border, while a simplified regime linked to the Union State and EAEU agreements continues to apply on the Belarusian-Russian border. Logistics industry representatives report that stricter controls on the Kazakh border have significantly increased transit delivery times. Carriers often face lengthy delays at checkpoints even when their documentation is in order. According to Alexandra Pokumeiko, head of a freight-forwarding department, the changes have created uncertainty in delivery schedules along Belarus-Russia transport corridors and on transit routes through Russia to Kazakhstan. The growing number of administrative restrictions has begun to spill into specific sectors of the economy, triggering retaliatory measures between member states. Escalating Tensions in the Automotive Sector A new dispute has emerged between Kazakhstan and Russia over vehicle recycling fees. On March 10, Kazakhstan announced plans to raise the scrap fee on Russian-made cars, describing the move as a reciprocal response to measures introduced by Moscow. Although the relevant order is yet to be formally signed, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry and Construction, Yersayin Nagaspayev, has stated that the increase would mirror Moscow’s policy. Within Russia, recycling fees on vehicles imported from Kazakhstan have reportedly risen tenfold and are set to increase further under a progressive scale through 2029-2030. Astana argues that the reciprocal step is necessary to support its domestic automotive industry. Nagaspayev emphasised that the value of Russian passenger vehicles accounts for only around 3.7% of Kazakhstan’s car imports, suggesting limited market impact and no expectation of sharp price increases. Meanwhile, Russian media outlets have reported that since spring 2024, more than 30,000 Hyundai, Kia, and Skoda vehicles assembled in Kazakhstan have entered the Russian market within the EAEU framework. Debate Over the Union’s Future The dispute has revived debate in Kazakhstan about the country’s economic gains from EAEU membership and speculation about the bloc’s long-term viability. Olzhas Zhorayev, an expert at the Association for Analysis and Management of Public Policy, argues that the institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Commission complicates the promotion of national interests. According to him, the multinational composition of the bloc's leadership positions sometimes makes dispute resolution difficult and contributes to perceptions that Eurasian integration remains largely declarative. Zhorayev also highlights concerns about the preparedness of some national officials working within integration bodies, suggesting that a limited understanding of economic conditions may reduce the effectiveness of their representation. Economist Arman Beisembayev takes a more critical view, arguing that Kazakhstan derives limited economic benefit from its membership in the union. Beisembayev points to a significant trade imbalance with Russia, noting that Kazakhstan imports substantially more from its northern neighbour than it exports. At the same time, he notes that Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on Russian supplies in sectors such as food and pharmaceuticals. Labour Migration Disputes Russia has also tightened legislation governing labour migration. In January, Kyrgyzstan filed a case with the EAEU Court, arguing that Russia’s refusal to provide compulsory medical insurance to the families of migrant workers violates union agreements guaranteeing access to social protection. In March, however, the court’s Grand Chamber clarified that member states are not required to automatically extend compulsory medical insurance coverage to migrants’ family members. The ruling emphasised the distinction within EAEU agreements between social security provisions and access to medical assistance. Armenia’s Strategic Dilemma Armenia’s shifting foreign policy priorities add another layer of uncertainty to the union’s future. The country’s leadership has repeatedly signalled hesitation between deepening integration with the EAEU amid moves aimed at potentially strengthening ties with the European Union. In the summer of 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan joined an EAEU forum via video link rather than attending in person, prompting speculation in regional media about Yerevan’s commitment to the bloc. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko later suggested that Armenia may have its own reasons for adopting a more critical stance toward the organization. Simultaneous membership in both the EAEU and the European Union is not feasible, meaning Armenia may eventually face a strategic choice. Rising Tensions Ahead of Key Meetings Internal disputes are likely to influence discussions at the upcoming EAEU summit of heads of state in May, as well as during the Russian president’s planned state visit to Kazakhstan, scheduled to coincide with the event. Kazakhstan assumed the rotating chairmanship of the EAEU from January 1, 2026. Recent trade disputes suggest that Astana intends to pursue a more assertive position within the organization rather than simply aligning with Moscow’s policy preferences.

Taken together, these disputes highlight growing contradictions within the EAEU. While the union was designed to remove barriers to trade and labor mobility, member states have increasingly resorted to unilateral restrictions when national economic interests are at stake. The result is a system that formally promotes integration but frequently operates through ad-hoc controls, exemptions, and retaliatory measures.

Whether the EAEU can reconcile these tensions remains uncertain. For countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the union still offers access to a large regional market and simplified migration rules, but recurring trade conflicts and regulatory asymmetries continue to fuel debate about how much members are willing to sacrifice for integration. As the bloc approaches another summit, the question is less about whether disagreements exist and more about how far they can escalate before the mechanisms of the union itself begin to erode.

China to Fund Construction of Nine Border Facilities in Tajikistan Near Afghanistan

China will finance the construction of nine border facilities in Tajikistan’s frontier regions with Afghanistan, according to a project approved by Tajik lawmakers earlier this month. The plan was reviewed and adopted during a March 4 session of the Majlisi Namoyandagon, the lower house of Tajikistan’s parliament, Asia-Plus reported. The construction project, valued at more than 550 million Tajikistani somoni (approximately $57,425,000), will be fully funded by the Chinese government. In turn, Tajikistan will exempt the project from taxes, customs duties, and other mandatory payments. According to Muradali Rajabzoda, first deputy chairman of Tajikistan’s State Committee for National Security, the initiative is intended to strengthen the logistical and technical capabilities of the country’s border forces. Speaking during the parliamentary session, Rajabzoda said the project would be implemented in three phases, with exchange letters already signed to launch the second stage. The total construction area of the facilities is expected to reach 17,109 square meters. Rajabzoda said the Chinese government would provide the financing “on a grant basis,” meaning the funds will not need to be repaid. Although authorities have not disclosed the precise locations of the planned installations, they confirmed that the facilities will be built in Tajikistan’s border regions with Afghanistan. According to Bahriddin Ziyoi, a member of the parliamentary committee on law enforcement, defense, and security, the Chinese side will also carry out research and design work related to the project. In addition to financing construction, China is expected to supply equipment, building materials, and engineering specialists. Chinese engineers will travel to Tajikistan to install and configure technical systems at the sites. The project will also include office and residential furnishings, computers, and other equipment necessary for operating the facilities. Infrastructure development will form another component of the plan. China will assist in building access roads to the border facilities and installing water supply, drainage systems, and electricity connections. Funding from Beijing is expected to begin after internal procedures in China are completed. Tajik authorities say the exchange letters governing the project were approved by the government in November 2025 and later submitted to parliament following consultations with relevant ministries and agencies. Officials also stated that the documents underwent an anti-corruption review and no risks were identified. The new facilities follow earlier cooperation between the two countries. According to Tajik security officials, 12 border installations were constructed in 2017-2018 in Tajikistan’s frontier areas with Afghanistan with financial support from China. Security cooperation between the two countries has previously drawn international attention. In 2024, the British newspaper The Telegraph reported that China had built a secret military base in Tajikistan, citing satellite imagery and describing a facility in mountainous terrain where Chinese and Tajik forces allegedly conducted joint exercises. Tajik authorities have repeatedly rejected those claims. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that reports about a Chinese military base on Tajik territory “do not correspond to reality,” adding that the issue has not been part of bilateral discussions between the two countries. China and Tajikistan have expanded security cooperation over the past decade, particularly along the Afghan border. In 2016, the two countries signed a security agreement aimed at strengthening coordination against regional threats following political changes in Afghanistan. Officials say the partnership includes bilateral mechanisms as well as cooperation through international organisations.

OTS Faces Security Test from Turkey to Central Asia

Iran's widening war has now reached the institutional space linking Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey said on March 4 that NATO air defenses destroyed an Iranian ballistic missile entering Turkish airspace, while Azerbaijan said the next day that four Iranian drones crossed into Nakhchivan, injuring four people, and damaging civilian infrastructure at the exclave’s airport. Iran denied targeting Nakhchivan; in the Turkish case, the missile’s intended target has not been fully clear in public reporting. Even so, the combined effect was unmistakable. By March 7, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) had become more than a bystander to a Middle Eastern war that had earlier seemed outside its main agenda. This is what gave the OTS foreign ministers’ meeting in Istanbul its significance. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on March 6 that the informal meeting of the OTS Council of Foreign Ministers would be held in Istanbul on March 7, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosting. After the meeting, the ministers adopted a joint statement declaring that threats to the security of any OTS member are a matter of concern for the whole organization. That language does not make the OTS a military alliance. It does, however, show the organization moving more openly into collective political-security signaling when member states come under attack. Why Nakhchivan Matters Nakhchivan is central to the logic of this story. The exclave is an integral part of Azerbaijan, but is separated from the rest of the country. It borders Armenia, Iran, and Turkey, making it significant out of proportion to its size. A military strike there is not a routine border incident. It reaches one of the most sensitive nodes in the wider Turkic political space: it is a meeting point for Azerbaijani sovereignty, Turkish strategic concern, and Iranian proximity. Until recently, Nakhchivan’s special status and borders were anchored in the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, which gave Turkey and Soviet Russia a formal say over the exclave’s autonomy and, it could be argued, its external security. But last year, Baku folded Nakhchivan more tightly into Azerbaijan’s domestic legal order by removing those references (along with other changes) from the constitution of the exclave, which has suddenly become a target in a much wider regional confrontation. Baku’s response to the Iranian attack showed that it saw the incident in political as well as tactical terms. President Ilham Aliyev said Azerbaijan would prepare retaliatory measures. Reuters later reported that Azerbaijan had ordered the evacuation of its diplomats from Iran, citing safety concerns. This is understandable, particularly in light of the January 27, 2023, incident when an armed attacker entered Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran and opened fire, killing the head of the embassy’s security and wounding two other staff. Baku called this a terrorist attack, evacuated most of its diplomatic personnel, and suspended embassy operations. Azerbaijani officials also said the March 5 attack on Nakhchivan violated international law, rejecting any implication that it could have been a technical mishap. The stakes widened further after that. On March 7, Azerbaijan said that it had foiled several sabotage plots linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (hardly being the first of their kind), including an alleged plan to attack the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was, according to one Indian report, subsequently attacked by a drone in Georgia. Reuters reported that other targets in Azerbaijan included the Israeli embassy, an Ashkenazi Jewish synagogue, and a leader of Azerbaijan's Mountain Jews community. Beyond this, once infrastructure such as the BTC enters the picture, questions arise concerning corridor security, energy transit, and regional economic exposure. What the OTS Response Means Central Asia enters the story more clearly with that in mind. No Central Asian OTS member was directly struck. But the March 7 joint statement said that threats to any OTS member’s security concern the entire organization. It warned that continued hostilities could disrupt trade routes, energy markets, food security, and migratory flows. Central Asia's exposure to threat is not directly from military engagement but indirectly through OTS member-state security, regional stability, and the wider consequences of conflict. The OTS secretariat, for its part, moved quickly. On March 5, the secretary general condemned the UAV attacks on civilian facilities in Nakhchivan, saying they had been carried out from the territory of Iran. He also called for restraint and for avoiding further deterioration in the regional situation. The OTS’s own institutional center thus already elevated the issue beyond bilateral diplomacy before the ministers assembled in Istanbul. It necessarily became an OTS matter, not just a Baku–Tehran confrontation. The ministers’ joint statement on March 7 gave that instinct a clearer political form. The text declared that any threats to the security of member states concern the entire organization. It condemned attacks targeting Turkey and Nakhchivan, including civilian facilities, and it expressed support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of Turkey and Azerbaijan. These formulations create a collective political frame for what might otherwise have remained two separate national incidents. They show that the OTS is willing to speak in the language of solidarity when violence reaches one of its members. At the same time, the ministers emphasized restraint, diplomacy, and a return to negotiations. The OTS did not evoke a military response but answered by widening the political scope of the problem. This is still an institutional development worth noting. The organization is not becoming like NATO, but it is becoming more explicit about the security implications of regional instability for its member states. The Next Test That brings Central Asia onto the stage. The March 7 statement does not create any formal security obligations for the Central Asian states, but it does establish a precedent. If threats to one member’s security concern the whole organization, then future crises involving transport corridors, border violence, or attacks on critical infrastructure will be harder to treat as purely local matters. The expectation of organization-wide consultation has now been created. The immediate question is whether the Iran-related incidents stop here or widen further. Turkey’s missile episode and Nakhchivan’s drone strike may still prove to be limited spillover events rather than the beginning of a sustained pattern. How quickly a new Supreme Leader is selected in Iran will make a difference here. But the institutional threshold has already shifted: The OTS has publicly stated, during ongoing military hostilities, that member-state security concerns are collective concerns. That statement will outlast the news cycle. For that reason, the most important result of the Istanbul meeting may not be any operational step taken today. It may be that the OTS has defined its own political horizon somewhat more broadly than before. The organization now finds itself speaking about attacks, sovereignty, corridor vulnerability, and regional instability in one connected register. The next test will show whether that language remains episodic solidarity or develops into more regular coordination from Turkey to Central Asia.

Iran War Highlights Central Asia’s Vulnerable Southern Trade Corridors

The widening war centered on Iran is reverberating far beyond the Middle East, exposing a structural vulnerability in Central Asia’s economic geography: the region’s reliance on transport corridors that pass through or near Iran and the Persian Gulf. As fighting escalates and shipping risks spread across the region, insurers, shipping companies, and logistics firms are reassessing operations across the Gulf. War-risk insurance premiums have surged while some commercial carriers have scaled back bookings to parts of the region amid growing security concerns. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have already pushed shipping costs higher as governments and logistics firms weigh the risks of operating in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. For Central Asia’s landlocked economies, the crisis highlights how much regional connectivity strategies still depend on southern access routes linking the region to global markets. The conflict has also edged closer to the transport routes linking Central Asia with Europe after what were alleged to be Iranian drone strikes on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan region, damaging facilities at the exclave’s airport and prompting diplomatic protests from Baku. While the strike did not directly disrupt trade corridors, it underscored how quickly the conflict could spill over into the South Caucasus, a key segment of the Middle Corridor. Nakhchivan is a landlocked Azerbaijani exclave bordering Iran and Turkey, separated from mainland Azerbaijan by Armenia, and lies at the frontier where Iranian territory meets the transport networks of the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus also hosts energy infrastructure with wider geopolitical significance. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transports mostly Azerbaijani crude through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, from where it is shipped to global markets. In 2025, Azerbaijani oil accounted for 46.4% of Israel’s crude imports, most of it moving through this supply chain before being shipped onward by tanker. The pipeline also carries limited volumes of Kazakh crude - 2-3% of Kazakhstan’s overall exports - making it far more significant for Israel’s energy supply than for Kazakhstan’s export system. Iran’s armed forces have denied responsibility for the drone incident, instead accusing Israel of attempting to provoke tensions and disrupt relations between Muslim countries. The Geography of Connectivity Since independence, Central Asian governments have sought to overcome the constraints of geography. Landlocked and long dependent on Soviet-era transport networks running north through Russia, the region has spent three decades developing alternative corridors in multiple directions. Routes leading south have held particular appeal, offering the shortest overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Iran sits at the heart of several connectivity initiatives designed to connect Central Asian rail networks to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Ashgabat Agreement — a multimodal transport framework linking Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and designed to connect Central Asia with ports on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman — was created specifically to facilitate international trade and transit between Central Asia and global shipping routes. For countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, rail routes running south through Iran provide one of the shortest overland connections to maritime trade. The Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway, opened in 2014 and linking Uzen in western Kazakhstan with Iran’s rail network via Bereket and Gorgan, created a continuous north–south corridor connecting Central Asia to ports on the Persian Gulf. The line forms part of a broader network of transit routes intended to move Central Asian commodities and manufactured goods toward Iranian ports and onward to global shipping lanes. Iran’s port of Chabahar has long been promoted as a potential gateway for Central Asian trade, providing access to the Indian Ocean while bypassing some of the more congested maritime routes further west. In May 2024, India signed a long-term deal with Iran to develop and operate the port, which New Delhi views as a strategic link connecting Central Asia and Afghanistan to global shipping lanes. The port previously received limited exemptions from U.S. sanctions because of its role in facilitating trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia, allowing India to continue with the project despite broader restrictions on Iranian infrastructure. The current war is now casting doubt on how reliable those routes may be during periods of geopolitical crisis. Trade Routes Under Pressure Even without a formal closure of the Strait of Hormuz, conflict in and around the Gulf is already altering shipping patterns. Rising insurance premiums and heightened security concerns are prompting vessels to reroute, delay voyages, or avoid the area altogether. Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil normally passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making instability in the waterway a major risk for global energy markets and freight costs. Tensions in the strait have already led major importers such as China to call for additional security protections for vessels operating in the area, as concerns grow about the safety of commercial shipping. For Central Asian exporters, the effects are indirect but significant. Freight moving across Eurasia ultimately depends on maritime shipping once cargo reaches ports, meaning instability in the Gulf can quickly ripple back into rail corridors thousands of kilometers away. This vulnerability is particularly acute for landlocked economies. Unlike coastal exporters that can shift cargo between nearby ports, Central Asian states must move goods across long overland routes before reaching maritime shipping lanes. Any disruption at the maritime end of those corridors, therefore, magnifies logistical uncertainty across the entire supply chain. The Limits of Diversification For more than a decade, Central Asian governments have sought to mitigate such vulnerabilities by investing in alternative transport corridors that connect the region with global markets in multiple directions. The most prominent of these initiatives is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, widely known as the Middle Corridor. The route links Central Asia to Europe through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, creating an east-west connection that bypasses both Russia and southern maritime chokepoints. Cargo volumes along the corridor have increased significantly since 2022, but the route still faces logistical bottlenecks, particularly limited shipping capacity across the Caspian Sea and congestion at ports such as Aktau. Freight moving along the route typically travels by rail across Kazakhstan to ports such as Aktau or Kuryk before crossing the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and continuing toward Georgia and Turkey. Kazakhstan has played a particularly active role in promoting the corridor as part of its broader connectivity strategy. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, governments and investors have accelerated efforts to expand capacity along the route as geopolitical tensions reshape Eurasian logistics networks and encourage companies to diversify supply chains. The corridor has also attracted increasing attention from Western governments seeking more resilient transport links between Asia and Europe as companies attempt to diversify supply chains away from routes disrupted by geopolitical tensions. Cooperation between the United States and Central Asian countries has expanded in areas such as infrastructure development, critical minerals supply chains, and regional transport connectivity, as reflected in growing engagement through frameworks such as the C5+1 partnership. A Reminder of Geography Even as investment in the Middle Corridor expands, southern routes through Iran continue to occupy an important place in the region’s connectivity landscape. Iran’s geography gives it a unique position linking Central Asia with the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. In stable conditions, that location offers Central Asian states a comparatively direct path to global maritime trade. The current conflict underscores the geopolitical risks that accompany transport corridors crossing politically volatile regions. Infrastructure projects designed to shorten trade routes can also expose supply chains to geopolitical shocks when tensions escalate. Central Asian governments have therefore pursued a multi-vector connectivity strategy, developing transport links in multiple directions to avoid overreliance on any single corridor. Southern routes through Iran remain a valuable component of that network. At the same time, uncertainty created by the conflict reinforces the rationale behind expanding alternative corridors across the Caspian and toward Europe. The war has not closed Central Asia’s southern trade routes, but it has exposed the strategic fragility that can emerge when geography, logistics, and geopolitics collide.

Central Asia and Britain Launch CA5+UK Ministerial Track

On February 26, 2026, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in London with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper at Lancaster House for the inaugural “Central Asia–UK” (CA5+UK) ministerial. Official statements described it as the first time since independence that all five Central Asian foreign ministers have met jointly with a UK foreign secretary in a single forum. They also presented the meeting as the start of a structured ministerial channel, intended to convene regularly, that can carry regional priorities while leaving bilateral agendas in place. The United Kingdom is framing the new CA5+UK channel as a replacement for scattered bilateral visits: a single ministerial venue can set shared priorities and route them into investment and services work. For the five Central Asian states, it adds another external track, widening options without forcing institutional choices. Public statements point to a practical agenda focused on trade and investment, transport connectivity, energy transition, and critical minerals, with security present chiefly as background context. The enabling layer of finance, standards, education, and professional services is also included. How the London Program Unrolled On February 25, meetings took place at the British Parliament as part of the London schedule. The five ministers met with House of Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle and held a session with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Central Asia, chaired by Pam Cox.  The meetings in Parliament complemented the ministerial session at Lancaster House by widening contact beyond foreign ministries. The discussion emphasized committee-to-committee contacts, visits, and exchange of legislative practice as a complement to intergovernmental diplomacy. Parliamentary relationships and staff channels can carry attention between ministerial sessions, assisting with follow-up after cooperative contacts have been publicly established. They represent a second continuity layer: implementation often turns on routine access and working familiarity rather than on formal statements alone. Between the parliamentary program and the ministerial delegations, they also met with the United Kingdom business community at a reception in London. This was a practical companion to the new format, aiming at the conversion of diplomatic intent into projects that can be financed and executed. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev cogently highlighted the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which operates under English common law with an independent court and arbitration system and British judges in the AIFC Court. Beyond the plenary session, a ministerial working lunch provided a venue to follow up on such initiatives. Early deliverables were not multilateral but bilateral. Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom signed a strategic roadmap on critical minerals through 2027 and paired it with education moves, including a licensed Coventry University campus in Almaty and plans involving British secondary and higher education institutions. Uzbekistan reported a Memorandum of Understanding on healthcare services that it presented as a platform for building pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, alongside separate discussions with investment and finance counterparts in London. Turkmenistan cited a 2026–2027 cooperation program between foreign ministries, and Tajikistan continued to emphasize investment and cooperation in science and education. CA5+UK Launches with Bilateral Packages The CA5+UK forum launches another “plus-one” mechanism in a region where major partners are now structuring their engagement through repeatable formats. In line with that engagement, the UK initiative concerns not so much building a new institution as attaching deal-enabling capacity to already existing projects. Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry underscored the breadth of the bilateral agenda and noted that ratification of the 2024 Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement would widen the platform for cooperation. At the CA5+UK, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev confidently presented Kazakhstan as the region’s connectivity hub, noting that 13 major transit corridors cross Kazakhstan and that about 85% of overland cargo between Europe and Asia moves through its territory. For the five delegations, the practical payoff is direct access to counterparties that can price risk, mobilize capital, and sustain follow-up between ministerial sessions, without narrowing external options. The schedule described by Uzbekistan’s foreign ministry paired political meetings with implementation-oriented discussions, including the healthcare MoU mentioned above, and separate talks with Standard Chartered Bank on financing large industrial projects as well as with Benoy on urban and transport planning, including New Tashkent and regional master plans. Kyrgyzstan used the Kyrgyz-British Business Council meeting to widen the investor pipeline around critical minerals and banking cooperation, with the emphasis on market access and capital-raising, rather than on a single signed headline document. Even in a UK-facing commercially oriented format, once banks, insurers, and logistics providers are involved, projects are shaped by compliance screening, sanctions exposure, and risk pricing. Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev warned that unilateral restrictive measures could affect trade, economic, and financial cooperation with the United Kingdom and called for dialogue to keep commercial ties from being pulled into political disputes. The practical effect is a tilt toward projects with clearly identified counterparties, documented compliance pathways, and predictable dispute-resolution procedures acceptable to financiers. Transactions that raise screening burdens close more slowly or at higher cost; taking these conditions into account, Kosherbayev described the new track as results-oriented and stressed “tangible results.” CA5+UK in the “Plus-One” Field The CA5+UK joins several other “plus-one” formats that Central Asian governments can sequence against one another. Germany’s Z5+1 has been presented as a tool-driven work channel that can move through German instruments while remaining compatible with European Union programming. The United States–led C5+1 is framed as a standing diplomatic platform for regional solutions and joint work across multiple agencies. China has relied on leader-level summitry and formal political upgrading, including a treaty-based umbrella for long-horizon cooperation. The UK format is different: it can succeed without a heavy institutional superstructure if it repeatedly converts priority sectors into financeable transactions under UK documentation and risk standards. It will look viable if it becomes a routine mechanism rather than an annual event. What is needed for that is an early decision on the next ministerial date, accompanied by the naming of contacts to carry the work between meetings. A small but visible pipeline of projects that reach financing and implementation steps would be another indicator, even if no project is a big headline. For the Central Asian five, the CA5+UK is useful if it increases execution capacity without narrowing external options or forcing institutional lock-in. The format can give them access to instruments that make projects financeable, particularly where counterparties depend on legal predictability and transaction support. The potential cost is that a larger number of channels increases the premium on intraregional coordination, because different timetables and financing terms can complicate the coordination of project selection and messaging.