Samarkand Declaration Paves the Way for a Stronger Central Asia–EU Partnership
The inaugural Central Asia-European Union Summit, held in Samarkand on April 3-4, marked a significant milestone in strengthening ties between the two regions. According to Sherzod Asadov, press secretary to Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the summit's most significant outcome is the adoption of the Samarkand Declaration, which is expected to provide strong momentum for expanding constructive dialogue and cooperation across all sectors.
In a statement, the EU reaffirmed its "commitment to deeper cooperation in an evolving global and regional geopolitical landscape [and] upgrade relations between the European Union and Central Asia to a strategic partnership." The EU declaration also committed the bloc to respect the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states within the framework of all international and regional fora" and expressed readiness to "address common security challenges."
Strengthening Economic Ties
Economic cooperation featured prominently on the agenda. Since 2020, trade between Uzbekistan and the EU has doubled, now exceeding €6 billion. Uzbek exports to the EU have quadrupled, and the number of joint ventures has surpassed a thousand. European investment projects in Uzbekistan, meanwhile, are now valued at over €30 billion.
A key development was the agreement to open a regional office of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Tashkent. Established in 1958, the EIB is the EU’s primary financial institution, and its new office is expected to attract greater investment in green energy, modern infrastructure, and digitalization.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has also deepened its engagement in Uzbekistan, investing over €5 billion to date. “We must work together to simplify trade procedures and ensure that Central Asian products gain greater access to European markets. Only through joint efforts can we build a strong and resilient economic partnership,” Mirziyoyev told Euronews. "Over the past seven years, the trade turnover between Central Asian countries and the EU has quadrupled, amounting to 54 billion euros... The signing of the Samarkand Declaration will reflect the common aspiration of the parties to establish a strategic partnership and lay the foundation for deepening ties between our regions."
During the summit, Mirziyoyev met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. Discussions focused on trade, investment, green energy, and digital development, with the EU’s "Global Gateway” strategy, a counterpart to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a central topic. The initiative is seeking to enhance global infrastructure and connectivity while promoting sustainability and transparency.
“The EU and Central Asia are becoming closer partners, and this summit marks the beginning of a new phase in our cooperation,” von der Leyen stated. An Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Uzbekistan and the EU is also under negotiation.
Regional Dialogue Among Central Asian Leaders
The Summit also offered a platform for Central Asian heads of state to hold bilateral discussions. Mirziyoyev met with his counterparts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Talks centered on increasing trade, improving border security, and advancing major infrastructure projects. A recent landmark border agreement between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was lauded as a breakthrough.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan agreed to accelerate the development of the International Industrial Cooperation Center, which was ratified by the Kazakh Mazhilis in early February, while progress was also made on the planned “Shovot-Tashovuz” joint border trade zone between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
As economic ties between Central Asia and Europe deepen, recent U.S. trade tariffs may further accelerate the shift. The Trump Administration's new tariffs imposed a 10% duty on exports from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, whilst Kazakhstan faces a notably higher 27% duty.
These tariffs could disrupt regional trade flows, positioning the EU as an increasingly attractive economic partner.
Kuirektykol Deposit May Elevate Kazakhstan to Global Leader in Rare-Earth Reserves
Kazakhstani geologists have identified several promising new areas within the Kuirektykol deposit in the Karkaraly District of the Karaganda Region. If confirmed, these reserves could position Kazakhstan among the world’s leading nations in rare-earth metal resources. Exploration of the Kuirektykol site began in 2022. By November 2024, surveyors had discovered commercially viable concentrations of rare-earth elements, including cerium and lanthanides, across four prospective zones. These were initially estimated to contain total resources of 935,400 tons, including 795,800 tons of proven reserves. At the time, experts predicted that with further in-depth exploration, total reserves could potentially double. That projection is now being borne out by new findings, according to the Ministry of Industry and Construction. In a recent statement, the ministry reported that LLP Tsentrgeolszemnadzor, working within the framework of the state program for geological subsoil research, had uncovered several additional promising areas at the Kuirektykol site. These areas are believed to contain a combined one million tons of rare-earth metals. The agency also announced the preliminary evaluation of a vast new prospective area named Zhana Kazakhstan. Following recent prospecting work, geologists now estimate the total predicted resources of rare-earth metals in the Kuirektykol area to exceed 20 million tons at depths of up to 300 meters. The average concentration of rare-earth elements in the ore is approximately 700 grams per ton. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the state-owned National Mining Company Tau-Ken Samruk is preparing to begin development of the Kuirektykol deposit, a move expected to attract significant private investment in the sector. These developments come amid increasing global demand for rare-earth elements, which are essential to technologies ranging from renewable energy and electric vehicles to defense and telecommunications, and are set to be exempt from new U.S. trade tariffs. Kazakhstan's growing resource base could play a pivotal role in diversifying global supply chains and enhancing the country’s strategic economic importance.
Trump’s Tariff Blitz Targets Global Imports, Kazakhstan Faces Harshest Impact in Central Asia
U.S. President Donald Trump has announced sweeping new tariffs on all goods imported into the United States, citing the need to protect American industry and jobs. Speaking at a White House press conference, Trump outlined a base tariff rate of 10% that will apply to 185 countries. However, several nations and blocs face significantly higher rates: China will see a 34% tariff, the European Union 20%, Switzerland 31%, and Israel 17%. The steepest tariffs were imposed on Vietnam (46%), Cambodia (49%), and Laos (48%). Notably absent from the list are Russia, Belarus, Mexico, Iran, Canada, and Belarus. Ukraine, however, will face the base 10% rate. Kazakhstan Hit with 27% Tariff The new U.S. duties also target Central Asian nations. According to a comparative chart published by the White House, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan will face 10% tariffs on their exports to the U.S. Meanwhile, Kazakhstani goods will be subject to a much higher rate of 27%. The White House document notes that Kazakhstani imports currently face a 54% tariff in Kazakhstan, figures that surprised local analysts, who have questioned the methodology behind the calculations. The rationale for the elevated rate on Kazakhstan remains unclear. However, the country's Ministry of Trade and Integration has initiated consultations with his U.S. counterparts to explore options for exempting certain goods. According to a preliminary analysis, many of Kazakhstan’s key exports fall under exceptions outlined in U.S. regulations. “In 2024, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and the United States amounted to $4.2 billion,” the ministry stated. “Kazakhstan's primary exports to the U.S. - crude oil, uranium, silver, and ferroalloys - constitute 92% of total exports and are included in the exemption list under the U.S. President’s decree on reciprocal tariffs.” Turning Tariffs Into Opportunities Despite the steep new tariffs, some experts believe the impact on Kazakhstan will be limited. Financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov argues that Kazakhstan’s marginal role in global trade dynamics shields it from major economic fallout. “The real battle is between the U.S. and the world’s largest economies, China and the EU,” Rysmambetov wrote on his Telegram channel. “Our trade with the U.S. accounts for less than 1% of Kazakhstan’s total foreign trade. Even with a 27% tariff, the effect will be negligible.” Rysmambetov noted that Kazakhstan exported over $2 billion worth of goods to the U.S. in 2024, while imports totaled $1 billion, maintaining a trade surplus for the tenth consecutive year. “We’re on the tariff list, but it’s mostly symbolic,” he added, emphasizing that Kazakhstan’s exports largely consist of strategic materials. Rysmambetov also sees potential upsides: countries facing new duties may seek alternative markets, possibly offering Kazakhstan better terms on imports such as equipment, metals, vehicles, and construction materials. “Global trade tensions can open windows of opportunity, for strategic borrowing, better equipment deals, and expanded exports. But quick action is key,” he concluded. International Backlash The U.S. move drew swift condemnation from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who called the policy a “severe blow to the global economy.” “Uncertainty will increase, leading to heightened protectionism. Millions, especially in vulnerable countries, will be hit hardest by the highest tariffs. This move contradicts our international economic goals,” she wrote on X. Von der Leyen made the remarks during a visit to Samarkand, Uzbekistan, where the first EU-Central Asia summit is taking place, a meeting Brussels has described as “historic.” Observers suggest that trade and tariffs could emerge as key topics at the summit. Economists have also voiced concern. David Beckworth, a former U.S. Treasury economist, warned of possible “stagflation,” a scenario where inflation rises as growth stalls. Prolonged tariffs, he cautioned, could disrupt supply chains and raise consumer prices. Olu Sonola, head of U.S. economic research at Fitch Ratings, added that extended trade barriers could push many economies into recession. “You can throw most forecasts out the window if these tariffs remain in place,” he said. As global leaders and economists weigh the implications, one point is clear: the U.S. tariffs, and the international response they provoke, are reshaping the global trade order in profound and unpredictable ways.
How Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Are Rewiring the Middle Corridor
Kazakhstan's acceleration of its strategic alignment with Azerbaijan signals more than bilateral convergence. It reflects a deeper structural reconfiguration of Eurasian connectivity, a reconfiguration that is not additive but integrative. As documented in multiple announcements and institutional moves across March 2025, their cooperation has crossed the threshold from parallel development to systemic coordination. This evolving dynamic illustrates the emergence of a regionally endogenous axis that, without proclaiming itself as such, is shaping the wider functional geometry of Eurasia. At the material core of this shift is the Middle Corridor — the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) — linking China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. While long viewed as a technical alternative to the Northern and Southern corridors, the Middle Corridor is now exhibiting the dynamics of what in systems theory would be called self-amplifying dynamic feedback loops. (The technical term is “autopoiesis,” literally “self-creation” of “self-production.”) In particular, institutional feedback, infrastructure reinforcement, and regulatory adaptation are all feeding into one another in ways characteristic of an autonomously emergent macroregional logic. Kazakhstan’s announcement in December 2024 of the financing of a new terminal at Alat port in Azerbaijan, on which construction began in 2025, illustrates this logic in material form. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan is upgrading its Aktau port, backed by Chinese capital from Lianyungang, to triple its container throughput by 2028. This situation exemplifies the transformation of quantity into quality. Specifically, the upgrades are instantiating a network strategy that values not only volumes but also redundancy, flexibility, and strategic optionality. The new fiber-optic cable agreement signed in March 2025 further reinforces this convergence. A 380-kilometer undersea connection between Sumqayit and Aktau — part of the broader Digital Silk Road — will reduce latency between the two countries from hours to milliseconds. In system-theoretic terms, this is not merely a technical augmentation. It converts the corridor from a physical transit route into a distributed digital platform capable of supporting real-time adaptive coordination. This shift from “throughput” to “synchronization” is foundational. It also deepens the infrastructure-energy-information triad that has become characteristic of new macroregional systems. Kazakhstan’s expanded use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, projected to carry 1.7 million tons of its oil in 2025, is not simply diversification. It is the strategic concretization of Azerbaijan’s role as a downstream node for Central Asian hydrocarbons. This is occurring alongside green transition signaling, including a modest floating solar project at Lake Boyukshor and a trilateral renewable energy agreement between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. The repurposing of hydrocarbon corridors for hybrid energy flows is not substitution but overlay, in effect a dual-pathway system. Meanwhile, capital commitment is reinforcing the commercial aspect. A $300 million joint investment fund announced by the two countries has already designated the construction of an intermodal terminal at Alat as its inaugural project. Additional integration comes from the UAE-backed $50 million grain terminal at Kuryk, which will further diversify the system's carrying capacity by drawing agro-logistics into the corridor's functionality. In my recent article on the EU’s “new power play” in Eurasia, I explained how Central Asia is increasingly understood not as a buffer zone but as a platform for cooperation. This new strategic consciousness is evident in the March 2025 trilateral meetings between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia to coordinate the Middle Corridor Multimodal Joint Venture. These are not bureaucratic exercises. They indicate a willingness to institutionalize mutual exposure as mutual benefit, transforming geographic proximity into systemic interdependence. Security coordination, although still unstated, is becoming structurally implicit. As corridor density increases, so too does vulnerability. The dangers of sabotage, cyber interference, and logistical disruption are all enhanced. The lack of overt defense cooperation does not negate its presence in planning models. Infrastructure without a security architecture is a recipe for systemic fragility, but this aspect of cooperation remains off-record out of strategic discretion. In this context, the EU’s recalibrated posture — epitomized by Kaja Kallas’s March 2025 tour of Central Asia and the upcoming EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand — must be interpreted as an attempt to enter this system as a non-hegemonic but indispensable partner. The EU’s Global Gateway initiative now recognizes the Middle Corridor as a backbone of Eurasian resilience. By embedding digital, energy, and regulatory integration within this initiative, the EU is engaging in a form of complex interdependence that enhances regional agency rather than co-opting it. Kazakhstan’s position within this evolving system deserves particular attention. As I set out in another recent article, specifically addressing a potential new phase in the development of Kazakhstan’s relations with the U.S., Kazakhstan is becoming a structurally stabilizing actor. It balances the overlapping power-projection interests of multiple actors: Russia, China, Europe, and, increasingly, Turkey. Its bilateral partnership with Azerbaijan epitomizes its broader strategic grammar of non-alignment without passivity and multivectorism with selective depth. Complex-systems theory teaches that when independent subsystems begin to coordinate across multiple domains (physical, informational, financial, normative), emergent properties appear. These properties cannot be reduced to any single actor’s intention or interest. They become, instead, the architecture within which intentions and interests are expressed. The Middle Corridor is approaching such a threshold. It is no longer merely a logistics route. It is a macroregional construct that channels, modulates, and refracts geopolitical agency. The future evolution of this emergent system is to be determined, but its formative logic is unmistakable. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, through a dense web of investments, agreements, and symbolic cooperation, are constructing more than a corridor. They are laying down the infrastructural and normative tracks for a region that is beginning to generate its own strategic gravitational field. By doing so, they are establishing the broader Caspian region, within Central Eurasia, as a system that is able to define and work toward its own goals.
Kazakhstan Faces Big U.S. Tariffs, but Minerals Could be Exempted
Kazakhstan will be hit with the largest U.S. tariffs among Central Asian states after President Donald Trump announced duties on goods from global trading partners, vowing to end what he calls unfair treatment of the United States even as concerns grow that a vast trade war carries grave risks for economies around the world. According to a White House list released on Wednesday, Kazakhstan charges 54% tariffs on American goods and its own products will therefore be subject to duties of 27% when they arrive in the United States. A minimum baseline of 10% tariffs will also be applied to goods from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. However, Kazakhstan has large reserves of minerals that could have applications in energy and other industries and might be exempted under terms of the Trump administration’s plan. The measure against Kazakhstan reflects what the White House calls “an individualized reciprocal higher tariff” on countries with which the United States has its biggest trade deficits. The U.S. says its tariffs on nations around the world, which are to take effect in the coming days, can be increased if trading partners retaliate or can go down if those partners collaborate with Washington on economic and security matters. The fallout from the Trump administration’s move remains to be seen, with many economists and other analysts warning that falling markets and the threat of higher prices, including in the United States, are a sign of the economic upheaval to come. But a possible loophole for some Central Asian countries lies in the U.S. statement that some goods will not be subject to the tariffs. They include copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber, bullion, and “energy and other certain minerals that are not available in the United States.” Kazakhstan said this week that it had discovered a huge rare earth metals deposit in the central region of Karaganda. By some estimates, the deposit could contain roughly 20 million tons of the coveted materials and is among the larger of more than a dozen similar deposits found in the country. “The identified rare earth deposits and promising areas, if further confirmed, could position Kazakhstan as a global leader in rare earth element reserves and enable the rapid development of a high-tech rare earth metals industry,” the Ministry of Industry and Construction said, according to the Orda news organization. Those natural resources are of interest to the United States. On March 12, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu and the U.S. “looks forward to working with Kazakhstan to deepen economic ties in the energy, telecommunications, and critical minerals sectors,” the U.S. State Department said. U.S. tariffs and Central Asian resources are also likely to be discussed at a meeting of regional and European Union leaders in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on Friday. The EU is seeking to expand trade ties with Central Asia as its longtime alliance with the United States unravels over trade and security matters. More on this breaking story will follow.
A Historic Gathering: The First Central Asia-European Union Summit in Samarkand
Excitement is building in Samarkand as it gears up to host the inaugural Central Asia-European Union Summit. This landmark event promises to pave the way for significant negotiations and collaboration, bringing together leaders and representatives from both regions. With a rich cultural backdrop and a vibrant atmosphere, Samarkand is poised to play a crucial role in shaping the future of partnerships and cooperation between Central Asia and the European Union. In recent weeks, Uzbekistan has experienced notable advancements in its foreign policy, signaling a proactive approach to international collaboration. A highlighted event was the fruitful engagement between Uzbekistan's head of state and Kaja Kallas, the High-level Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Additionally, a delegation led by Josef Sikela, the European Union Commissioner for International Cooperation, participated in discussions to foster deeper ties. A significant milestone on the horizon is the inaugural Central Asia-European Union summit, set to unfold in the historic city of Samarkand on April 3-4. During a pivotal meeting on March 27 with Kallas, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev meticulously explored the preparations for this groundbreaking summit, which has captured global attention due to its potential to reshape regional dynamics. The leaders engaged in a rich exchange of ideas focused on bolstering practical cooperation between their regions and planning future collaborative events that could further strengthen these ties. The significance of fostering mutually beneficial cooperation between the two regions in trade and logistics was emphasized during the meeting. This includes harnessing the potential of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, advancing digitalization, promoting green energy, addressing ecological concerns, modernizing infrastructure, and other priority areas. The introduction of effective mechanisms for implementing initiatives and projects in these fields was also highlighted. Participants exchanged views on enhancing Uzbekistan's relations with European Union organizations, discussing adopting a new agreement for enhanced partnership and cooperation and Uzbekistan's accession to the World Trade Organization. Current international and regional policy issues were also addressed. Additionally, on March 18, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met with a delegation led by Josef Sikela, the European Union Commissioner for International Cooperation. This meeting discussed critical matters regarding further developing multifaceted relations between Uzbekistan and the European Union. Moreover, plans for organizing the inaugural "Central Asia - EU" summit and the Climate Forum in Samarkand were considered. In recent years, bilateral cooperation with the European Union has accelerated across political, trade, economic, investment, and cultural-humanitarian spheres, presenting extensive opportunities for the continued expansion of these ties. A new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Uzbekistan and the European Union is anticipated to be signed soon. Both parties have expressed a keen interest in promoting joint projects and programs across transport and logistics, energy, digitalization, agriculture, water management, and other key areas. Kallas conveyed warm greetings and best wishes on behalf of key EU figures, including António Costa, the President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission. The discussions underscored the necessity of cultivating mutually beneficial cooperation across various sectors, including trade and logistics, and harnessing the untapped potential of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. Other critical themes included digitalization efforts, green energy initiatives, environmental programs, infrastructure modernization, and the establishment of effective mechanisms for executing joint projects. Furthermore, there was a focus on deepening Uzbekistan's engagement with EU organizations, including adopting a new agreement to enhance partnership and cooperation. The talks also touched on Uzbekistan’s anticipated accession to the World Trade Organization, alongside key international and regional policy matters. Earlier in the month, on March 18, Mirziyoyev held a significant meeting with Josef Sikela’s delegation. During this meeting, they addressed pressing issues related to advancing multifaceted relations between Uzbekistan and the European Union. The agenda revolved around organizing the forthcoming Central Asia-EU summit and the Climate Forum, which will take place in Samarkand. The trajectory of bilateral cooperation with the European Union has accelerated remarkably in recent years, encompassing various dimensions such as politics, trade, economics, investment, and cultural-humanitarian exchanges. Both partners recognize the prosperous opportunities available for further growth and collaboration. In March, a significant agreement was finalized in Tashkent concerning two strategic projects backed by the European Union. The delegation underscored that the "Connecting Central Asia" (C4CA) initiative focuses on enhancing digital infrastructure and fostering regional integration, which will, in turn, encourage cooperation and economic exchanges among Central Asian nations. According to Sikela, the collaboration between the European Union and Uzbekistan seeks to improve internet connectivity across Central Asia, aspiring to provide fast and secure internet access. This initiative aims to empower businesses, generate new employment opportunities, and elevate living conditions for local communities by integrating advanced European technologies and Uzbekistan’s expertise. Overall, the partnership between Uzbekistan and the European Union is entering a transformative phase, offering substantial opportunities for growth and mutual benefit as both sides work together to create a more interconnected future.
What Does Turkey’s “Return” to Europe Mean for Central Asia?
Turkey’s ties with Europe are undergoing a reinvigoration. This phenomenon is foregrounded by recent high-level diplomatic engagements and burgeoning military and economic linkages, which may at first glance appear as a realignment within the Euro-Atlantic system. It holds deeper implications, however, and most consequentially for Central Asia. Turkey is re-entering the European strategic imagination, this time not as a supplicant but as a self-assured middle power. Europe's altered international environment, by changing its external posture, will provide the Central Asian states with additional geopolitical resources in a world marked by shifting alignments and competing centers of power. To grasp the systems-level implications of this shift, one must first dispense with the linear narrative of bilateralism that has long framed Turkey-Europe or Turkey-Central Asia relations in isolation. Instead, Turkey’s position as a hub of multi-vectorial networks — anchored in NATO, increasingly interlocked with EU markets, yet culturally and politically entwined with Turkic Central Asia — makes it a proactive agent whose movement in one sphere triggers systemic perturbations across others. Thus, when Turkey edges closer to Europe, it also subtly reconfigures the vector of Central Asia’s international relations. The second Trump administration is continuing the transition in Europe’s security architecture that was inaugurated during the first. With longstanding assumptions about American commitment to the Atlantic alliance shaken, Europe finds itself unmoored. In this new context, Turkey’s military interventions — its incursions in northern and now central Syria, its containment of Russian advances in Ukraine, and its supply of military drones to Azerbaijan — demonstrate a degree of strategic autonomy that is rare among NATO members. Europe has noticed. The readjustment of its view of Turkey is evident through invitations to summits with key EU players, overtures from German and Polish leaders, and discussions around deepening the customs union. Turkey is no longer peripheral country knocking at the EU’s door; shifts in the international system have made it an increasingly indispensable node in the continent’s security and energy architectures. This European courtship of Turkey has ramifications well beyond Brussels or Berlin, or even Ankara. For the Central Asian states, afflicted by asymmetric dependencies on Russia, Turkey’s geopolitical normalization with Europe presents a "demonstration effect". That is, it puts the spotlight on a regional actor that is using soft power affinities and hard power capabilities to parlay its peripheral status into centrality. Turkey’s return to Europe showcases a successful strategy of multidirectional engagement. Such "strategic hedging" obviates obedience to any single bloc, instead leveraging the overall system's recursive entanglements for national-interest advantage. The Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership is illustrative. Turkey’s provision of military assistance used during the Second Karabakh War in 2020, notably the Bayraktar TB2 drones, enabled Azerbaijan to shift the regional balance. Russia is no longer the hegemonic power in the South Caucasus and must compete in a condition where it is diplomatically and militarily weakened by its war against Ukraine. Baku stands to benefit from its multisectoral economic cooperation with Ankara, which goes far beyond military assistance. Specifically, Azerbaijan's partnership with Turkey enhances its autonomous access to European political and economic systems. This logic extends beyond the South Caucasus. Central Asian republics like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have long sought to diversify their foreign relations beyond the Moscow–Beijing axis. Turkey’s growing influence in Europe offers Central Asia an opportunity to readjust its own alignments, and this process is already under way. Partnership with Turkey adds another vector on the strategic pathway to their cooperation with Western systems. In systems-theoretic terms, Turkey serves as a coupling interface between two loosely integrated subsystems — Europe and Central Asia — where previous linkages were weak and constrained by chokepoints on capital, knowledge, and influence. None of this, of course, occurs in a vacuum. Russia’s declining leverage, compounded by Western sanctions and the vitiation of its own forces in Ukraine, creates space for new actors to assert influence. China’s rise provides Central Asia with infrastructure but not ideological or cultural affinity. Turkey’s renewed ties to Europe position it, by contrast, as a system-balancer: culturally proximate, economically credible, and strategically mobile. It is the hybrid quality of being Western-facing and Eastern-rooted that increases Turkey's relevance for Central Asia. Yet the durability of this influence remains contingent. Europe’s embrace of Turkey is pragmatic, not ideological. Should the EU fragment further, or should Ankara overplay its hand, the momentum could stall. Central Asia’s receptivity likewise depends on Ankara's maintenance of its ability to remain an autonomous actor whose proximity to Europe amplifies, rather than constrains, its regional partnerships. In the medium term, the challenge for Turkey will be to operationalize this systemic advantage without succumbing to overextension. For Central Asian states, the opportunity lies in strategically leveraging Turkish-European synergy to increase their own possibilities. The region's long history of subordination to external powers has produced a diplomatic caution, but the spectacle of Turkey navigating from NATO to the Kremlin to Brussels — all while deepening ties with Baku, Tashkent, and Astana — offers a working model for a new kind of Eurasian agency. Turkey’s "return" to Europe is, therefore, not a story of Atlantic integration, particularly as the United States is withdrawing its longstanding attention to Europe in the direction of Asia and the Indo-Pacific. This "return", rather, represents a redefinition of how once-peripheral actors can, in the rapidly evolving international system, transform their situation and affirm their new position, afforded by the evolution in that system. For Central Asia, the lesson is clear: proximity to Turkey now means potential proximity to Europe. In a world of connectivity and relative rather than absolute autonomy, proximity is still an underestimated resource.
Controversies and Rejections: What Future Awaits the CSTO?
Armenia has officially refused to contribute financially to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a bloc tasked with ensuring the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its member states. Meanwhile, the organization’s Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov, has come under scrutiny for remarks he made related to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Shifting Alliances and Regional Tensions Founded in 1992, the CSTO comprises Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan have withdrawn from the organization at various times. While the CSTO regularly conducts joint military exercises and cooperates on counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts, the war in Ukraine has exposed internal divisions and challenged the bloc’s cohesion. Tasmagambetov Responds to Criticism In March, Secretary General Tasmagambetov raised eyebrows in an interview with a Russian outlet, warning that any deployment of EU troops to Ukraine could escalate regional tensions. He stated that the CSTO would be ready to provide assistance “within the framework of the organization’s charter and subject to approval by all member states.” The remarks sparked a backlash, particularly on social media in Kazakhstan, where some users accused Tasmagambetov, the former prime minister, of adopting a pro-Russian stance. Responding in late March, Tasmagambetov recorded a rare video message clarifying his position. “How can one calmly react to baseless claims that I would send my compatriots to war?” he asked. “There will always be those who distort my words. I have always remained loyal to my people; the interests of our country have always come first.” Tasmagambetov went on to urge viewers to think critically about information shared online. This controversy follows an earlier statement by Aibek Smadiarov, spokesperson for Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who said in October 2022 that the CSTO had no plans to involve itself in the Ukraine conflict. “The CSTO's jurisdiction is limited to the internationally recognized territories of its member states,” Smadiarov stated. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, is reviewing a report by a Ukrainian institution that said about 661 Kazakh citizens have fought for Russia since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The I Want To Live center, which is run by the Ukrainian security services and assists with surrender requests from soldiers fighting for Russia, published a list of what it said were the Kazakh nationals. Of the 661, at least 78 have been killed, according to the center. Without providing details, it said it received the list from its own sources within the Russian military. Kazakh media quoted Igor Lepekha, Kazakhstan’s deputy interior minister of internal affairs, as saying the numbers have to be checked because it is unclear whether they are reliable. Kazakhstan bans mercenary activities in foreign conflicts and has opened a number of related investigations in the last few years. Last year, a court in Kazakhstan sentenced a Kazakh national to more than six years in jail for fighting with Russia’s Wagner Group in Ukraine. Armenia Pulls Back Adding to the bloc’s instability, Armenia recently announced that it would no longer finance the CSTO. The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the decision, citing its refusal to sign the 2024 budget agreement. Yerevan has long criticized the CSTO for its lack of support during the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Tensions escalated further when the Armenian parliament passed a bill signaling the country's intent to join the European Union. Political analyst Gaziz Abishev suggests that Armenia’s financial withdrawal may be part of broader efforts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan. “By halting payments, Armenia is signaling that it no longer requires territorial guarantees from its CSTO partners. This leaves room for a peace deal,” Abishev noted. A Look Back: CSTO’s Kazakhstan Mission Despite the current turmoil, the CSTO's mission in Kazakhstan in January 2022 remains one of its most effective operations. Initially triggered by protests over gas price hikes, the crisis escalated into violent clashes and the seizure of government buildings. On January 5, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev requested CSTO assistance, and within days, troops from Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Belarus were deployed to secure strategic sites while Kazakhstani forces restored order. Often criticized for being a "paper tiger" and a "zombie" alliance, it remains to be seen whether the CSTO can be an effective force in a time of geoploitical strife as NATO increasingly falters.
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