Tokayev Says Kazakhstan Will Continue Supporting ‘Board of Peace’ Initiative
Kazakh president says the format offers a new blend of diplomacy and business that could help ordinary people, particularly in Gaza In remarks released by Aqorda, Kazakhstan’s presidential press office, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said Kazakhstan will continue to support the “Board of Peace” initiative, describing it as an innovative diplomatic format that could still play a role in efforts to advance peace in the Middle East. Tokayev made the comments while answering a question from Bojan Brkic, Astana bureau chief for Euronews, during Kazakhstan’s national referendum. Brkic asked whether the initiative remained viable amid current developments in the Middle East and why Kazakhstan had decided to join it in the first place. He framed the question in the context of Tokayev’s repeated assertion that Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a “middle power” on the international stage. In his response, Tokayev said he was drawn to the initiative because of what he called its unconventional and practical approach to resolving complex international issues. “It is a mixture or a combination of traditional diplomacy and big business which will benefit ordinary people, particularly in the Gaza Strip,” Tokayev said. “So I think that this idea needs to be supported, and that is why we made the decision to join the Board of Peace.” The president argued that the international community has grown weary of diplomatic processes that produce statements but few concrete results. In his view, new mechanisms are needed to address long-running crises more effectively. “People around the world got tired of endless conferences with wishful-thinking resolutions that very few people read, as a matter of fact,” he said. “That is why we should support this idea, because it is a very new one.” Tokayev also voiced strong personal respect for U.S. President Donald Trump, praising what he called Trump’s “strategy of common sense” and expressing confidence that the prospects for peace in the Middle East had not disappeared. “I think that the prospect of peace in the Middle East, and particularly in Palestine, still exists,” Tokayev said. “And I believe that the future of this idea, of this initiative — at least I would like to hope so — is very bright.” He added that Kazakhstan intends to remain committed to the initiative. “As far as Kazakhstan is concerned, of course, we will continue to support this initiative,” Tokayev said.
Tokayev: Kazakhstan’s GDP Could Reach $320 Billion by End of 2026
Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product could reach $320 billion by the end of 2026, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said at a forum for parliamentary deputies. Speaking at the event, Tokayev noted that the global economy is facing heightened geopolitical tensions and trade conflicts, which he linked to declining trust between major powers and what he described as a weakening of international responsibility mechanisms. “Of course, the current situation directly affects our country’s opportunities. But despite this, we are overcoming challenges, maintaining steady economic growth, and consistently implementing our national strategy,” Tokayev said. According to him, Kazakhstan’s GDP reached $306 billion in 2025. He described this as the second-highest level among post-Soviet countries and the highest in Central Asia. Tokayev also said Kazakhstan had entered the world’s top 50 economies and cited forecasts by international financial institutions suggesting that GDP could reach $320 billion by the end of 2026. Investment and reserves Kazakhstan continues to attract significant foreign direct investment, Tokayev said, noting that net inflows had exceeded $150 billion. According to him, this represents about 69% of total investment directed to Central Asia. He added that the country’s financial buffers remain substantial. Gold and foreign exchange reserves stand at about $74 billion, while total reserves, including assets held in the National Fund, amount to approximately $139 billion. Industrial and agricultural growth Tokayev said economic expansion is being driven not only by overall growth but also by structural changes. In particular, manufacturing output has increased by more than 6% annually over the past two years. He also highlighted the importance of the agro-industrial sector, which he said affects the living standards of 7.4 million people, or about 36% of Kazakhstan’s population. State support for agriculture has increased in recent years. In 2025, more than $2 billion was allocated for concessional lending to farmers, which Tokayev described as the largest level of support provided to the sector since independence. According to Tokayev, government policy aims not only to expand agricultural production but also to develop a modern, export-oriented agro-industrial economy. He said that in 2025 around 250 new production facilities were launched in the sector, while international companies increased their presence in agricultural projects. Major investment initiatives involving foreign partners are being implemented in the Almaty, Akmola, Zhambyl, and North Kazakhstan regions, as well as in the city of Shymkent. Total investment in these projects exceeds $1 billion and is expected to create tens of thousands of jobs. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, export revenues from Kazakhstan’s agro-industrial sector reached $7 billion in 2025, an increase of 37% compared with the previous year.
Kazakhstan Authorities Acknowledge Gap Between Real Scale of Shadow Employment and Official Data
Kazakhstan’s authorities have acknowledged a significant discrepancy between official estimates of informal employment and administrative data, highlighting the scale of the country’s shadow labor market. Minister of Labor and Social Protection Askarbek Yertaev said the actual number of people working outside the formal economy could be almost three times higher than indicated by official statistics. He made the statement during a Senate meeting devoted to regional development issues. Presenting the ministry’s assessment of informal employment, Yertaev noted that out of a workforce of 9.7 million people, only 6.7 million made mandatory pension contributions at least once in 2025. Of these, 5.3 million were employees and 1.4 million were self-employed. This leaves around 3 million people without recorded pension contributions. According to the minister, the figure significantly exceeds official estimates. Data from the National Statistics Bureau indicated that at the beginning of 2025, informal employment accounted for about 12% of the employed population, or just over 1.1 million people. Yertaev said the discrepancy suggests that a substantial number of citizens either work informally or underreport their income. Additional evidence of the scale of shadow employment comes from differences between statistical data and digital administrative records. While official statistics show 7.1 million registered employees, the Unified System for Accounting for Employment Contracts records contracts for only 4.1 million people. Among the factors driving workers into informal employment, Yertaev cited overdue debts and the freezing of bank accounts, which he said may encourage individuals to conceal income and avoid formal labour arrangements. To address the issue, the Ministry of Labor plans to expand the use of digital tools aimed at facilitating formal employment. This includes the introduction of AI solutions on the Electronic Labor Exchange portal. According to the ministry, an AI-based system will automatically match job seekers with vacancies based on their education and professional background, while also supporting users throughout the job search process. Deputy Chairman of the State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance Zhanibek Nurzhanov also presented the results of a pilot project on platform employment. Implemented jointly with the Ministry of Labor, the initiative led to the registration of more than 43,000 taxi drivers as individual entrepreneurs under a special tax regime. The State Revenue Committee’s information systems are now integrated with 31 online platforms, a step authorities say should help bring more workers into the formal economy. Participants in the Senate discussion stressed that efforts to reduce shadow employment should combine enforcement measures with policies that encourage voluntary legalization of labor relations. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, proposals to combat the payment of undeclared wages included sectoral agreements on salary levels and requirements for companies to disclose employment structures.
Kazakhstan Faces Landmark Constitutional Referendum
On March 15, citizens will vote in a nationwide referendum on sweeping constitutional amendments that could significantly reshape Kazakhstan’s political system. Kazakhstan’s Constitution has undergone periodic revision since independence, with changes adopted in 1998, 2007, 2011, 2017, 2019, and most recently in 2022, when 56 amendments to the basic law were approved in a national referendum. According to official statements, the proposed draft would affect about 84% of the Constitution, making it the most extensive revision in the country’s modern history. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has described the proposed document as “essentially a new Constitution.” At the same time, the draft retains several core principles. Kazakhstan would continue to be defined as a secular, democratic, unitary state, with the people recognized as the sole source of state power. Attempts to overthrow the constitutional order would remain punishable by law. The draft also proposes the creation of a new representative body, the Kurultai, which would replace the current bicameral parliament, consisting of the Mazhilis (lower house) and the Senate (upper house), with a unicameral legislature. The scale of the proposed reforms has generated significant public attention. The draft Constitution has been widely debated, and the referendum campaign has been accompanied by a large-scale public information effort. Supporters argue that the changes could streamline governance and modernize political institutions, while critics have raised concerns about the concentration of authority and the pace of reform. Rights and Freedoms The current Constitution states that human rights and freedoms must not infringe on the rights of others, the constitutional order, or public morality. The new draft expands this provision, specifying that the exercise of rights and freedoms must not violate the rights or restrict the freedoms of other individuals, undermine the constitutional order, disrupt public order, threaten public health, or contradict societal morality. The document continues to guarantee freedom of speech and prohibit censorship, stating, “Freedom of speech and scientific, technical, and artistic creativity is guaranteed.” It also introduces an additional clause stipulating that the dissemination of information must not infringe upon the honor and dignity of others, public health, or public order. The list of prohibited forms of propaganda is also broadened. It includes advocacy for violent changes to the constitutional order, violations of territorial integrity and sovereignty, threats to national security, incitement to war or armed conflict, and the promotion of social, racial, national, ethnic, or religious superiority or discord, as well as the glorification of cruelty and violence. Supporters of the draft say these provisions are intended to strengthen social stability and national security. However, some observers note that broader restrictions linked to public order or morality may raise questions about how such norms would be interpreted and applied in practice. In family law, the draft specifies that marriage is defined as a voluntary and equal union between a man and a woman, registered by the state in accordance with the law. President and Vice President Proposed changes to the structure of executive power have been among the most widely discussed aspects of the reform. The draft retains the rule that the president is elected for a single seven-year term. It also provides that, with the consent of the Kurultai, the president would appoint ten judges to the Constitutional Court for eight-year terms, six members of the Central Election Commission for five-year terms, and eight members of the Supreme Audit Chamber for five-year terms. If the Kurultai twice refuses to approve these appointments, the president would have the authority to dissolve the legislature. The draft reintroduces the post of vice president, which existed between 1991 and 1996, and was held by Yerik Asanbayev before being abolished. Under the proposed amendments, the vice president would be appointed by the president with the consent of the Kurultai. The vice president’s anticipated duties include representing the country abroad on behalf of the president, serving as the president’s representative in relations with the Kurultai, the government, and other state bodies, and maintaining contacts with public, scientific, and cultural organizations both domestically and internationally. If the Kurultai twice refuses to approve the vice-presidential appointment, the president would again have the right to dissolve it. Proponents argue that the measure could help prevent institutional deadlock, while critics warn it may further strengthen presidential leverage over the legislature. The reintroduction of the vice presidency would also alter the constitutional succession procedure. Currently, if the president leaves office early, his duties are assumed by the chair of the Senate, followed by the chair of the Mazhilis, and then the prime minister. Under the draft, presidential powers would first pass to the vice president. If the vice president is unable to assume the role, authority would transfer to the chair of the Kurultai and subsequently to the prime minister. Unicameral Parliament Legislative authority in Kazakhstan is currently vested in a bicameral parliament comprising the Senate and the Mazhilis. If the amendments are approved, these chambers would be replaced by the Kurultai, a term historically used for assemblies of tribes among Turkic and Mongol peoples. President Tokayev first proposed the creation of a unicameral parliament in September 2025 and suggested the name Kurultai. The proposed body would consist of 145 deputies elected for five-year terms. According to the draft, the Kurultai would serve as the country’s highest legislative authority, responsible for passing laws, reviewing legislation challenged by the president, deciding on matters of war and peace, calling presidential elections, and initiating referendums. It would also approve key state appointments and oversee government activity through reports and votes of no confidence, as well as establish commissions, hold hearings, and monitor budget implementation. Supporters of the unicameral model argue that it could make the legislative process more efficient and responsive. Others caution that removing the upper chamber may reduce institutional checks within the parliamentary system. The draft also provides for the creation of the Kazakhstani People’s Council as a consultative body representing citizens’ interests. It would be tasked with developing recommendations on major areas of domestic policy, strengthening national unity, and promoting national values. The council would also be able to submit draft legislation to the Kurultai and propose national referendums. Correcting Accumulated Imbalances Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev argues that both domestic developments and changes in the international environment are driving the push for constitutional reform. “The 1995 Constitution was adopted during the transition to a market economy and the consolidation of independence. At that time, expectations about globalization and international law were different. Today, international legal norms are under strain, and geopolitical risks are increasing. Some provisions have become outdated and require reassessment. In this sense, the new Constitution reflects an emerging political reality,” he stated. Ashimbayev added that modern societies face competing trends, including what he described as cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and a revival of traditionalist social models on the other. In his view, this creates a need to redefine and institutionalize balanced social principles.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will be discussing a series of major developments across the region, from unusual trade figures linking Afghanistan and Central Asia to the expansion of border fencing and fortifications between two Central Asian states. We also look at the arrest of one country's anti-corruption chief on corruption charges, the suspicious death in custody of a man accused of attempted assassination, and Kazakhstan's shifting position on peacekeeper commitments in the Middle East. The episode also explores Turkmenistan's growing role in assisting foreign evacuations out of Iran, before turning to the main story: the war in Iran and the implications it may have for Central Asia, alongside renewed fighting between Afghanistan and Pakistan in some of the heaviest clashes seen since the U.S. withdrawal. On the show this week: Stephen M. Bland (The Times of Central Asia).
Kazakh Parliament Backs Caspian Green Energy Corridor Linking Central Asia to Europe
Kazakhstan’s Mazhilis, the lower house of parliament, has ratified a strategic partnership agreement with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan on cooperation in green energy production and transmission. The agreement involved the construction of a high-voltage power cable along the seabed of the Caspian Sea. Speaking at a plenary session, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov noted that the document had been signed by the leaders of the three countries in November 2024 on the sidelines of the COP29 climate conference in Baku. According to the minister, the agreement lays the groundwork for one of the most ambitious energy initiatives in the history of independent Kazakhstan. The project involves the creation of a “Green Energy Corridor” designed to facilitate the export of environmentally friendly electricity, as well as green hydrogen and green ammonia, from Central Asian countries to European markets via the Caspian region. A key component of the initiative is the planned installation of a high-voltage direct current underwater cable system across the Caspian Sea. Officials say the project could provide Kazakhstan with direct access to the European Union’s energy market through interconnection with a similar energy infrastructure initiative being considered in the Black Sea region. The initiative reflects a broader effort by Central Asian governments to position the region as a supplier of low-carbon energy to Europe while developing east-west infrastructure that bypasses traditional Russian transit routes. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular, exporting renewable electricity and related products such as green hydrogen could open new markets as global demand for cleaner energy continues to grow. Italian consulting company CESI has begun preparing a feasibility study, which is expected to define the project’s financial model and core technical parameters. The cost of preparing the feasibility study is estimated at around €1 million and will be fully covered by grant funding. The Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have indicated their readiness to allocate up to $2 million in additional support. To coordinate implementation, the Green Corridor Alliance joint venture was established in July 2024. Ownership is divided equally among Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, with each country holding a 33.3% stake. The company is currently overseeing expert consultations and preparing subsequent phases of the project. According to Akkenzhenov, successful implementation would strengthen Kazakhstan’s position in global energy markets. “The project will help position Kazakhstan as a reliable partner in sustainable energy, capable of contributing to international energy corridors and implementing large-scale technological initiatives,” he stated. The initiative is also expected to expand export potential, stimulate the development of new energy technologies, and reinforce Kazakhstan’s role as a regional energy hub. Following the parliamentary debate, the Mazhilis deputies approved the agreement, emphasising its importance for enhancing regional energy security. The project is intended to deepen the interconnection between the power systems of Central Asia and Azerbaijan and create conditions for stable exports of green electricity. At the same time, the initiative highlights the growing role of the Caspian region in emerging energy corridors linking Central Asia with European markets. Alongside transport projects such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, energy infrastructure is increasingly viewed as another pillar of east-west connectivity across the region. Kazakhstan has accelerated the development of renewable energy in recent years. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the country plans to significantly expand hydropower capacity by 2030.
Growing Trade Disputes Test the Eurasian Economic Union
Trade disputes within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are as old as its creation. Restrictions on the import and export of certain goods have long been common practice. However, analysts increasingly warn that tensions have reached a point at which the organization risks losing its core function, ensuring the free movement of goods across borders and maintaining simplified conditions for migrant workers. Mounting Restrictions The EAEU currently comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Economic integration among several post-Soviet states began in 2000 with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2006, but suspended its participation in 2008. The foundation of this organization was the Customs Union agreement, intended to abolish customs duties among member states. The structure of the integration project has since evolved. The EAEU treaty was signed in 2014 and entered into force on January 1, 2015. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not join, while Armenia became a member in 2015. More than two decades after the first integration agreements, however, many of the bloc’s original promises remain only partially fulfilled. Experts have long argued that protectionist measures remain widespread within the bloc and that full freedom of movement for all categories of goods, including strategic products, has not been achieved. They also point to pronounced economic asymmetry: Russia accounts for approximately 85–87% of the union’s combined GDP, whereas Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 9–10%. Russia’s significantly larger population and political influence have further reinforced perceptions of structural imbalance. Moscow is now preparing new regulatory measures affecting its partners. From April 1, 2026, a national system for confirming the arrival of goods will be introduced for road imports from EAEU countries. According to the Russian authorities, shifting key control procedures to the pre-border stage is intended to improve transparency in the administration of indirect taxes. Previously, such checks were conducted after goods entered the country through desk and field audits. At the same time, Russia has intensified selective customs controls on its borders with Kazakhstan and Belarus, officially citing efforts to combat counterfeit goods. Particular scrutiny is being applied to product labelling and accompanying documentation. Controls were tightened last summer, when mobile checkpoints were established along the Kazakh-Russian border, followed by the inspections of vehicles leaving Belarus in the autumn. Full-scale checkpoints are now operating on the Kazakh-Russian border, while a simplified regime linked to the Union State and EAEU agreements continues to apply on the Belarusian-Russian border. Logistics industry representatives report that stricter controls on the Kazakh border have significantly increased transit delivery times. Carriers often face lengthy delays at checkpoints even when their documentation is in order. According to Alexandra Pokumeiko, head of a freight-forwarding department, the changes have created uncertainty in delivery schedules along Belarus-Russia transport corridors and on transit routes through Russia to Kazakhstan. The growing number of administrative restrictions has begun to spill into specific sectors of the economy, triggering retaliatory measures between member states. Escalating Tensions in the Automotive Sector A new dispute has emerged between Kazakhstan and Russia over vehicle recycling fees. On March 10, Kazakhstan announced plans to raise the scrap fee on Russian-made cars, describing the move as a reciprocal response to measures introduced by Moscow. Although the relevant order is yet to be formally signed, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry and Construction, Yersayin Nagaspayev, has stated that the increase would mirror Moscow’s policy. Within Russia, recycling fees on vehicles imported from Kazakhstan have reportedly risen tenfold and are set to increase further under a progressive scale through 2029-2030. Astana argues that the reciprocal step is necessary to support its domestic automotive industry. Nagaspayev emphasised that the value of Russian passenger vehicles accounts for only around 3.7% of Kazakhstan’s car imports, suggesting limited market impact and no expectation of sharp price increases. Meanwhile, Russian media outlets have reported that since spring 2024, more than 30,000 Hyundai, Kia, and Skoda vehicles assembled in Kazakhstan have entered the Russian market within the EAEU framework. Debate Over the Union’s Future The dispute has revived debate in Kazakhstan about the country’s economic gains from EAEU membership and speculation about the bloc’s long-term viability. Olzhas Zhorayev, an expert at the Association for Analysis and Management of Public Policy, argues that the institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Commission complicates the promotion of national interests. According to him, the multinational composition of the bloc's leadership positions sometimes makes dispute resolution difficult and contributes to perceptions that Eurasian integration remains largely declarative. Zhorayev also highlights concerns about the preparedness of some national officials working within integration bodies, suggesting that a limited understanding of economic conditions may reduce the effectiveness of their representation. Economist Arman Beisembayev takes a more critical view, arguing that Kazakhstan derives limited economic benefit from its membership in the union. Beisembayev points to a significant trade imbalance with Russia, noting that Kazakhstan imports substantially more from its northern neighbour than it exports. At the same time, he notes that Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on Russian supplies in sectors such as food and pharmaceuticals. Labour Migration Disputes Russia has also tightened legislation governing labour migration. In January, Kyrgyzstan filed a case with the EAEU Court, arguing that Russia’s refusal to provide compulsory medical insurance to the families of migrant workers violates union agreements guaranteeing access to social protection. In March, however, the court’s Grand Chamber clarified that member states are not required to automatically extend compulsory medical insurance coverage to migrants’ family members. The ruling emphasised the distinction within EAEU agreements between social security provisions and access to medical assistance. Armenia’s Strategic Dilemma Armenia’s shifting foreign policy priorities add another layer of uncertainty to the union’s future. The country’s leadership has repeatedly signalled hesitation between deepening integration with the EAEU amid moves aimed at potentially strengthening ties with the European Union. In the summer of 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan joined an EAEU forum via video link rather than attending in person, prompting speculation in regional media about Yerevan’s commitment to the bloc. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko later suggested that Armenia may have its own reasons for adopting a more critical stance toward the organization. Simultaneous membership in both the EAEU and the European Union is not feasible, meaning Armenia may eventually face a strategic choice. Rising Tensions Ahead of Key Meetings Internal disputes are likely to influence discussions at the upcoming EAEU summit of heads of state in May, as well as during the Russian president’s planned state visit to Kazakhstan, scheduled to coincide with the event. Kazakhstan assumed the rotating chairmanship of the EAEU from January 1, 2026. Recent trade disputes suggest that Astana intends to pursue a more assertive position within the organization rather than simply aligning with Moscow’s policy preferences.
Taken together, these disputes highlight growing contradictions within the EAEU. While the union was designed to remove barriers to trade and labor mobility, member states have increasingly resorted to unilateral restrictions when national economic interests are at stake. The result is a system that formally promotes integration but frequently operates through ad-hoc controls, exemptions, and retaliatory measures.
Whether the EAEU can reconcile these tensions remains uncertain. For countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the union still offers access to a large regional market and simplified migration rules, but recurring trade conflicts and regulatory asymmetries continue to fuel debate about how much members are willing to sacrifice for integration. As the bloc approaches another summit, the question is less about whether disagreements exist and more about how far they can escalate before the mechanisms of the union itself begin to erode.
The Children of Kazakhstan Concept: Reality and Barriers to Implementation
The 2026-2030 Children of Kazakhstan Concept, approved by the Kazakh government, introduces new standards for the protection of children’s rights. The document is largely based on modern international approaches to social policy. However, its implementation may face a number of systemic barriers characteristic of Kazakhstan’s institutional environment. Honest Acknowledgment of Problems The authors of the concept do not attempt to downplay existing challenges. The document openly recognises serious issues in the field of child protection. In 2024, 2,693 crimes against minors were registered. In 2025, the figure stood at 2,603. Of these, nearly 900 cases involved sexual abuse. Particularly alarming is the fact that 60-70% of such crimes are committed by individuals close to the child, including parents, stepfathers, relatives, or neighbours. Another critical issue is the mental health of adolescents. Kazakhstan remains among the countries with high rates of youth suicide. According to psychologists cited in the Kazakh media, over the past two years, approximately 300 suicides among children have been recorded nationwide, while nearly 600 more adolescents have attempted suicide. The scale of the problem is reflected in the workload of the 111 national contact centre. In 2025, the service received 145,000 calls and 121,000 text messages. The high volume of messages sent via QR codes suggests that many children find it psychologically easier to report abuse in writing than in person. The state also acknowledges shortcomings in the healthcare system. Children’s hospitals face shortages of medical equipment, particularly in intensive care units. The situation is most difficult in remote regions, where insufficient equipment can directly affect children’s chances of survival in emergency situations. Another serious concern is the shortage of specialists. Kazakhstan lacks sufficient numbers of child psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. The deficit is particularly acute in regional areas. At the same time, many parents conceal their children’s psychological problems for fear of social stigma, leading to delayed diagnosis and complicating suicide prevention efforts. Staff Shortages Versus High Standards The concept emphasises early prevention. One of its key instruments is a case-management mechanism involving individual support for families and children by trained specialists. The intention is to shift from crisis response to systematic preventive work. However, the implementation of this model faces serious limitations. The main challenge is the acute shortage of personnel and insufficient levels of professional training among specialists in the field. Independent experts point to systemic weaknesses in the training of psychologists. Many public-sector employees lack the qualifications required to work with adolescents experiencing severe psychological distress. In addition, the professions of school psychologist and social pedagogue remain poorly paid. Experienced specialists often move to the private sector, where salaries can be three to four times higher. Digitalization Outpacing Infrastructure The government is placing a significant emphasis on digital tools. One of the flagship initiatives is the FSM Social system, known as the Digital Family Map. The system analyses dozens of socio-economic indicators and is designed to identify families at risk. However, digitalization is currently outpacing infrastructure development. Analysts caution that digital systems cannot substitute for trained social workers and psychologists. A significant urban-rural divide also persists. Many vulnerable families live in remote villages where stable internet access remains limited. Even when the system identifies a child at risk, local support may be unavailable due to the lack of qualified personnel. Access to paediatricians, psychologists, and speech therapists in rural areas remains limited. Despite government incentive programmes, young professionals often leave villages because of challenging working conditions. Blurred Responsibilities Another risk relates to interagency coordination. Several government bodies are involved in implementing the concept, including the ministries of education, healthcare, labour and social protection, internal affairs, and regional administrations. Such a system of collective responsibility can create coordination challenges. Different agencies maintain separate databases and operational procedures, increasing the risk of responsibility being shifted between institutions. This is particularly problematic in complex cases such as preventing juvenile crime or suicide, which require coordinated action by law enforcement, schools, and healthcare providers. Funding remains an additional barrier. Many practical measures under the concept are assigned to local executive authorities. At the same time, funding is expected to come primarily from local budgets within planned expenditure limits. This means that additional allocations from the republican budget may not always be available. Regional budget capacities in Kazakhstan vary significantly: out of twenty regions, only three are net contributors, while the rest depend on subsidies. In such circumstances, many initiatives risk being financed on a residual basis, potentially leading to delays or reduced implementation quality. The system for evaluating performance presents a separate concern. A key indicator of the programme’s success will be the Child Well-Being Index, a composite measure of minors’ quality of life. At the beginning of 2026, the index stood at 61.5 points. By 2030, the authorities aim to increase it to 68 points. However, strict targets may encourage formal compliance rather than substantive improvements. There is a risk of “paper KPIs,” whereby regional authorities focus on improving statistical indicators without achieving meaningful change. Between Strategy and Practice The Children of Kazakhstan Concept for 2030 sets an important and humanitarian direction for social policy development. The document reflects international standards and accurately identifies many existing challenges. However, the practical feasibility of the concept remains uncertain. Its success will depend less on formal digital mechanisms and more on local political will, stronger interagency coordination, and genuine investment in human resources. Without raising the status and salaries of social workers, school psychologists, and child mental-health specialists, achieving the programme’s objectives may prove extremely difficult.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
