Kazakh MP Sarym Proposes Legal Measures Over Social Media Posts on Pipeline Strike

A Kazakhstani lawmaker has proposed criminal liability for social media posts that express support for attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure. During a recent session of the Mazhilis (lower house of parliament), MP Aidos Sarym called for posts endorsing Ukrainian military strikes on oil infrastructure to be examined under existing laws on terrorism and high treason. The proposal follows a November 29 incident in which Ukraine’s armed forces reportedly targeted the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal in Novorossiysk, Russia. The attack damaged the CPC’s VPU-2 offshore loading terminal and temporarily halted operations. Addressing Prosecutor General Berik Asylov and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balaeva, Sarym said the incident had sparked public commentary online that he believes exceeds the boundaries of protected speech. He called for investigations into such posts and suggested they may warrant legal action. “Such actions clearly go beyond the constitutional right to freedom of speech and directly harm national interests,” Sarym said, proposing that the government also launch an information campaign to discourage rhetoric supporting violence against critical infrastructure. The initiative coincides with broader debates in Kazakhstan over how to manage public discourse surrounding the war in Ukraine, amid concerns that expressions of support for either side could have diplomatic implications. Kazakhstan maintains relations with both Ukraine and Russia and has sought to preserve a neutral stance throughout the conflict. Sarym’s remarks were interpreted by some political analysts as a broader signal to members of parliament, following earlier comments by fellow deputy Yermurat Bapi. Bapi had previously characterized Ukrainian strikes on CPC facilities as part of a legitimate military strategy, a position that Sarym suggested could fall under legal review. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov noted that approximately 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports transit through the CPC. While the pipeline includes Russian ownership, most shares belong to companies based in Kazakhstan, Europe, and the U.S., he said, countering claims that the CPC is solely a Russian asset. Kazakhstan is accelerating the repair of the VPU-2 terminal, now aiming for completion by January 2026. The Ministry of National Economy is currently assessing the economic impact of the disruption. Oil and gas analyst Olzhas Baidildinov estimated the production loss at 480,000 tons, equating to about $210 million in revenue over two weeks. He forecast monthly losses exceeding $400 million, including an estimated $150 million shortfall in budgetary revenue. Baidildinov expressed support for Sarym’s proposal, describing it as part of efforts to safeguard internal stability amid external geopolitical uncertainty. The proposal has not yet led to formal legislative action, and no prosecutions have been reported. Further discussion on the issue is expected as part of Kazakhstan’s broader approach to managing public discourse and national security in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Tokayev Meets Emperor Naruhito Ahead of Landmark Japan–Central Asia Summit

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Japan’s Emperor Naruhito in Tokyo on December 18, opening Kazakhstan’s first official presidential visit to Japan ahead of a landmark summit between Japan and all five Central Asian states. Japan’s imperial meetings are ceremonial, but they also signal political warmth and set the tone for high-level talks that follow. According to Nippon.com, Naruhito and Tokayev held a 20-minute meeting at the Imperial Palace before attending an hour-long luncheon with Crown Prince Akishino. The palace discussions included water issues, a long-standing focus of the emperor’s research and public work. Naruhito expressed sympathy over flooding in Kazakhstan last year – described by Tokayev as the “largest natural disaster in the last 80 years” - and raised concerns about water shortages linked to falling water levels in the Caspian Sea. Tokayev told the emperor that Kazakhstan is seeking a comprehensive United Nations approach to water problems. Tokayev’s Japan trip encompasses the first leaders-level “Central Asia + Japan” summit, scheduled for December 19–20 in Tokyo. The format began in 2004 and has operated through ministerial meetings and technical projects, so the move to the heads-of-state level marks a step-change. The summit - chaired by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi - will bring together the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, with bilateral meetings and a business forum taking place on the sidelines. Japan’s government has been seeking stronger economic security and supply chain resilience, and Central Asia sits at the intersection of trade corridors, mineral resources, and infrastructure planning. Japan also plans to create a new framework for cooperation in artificial intelligence with the Central Asian states, using AI in mineral resource development and supply chain construction. This could be included in a joint leaders’ declaration, which is expected to mention infrastructure for transport routes connecting Central Asia and Europe via the Caspian Sea, backed by Japan’s official development assistance. Tokayev’s schedule includes meetings with Japanese business leaders, with major commercial deals tied to energy, renewables, digitalization, mining, and transport worth more than $3.7 billion expected to be finalized, according to Ruslan Zheldibay, press secretary to the Kazakh president. The optics are also important. Kazakhstan has long balanced relations with major powers, and Japan offers a different model of engagement from its larger neighbors. Tokyo’s outreach tends to focus on long-term financing, technology cooperation, and skills development rather than security blocs. That approach gives Central Asian governments another channel for investment and expertise, especially as they pursue energy transition projects and modernize transport routes such as the Middle Corridor. Tokayev’s meeting with Emperor Naruhito offers a high-profile opening to a visit that now moves into summit diplomacy and business negotiations. The Tokyo summit will test whether the upgraded Central Asia + Japan format can deliver concrete outcomes on technology, logistics, and investment, and whether Japan can translate symbolic moments into sustained influence in a region where trade routes and resources are again driving foreign policy.

The Digital Future of Central Asia: Who Is Shaping It, and How?

Digital security is now a key component of most processes in every country. A large share of organizations is moving, or has already moved, their processes online, which requires increased attention and control. Many Central Asian countries are already rolling out AI technologies at the state level. Financial institutions, social systems, crypto services, rental services, and other high-risk areas can no longer develop effectively without biometric identification and AI. Central Asia is gradually developing its own biometric landscape, and if we look at it not as a set of disparate projects but as an emerging infrastructure, it becomes clear that the countries are moving at very different speeds.

Kazakhstan: Leader in Biometrics and Digital Identity in the Region

Kyrgyzstan: State-Led Development of Biometric Systems

Tajikistan: Biometrics Without a Market

The Future of Digital Identity in Central Asia

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Available Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, we're unpacking Turkmenistan's Neutrality Summit, a rare moment where a string of big names quietly rolled into Ashgabat, and where the public messaging mattered just as much as the backroom deals. We'll also cut through the noise on the latest reporting from the Tajik–Afghan border, where misinformation is colliding with real security developments on the ground. From there, we'll take a hard look at the results of Kyrgyzstan's elections, what they actually tell us about where Bishkek is heading next, and what they don't, before examining the looming power rationing now shaping daily life and political pressure in two Central Asian states. And to wrap it up, we're joined by two outstanding experts for a frank conversation on gendered violence in Central Asia: what's changing, what isn't, and why the official statistics may only capture a fraction of the reality. On the show this week: Daryana Gryaznova (Equality Now) Svetlana Dzardanova (Human Rights and Corruption Researcher)

Bishkek to Host Second B5+1 Forum of Central Asia and the U.S.

Kyrgyzstan is preparing to host the second B5+1 Forum of Central Asia and the United States, scheduled for February 4-5, 2026, in Bishkek. On December 12, Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy and Commerce held a joint briefing for ambassadors from Central Asian countries and the United States to outline preparations for the event. The B5+1 platform serves as the business counterpart to the C5+1 diplomatic initiative, which unites the five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – with the United States. Launched by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) under its Improving the Business Environment in Central Asia (IBECA) program, B5+1 is supported by the U.S. Department of State and aims to foster high-level engagement between business leaders and policymakers. The upcoming forum in Bishkek builds on the outcomes of the C5+1 Summit held in Washington on November 6 this year. Its objective is to deepen U.S.-Central Asia economic cooperation and highlight the private sector’s pivotal role in advancing economic reform across the region. The event is co-hosted by CIPE and the Kyrgyz government. According to organizers, the forum’s agenda will focus on key sectors including agriculture, e-commerce, information technology, transport and logistics, tourism, banking, and critical minerals. These thematic areas reflect emerging regional priorities and shared interests in enhancing sustainable growth and economic resilience. The B5+1 Forum aims to create a platform for sustained dialogue between governments and private sector actors, encouraging the development of long-term partnerships and policy coordination. The inaugural B5+1 Forum was held in Almaty in March 2024, and brought together over 250 stakeholders from all five Central Asian countries and the United States. The first event centered on regional cooperation and connectivity, with a strong emphasis on empowering the private sector to support the objectives of the C5+1 Economic and Energy Corridors.

The Contested Legacy of Kazakhstan’s Independence Day: From Sovereignty to Unrest and Reinvention

On December 16, 2025, Kazakhstan marks the 34th anniversary of its independence. The story of this national holiday mirrors the nation’s own complex path toward sovereignty and statehood. A Difficult Legacy On December 16, 1991, Kazakhstan adopted the Law “On State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” officially becoming the last Soviet republic to leave the USSR. The date came at the tail end of the so-called “parade of sovereignties,” when other republics had already declared independence. This delay led to a popular saying: “Kazakhstan turned off the lights in the USSR.” In the early years of independence, the holiday was celebrated widely, often with several days off. Yet the date also evokes painful memories. Just five years earlier, in December 1986, the capital city of Alma-Ata (now Almaty) witnessed what are now known as Jeltoqsan köterılısı - the December Events. On December 16, 1986, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan abruptly dismissed First Secretary Dinmukhamed Konaev and replaced him with Gennady Kolbin, a party official from the Russian city of Ulyanovsk with no ties to the republic. This Moscow-imposed decision sparked protests by students and young people that turned violent. While the full causes and consequences remain partially unexplored, the uprising is widely seen as an early expression of resistance to Soviet central control and the imposition of non-Kazakh leadership. The protests were brutally suppressed. For several days, unrest continued in the city, with some incidents fueled by ethnic tensions. In the years since, the December Events have become symbolic of both state repression and the early stirrings of Kazakh nationalism. Because of the proximity of dates, many citizens continue to conflate the date of independence with the December Events. For years, the national holiday was therefore overshadowed by grief and division. Unrest in the Oil Region Independence Day was further marred in 2011 by violent unrest in the oil-rich Mangistau region after months of unresolved labor disputes. On December 16 of that year, striking workers from the OzenMunaiGas company in the town of Zhanaozen clashed with police after demanding higher wages. The protests escalated into riots, with government buildings, hotels, and vehicles set ablaze. ATMs were looted, and a state of emergency was declared. Official figures state that about 20 people were killed and over 100 were injured. The Zhanaozen tragedy underscored deep socioeconomic disparities, particularly in regions rich in resources but lacking infrastructure and basic services. From Old to New Kazakhstan Over time, Independence Day became closely associated with unrest and national trauma. Analysts suggest that full investigations into the December 1986 and 2011 events were hindered by the political legacy of Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president. Nazarbayev held senior posts during the Soviet period and later presided over the country during the Zhanaozen crackdown. In June 2019, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev succeeded Nazarbayev as president and launched a platform of gradual political reform. However, his efforts were reportedly obstructed by entrenched elites aligned with the Nazarbayev era, often referred to as “Old Kazakhstan.” Public discontent boiled over again in January 2022. Protests that began in Zhanaozen over gas price hikes quickly spread nationwide and were later overtaken by a coordinated attempt to seize power. From January 4 to 7, organized groups attacked state institutions, seizing and burning government buildings, television stations, and Almaty’s airport. The violence left 238 people dead, including 19 law enforcement officers. In response, President Tokayev invoked the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), prompting the deployment of troops from Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Belarus to secure strategic sites. By January 8, order was restored.  Though the unrest occurred in January, the so-called “Qantar” or "Bloody January" remains closely associated in the public mind with Independence Day and the legacy of Old Kazakhstan. A Shift in National Identity In 2024, Kazakhstan’s leadership officially shifted the emphasis of the main state holiday calendar from Independence Day on December 16 to Republic Day on October 25. The latter commemorates the 1990 declaration of sovereignty, seen by many as a more unifying milestone. Republic Day is now marked with a three-day public holiday, while Independence Day has been reduced to a single day off. Analysts view this change as an attempt to reframe the national narrative, away from traumatic anniversaries and toward a more inclusive and forward-looking identity. The repositioning also aligns with Tokayev’s vision of a “New Kazakhstan,” distinct from the contested legacy of the past.

Kazakhstan Turns from Pipelines to Processors

Kazakhstan’s strategic plan for advanced computing represents a diversification of its traditional oil, gas, and transit profile and of the wider national economy. A $2 billion Nvidia-linked initiative now turns on three main elements. First is a national supercomputer using Nvidia H200 chips, with headline AI performance around 2 exaflops. Second is a planned 100 MW data-center campus, designed to expand capacity for commercial users over several years. Third is a “sovereign AI hub” concept that promises long-term chip access for sensitive public-sector workloads. Prior to this package, Kazakhstan had already moved unusually quickly to build high-end AI and computing infrastructure, treating digital capacity as central to its development policy. The national supercomputer is now the most powerful system in Central Asia and is housed in a Tier III state data center intended for use by universities, startups, and corporate tenants. The hardware push accompanies a wider digital policy agenda, including new training programs with Nvidia to expand the country’s AI talent base. Parallel initiatives with the United States seek to anchor Kazakhstan more firmly within Western regulatory and connectivity frameworks, as part of a broader attempt to move beyond hydrocarbons and build domestic capability in computation-heavy activities. Kazakhstan’s New AI Statecraft Astana is presenting the Nvidia package as an economic instrument, not just a hardware upgrade. Senior officials now describe advanced computing as a new pillar of national development, on a par with hydrocarbons and transit. Recent policy statements frame AI and digital infrastructure as central, not a side theme of “innovation” policy. In parallel, the long-running “Digital Kazakhstan” agenda has moved from e-government and broadband roll-out into a second phase where data centers, national platforms, and specialized training come to the foreground. Within that shift, “sovereign AI” is becoming a core organizing idea. Officials and local specialists talk about national language models that can handle Kazakh, Russian, and other regional languages, and about keeping sensitive public-sector data on infrastructure under national jurisdiction. The new supercomputer and the sovereign AI hub are presented as the place where that work will happen at scale: training and serving models for government services, regulatory tasks, and domestic firms, rather than relying entirely on foreign platforms. The Nvidia partnership is therefore framed as a way to secure long-term access to leading chips for these “sovereign” workloads, even as global export rules tighten. The same initiative also underwrites a shift in Kazakhstan’s self-presentation from a “pipeline corridor” to Kazakhstan as a corridor for data and high-end digital services. The government has begun to link the sovereign AI hub and supercomputer to a set of fiber-optic projects across the Caspian that aim to tie Central Asia more tightly into Eurasian data routes. The same geography that once made Kazakhstan a crucial link for oil, gas, and rail freight can now make it a regional conduit for digital traffic and AI-enabled services. Kazakhstan is also using the package to deepen a specific diplomatic track with the United States. Joint announcements and working groups on digital transformation, cybersecurity, and AI skills are now regular features of the C5+1 agenda and related visits. Astana presents advanced computing infrastructure in Kazakhstan not as a purely commercial purchase but as part of a broader political alignment. By stressing transparency, security, and cooperation with Western firms and agencies, Astana is seeking to reassure Washington that high-end hardware on its territory will not become an uncontrolled channel toward Moscow or Beijing. Domestically, the government is beginning to assemble a set of complementary measures. Officials have outlined targeted tax and customs relief for high-tech imports and special regimes for data centers. They intend to provide public funding for AI-related education as mutually reinforcing instruments. President Tokayev has also proposed measures to retain top foreign graduates in sectors such as information technology, to expand the pool of specialists who can actually use the new systems. These steps remain modest by global standards, but they give the Nvidia initiative a clearer policy context: it is not only a prestige project, but a focal point around which Kazakhstan is trying to organize its next phase of digital and economic development. Regional Race for AI Hub Status Kazakhstan is currently the regional leader in physical infrastructure. As mentioned above, its new supercomputer is already the most powerful system in Central Asia and is backed by a state Tier III facility for public, academic, and corporate use. At the same time, foreign partners are financing a Tier IV data center complex in Astana that is aiming for up to 100 megawatts of capacity. Additional sites in the Akmola and Karaganda regions are planned. Together, these projects give Kazakhstan a strong claim to be Central Asia’s main concentration point for advanced computing. Uzbekistan, however, is trying to narrow the gap by presenting itself as the region’s next AI and technology hub. Tashkent has launched a partnership with Nvidia to create an AI Center of Excellence, training programs, and initial infrastructure, including two AI clusters that together are expected to reach about 1 megawatt of capacity by 2026. In parallel, the Karakalpakstan region is being promoted as a tax-free zone for AI and data-center projects, anchored by a 12-megawatt facility under construction by the Saudi firm, DataVolt. At the Central Asian scale, “hub” in this context means something more modest than the global cloud centers in Europe or Southeast Asia. The real contest is over who can offer reliable data-center campuses in the tens of megawatts, tied to improving regional connectivity from the planned Trans-Caspian fiber-optic cable between Aktau and Sumgait to new terrestrial links across the Middle Corridor. By this measure, Kazakhstan is well placed to become the dominant AI and data-center node for Central Asia and parts of the wider Caspian neighborhood. Constraints of Power, Law, People, and Export Controls The first constraint is power. A 100-megawatt data-center campus needs a grid that can feed that load reliably throughout the year. As recent coverage in The Times of Central Asia makes clear, Kazakhstan is still managing recurring power strains and is only now committing to a new generation of baseload projects. Parallel efforts to modernize aging power stations and grid infrastructure are underway with foreign partners, as well as moves to create a unified digital platform for energy-sector management. A second constraint is legal and regulatory depth. Kazakhstan has taken visible steps to build modern commercial frameworks, notably through the Astana International Financial Centre, which was launched with multilateral support as a regional financial hub under English-language common law. But Kazakhstan cannot yet offer the long track record, specialist dispute-resolution practice, or granular data-protection jurisprudence that make Singapore or the Netherlands attractive to global cloud platforms. The most likely tenants for sovereign-AI and high-performance systems in the near term will be state agencies, local banks and telecoms, and a limited set of regional corporates. Human capital is the third piece. Kazakhstan’s leadership has started to treat this as a strategic issue. Recent analysis in TCA has framed human capital and AI as foundations for regional leadership rather than afterthoughts, while more sector-specific analysis has examined how domestic AI projects and training tracks are emerging around the Nvidia partnership. The question is whether these initiatives can expand fast enough, and on competitive terms, to keep specialists from moving to better-paid roles elsewhere. Finally, export-control and sanctions risks remain an important background condition for any Nvidia-based expansion of computing infrastructure, given the tightening U.S. rules on advanced AI hardware since 2022. In Kazakhstan’s case, these issues have been addressed directly through high-level engagement with U.S. counterparts, including understandings around licensing and end-use assurances for high-end Nvidia systems. Continued access nevertheless depends on specific export licenses to secure high-end Nvidia chips under the current regime. Kazakhstan must show both credible end-use controls and a clean separation from sanctioned actors. Any uncertainty could cap the class of Nvidia technology deployed in Kazakhstan. The more clearly Astana can demonstrate transparent governance, verifiable safeguards, and alignment with U.S. and allied security concerns, the more durable its access to top-tier hardware is likely to be. Tests of the Structural Shift The Nvidia-linked package has not appeared from out of nowhere. It comes after several years of policy movement, closely followed by TCA, where Kazakhstan has, in its own language, sought to redefine itself as a regional “digital nexus,” making AI and human capital central to its claim for continued Central Asian leadership. The $2 billion initiative, therefore, represents an attempt to lock in a new pillar of national strategy that integrates advanced computing infrastructure under national jurisdiction, tied to regional data routes across the Caspian. Singapore’s rise as a computing center was the product of a deliberate, multi-decade industrial strategy that fused regulatory predictability with aggressive investment in digital infrastructure. From the early 2000s, policymakers treated data centers as a productivity-enhancing export sector, using the Economic Development Board to attract foreign cloud providers, while the Infocomm Development Authority expanded fiber backbones and subsidized subsea cable landings. Crucially, Singapore’s early and sustained emphasis on rule-of-law institutions, intellectual-property protections, and the reliability of the power system created conditions conducive to large-scale digital investment. Over the years, this combination of institutional depth and physical connectivity enabled the city-state to emerge as a dense, capital-intensive cluster anchoring Southeast Asia’s digital economy. Three practical tests over the next three to five years will indicate whether Kazakhstan succeeds in its structural shift. One test will be how much of the promised 100 megawatts of data-center capacity is actually energized, how many Nvidia-class systems are installed, and how consistently they run. A second test is whether the main users remain state entities and a narrow circle of local firms, making Kazakhstan a national AI node rather than a regional hub. A third test is rule-making and trust, meaning visible progress on data and investment law, and clean export-license decisions. Climate, state leverage, domestic demand, and cost base make Kazakhstan a logical candidate for this type of build-out. A real structural shift will depend on strong political will, a credible future energy mix, serious connectivity, and external trust. The Kazakhstani leadership has held Singapore as an exemplar to emulate since the mid-1990s, usually invoked as an aspirational direction for domestic economic reforms. Bilateral relations are very good and multifarious; President Tokayev undertook a state visit to Singapore in May 2024. Consequently, talk about Kazakhstan emerging as the “next Singapore” should not be directly tied to the Nvidia chip deal. Kazakhstan is on track to consolidate its existing role as the AI data-center leader in Central Asia, with the potential of becoming a key node in global networks. The main bottleneck now is long-haul fiber infrastructure; the so-called TRIPP route through the South Caucasus significantly improves prospects for a new high-capacity digital corridor between Kazakhstan and Europe. A Kazakhstan–Europe backbone route, combining the Caspian and South Caucasus segments, is technically straightforward. Actual capex would depend heavily on routing, landing stations, redundancy, and capacity. Nevertheless, it would likely cost in the mid–hundreds of millions of dollars, a scale Kazakhstan can realistically support as a lead investor within a wider consortium. Singapore’s dense submarine-cable connectivity, specialized finance, and high-trust regulation sets the benchmark for Central Asian states—and others—aspiring to become major digital hubs.

Kazakhstan Yet to Decide on Potential Purchase of LUKOIL Assets

Kazakhstan holds the legal right of first refusal on any potential sale of LUKOIL's assets within its territory, but the authorities have not initiated negotiations to acquire them, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov has said during a recent briefing. In October, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) expanded restrictions affecting Russian energy companies, including certain transactions involving LUKOIL and Rosneft, granting temporary licenses permitting specified transactions and wind-down activities until November 21. The United Kingdom also issued restrictions on October 15. In response, LUKOIL began exploring the sale of its foreign assets, including holdings in Kazakhstan. LUKOIL has maintained a presence in Kazakhstan since 1995. The company currently holds a 13.5% stake in Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (operator of the Karachaganak field), 5% of Tengizchevroil LLP (which develops the Tengiz field), 50% of Turgai Petroleum JSC (Kumkol field operator), and 12.5% of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the primary export route for Kazakh oil. However, several of LUKOIL’s international projects, such as its involvement in Tengiz and Karachaganak, as well as the CPC, have received exemptions from U.S. and UK sanctions. OFAC recently extended a license allowing negotiations and agreements related to the potential sale of LUKOIL International GmbH or other affiliated entities until January 17, 2026. Speaking at the briefing, Minister Akkenzhenov stated that Kazakhstan is not rushing to engage in any asset acquisition discussions. "The deadline has now been extended until mid-January, and we are all awaiting the conclusion of that period and any further developments. The government is not currently negotiating the purchase of these assets," Akkenzhenov said. "However, many companies around the world are interested, and I would like to remind everyone that Kazakhstan has priority rights under the Subsurface Code. We will decide in due course whether to exercise this right." Akkenzhenov also addressed the ongoing arbitration dispute over the Kashagan oil field, the largest in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea. According to the minister, substantive legal proceedings are not expected to begin before the second half of 2026, with a more detailed review likely to follow in 2027. “Currently, the process is limited to collecting documents. It is premature to speculate on potential arbitration amounts, as the court has not yet accepted the case for detailed consideration,” he said. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan’s arbitration claims against the NCOC consortium developing Kashagan, which includes Shell, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, and Eni, exceed $150 billion.